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While Richard Baxter (1615-91) is well known and rightly held in high esteem 
for his practical divinity and his evangelistic zeal, he has hitherto been 
conspicuously neglected as a theologian.  In particular there have been no major 
studies of him with respect to the renewed paradigm of Protestant Scholasticism 
and none at all of his Methodus Theologiae (1681), which represents the fruit of 
a lifetime of theological reflection and study and which is arguably, in both 
scope and vision, one of the last great Summas of English scholastic divinity.  
This thesis focuses on the Methodus and on Baxter‟s theological method, which 
he took, though imperfect, to be the closest to the true Scripture method of 
theology that anyone had yet come.  
Baxter believed that every level of (active) created reality reflected the impress 
of God‟s Triune being in metaphysical composition, structure and activity.  This 
he described, following the Italian metaphysicist Tommaso Campanella, in terms 
of the divine primalities or principles of Power, Wisdom and Love. In the 
Methodus these insights are systematised into a kind of Trinitarian logic.  Baxter 
held that human reason should be sanctified in order to conform to the 
Trinitarian structure of created reality, and therefore espoused a method of 
trichotomising organised according to these same divine principles, derivative of 
both Ramist and Lullist method.  This thesis argues that the whole of Baxter‟s 
mature thought is structured in a Trinitarian fashion according to his own 
„hallowed logic‟ and that two themes, often interlinked, are the key to 
interpreting his thought: the metaphysics of the divine principles and the 
Christian‟s baptismal covenant with the Triune God.  Furthermore it examines 
Baxter‟s analogical ascent from the general vestigia Trinitatis present in the 
whole created order through the special vestigium of man‟s soul fashioned in the 
image of God and finally to the Trinity itself.  This detailed exposition provides 
the basis, in the concluding chapter, for an examination of the whole of the 
Methodus and a demonstration that this represents a methodological unfolding of 
the covenant between the believer and God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the 
threefold Kingdom of Nature, Grace and Glory.  In this way the Methodus may 
vi 
 
be seen as having taken its inspiration from the Theo-Politica (1659) of Baxter‟s 
friend George Lawson. 
Finally this thesis concludes that Baxter‟s thought has pronounced Scotist and 
Nominalist accents.  His Scotism in particular runs deep and has strong ties with 
his Trinitarian thought, which is especially significant in light of the recent 
increasingly vocal discussions of the Scotist character of Protestant 
Scholasticism.  Overall therefore it is suggested that Baxter is a neglected figure 
who deserves to be rediscovered and whose mature theology represents a 
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Near the end of his great apologetic work The Reasons of the Christian Religion 
Richard Baxter lays out on a grand scale his vision for Christian theology: 
There is greater exactness of true logical method in some parts of the 
Scripture, (as e.g. in the Covenant of Faith, the Lord‟s Prayer, and the 
Decalogue) than any is to be found in Aristotle or Cicero; though men 
that understand them not do not observe it.  The particular books of 
Scripture were written at several times, and on several occasions, and not 
as one methodical system, (though the Spirit that indited it, hath made it 
indeed a methodical system, agreeably to its design:) but if you saw the 
doctrines of all this Bible uno intuitu, in a perfect scheme, as it is truly 
intended by the Spirit of God; if you saw all begin the Divine Unity, and 
branch out it self into the Trinity, and thence into the Trinity of Relations 
and Correlations, and thence into the multiplied branches of mercy and 
precepts, and all these accepted and improved in duty and gratitude by 
man, and returned up in love to the blessed Trinity and Unity again, and 
all this in a perfect order, proportion and harmony, you would see the 




The crowning fulfilment of this vision is found in the Methodus Theologiae 
Christianae, published in 1681 but written over a period of years from the end of 
1668.  This work, which Baxter had to publish at his own cost,
2
 has never achieved 
widespread recognition.  In fact even among scholars of the seventeenth century it 
remains little known and even less read. 
                                                 
1
 Richard Baxter, The Reasons of the Christian Religion (London, 1667), 411-2.  For an account of 
Baxter‟s life see Geoffrey Nuttall, Richard Baxter (London: Nelson, 1965); Neil Keeble, „Baxter, 
Richard (1615-1691)‟, in DNB. 
2
 Richard Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (London, 1696), III.190. 
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The reason for this is twofold: firstly, Baxter‟s later editors, while they lauded his 
practical works, conspicuously neglected his technical treatises.
3
  In fact it was 
Baxter‟s misfortune to publish the Methodus at the dawning of the Enlightenment 
when the scholastic method, which had endured for five centuries, was finally 
eclipsed.  Furthermore his own exemplaristic Trinitarian metaphysics, while still 
acceptable in the seventeenth century, was definitely out of fashion by the early 
eighteenth century.
4
  Indeed the eighteenth century was a time of general decline in 
Trinitarian orthodoxy, especially among the non-conformists who were Baxter‟s 
greatest sympathisers.  It is no wonder then that Philip Doddridge, a noted non-
conformist and one of Baxter‟s most prominent eighteenth-century popularisers, 
should have been disappointed in the Methodus, declaring it to be unintelligible.
5
  
Secondly, a widespread prejudice against the entire Protestant Scholastic enterprise 
prevailed from the eighteenth century almost to the end of the twentieth century.  
This prejudice was founded on overtly ideological or confessional readings of the 
period pursued by a number of noted dogmaticians. These propounded the „central 
dogma‟ theory, which regarded post-Reformation Reformed theology as a system 
deductively structured around a variety of central dogmas (most notably 
predestination).  This theory was often correlated with the view that Protestant 
Scholasticism represented a rationalistic degeneration of Reformation theology.  
These ideas were expanded on and propagated widely in the twentieth century and 
quickly established themselves as canonical.
6
 
As is now increasingly recognised, both the central dogma theory and the assumption 
that Protestant Scholastic theology was governed by a rationalist, predestinarian 
                                                 
3
 Carl Trueman, „A Small Step towards Rationalism: The Impact of the Metaphysics of Tommaso 
Campanella on the Theology of Richard Baxter‟, in Carl Trueman and R. Scott Clark (ed.), Protestant 
Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 185. 
4
 For a discussion of exemplaristic metaphysics see Chapter Two. 
5
 Geoffrey Nuttall, Richard Baxter and Philip Doddridge: A Study in Tradition (London, 1951), 17-8. 
6
 For an overview of scholarship on Protestant Scholasticism from the nineteenth century onwards and 
a detailed classification of the different schools of approach see Willem van Asselt and Eef Dekker, 
„Introduction‟, in Willem van Asselt and Eef Dekker (eds.), Reformation and Scholasticism: An 
Ecumenical Enterprise (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2001), 11-43; Richard Muller, 
After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 





  Following the pioneer work of Richard Muller, Willem 
van Asselt, Carl Trueman and Antonie Vos among others, a new paradigm of 
scholarship has emerged.  The claims of these scholars rest on a fundamentally 
revised understanding of the nature of scholasticism, as well as a clear understanding 
of the complex patterns of continuity and discontinuity that run between the three 
foci of the late medieval and Renaissance eras, the Reformation and the era of 
Protestant Scholasticism itself.
8
   
In these terms scholasticism is no longer to be viewed as a philosophy inherently at 
odds with Reformation norms, but rather, following what has emerged as a 
consensus among medievalists, as a value-neutral method of academic discourse.
9
  
Furthermore it is now clear that the movement of Protestant Scholasticism originated 
in the need to place insights of the Reformers within the context of a comprehensive 
and coherent system.  Thus Protestant Scholasticism was in no way a departure from 
the pristine, biblical theology of the Reformers.  Rather it preserved these selfsame 
biblical insights for succeeding generations, giving them new and vital expression in 
ever-changing intellectual and cultural contexts.  For as is often pointed out, without 
the influence of scholastic methodology on Protestantism it is difficult to see how it 
could have retained its intellectual credibility and philosophical coherence in the face 
of renewed Catholic onslaughts in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  In 
this regard we may conclude that Protestant Scholasticism was simply the academic 
wing of that complex process which historians call confessionalisation.
10
 
Richard Baxter, by common consent, was the most scholastic of all the Puritans and 
his Methodus itself the Puritan Summa par excellence.
11
  Yet despite the widespread 
resurgence of interest in Protestant Scholasticism Baxter remains little studied.  
Indeed, there are no full-scale treatments of his thought according to this new 
paradigm.   As Trueman has suggested: 
                                                 
7
 PRRD, 1.123-40. 
8
 Muller, After Calvin, 71-80. 
9
 PRRD, 1.34-7. 
10
 PRRD, 1.27, 44-6, 63. 
11
 Carl Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 
1998), 26, 32. 
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...it is also clear that there is considerable work to be done on the sources 
of Baxter‟s thought.  Whether dealing with his practical works or with his 
controversial writings, any approach which focuses solely upon the 
narrow seventeenth-century English, or even Protestant, context without 
reference to the wider Western tradition will simply not do justice to the 
content and structure of his theology. His use of medieval and 
Renaissance scholastic sources, and, one might add, the relationship 
between his practical and his doctrinal writings, needs to be explored in 
far greater depth than has hitherto been the case... A brief paper such as 
this [on Baxter and Campanella] can, of course, only scratch the surface, 
merely hint at what potential there is in this field, but even so, it should 
by now be clear that Baxter‟s dependence upon a thinker such as 
Campanella for things as basic as general ontology and methodology 
makes it crucial that a full exploration of this aspect of his thought should 
now be undertaken in order to further our understanding of the dynamics 
of English Reformed thought in the mid-seventeenth century.
12
 
Over ten years later such a study is still lacking.  The aim of this thesis is to meet this 
want, by considering in depth the intellectual and theological sources of Baxter‟s 
thought, his especial link to the scholastic heritage of the Western Church and the 
Trinitarian dynamic of his theoretical and practical theology. 
2. Approaching Baxter’s Theology 
In our own approach to Baxter‟s theology we will be aided considerably by those 
pioneers who have gone before.  The start of modern Baxter scholarship is found in 
the nineteenth-century scholar George Fisher.
13
  Fisher particularly admired Baxter‟s 
theological acumen, calling him a „marvel‟ and suggesting that he „gained an 
acuteness, as a metaphysician, which few men have ever attained‟.  We also owe him 
a great debt in pointing to the importance of the Methodus and Catholick Theologie 
as mature expressions of Baxter‟s thought.
14
  For our purposes Fisher is especially 
important for including a brief discussion of Baxter‟s doctrine of the Trinity.  In 
particular he notes the importance of the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and 
Love in grounding both the immanent and transient acts of God and as exemplars for 
                                                 
12
 Trueman, „Small Step‟, 195. 
13
 George Fisher, „The Theology of Richard Baxter‟, Bibliotheca Sacra 9 (1852), 135-69.  For a 
comprehensive review of Baxter scholarship see Hans Boersma, A Hot Pepper Corn: Richard 
Baxter’s Doctrine of Justification in its Seventeenth-Century Context of Controversy (Vancouver, 
B.C.: Regent College Publishing, 2004), 1-24.   
14
 Fisher, „Theology‟, 137-8. 
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the vestigia Trinitatis.  Crucially he also indicates Baxter‟s unwillingness to 
speculate on the connection between the Trinity of Persons and this Trinity of 
Principles, which will be a major aspect of our own discussion.  He rightly locates 
the source of Baxter‟s distinctive doctrine of the Trinity in the exemplaristic thought 
of the Middle Ages and indicates the thoroughness of Baxter‟s Trinitarian method 
saying „Baxter has gone beyond every other writer, in the minuteness with which he 
has carried the system of trichotomy through every form of existence and every 
department of science‟.
15
   
J. I. Packer‟s Redemption and Restoration remains the best and most comprehensive 
work on Baxter‟s theology.  In it Packer investigates Baxter‟s intellectual and 
spiritual heritage, placing him squarely within the Puritan camp and giving a 
fascinating and lucid account of Baxter‟s thoughtworld, which he maintained must 
be grasped for any complete understanding of Baxter‟s theology.
16
  He was therefore 
the first to grapple with Baxter‟s own distinctive method, pointing out its intimate 
connection to the Puritan theory of the unity of all knowledge in the mind of God.  
The primary epistemological axiom of such a theory was that creation embodies a 
rational design – in Baxter‟s terms an „ordo‟ – which can be detected, analysed, 
anatomised and subsequently reproduced through reason.  Method was the key to 
achieving this and Packer notes Baxter‟s particular affinity to Ramist logic in which 
systematic dichotomising was used to yield the elementary principles of the 
universe.
17
  Importantly Packer also draws attention to the Methodus as representing 
the mature fruit, long in gestation, of Baxter‟s methodological endeavours, 
demonstrating the way in which Baxter developed his own method of trichotomising 
as a pattern of logic akin to Ramism but employing threefold rather than twofold 
division.  He traces the specific inspiration for this to Baxter‟s reading of Tommaso 
Campanella, whom Baxter followed in positing Power, Wisdom and Love as 
metaphysical principles informing all of nature and exemplified within God 
himself.
18
  However, while he acknowledges that Baxter viewed his trichotomous 
                                                 
15
 Fisher, „Theology‟, 154-7. 
16
 J. I. Packer, The Redemption and Restoration of Man in the Thought of Richard Baxter: A Study in 
Puritan Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2003), 64. 
17
 Packer, Redemption, 64-76. 
18
 Packer, Redemption, 81-5. 
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logic as entirely scriptural, Packer himself is dismissive, remarking that „the 
marvellous industry which he showed in trichotomizing cannot but impress the 
modern reader as largely wasted effort‟.
19
   
Packer is also the first to have given significant attention to the intellectual sources 
which shaped Baxter‟s thought.  However in emphasising the Puritan nature of his 
thought he tends to downplay its scholastic roots.  Nevertheless, he does draw 
attention to a particular Scotist influence on Baxter‟s thought, seen, for example, in 
Baxter‟s definition of theology as „scientia-affectiva-practica‟ and especially, by his 
own admission, in his voluntarist psychology.
20
  Packer also stresses that, while 
Baxter never lost his appreciation for scholastic subtlety and clarity, he came to fear 
the scholastic presumption to which he himself had fallen prey to in his youth.
21
  
This is important to remember in our own endeavours to elucidate the scholastic 
contours of Baxter‟s thought.  For it should not be forgotten that in everything Baxter 
desired to be scriptural and that Scripture itself was therefore the benchmark of all 
his thought.  Baxter thus emerges as a true Protestant scholastic, willing to criticise 
the medieval scholastics for their departure from biblical theology, yet at the same 
time to make extensive use of their concepts and methodology.
22
  While Packer does 
not use such terminology, he says what amounts to exactly the same thing: that 
Baxter stands out as a truly catholic thinker, gathering up the incomparable riches of 
Scripture, with the entire wealth of tradition, into one comprehensive and methodical 
system of Christian thought.
23
 
Much more could be said about Packer‟s magisterial work.  However its main 
contribution is undoubtedly the thesis that Baxter‟s „political method‟ is the key to 
understanding his whole theology.  By this Packer referred to Baxter‟s use of 
contemporary political categories in expounding his theology and especially his 
application of the governmental triad of Owner, Rector and Benefactor, derived from 
the primary triad of Power, Wisdom and Love.  Through these, and according to 
                                                 
19
 Packer, Redemption, 84, 402. 
20
 Packer, Redemption, 73-4, 86-7, 113-4. 
21
 Packer, Redemption, 74. 
22
 For a comparison see Joel Beeke, „Gisbertus Voetius: Towards a Reformed Marriage of Knowledge 
and Piety‟, in Trueman and Clark (eds.), Protestant Scholasticism, 227-243. 
23
 Packer, Redemption, 10, 395-406. 
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Packer, particularly through God‟s Rectoral role, Baxter came to understand the 
whole of salvation history and to reconfigure redemption, in Grotian terms, as the 
equivalent (rather than identical) satisfaction of God as Rector.  Consequently, 
according to his much vaunted theory of universal redemption, Baxter held that 
Christ suffered the penalty for the sins of the whole world and not only for the elect, 
and that in doing so won the authority, as Rector by redemption as well as creation, 
to issue a new and universal law.  This is the Gospel, promising the gift of Christ‟s 
legal righteousness, and hence salvation, under the condition of what Baxter called 
inherent evangelical righteousness, gained through sincere faith and obedience to the 
terms of the new law.  Controversially this meant that justification was no longer 
simply by faith alone.  Final or sentential justification, that is justification at the last 
judgement, is according to both faith and obedience.
24
  No doubt all these facets of 
Baxter‟s soteriology were well known but it was Packer‟s especial genius to show 
how they all fitted together logically and coherently into the framework of the 
political method.   
In Redemption and Restoration Packer‟s own assessment of this political method, 
while not always uncritical, was certainly measured.  Yet later Packer expressed a 
very different opinion, remarking of Baxter that „as a theologian he was, though 
brilliant, something of a disaster‟, and adding that: 
Thus Baxter, by the initial rationalism of his „political method‟, which 
forced Scripture into an a priori mould, actually sowed the seeds of 
moralism with regard to sin, Arianism with regard to Christ, legalism 
with regard to faith and salvation, and liberalism with regard to 
God…What we see in Baxter is an early stage in the decline, not simply 
of the doctrine of justification among the Puritans, but of the Puritan 
insight into the nature of Christianity as a whole.
25
 
Although Packer deserves to be taken seriously in his recantation it must be said that 
he issues it during the course of a passionate defence of limited atonement and his 
reassessment of Baxter is therefore to some degree ideologically motivated.  For this 
reason, and also because I do not think Packer here takes the scriptural and 
                                                 
24
 Packer, Redemption, 179-263. 
25
 J. I. Packer, A Quest for Godliness: The Puritan Vision of the Christian Life (Wheaton, Illinois: 
Crossway, 1990), 159-60. 
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Trinitarian roots of Baxter‟s political method seriously enough, my own sympathies 
lie entirely with his earlier work. 
Another highly significant study of Baxter‟s soteriology is Hans Boersma‟s A Hot 
Pepper Corn.  Boersma highlights briefly the importance of method to Baxter 
suggesting that Baxter‟s logic, which, like Packer, and others he views as essentially 
Ramist, is a matter worthy of further study.
26
  His main concern, however, is with 
refining Packer‟s account of the political method.  This he describes as a key which 
only unlocks half of Baxter‟s theology – God‟s will as Rector – and leaves 
untouched the other half – God‟s will as Owner.
27
  Instead Boersma regards the 
distinction between God‟s revealed will as Rector and his absolute will as Owner as 
determinative of Baxter‟s thought, arguing convincingly that the high Calvinist 
William Twisse was one of Baxter‟s primary contemporary sources for this.
28
 
Taking up this distinction, which Baxter referred to as a „singular key for opening the 
sence of Scripture‟,
29
 Boersma traces its vital role in every aspect of Baxter‟s 
soteriology.
30
  Furthermore, in providing a detailed context for Baxter‟s soteriology 
he goes well beyond Packer, offering a wealth of references to both Baxter and his 
opponents and thus highlighting very effectively Baxter‟s own distinctive 
contributions.  He is himself very sympathetic to Baxter, using his twofold 
distinction on the one hand to deny the perennial charge that Baxter was a legalist 
and on the other to indicate his similarity to a Roman Catholic and more specifically 
Scotist position.
31
   
On two points however I believe Boersma‟s satisfying study could be extended even 
further.  Firstly, although he acknowledges Baxter‟s character as a Protestant 
scholastic, he does not seek to probe the medieval background of Baxter‟s 
soteriology.  Indeed he suggests that this is unnecessary, since Baxter‟s 
understanding and use of these distinctions is largely refracted through seventeenth-
                                                 
26
 Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 29-30. 
27
 Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 8. 
28
 Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 32, 80-3, 88-9, 331-2. 
29
 Richard Baxter, Universal Redemption of Mankind (London, 1694), 28. 
30
 Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 89, 161, 189-90, 193-7, 235, 254-6, 289, 331-2. 
31





  While this is a fair point, it seems to me that for a full 
understanding of Baxter we must grasp the medieval as well as contemporary context 
of his thought.  Secondly, a more serious shortfall is Boersma‟s neglect of Baxter‟s 
Trinitarian method and the Methodus which birthed it.  My own contention will be 
that Boersma‟s twofold distinction can itself be enfolded within the broader 
Trinitarian movement of Baxter‟s theology.   
Coming after Boersma is Tim Cooper who holds that Baxter in his extreme antipathy 
to antinomianism became a neonomian.  This is by no means a new thesis and can be 
found as early as 1692 in Isaac Chauncy‟s Neonomianism Unmask’d and in modern 
times is represented by Allison‟s Rise of Moralism.
33
  Cooper‟s primary concern is 
with the polemical function of the twofold distinction in God‟s will.  This he 
suggests acts as a buttress against antinomianism allowing Baxter to erect his own 
conditional soteriological system.  Furthermore Cooper argues that at each stage in 
Baxter‟s career his reaction to the threat of antinomianism was determinative of his 
theology.  This position he characterises, following William Lamont, as anti-
antinomianism.
34
  Without doubt Cooper has done us a valuable service in 
contextualising Baxter‟s thought; arguably, however, he fails to penetrate to the true 
heart of Baxter‟s mature theology, which I shall suggest lies in its thoroughgoing 
Trinitarianism.   
In his Claims of Truth Carl Trueman develops an extensive comparison between 
Baxter and John Owen, which although not always to Baxter‟s advantage is certainly 
illuminating.  In no doubt whatsoever about Baxter‟s theological ability, Trueman 
describes his „breathtaking learning‟ and „penetrating philosophical acumen‟, ranking 
him with Owen as among the leading English Protestant scholastics of the 
seventeenth century.  Of the two Trueman holds that Baxter was much the more 
scholastic, describing the Methodus as the „English Puritan work which bears the 
closest resemblance to medieval scholastic antecedents‟ and as „perhaps the greatest 
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application of the medieval quaestio method to the theological task which Puritanism 
produced‟.
35
  This is undoubtedly high praise but it comes with a sting in its tail.  For 
Trueman throughout uses Baxter as something of a foil for Owen‟s doctrines.  He 
therefore consistently represents Baxter‟s theology as a speculative and to a degree 
rationalistic alternative to Owen‟s purer and more biblical theology.
36
   
In an earlier essay Trueman developed this thesis much further, focussing on the link 
between Baxter and Tommaso Campanella, the controversial Renaissance 
philosopher.  Using evidence from Baxter‟s own writings he shows how Baxter came 
to modify the standard Ramist dichotomy into a trichotomy structured around 
Campanella‟s divine primalities of Power, Wisdom and Love.  Campanella held that 
God communicated his threefold being to creation, with the result that his external 
works reflect his internal being and are in accordance with these primalities.  
Trueman argues convincingly that Baxter used these ideas to relate Trinitarian 
metaphysics to the created order and thus to forge his own theological method 
grounded on the vestigia Trinitatis.  For Trueman however this was a negative 
development, marking a distinct shift towards rationalism and bringing the Trinity 
(almost) within the sphere of natural theology.  As he provocatively concludes, 
Baxter‟s Trinitarian doctrine can thus be seen as a „halfway house‟ between John 
Owen‟s and that of the Socinian John Biddle.
37
  Such an opinion is completely 
understandable, but it does not ultimately do justice either to Baxter‟s own 
Trinitarian theology or to his frequent strictures against excessive speculation.  
Nevertheless, in paving the way for future work on Baxter, Trueman‟s own 
illuminating studies are to be warmly applauded. 
3. Purpose, Rationale and Methodology 
It is clear that although significant work has already been done on Baxter much more 
is still required.  While a number of scholars have drawn attention to Baxter‟s own 
distinctive theological method, none have considered its nature in any great detail, 
nor sought to evaluate its significance for our understanding of Baxter.  In this light 
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the primary aim of this thesis will be a detailed study of what I have called Baxter‟s 
„hallowing of logic‟, involving close analysis of his Trinitarian method and its 
application to every sphere of his thought.   
I will demonstrate that the Trinity lies at the heart of Baxter‟s mature thought and of 
his mature theology in each of its scientific, affective and practical dimensions.
38
  In 
particular I will aim to show that the Trinity performs this role theologically 
according to both the scriptural account of the Baptismal Covenant between the 
Christian believer and the Triune God (henceforth the Triune Baptismal Covenant) 
and the metaphysical theory of the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love.  In 
the Methodus these twin poles converge, merging into one unified account in which 
all of Baxter‟s theology may be seen to proceed as a metaphysical elaboration of this 
key scriptural locus.  In scientific terms these convergent Trinitarian ideals shape the 
pattern of Baxter‟s theological method (his hallowed logic) and the global 
architecture of his theology.  In affective and practical terms they enable and 
condition man‟s threefold response of faith, hope and love to the Triune God.   
Here the Triune Baptismal Covenant will be seen as the cardinal doctrine of Baxter‟s 
theology, acting as the hinge between theory and praxis, and so justifying Baxter‟s 
claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is the fount of all theology (both practical and 
theoretical).
39
  Furthermore this scriptural schema channels its own metaphysical 
development according to the traditional doctrine of the vestigia Trinitatis, 
interpreted in terms of the impress of divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love 
on the causal and constitutive fabric of reality.  These metaphysical concepts are of 
primary importance for Baxter‟s theology, ontologically as providing the bridge 
between the immanent and economic Trinity and epistemologically as authorising 
the analogical extension from man‟s threefold soul to God‟s own Triune being.  As 
allowing this two-way traffic between God and man they therefore provide the basis 
for Baxter‟s Ramist-Lullist logic encompassing the whole of created and uncreated 
being, and thus for his Trinitarian account of theology and every field of human 
endeavour. 
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The secondary aim of this thesis is to examine Baxter as a Protestant scholastic.  
Here we will discover that Baxter‟s theology combines key elements from both the 
Scotist and Nominalist schools, in a way which could perhaps be best described as 
„Nominalised Scotism‟.
40
  This is especially significant given the recent, increasingly 
vocal, discussions over the Scotistic character of Protestant Scholasticism and indeed 
of seventeenth-century metaphysics as a whole.
41
  Baxter‟s Trinitarian perspective is 
in fact heavily influenced by his Nominalised Scotism.  Similarly, for Baxter as for 
Scotus, divine love is the „lodestone‟ of his theological vision.
42
 This places the 
beatific embrace of man and the Triune God as the eschatological climax of all 
Baxter‟s theology, a perspective of final causality which is seen to drive the Christian 
life.   
Ultimately it is the coherence of this vision which belies the common caricature of 
Baxter as a kind of brilliant but ultimately muddled eclectic, patching together bits 
and pieces of English practical divinity and scholastic thought into an artificial and 
unwieldy system.  Instead Baxter‟s mature theology will be seen to be a careful 
synthesis of traditional scholastic concepts in the context of a Ramistic and Lullist 
logic and metaphysics, all constrained by his fundamental scriptural concerns and 
governed by his overarching Trinitarianism. 
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Apart from my first chapter on the catechetical roots of Baxter‟s theology and 
theological method I will not in general attempt to locate Puritan antecedents for 
Baxter‟s thought, something already well handled by Packer, Cooper and Boersma.  
This is not to say that their studies have been entirely exhaustive, and certainly not to 
deny the primary importance of Puritan divinity for Baxter‟s spiritual and intellectual 
formation, but simply to suggest that Baxter‟s theology should be seen in as broad a 
perspective as possible.  However I shall attempt where appropriate to highlight the 
biblical inspiration for Baxter‟s thought.  Baxter‟s references to Scripture are 
multitudinous and it is clear this was by far the most important source for his 
theology.  It is notable that, on his own account, his „political method‟ was entirely 
inspired by Scripture and that his Trinitarian metaphysics also has scriptural, as well 
as more conspicuous medieval and Renaissance, origins.
43
   
Furthermore, as my focus will largely be on Baxter‟s Methodus Theologiae as 
representative of his mature thought I will not in general attempt a detailed 
characterisation of his theological development.  Again to some extent this has 
already been done by Packer, Boersma and Cooper and where appropriate I will 
therefore draw on their work.  The one major exception to this will be my survey of 
the development of Baxter‟s Trinitarian political method, where there remains a 
significant lacuna.  For while Baxter‟s early controversies with Arminianism and 
Antinomianism have been thoroughly studied and both William Twisse and Hugo 
Grotius highlighted, and to some degree investigated, as significant influences on his 
theological formation, as of yet almost nothing has been said about the influence of 
Baxter‟s friend George Lawson on the final form of his political method.
44
  This is 
doubly surprising, firstly since Baxter himself ranks Lawson (with Grotius) as the 
chief influence behind the political turn in his theology,
45
 and secondly because in 
his Methodus he holds up Lawson‟s Theo-Politica of 1659 as a paramount exemplar 
                                                 
43
 Baxter, Methodus, I.31. 
44
 Lawson‟s influence on Baxter‟s theology has been duly noted in Packer, Redemption, 84, 207, 216, 
244, 252; Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 38-9; Lamont, Baxter, 117-9, 144, but there has been no 
detailed investigation of this.  For an account of Lawson‟s influence on Baxter‟s politics see Conal 
Condren, George Lawson’s Politica and the English Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 137-42. 
45





  I will therefore argue that the Theo-Politica, which is itself 
structured around the Triune Baptismal Covenant, had a significant influence on the 
development of Baxter‟s Trinitarian political method in theology (as found in its 
mature expression in the Methodus as opposed to the pre-Trinitarian or proto-
Trinitarian political method seen in the Aphorismes and other early works).  
As befits my topic, the main focus of my thesis will be on Baxter‟s explicitly 
theological works and especially his Methodus.  As was made clear above this is 
without doubt Baxter‟s theological Summa, forming an intentional companion piece 
to his even more massive Christian Directory, sometimes described as his ethical 
Summa.
47
  This represents the full-dress exposition of Baxter‟s Trinitarian method as 
well as its subsequent application to all fields of scientific knowledge and to theology 
itself.  To some degree then my thesis will be a commentary on the relevant sections 
of the Methodus.  As far as possible each section will of course be supplemented by 
extensive referencing to a wide range of Baxter‟s other works and especially his 
theological treatises.  However in this thesis I have not referenced Baxter‟s 
voluminous unpublished writings or correspondence.  Indeed the task of relating both 
of these to his intellectual development goes well beyond a single study.
48
   
Although wholly inspired by the method and subject matter of the Methodus, the 
chapters in my thesis will not follow the order found there but rather a different 
Baxterian order – the route of intellectual ascent through the disciplines 
recommended in the Christian Directory.  This begins from exposition of the 
catechism, after which Baxter recommends training in basic logic to be accompanied 
by study of associated disciplines such as grammar and languages as well as biblical 
history.  This is followed by study of ontology, which for Baxter is essentially the 
physics and metaphysics of material and immaterial substances.  Having completed 
this study students return to a more advanced study of logic, now seeking to draw 
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together their logic and metaphysics into one comprehensive system.  Finally they 
turn to the detailed study of theological systems as well as the reading of patristic, 
scholastic and contemporary theologians of all confessions.
49
  What is most notable 
in Baxter‟s scheme, apart from the synthesis of the student‟s intellectual and spiritual 
development, is the comprehensive intellectual ascent through the disciplines to 
theological method and system as the crown of science.  Yet having said this it is 
also clear from his account of this progression that he never intends theology to 
depart from its biblical and catechetical roots. 
It is therefore within this intellectual framework, as seeming particularly appropriate 
given Baxter‟s encyclopaedic tendencies, that I shall give my own exposition of 
Baxter‟s Trinitarian method.  Incidentally my choice to follow a logical rather than 
chronological progression provides a further reason against giving a detailed account 
of Baxter‟s theological development, as well as a further incentive to dig down to the 
sources of his thought.  Beginning at the most basic level in Chapter One I will 
therefore endeavour to show the catechetical roots of Baxter‟s focus on the Triune 
Baptismal Covenant and his Trinitarian conception of theology as scientia-affectiva-
practica.  Building on this, in Chapter Two I will consider the hallowing of Baxter‟s 
logic, by which I mean his conforming of it to the perceived Trinitarian structure of 
reality.  Chapters Three and Four are two parts of a diptych considering respectively 
the general vestigia Trinitatis and the special and highest vestigium of the human 
soul made in the image of God.  The material of these two chapters therefore 
includes the traditional disciplines of physics, metaphysics and psychology as they 
emerge from Baxter‟s comprehensive Trinitarian reformation.  The final two 
chapters are also linked.  Thus in Chapter Five I consider in detail Baxter‟s doctrine 
of the Trinity and its relation to scholastic norms and in Chapter Six the covenantal 
relation of the Triune God to triune man.  My concluding chapter will also be a 
return to the theme of the Triune Baptismal Covenant, seeking to establish this as the 
keystone of all of Baxter‟s theology: that central aspect of his thought by which all 
its other parts are held together and from which they all radiate. 
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Chapter One: Touchstones of Theology 
1. Introduction 
Despite all the attention given to the prominent role of catechising in Baxter‟s 
pioneering Kidderminster ministry, the importance of catechisms in shaping his 
theology has hitherto gone largely unnoticed.
1
  In this chapter our aim will be not 
only to address this question but also to explore the foundational status of catechisms 
in Baxter‟s thought, especially as they are the ground of his theological and 
Trinitarian method.   
In the first section of the chapter we will consider catechising in its post-Reformation 
spiritual and theological context, seeking to show especially how catechisms 
provided the link between basic instruction and more advanced theological reflection 
in the era of Protestant Scholasticism.  This historical background will also provide 
an important context for a brief review of Baxter‟s own catechetical practice in the 
second section. 
In the third and fourth sections we will consider the nature of Baxter‟s catechetical 
theology and its Trinitarian shape respectively.  We will see here that the basis of 
both of these is Baxter‟s conviction that the Triune Baptismal Covenant contains the 
essentials of Scripture and the essence of the Christian religion itself.  Furthermore 
we will also see that catechisms are important in determining the character, content 
and method of Baxter‟s theology, as well as in mediating between basic and more 
advanced theological instruction.   
We shall then turn to consider Baxter‟s definition of theology as scientia-affectiva-
practica concerned with the Kingdom of God, contending that this understanding of 
theology is rooted in both the catechetical process and traditional scholastic 
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categories.  Likewise the characterisation of theology as an affective, practical 
science will illuminate Baxter‟s own Trinitarian method, showing the role of the 
Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Ten Commandments as rules of knowledge, desire and 
practice as well as scriptural Summas.  In their cohering in the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant these will be seen not only as the prototype for a larger theological schema 
(as in other Protestant Scholastic treatises) but also as the connective of theory and 
praxis and the very fount of Baxter‟s Trinitarian method. 
2. Catechising – Historical and Theological Background 
Without doubt catechising played a central role in the Reformation.  Shocked by the 
level of ignorance among the laity, due to what they perceived as centuries of 
Catholic neglect, the Reformers introduced widespread catechetical programmes.  
„Among us‟, Luther claimed, „the catechism has come back into use, by right of 
recovery‟.  Similarly in the preface to his catechism Calvin reminded his readers that 
catechising had been widely practised in the early Church, only disappearing in later 
years.
2
  Indeed catechising aided considerably the rapid spread and consolidation of 
the Lutheran and Reformed faiths.  This was even acknowledged by the Council of 
Trent, who in the preface to their own counter-catechism reminded the faithful that 




In the wake of the Reformation the following centuries were witness to catechetical 
revival on a massive scale.  In England alone from the Reformation to the 
Enlightenment over 600 catechisms were printed.  If European catechisms are 
included, the number runs into the thousands.  The most popular of these English 
catechisms were runaway bestsellers, in some cases running to tens of editions.
4
  
Indeed so prevalent was the practice that at the end of the seventeenth-century 
Archbishop Tillotson could remark that catechising and Foxe‟s Book of Martyrs had 
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been the „two great pillars of the Protestant religion‟.
5
  According to at least one 
contemporary commentator, therefore, catechising was instrumental to the success of 
the English Reformation.  Certainly it became ubiquitous in this period, relevant for 
every kind of person at almost every stage of life.
6
   
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries catechising was regarded almost 
universally as of divine authority and institution and it became commonplace to 
assert patriarchal and Mosaic descent, with some even claiming that God had 
catechised Adam in the Garden of Eden!
7
  In the words of the anonymous E. B., 
catechising „ascendeth to the supremest height of antiquitie‟.
8
  Moving forward 
several millennia, catechising was also regarded as a key feature of Jesus‟ life and 
teaching, the ministry of his Apostles and the subsequent history of the early 
Church.
9
  The claims for a scriptural mandate were bolstered by the presence of 
forms of the Greek root verb katechizo in a number of places in the New Testament.  
For many the etymology of this word, meaning „to echo‟ or „to resound‟, also gave 
important biblical precedent to the new question and answer format of Reformation 
catechisms.
10
   
The popular catechetical tradition of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was 
remarkably uniform and had five main hallmarks: instruction in the essentials of 
Christian faith, deepening understanding of Scripture and Church practice, 
preparation for the Lord‟s Supper, distinguishing true from false doctrine and 
promoting Christian virtue.
11
  Catechisms were intended as the „pure milk‟ of the 
Gospel for those Christian babes not yet able to digest the „strong meat‟ of more 
advanced teaching and were held to contain the „grounds‟ of the Christian faith and 
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its „first principles‟ – those points of faith regarded as absolutely necessary for 
salvation.
12
  In Richard Bernard‟s words it was intended to preserve the „puritie of 
doctrine‟ and to stop men turning like weather-cocks.
13
  Without a catechetical basis 
it was held impossible for the average layman either to understand preaching 
properly or to participate in the sacraments, and a large proportion of catechisms 
were therefore specifically designed to ensure worthy communicating.
14
  Finally, 
moving beyond the sphere of the Church, catechisms were intended to cement social 
relations and encourage the reform of manners.  This may be seen for example in 
Cranmer‟s Catechismus, one of the earliest English vernacular catechisms, which 
advocates „honest conversation of lyuynge‟ coupled with „office and dewtie‟ towards 
God, the King and their respective servants and ministers.
15
 
From the onset of the Reformation the catechism also attained new theological 
prominence.  Thus Luther in his „Greater Catechism‟ remarked that even a doctor of 
theology could never be past his catechism.
16
  Likewise Calvin‟s Institutes itself 
began its life as an extended catechetical essay, even in later editions retaining its 
credal structure.
17
  In the years after the Reformation this catechetical basis of 
theology became established in the common distinction between „popular‟ and 
„scholastic‟ method.
18
  This may be seen as early as Ursinus‟ Doctrinae Christianae 
Compendium, in its division between „catecheticall institution‟ intended for both 
learned and unlearned, a „handling of common places‟ containing a larger 
explanation of each point and „diligent meditation of the Scripture‟ which is 
theology‟s highest degree.
19
  This division became the basis for subsequent 
Reformed prolegomena and can be seen, for example, in the works of Paraeus, 
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  On a more popular level it is apparent in Egerton‟s 
identification of catechisms, common places and commentaries as the staples of 
„divine knowledge‟ for the learned Englishman.
21
 
This hierarchical structure however should not be taken to imply the complete 
isolation of one element from another, for the catechism was the common 
prerequisite for all,
22
  often functioning as the prolegomenon to a larger theological 
system.  A good example of this is provided by Edward Leigh who like Ursinus held 
to a threefold model of „succinct and brief‟ catechetical instruction, „prolix and 
large…scholasticall‟ discussion of common places and the „diligent meditation of 
Scripture‟.  Significantly the prolegomenon to his own scholastic Body of Divinity 
consists of a discussion on catechising from Hebrews 6:1, which leads seamlessly 
into the doctrine of Christ as fundamentum quid and Scripture as fundamentum quo, 
thus establishing the pattern for his entire work.
23
   
As well as acting in a prolegomenal role, a catechetical structure could also be used 
to frame an entire systematic theology.  In this way, as we shall see borne out by 
Baxter himself, there was a significant overlap between the higher level catechisms 
and the more basic theological systems, often making it difficult to distinguish 
between the two.  A good example here is Ussher‟s Body of Divinity, referred to by 
Crawford Gribben as „Puritanism‟s earliest and most important volume of systematic 
theology‟.
24
  Divided into fifty two „heads‟, this gave a systematic coverage of the 
whole of theology entirely through a question and answer format.  True to its 
catechetical roots it also included long expositions of both the Ten Commandments 
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and the Lord‟s Prayer.
25
  Significantly there is also extant a condensation of the 
whole into a much smaller, more manageable catechism.
26
 
Ussher‟s Body of Divinity is also thought to have exerted considerable influence on 
the divines of the Westminster Assembly.
27
  This is illustrative of the important role 
that catechisms often played in shaping authoritative confessional documents.  Such 
a process has long been recognised at work in the formation of the Heidelberg 
Catechism, for it is clear that this draws extensively on the catechisms of Ursinus as 
well as those of a number of other theologians from a range of confessional 
backgrounds.
28
  It is seen even more clearly in the English context of the 
Westminster Catechisms,  which are sourced in Ussher‟s Body of Divinity as well as 




Finally as well as giving birth, or at least acting in the capacity of midwife, to a range 
of confessional standards, catechisms could themselves become the basis for entire 
theological systems.  It was extremely common for theologians to write 
commentaries on standard catechisms, much as medieval theologians had expounded 
Lombard‟s Sentences, which then became systems of theology in their own right.  
This gave rise to what Muller has called „two-level systematic essays‟,  which 
provided the Reformed orthodox with „a methodological tool for developing and 
coordinating their theology at several levels‟.  Such a practice was particularly 
prevalent among the Dutch, who employed Ursinus‟ popular lectures on the 
Heidelberg Catechism as a standard model.  Likewise in seventeenth-century 
England there developed an entire industry of commenting on the Westminster 
Catechism, continuing well into the eighteenth century and even beyond.
30
  One of 
the earliest examples of such a commentary was that of Joseph Alleine, one of 
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Baxter‟s closest friends.  Baxter himself held the Westminster Shorter Catechism in 
the highest regard, referring to it in his Confession as „the best catechism that ever I 
yet saw‟.  Significantly the only possible lack he could find was that the catechism 
was not „more copious‟ concerning the „mysterie of the Trinity‟.
31
  This was 
something he certainly sought to remedy in his own catechisms. 
3. Baxter’s Catechetical Practice 
Richard Baxter‟s catechetical ministry represents one of the high points of the 
Puritan tradition.  Both in his own parish of Kidderminster and much further afield 
Baxter‟s pioneering practice of catechising had a remarkable impact.  Indeed it was 
largely through this ministry, immortalised in his Reformed Pastor, that Baxter 
earned his wider reputation.  As such his pastoral practice is well known and for this 
reason we shall not stay too long in describing it. 
The parish of Kidderminster, as the scene of Baxter‟s earliest and greatest pastoral 
triumphs, was also the testing ground for his catechetical ministry.  In the early years 
of his tenure Baxter neglected catechising in favour of a tireless programme of 
preaching.
32
  This changed however following a visit to London in 1654-5.  It seems 
to have been here that Baxter gained a particular enthusiasm for catechising, perhaps 
through the influence of Archbishop Ussher whom he met during his sojourn and 
later came to regard as his mentor.
33
  Certainly later, in the Reformed Pastor, Baxter 
quotes approvingly a sermon of Ussher‟s before King James I at Wanstead, in which 
Ussher advocated strongly the need for catechising.
34
  However, whether Ussher was 
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the main influence on him or not, we do find Baxter at the end of his London period 
preaching boldly before Cromwell the necessity of a national catechetical ministry.
35
  
On his return from London Baxter immediately began to implement his programme 
of catechising, making it his aim to catechise the whole of his flock every year.  
Together Baxter and his two assistants devoted the best part of two days to this task, 
catechising upwards of fourteen or fifteen families per week, making it just feasible 
to catechise the full complement of all 800 families every year.
36
  All in all it was a 
sterling effort and one for which Baxter justly became widely known far beyond the 
boundaries of Worcestershire. 
As well as starting his own model Kidderminster ministry, Baxter was also involved 
in a number of larger catechetical initiatives.  The most important of these was his 
Worcester Association, a group of ministers of different churchmanship gathered by 
Baxter and united by a common „apprehension‟ of the great need for catechising and 
theological instruction in their parishes. Baxter‟s hope for this movement was 
twofold: firstly to foster wider Christian unity and secondly to set in train a national 
Reformation.  He intended the grounds of this unity to be the catechetical staples of 
the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue as may be seen from the Catechism and 
Articles of agreement that he drew up for the Association.  In these Baxter sets out a 
pattern of Church life and discipline oriented around the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant.
37
  The importance of the Baptismal Covenant can also be seen in the 
Association‟s renewed emphasis on Confirmation.  This Baxter viewed as a 
necessary transitional stage between infant and adult Church membership and came 
to regard as foundational.
38
  Indeed it was his desire for the Baptismal Covenant and 
the Creed in particular to become the grounds of Church unity and comprehension.
39
 
The full grandeur of Baxter‟s catechetical enterprise may be seen in his vision for a 
national Reformation.  Thus in the Reformed Pastor he speaks of the great privilege 
that his fellow ministers have to be the „beginners and awakeners of the nation‟ and 
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suggests that untold millions could be blessed by such a ministry.  His hope is that 
those „yet unborn‟ might one day live to thank them and that through the 
Association‟s ministry a blessed spiritual inheritance might be secured for 
generations to come.
40
  It is clear that Baxter viewed catechising as a kind of 
„missing-link‟ of the Puritan project.  He therefore suggests that all the success of 
previous initiatives for promoting spiritual revival, such as the Parliamentary days of 
national prayer and fasting, were simply a foretaste of what could be achieved 
through a unified and diligent catechising ministry.  This he says is the secret 
ingredient of that universal „discipline‟ so long sought and prayed for.
41
 
It was therefore an enormous frustration to him when the Restoration brought an end 
to his catechising and Association ministry, with the ejections of 1662 finally 
dashing irretrievably the high hopes spelled out in his Reformed Pastor.  We find 
him saying poignantly in the Reliquiae that „since bishops were restored this book is 
useless, and that work not medled with‟.
42
  In these later years his focus therefore 
shifted towards the nurturing of the non-conformist remnant.  In this, as John 
Brouwer suggests, he saw the family unit – the ecclesiola in ecclesia – as forming 
the core of the non-conformist movement.
43
  Likewise, as the preface to the Christian 
Directory reveals, he also came to regard books as his only remaining way of 
preaching.
44
  It is in this context therefore that we should see his writing of the Poor 
Man’s Family Book and the Catechizing of Families, both of which are post-
Restoration works. 
Overall, Baxter‟s catechetical programme clearly transcended the merely individual.  
Instead he pitched his hope on the transformation of Church and Society.
45
  Here we 
see the theo-political dimension of Baxter‟s catechetical endeavour, in his dynamic 
conception of the outworking of the Kingdom of God.  In this the catechism as 
political instrument serves a higher politics in which love is regarded as the soul of 
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the law.  Ultimately then catechising was intended to realise his dream of a „Holy 
Commonwealth‟, or sanctified society, living in covenant with the Triune God.
46
 
4. Baxter’s Catechetical Theology 
4.1. Essentials of the Christian Religion 
Underpinning Baxter‟s catechetical theology was his distinctive conception of the 
relation between Scripture and the catechism.  In particular, Baxter‟s identification of 
the essentials of the Christian religion with the main elements of the catechism meant 
that catechisms came to play a central role in his theological enterprise. 
Baxter regarded the Bible as the supreme, although not the sole, authoritative source 
of doctrine, insisting on its dual divine-human nature.  However this distinction 
between the two natures of Scripture entailed a question of „unspeakable moment‟– 
how we may be sure of the revelation delivered down to us.
47
  Baxter‟s own answer 
to this sceptical enquiry bears some similarity to the „latitudinarian‟ solution to the 
problem found in William Chillingworth and his later followers.
 48
  It relied firstly on 
constructing a secure chain of historical testimony and secondly on drawing out the 
essential, undeniable truths of revelation.  Thus while Baxter believed that every 
word of the Bible spoken by God is infallibly true, he did not think that every truth 
had equal evidence.
49
  This caused him to focus on the essentials, those truths 
particularly relating to Christ, confirmed beyond doubt by great miracles,
50
 and held 
to be necessary for salvation.
51
  For Baxter these essentials were „comprehended in 
the Baptismal Covenant instituted by Christ‟ himself, which he believed to contain 
the covenanting parties, the covenanting benefits and the essential duties of 
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Christianity, all expressed in terms of man‟s union with the Trinity and sealed by 
Christ‟s own promise.
52
   
In the Methodus Baxter formalised the relation between Scripture and the Triune 
Baptismal Covenant under the notion of the threefold Gospel, making a distinction 
between the essentials or integrals of the Christian faith and its mere accidentals.  
Drawing on the Augustinian distinction between signs and things
53
  he described the 
integrals – such as the Trinity, grace and glory – as the objective things of the 
Christian religion, and not simply the words or notions signifying them.
54
  The 
threefold Gospel itself consisted of the Gospel as manifest in its various 
„contractions‟: the Triune Baptismal Covenant as the most contracted form, the three 
„little summaries‟ of the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue as the intermediate 
form, containing the necessary integrals, and the whole Canon of Holy Scripture as 
the most expanded form, containing the lesser non-essential things and accidentals.
55
  
As he put it, „the Scripture is like a man‟s body, where some parts are but for the 
preservation of the rest, and may be maimed without death.  The sence is the soul of 
the Scripture, and the letters but the body, or vehicle.  The doctrine of the Creed, 




Thus the Triune Baptismal Covenant formed the very heart of the Gospel.  This 
Baxter held not simply conceptually, as it was the supreme contraction of Scripture, 
but also historically, describing it as the motivation for the entire witness of the 
Church and the seed of the New Testament itself.
57
  Furthermore the importance 
Baxter attached to the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue as „intermediate‟ 
expressions of the Gospel is highly significant for our study of his theological and 
Trinitarian method. 
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Baxter‟s understanding of the relation between Creed and Triune Baptismal 
Covenant was shaped by his reading of contemporary scholarship.  In particular, he 
derived from Sanford and Parker‟s comprehensive De Descensu Christi the view that 
the Apostles‟ Creed had its origin in the Triune Baptismal Covenant.
58
  This gave 
Baxter the grounds for arguing that the Creed is nothing other than the exposition of 
the three baptismal articles and that its genesis was considerably before the writing of 
the New Testament.  Nevertheless he denied the traditional view that its words had 
been written by the Apostles and instead followed the scholarship of Ussher and 
Vossius, as well as Sanford and Parker, who argued that the words of the Creed were 
not finally fixed until centuries after the Resurrection.  In their view the Creed itself 
developed gradually from the Triune Baptismal formula – „I believe in the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit‟ – out of the need for the Church to have a clear dogmatic 
statement against heretics.
59
  In Sanford and Parker‟s picturesque language, 
reminiscent of Baxter‟s own imagery, the clauses of the Creed were the „splendid 




Baxter‟s engagement with contemporary scholarship indicates that what was 
important to him was not the words of the Creed so much as the authenticity of the 
truths that they contained – another instance of the Augustinian distinction.  In this 
he can be seen as in opposition to those Biblicists, present at the Westminster 
Assembly, who branded the Creed as late and apocryphal and suggested it should be 
discarded as a theological warrant.
61
  Baxter‟s own stance against such biblicism is 
apparent from his role in the 1654-5 Conference to determine the Fundamentals of 
Religion.  In this „ticklish business‟ he found himself opposing the „over-orthodox‟ 
party led by John Owen and Francis Cheynell.  Against them Baxter held that only 
the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue should be offered to Parliament as 
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essentials. For as he summarised it „quoad rem there is no more essential or 
fundamental in religion, but what is contained in our Baptismal Covenant‟ and that 
„quoad verba, I suppose that no particular words in the world are essentials of our 
religion‟.
62
   
Owen and his party, although they respected the Creed,
63
 objected to this as giving 
overly broad terms of subscription encompassing even Catholics and Socinians.  
Instead, „extolling the Holy Scriptures‟, they held „that no man could know God to 
salvation by any other means‟.  For Baxter however this was a subversion of the 
Christian Church and faith, establishing the Scriptures, rather than God their author, 
as the formal object of faith.  Furthermore he welcomed broader terms of 
subscription with open arms as providing the best opportunity for concord.  In his 
own views submitted to the conference he identified the main difference between 
him and Owen as concerning the manner of doctrinal transmission rather than the 
doctrine transmitted.  According to Baxter, Owen held that there could be no 
salvation without Scripture revelation and that there was no possibility of any „co-
ordinate way of revealing Christ‟.  By contrast Baxter held that „the very sum and 
kernel of the Gospel‟ had been „constantly delivered down by Baptism as a collateral 
way distinct from the written Word‟ and, drawing from Ussher, that Creeds and 
catechising had likewise been another important „collateral way of delivering down 
the saving truths of the Gospel‟.  By denying this Owen indeed threatened the faith 
and assurance of many Christians.
64
 
Baxter‟s exchange with Owen indicates the foundational nature of Creeds and 
catechisms in his theology, particularly as summarised in the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant.  It also provides the first intimation of Baxter‟s view that theology could 
and indeed should admit the witness of other collaterals besides Scripture.  The most 
important of these for Baxter were found in Baptism and the Creed which he 
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regarded as co-ordinate streams of revelation of equal authority to Scripture.
65
  
Another very important, if lesser, collateral was seen in the witness of creation 
apprehended by reason.  Baxter‟s theology, as we shall see, was intended to pay 
attention to each of these theological warrants in due proportion to their importance, 
implying that its content must be as much catechetical as scriptural. 
4.2. Theology as Scientia-Affectiva-Practica  
Like many of his predecessors Baxter held to a kind of two-tier view of catechetical 
theology.  The first tier of „popular‟ theology regarded catechisms as a condensed 
body of saving knowledge – the essentials of Christianity – and, as we shall see, 
therefore laid particular stress on the nature of theology as an affective and practical 
discipline, as well as on its habitual character.  The second tier built upon this 
perspective, but was particularly concerned with the role of catechisms as 
methodological paradigms, providing the templates for in-depth theological 
discussion.  Catechetical reflection therefore acted as the nucleus or seed for a more 
rigorous systematic or scholastic theology, providing both the genesis of Baxter‟s 
theology and its fruition as a comprehensive scientific, affective and practical 
discipline. 
For Baxter all theology, whether catechetical or otherwise, began with the 
Augustinian distinction between words and things.  Thus at the beginning of his 
Methodus Baxter says: 
Syllabarum partes sunt literae, verborum syllabae, sententiarum verba, 
orationis sententiae, cuius ORDO et debita compaginatio methodus est.  
ORDO aut RERUM aut verborum et sententiarum est…Quoniam autem 




Words then are the requisite signs of spiritual things.  As he says in his Catechizing 
of Families, „words are signs, by which we are helpt to know the things, and must be 
diligently learned to that end... God worketh on man as man, and we must know by 
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signs, till we know by intuition‟.
67
  Indeed Baxter was only too well aware that 
attention to words alone without reference to things was a recipe for both theological 
disaster and Church division.
68
 
Catechetical theology was thus in the first place intended to teach the distinction 
between words and things on a popular level.
69
  Its domain was the „essentials‟ of the 
Christian religion and Baxter therefore characterises it as the „knowledge of so much 
of theologie as is necessary, to your own duty and salvation‟.
70
  The first task of the 
catechist was therefore to make his catechism as plain as possible and in particular to 
avoid both minutiae and controversies in religion.
71
  The priority was always that the 
people must be taught „very familiarly and plainly, according to their capacities, 
beginning with the plain and necessary things‟.  Catechising was therefore „nothing 
but the choosing out of the few, plain, necessary matters from all the rest and in due 
method or order teaching them to the ignorant‟.
72
   
The second task of a „popular‟ catechetical theology was the effective 
communication of these spiritual truths.  This involved bridging the divide between 
words and things.  For „true wisdom‟ did not lie in storing up a „treasury of words 
and second notions‟ but rather in the knowledge of things themselves.
73
  Baxter was 
particularly concerned about those who „like parrots rest in the utterance of words‟, 
never considering or understanding „the sense, much less the power and practice of 
what their tongues recite‟.
74
  A comprehensive programme of catechising, involving 
repeated reading, memorising, verbalising and reflecting, was thus intended to 
counter any such tendencies and lead to a personal appropriation of divine truths. 
To foster such appropriation as much as possible Baxter held that catechetical 
education should begin in childhood, even before children could fully understand 
what they had been taught.
75
  It was his view that children „can never begin to learn 
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that too soon which they were made and redeemed to learn, and which their whole 
lives must be employed in practising‟.
76
  In order to „bed down‟ these essentials, 
Baxter laid out in the Christian Directory a whole curriculum for a general 
theological education designed not only to ensure complete grounding in the 
catechetical staples but also to enable a gradual ascent in theological complexity.   
This programme begins with the expounding of the Triune Baptismal Covenant „as 
the summ of all that is essential to Christianity‟.  In doing this Baxter suggests that 
parents should help their children to understand the meaning of their baptism in the 
name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, as a covenant made between God and man.  
His reasoning is that this will enable them further to explain the nature of God and 
man as covenant partners, beginning with man as made in the image of God and 
moving on to consider God‟s essential nature and attributes, with such an approach 
opening the way to a full discussion of the history of the relation between God and 
man through the stages of Creation, Fall, Redemption, Sanctification and 
Glorification.
77
   
After gaining an understanding of baptism Baxter suggested that children should be 
taught the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue and have it explained to them that 
these are rules of belief, desire and practice, essential for fulfilling the covenantal 
obligations of faith and obedience.  At this stage they could also begin to learn their 
first catechism and Baxter recommended either his own catechism or those of the 
Westminster Assembly.
78
  Baxter evidently expected the child to be learning his 
catechism at school as well as at home, for the Catechizing of Families was written 
„in hope that family and school-diligence, may do much to keep up true religion‟.
79
 
With this completed, the catechumens were finally ready to graduate to a full 
exposition of each element of the catechism.  These Baxter suggested should be „not 
too large to confound them, nor too brief so as to be hardly understood‟.  For an 
overall summary he recommended Brinsley‟s True Watch, but for more detailed 
explanation he suggested that parents should read aloud to their children the works of 
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William Perkins on the Creed, Dr King on the Lord‟s Prayer and John Dod on the 
Commandments, proceeding one article, one petition and one commandment at a 
time.  At this final stage of catechetical education the catechist should in „familiar 
discourse... open plainly to them one head or article of religion at a time‟.
 80
  It is here 
then that we see the beginning of the transition into a more advanced catechetical 
theology. 
While this programme was designed for children, Baxter certainly did not think that 
catechetical education should cease after childhood or Confirmation. Instead he held 
that the principles learned early in life should continue to form the bedrock of 
Christian piety and practice.  Reflecting in his Reliquiae on his own theological 
development Baxter says „now it is the fundamental doctrines of the catechism, 
which I highliest value, and daily think of, and find most useful to my self and 
others... they are to me as my daily bread and drink.  And as I can speak and write of 
them over and over again; so I had rather read or hear of them, than of any of the 
school niceties, which once so much pleased me‟.
81
  Clearly Baxter would have 
agreed with Luther in his opinion that even a theologian never progresses beyond the 
truths of the catechism! 
At the heart of Baxter‟s catechetical theology is his conviction that belief in Christian 
essentials should translate into an affective and practical faith.  It was axiomatic to 
Baxter that „knowledge and goodness have a communicative nature‟.
82
  This is one 
of the main reasons why his educational curriculum offers repeated and prolonged 
exposure to the essential things themselves.  Baxter‟s hope was that through the 
spiritual power and efficacy of the words as mediating the essentials, catechetical 
truths should become a part of the catechumen, informing every aspect of their being.  
As he writes: 
The essential necessary truths of your religion, must imprint the image of 
God upon your hearts, and must dwell there continually, and you must 
live upon them as your bread, and drink, and daily necessary food. All 
other points must be studied in subserviency to those. All lesser duties 
must be used as the exercise of the love of God or man, and of a humble 
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heavenly mind. The articles of your Creed, and points of catechism, are 




In this we may readily see Baxter‟s fulfilment of Paul‟s injunction „to let the Word of 
Christ dwell in you richly in all wisdom‟.
84
  Catechising itself was this „imprinting‟, 
as it worked iteratively through memorising and reflecting. 
The process of learning, understanding and spiritual transformation which the 
catechism initiated and encouraged thus provided the pattern for Baxter‟s whole 
theological endeavour.  As we have begun to see, for Baxter, theological education 
and formation entailed participation in the dynamic relationship between words and 
things.  Therefore at the opening of his Catechizing of Families he says that true 
religion is a habit and becomes in us a divine nature.
85
  The nature of habits and their 
Trinitarian grounding will be an important concern of later chapters of this thesis.  
For now it is sufficient to define a habit as an indwelling principle of action.  
Through continual exposure to truth catechising was intended to shape a person‟s 
habitual character.  It is such a habitual understanding of theology, shared with many 




In Baxter‟s thought it is impossible to isolate theological method from its affective 
and practical concerns.  To do so would be to violate the whole character of 
theology, for theology deals with living truth and therefore all method must subserve 
this.  His initial counsel to young divinity students in his Christian Directory is 
therefore that „the order of their studies is such as respecteth their whole lives‟ and is 
informed throughout by the principle that „the right intention of our end is antecedent 
to all right use of means‟.
87
  For Baxter there can be no such thing as neutral or 
redundant knowledge.  This he puts very starkly saying „they that would not have 
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children begin with divinity, would have them serve the devil and the flesh.  God 
must be our first and last and all‟.
88
 
It is for this reason that a rigorous training in theological method comes only after the 
student has mastered the catechism and attained a thorough grounding in Scripture 
History.
89
  At this stage Baxter also stresses the necessity of reading „the most plain 
and suitable books of practical divinity‟, a comprehensive list of which he provides 
in the Christian Directory.
90
  His recommendation is to read „as many affectionate 
practical English writers as you can get‟.  At the end of a list of more than sixty of 
these he reiterates this point saying „as many as you can get‟.
91
  As Packer suggests, 
Baxter clearly „has little hope for young ministers who will not steep themselves in 
affectionate practical English writers‟.
92
 
A large part of the purpose of this preliminary grounding in practical divinity was to 
make sure that students did not depart from a scriptural method of theology.  Baxter 
warns against this danger specifically: 
And finally, the truth is, that the sacred Scriptures are now too much 
undervalued, and philosophy much overvalued by many both as to 
evidence and usefulness.  And a few plain certain truths which all our 
catechisms contain, well pressed and practised, would make a better 
Church and Christians, than is now to be found among us all.
93
 
This statement is striking for, as we shall see, much of Baxter‟s own theology draws 
extensively from logic, metaphysics and philosophy.  However this thesis will argue 
that the logical and metaphysical shape of Baxter‟s thought is conditioned throughout 
by both Scripture and especially these „few plain certain truths‟ of the catechism.  
We may see this on a preliminary level from the fact that it is only once the 
catechism and Scripture are truly mastered and understood, and their spiritual truth 
properly digested, that the student can progress in sequence to other important 
                                                 
88
 Baxter, CD, III.917. 
89
 Baxter, CD, III.918-20. 
90
 Baxter, CD, III.918, 922. 
91
 Baxter, CD, III.922. 
92
 Packer, Quest, 49. 
93





  Indeed for Baxter, as will appear in the course of this study, the 
understanding and systematising of these other disciplines often builds upon the 
basic truths learned in catechising. 
Divinity proper comes last in Baxter‟s suggested order of studies, for he did not want 
students to embark in studies of theological systems and methods before they were 
properly prepared and spiritually mature.  He may have also hoped that by studying 
other disciplines first students would gain a better theoretical and practical awareness 
of the vital distinction between signs and things.  Whatever the reason, Baxter 
advises his students that „when you come to divinity, I am not for their way that 
would have you begin with the Fathers, and thence form a body of divinity to 
yourselves‟.  To his mind this would simply be to invite confusion and error, as well 
as the proliferation of individualised theologies.
95
  As he says: 
And in good sadness, can you that have read both, believe that the 
writings of the Fathers are as methodical, as accurate, as sound, as full, as 
useful to form a true body of theology in the mind, as the later writers 
are?  Can you believe this?  Is there any thing among them to these uses, 
like Melancthon‟s Loci Communes, Tzegedines Tables, Calvin‟s Inst. 
Polanus, Ludov. Crocius, Georgius Sohnius, Amesius, Theses 
Salmuenses, Synops. Theol. Leidensium, Camero, etc.  Or if you had 
rather like Arminius, Episcopius, Dr Hammond, especially like Bishop 
Andrews, Dr Field, Bishop Davenant, etc.
96
   
This is not to say that Baxter was hostile to patristic theology; indeed his own works 
bear testimony to a critical appreciation of it.  Rather he did not think it appropriate 
for a theological novice and especially one who had only just grasped the basic 
rudiments of the Christian faith. 
For this reason Baxter quickly draws his readers‟ attention away from the Fathers to 
contemporary theology, which he eulogises as „incomparably more methodical, 
judicious, full, clear, and excellently fitted also by application, to the good of souls, 
than any that are known to us since the writing of the sacred Scriptures‟.  His advice 
is that the young theological student should begin with a „conjunction of English 
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Catechisms, and the Confessions of all the Churches, and the practical holy writings 
of our English divines‟.  These, he says, not only contain the principles of the 
Christian religion „but do press them in so warm a working manner as is likest to 
bring them to the heart‟.
97
  Having assembled „six or seven of the most judicious 
catechisms‟ and all the „Confessions of the churches‟, Baxter‟s recommendation is to 
„compare them well together‟.
98
  His purpose in doing this, we may presume, was 
primarily for students to gain an appreciation of the fundamental doctrines and their 
usual orderings.  With this complete Baxter advises to „read over three or four of the 
soundest systemes of divinity‟ and then proceed via „some larger theses‟ to the „study 
of the clearest and exactest methodists‟.
99
  As a means of transition from catechetical 
theology to systematic he recommends particularly Ames‟s Marrow of Theology as a 
first port of call.
100
 
Underlying Baxter‟s consideration of catechisms as shaping and patterning affective 
divinity was his conviction that they form the proper template for all true theological 
method.  Catechetical theology is thus not only prolegomenal in nature, but also 
wholly integral to Baxter‟s systematic theology.  This is because catechisms follow a 
scriptural method in the unfolding of theological truth.  In its essentials he held that 
this „most beautiful and regulating method‟ of Scripture was that of the Triune 
Baptismal Covenant, consisting simply of expositions of the Creed, the Lord‟s Prayer 
and the Decalogue.  Through this method he thought that words might be properly 
conformed to things and the pattern of divine wisdom manifested without any 
impediment. Compared to this Baxter dismissed the „logical systems of philosophers‟ 
and the most part of metaphysical systems as mere „childish trifles‟,  holding that 
„whoever has learned or taught rightly Baptism, the Creed, the Lord‟s Prayer and 
Decalogue learns or teaches the true and necessary method of theology‟.
101
 
Baxter also suggests that this method should be combined with further elucidations 
of Christ, the special laws and the sacraments and be expounded by a „political 
method‟ in the context of the institution, constitution and administration of the 
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Kingdom of God.  It is because of this fidelity both to Scripture and to a „political 
hermeneutic‟ that Baxter privileges „our more common catechisms‟ above every 
other attempt at systematic theology known to him, with the sole exception of 
George Lawson‟s Theo-Politica, a work which he saw as the most refined expression 
of the scriptural and political method in theology.
102
  We shall return to Lawson and 
his influence on Baxter‟s „political method‟ in Chapter Two.  For our purposes here, 
what is more important is the vital role that catechisms can be seen to have played in 
forming Baxter‟s theo-political as well as his Trinitarian method. 
Baxter‟s final piece of advice to students in the Christian Directory is instructive and 
particularly demonstrates the practical, affective and methodological impulses that he 
thought should condition all theology: 
And think not that you well understand divinity, till 1. you know it as 
methodized and joynted in a due-scheme, and the several parts of it in 
their several schemes, seeing you know not the beauty nor the true sense 
of things, if you know them not in their proper places, where they stand 
in their several respects to other points.  And 2. till it be wrought into 
your very hearts, and digested into a holy nature: For when all is done, it 
is only a holy and heavenly life, that will prove you wise, and make you 
happy and give you solid peace and comfort.
103
 
Here again we see the connection between method and the habitual nature of true 
theology, with the in-forming of a holy nature as the summit of the Christian 
theological enterprise. 
The habitual, affective, practical and methodological character of Baxter‟s 
catechetical theology, along with its political concern, are significantly all combined 
in his discussion of the nature of theology in the first chapter of the Methodus.  Here 
he defines theology as „scientia-affectiva practica de Regno Dei super hominibus‟.
104
  
Leaving aside, for the moment, its political dimension, it is clear that this definition 
combines harmoniously into one a number of significant scholastic accounts of the 
nature of theology. 
                                                 
102
 Baxter, Methodus, „Praefatio‟. 
103
 Baxter, CD, III.920. 
104
 Baxter, Methodus, I.3.  See also Baxter, Confession, 14. 
38 
 
The debate over the genus of theology in both the medieval and Protestant Scholastic 
age was highly complex.  Broadly speaking however it concerned two related 
questions: to which of the five Aristotelian genera (intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, 
prudentia or ars) theology should be assigned and whether it should be considered as 
theoretical, practical or affective in character.  Aquinas famously held that theology 
was the highest theoretical science, receiving its principles directly from God 
himself.
105
  However while Scotus allowed that theology was a science in a qualified 
manner, he argued that it was not primarily theoretical – associated with pure 
beholding and enjoyment of God – but rather practical – directed towards a goal 
beyond itself which is salvation and the love of God.
106
  Other Franciscans and 
especially the Augustinians viewed theology as affective, directed to neither theory 
nor praxis but rather to love itself.
107
  One of the most famous exponents of this 
position was Jean Gerson, the great catechist and pastoral theologian, who held that 
„theologia est scientia-affectiva non speculativa‟.
 108
 
Baxter of course was well aware of these various scholastic discussions, with his 
own definition of theology significantly combining the three scholastic definitions 
into one.  However Baxter‟s emphasis was decidedly on the affective and practical 
nature of theology.
109
  Indeed in his Methodus he specifically downplays the 
speculative or theoretical character of theology, suggesting that it can be held so only 
equivocally.
110
  This was a common position among the Protestant scholastics, who 
here tended to follow a broadly Scotist line.
111
  It seems therefore that the most likely 
sources for Baxter‟s definition of theology as scientia-affectiva-practica may be 
found in Gerson‟s description of theology as scientia-affectiva non speculativa 
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(echoed in Hammond‟s Practical Catechism which Baxter greatly admired)
112
 and 
Scotus‟ understanding of its thoroughly practical character.  Furthermore, 
significantly for the understanding of Baxter‟s theological method that we shall 
develop in Chapter Two, this practical orientation of theology also accords well with 
the Ramist definition of theology as the „art of living well‟.
113
  Overall, then, 
Baxter‟s catechetical understanding of theology as an affective and practical science 
not only dovetails neatly with scholastic (and specifically Augustinian and Scotist) 
views, but also provides the dynamic for the whole of his theological system in the 
Methodus. 
5. Trinitarian Catechetical Theology 
Baxter‟s understanding of theology as scientia-affectiva-practica derives from a very 
particular Trinitarian worldview, the nature of which will occupy much of our 
attention in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  Here we shall only seek to indicate its 
importance for Baxter‟s catechetical enterprise as well as some of its general 
features.  In the Methodus Baxter highlights the una-trina nature of theology, 
pointing out its analogy with the motive, illuminative and calefactive virtue of fire 
and the triune form of the human soul.  This latter is particularly important, for 
Baxter holds that theology as scientia-affectiva practica is adapted to the perfection 
of the human intellect, will and praxis.
114
 Furthermore, as we shall see, true theology 
seeks as far as possible faithfully to reflect God‟s Triune being in both its structure 
and content. 
In relating to the speculative, affective and practical dimensions of human experience 
theology seeks to be entirely comprehensive, concerning the „whole man‟ in his 
relation to God.  This principle acts as the ground of much of Baxter‟s catechetical 
theology.  For it is axiomatic to him that „as the soul‟s essential form is the virtue of 
vital action, understanding and will conjunct, so holiness is holy life, light and love 
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  It is therefore as truth is contemplated, desired and enacted that we 
become perfected in its likeness.  In this idea, as we saw above, lie the habitual roots 
of true theology.  Another foundational principle of Baxter‟s theology is that God‟s 
being can be understood through analogy with our own.
116
  This means that the 
„natural‟ trinity of action, understanding and will (or life, light and love) seen in man 
mirrors the divine primalities of Power, Wisdom and Love which are essentially in 
God.
117
   
We shall consider the primalities more in subsequent chapters; their immediate 
importance to us is in their role in Baxter‟s catechetical theology.  This may be seen 
even from his „Shortest Catechism.  Here, after statements of the Baptismal 
Covenant, Apostles‟ Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Ten Commandments, Baxter gives an 
„explained profession‟ of the Christian religion: 
I believe that there is one GOD; an infinite Spirit of life, understanding 
and will; perfectly powerful, wise and good; the Father, the Word and the 
Spirit; the Creator, Governor and End of all things; our absolute Owner, 
our most just Ruler, and our most gracious Benefactor, and most amiable 
good. 
In the second article Baxter continues in a similar vein saying: „I believe that man 
being made in the image of God, [is] an imbodied spirit of life, understanding and 
will, with holy vivacity, wisdom and love, to know, and love, and serve his Creator, 
here and for ever...‟  Significantly, from these twin perspectives he goes on to unfold 
the whole drama of sin and redemption.
118
   
In his „Short Catechism‟ of the same work Baxter expands on these Triune 
conceptions of God and man, incorporating a lengthy gloss on each article of his 
profession.  His discussion here is surprisingly technical, including a detailed and 
systematic discussion of God‟s Unity and Triunity, his essence, his internal and 
external attributes and finally his relations, and his ordering of topics demonstrates a 
strong concern that theology must be dealt with in a methodical manner.  As he says 
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of the attributes, they „must not be cast together into a heap‟.
119
  The whole pattern of 
discussion demonstrates the Trinity as the main focus of his thought.  So for example 
he organises his treatment of God‟s relations with man around the three primalities.  
This leads onto a „governmental‟ Trinity of Owner, Rector and Benefactor 
corresponding respectively to God‟s exercise of his Power, Wisdom and Love. As 
we shall see in Chapter Six this triad is of particular importance for understanding 
Baxter‟s soteriology.  It is also the source of his political method and closely related 
to Boersma‟s discussion of God‟s twofold will.  For our purposes here however it 
reveals once more an important link between a catechetical and political conception 
of the nature of theology. 
Baxter‟s entire discussion of God and the nature of God‟s Triunity in his „Short 
Catechism‟ is highly abstract and much more suited to a sophisticated systematic 
theology.  It is in fact probably unique among catechisms in the technicality of its 
language and its employment of natural categories.
120
  This is especially remarkable 
considering his intended audience of poor families!  Even an advanced catechetical 
theology such as Watson‟s Body of Divinity gives a much simpler discussion of the 
Trinity, focussing on the persons of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and not 
attempting to give any explanation of their subsistence in one unified essence.
121
  It is 
also unusual to devote so much attention to natural theology in a catechism and 
especially to give natural considerations – such as the primalities of Power, Wisdom 
and Love – so much theological weight.
122
  Baxter assumes the complete harmony of 
natural and scriptural revelation, suggesting that Scripture like nature also bears the 
inherent stamp of the divine primalities.
123
  This gives his theology an important dual 
aspect, placing its development within both a Scriptural and a natural dynamic, 
something which we shall see is particularly important for his metaphysical thought. 
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Baxter‟s „Short Catechism‟ is therefore important for illustrating just how much 
overlap he considered there to be between catechetical and systematic theology.  
Unlike most of his contemporaries, Baxter entirely blurs the distinction by giving 
standard catechetical fare advanced metaphysical treatment.  In developing these 
ideas Baxter goes on to relate the Trinitarian categories of his own theology to the 
high drama of man‟s salvation, in this way clearly demonstrating the nature of 
theology as scientia-affectiva-practica – expressing the knowledge, affection and 
practice which he regards as the true pattern of faith.   
Baxter achieved this goal through a subtle use of the standard catechetical template 
of the Apostles‟ Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Ten Commandments.  In his Christian 
Directory Baxter gives the following direction for parents in catechising their 
children: 
When you have opened the Baptismal Covenant to them, and the 
essentials of Christianity, cause them to learn the Creed, the Lords Prayer 
and the Ten Commandments.  And tell them the uses of them; that man 
having three powers of soul, his understanding, his will, and his 
obediential or executive power, all these must be sanctified, and therefore 
there must be a rule for each. And that accordingly the Creed is the 
summary rule to tell us what our understandings must believe, and the 
Lords Prayer is the summary rule to direct us what our wills must desire, 
and our tongues must ask, and the Ten Commandments is the summary 
rule of our practice.
124
 
What is especially interesting here is that the three „powers of the soul‟ are portrayed 
as the basis of the three catechetical staples.  This is because Baxter makes the 
assumption that the sanctification of each „power‟ entails a corresponding and 
summary rule.  The catechism, as a living text explaining these three „rules‟ and their 
implications, is thus perfectly designed for the sanctification and perfection of the 
„whole man‟. 
Later in the same work Baxter grounds his catechetical theology even more firmly on 
the bedrock of Trinitarian faith.  Exploring the nature of the covenant Baxter says 
that it contains true things, good things and practical things.  These he says are the 
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credenda, diligenda and eligenda (or more usually agenda) of faith.
125
  These were 
not terms coined by Baxter but derived from Augustine‟s Enchiridion where the 
theological virtues of faith, hope and love are prominently linked to the catechetical 
pattern of the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue.
126
  By the seventeenth century 
the terms were theological commonplaces.  A version of them can be found, for 
example, in Leigh‟s Body of Divinity where they are once again linked to this 
catechetical pattern.
127
   
The distinctiveness of Baxter‟s conception of these categories can be seen in their 
role as Trinitarian correlates.  Baxter says that the object of the credenda is nothing 
other than the Holy Trinity, known and believed in as God the Father, Christ the 
Saviour and the Holy Spirit the Sanctifier.  The diligenda he summarises succinctly 
as „the same three persons in these three relations as good in themselves and unto us, 
which includeth the grand benefits, of reconciliation and adoption, justification and 
sanctification, and salvation‟.  Finally he suggests that the agenda in the context of 
baptism are the „actual dedition‟ of ourselves to Father, Son and Holy Spirit, coupled 
with the promise to „faithfully endeavour‟ to live a creative, reconciled and sanctified 
life according to these relations.  He then reminds his reader that „the Creed is a 
larger explication of the credenda, and the Lords Prayer of the diligenda... and the 
Decalogue of the natural part of the agenda‟.
128
  Furthermore in his Reasons Baxter 
explicitly links the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue not only to the Trinity but 
also to the theological graces of faith, hope and love.
129
  In this we have a link to 
both the Augustinian and the Scotist tradition.  For the Scotist understanding of 
theology as practical was often directed to faith, hope and love as the highest goal.
130
  
This is but the first of many connections which we shall have occasion to note 
between Baxter‟s Scotism and his Trinitarian thought.  Fascinatingly this link is here 
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5. The Centrality of the Triune Baptismal Covenant 
In this chapter we have considered in detail Baxter‟s catechetical theology, seeking 
to place it in its wider historical and theological context.  What has emerged from 
this discussion is Baxter‟s central focus on the Triune Baptismal Covenant as 
containing the essentials of the Christian faith.  Following contemporary scholarship, 
Baxter believed this to be the origin of the Apostles‟ Creed.  This view he integrated 
into his own account of the threefold Gospel, placing the Triune Baptismal Covenant 
at the heart of Scripture as it was already at the heart of the catechism.  This showed 
his conviction that man‟s covenant with the Triune God was the most important 
aspect of the Christian life.  At Baptism and Confirmation the Christian affirmed his 
intellectual assent, willing consent and practical obligation to Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit through the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Ten Commandments respectively and in 
doing so entered into relationship with the Triune God. 
As the source of Baxter‟s catechetical theology the Triune Baptismal Covenant also 
gave his theology its character as scientia-affectiva-practica concerned with the 
Kingdom of God among men.  It is in fact scientia as it affirms the truth of the 
Creed, affectiva as it expresses the heart-consent of the Lord‟s Prayer and practica as 
it demonstrates the practical obligations of the Decalogue.  It is all three of these 
together and at once as it expresses the Trinitarian nature of the Kingdom of God.  In 
this definition therefore we have the first intimations of a Trinitarian structure to 
Baxter‟s theology.  Furthermore we have seen that this definition deftly combines a 
number of scholastic accounts of the genus of theology into one.  Its Scotist 
accenting, however, clearly suggests the character of theology as faith, hope and love 
directed towards the Triune God. 
From his Catechizing of Families to his Methodus, indeed across the full spectrum of 
his mature theological writing, Baxter affirms the truth that „the doctrine of the 
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Trinity in Unity is the very summ of all the Christian Religion, as the Baptismal 
Covenant assureth us‟.
132
  In the following chapters of this thesis we will seek to 
demonstrate in some detail exactly how the Trinity can be said to underpin the 
logical, metaphysical, physical, psychological and political aspects of his theology, 
and thus provide full proof for this claim.  By its very nature this task will necessitate 
a close engagement with Baxter‟s more theoretical treatises. However in doing so we 
must never forget that for Baxter the Trinity is the fount of all Christian praxis and 
affections as well as all Christian doctrine.  
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Chapter Two: The Quest for Method 
1. Introduction 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were characterised by an extraordinary 
„exaltation of method‟.
1
  Although method had played a role in both classical and 
medieval discussions it had never before gained such prominence.
2
  In theology the 
question of method therefore attained paramount importance, leading to a focus on 
both the micro- and macro-structure of theological discourse unrivalled since the 
heyday of scholasticism.  A natural consequence of this was a renewed focus on 
logic and its competency in theological matters.  Such a logical and methodological 
turn was in Protestant circles a perhaps inevitable result of the internal pressures of 
systematisation and the external pressures of polemic, and an integral part of that 
process of self-definition called confessionalisation.  Certainly it rendered utterly 
untenable the extreme (and undoubtedly polemical) position of Luther that all 
syllogisms should be excised from theology.
3
   
Yet while the century after Luther witnessed a notable resurgence of scholastic logic 
and methodology, Reformed theologians also drew extensively from non-scholastic 
or even anti-scholastic sources.  Furthermore, following the Reformation principle of 
sola scriptura, they were particularly concerned that their logical argumentation 
should be faithful to Scripture.  An early and prominent example of this may be 
found in the De Verbo Dei Scripto (1580) of Antoine de la Roche Chandieu which 
criticised the unscriptural logic of the medieval scholastics, holding that logic must 
be subordinated to Scripture and must draw all of its precepts from Scripture alone.
4
  
Likewise through their departure from exclusively syllogistic reasoning and their 
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embracing of aspects of Renaissance method, the logic of even the most ardent 
Aristotelians can generally be seen to represent a refinement of that to be found in 
their medieval predecessors.
5
  Very generally therefore, both in content and 
methodology, we are already justified in speaking of a sanctifying of logic among 
Baxter‟s Protestant Scholastic forebears. 
For Baxter, elaborating a theological method in the seventeenth century, there were, 
broadly speaking, three options available: Aristotelian, Ramist and Lullist.
6
  
Strikingly, in his quest for method Baxter seems to have drawn inspiration from all 
three, although principally from the Ramist and Lullist schools.  In the second 
section of this chapter we shall therefore consider both of these in detail as well as 
the theo-political method of Baxter‟s friend George Lawson, which we shall see is of 
particular relevance.  This will lead into the third section where we shall discuss 
Baxter‟s response to scholastic and Ramist logic specifically, as a prelude to an 
account of his own refining of logic. 
In the fourth section we shall consider Baxter‟s own distinctive „hallowing of logic‟ 
as it is grounded on both the Triune Baptismal Covenant and the vestigia Trinitatis.  
Here we shall suggest that Baxter‟s logic has a particular affinity both to Lullist 
Trinitarian exemplarism and to Lawson‟s Trinitarian theo-politics.  Finally in the 
fifth section we shall consider Baxter‟s logic from the Methodus, showing how his 
Trinitarian construal of ordo marks the centrepiece of his hallowed logic. 
2. The Exaltation of Method 
2.1. Ramist Logic 
The roots of Protestant Scholastic method can be traced back not only to Aristotle 
and his medieval scholastic successors but also to the topical logic laid out by 
Rudolph Agricola in his De Inventione Dialectica of 1479.  As is widely recognised 
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this had a profound influence on European intellectual culture, not least in giving 
logic a distinctly rhetorical rather than syllogistic orientation.
7
   
In the sixteenth century two adaptations of Agricolan logic proved highly influential 
on the formation of Protestant Scholasticism.  The first of these was that of Phillip 
Melanchthon who organised his famous Loci Communes of 1521, the first systematic 
work of Protestant dogmatics, according to Agricola‟s loci.  These he described as 
„places…whereby the whole of each science is comprehended‟ and as the „goal to 
which all our studies may be directed‟.
8
  Likewise Melanchthon followed Agricola in 
dividing dialectic (logic) into its two parts of invention and judgement and in 
describing method as an ordered pathway to be followed through the topics 
themselves.
 9
  Notably in Melanchthon we find both a critique of scholastic logic and 
a self-conscious desire for a Christian scriptural method.
10
  In this way we may 
immediately talk of a sanctifying of logic as present right at the beginning of 
Protestant Scholasticism.  Furthermore it was Melanchthon‟s locus method, 
increasingly modified in a scholastic direction, that set the standard for both Lutheran 
and Reformed theologians well into the seventeenth century.
11
   
The second adaptation of the Agricolan logic to prove important in Protestant 
Scholasticism was that of Peter Ramus, whose Dialecticae was published in 1555.  
Arguably in fact it is Ramus who represents the true pioneer of method in the 
sixteenth century, assigning it a prominence in his dialectic which it never possessed 
in the systems of his predecessors.  Ramus was a pedagogical reformer who 
formulated his ideas in reaction to the prevailing Aristotelianism of sixteenth-century 
Paris.  He saw his role as the radical simplification and reorientation of the traditional 
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Quite naturally the reform of logic itself, as fundamental to all the other disciplines, 
occupied a central place in the Ramist project.  In his search for a new logic Ramus 
was drawn to the topical system of Agricola with its promise of a streamlined and 
methodical alternative to the unwieldy system of scholasticism.
13
  His refined 
dialectic therefore had a rhetorical orientation, substituting the Aristotelian 
predicaments for Agricolan topical arguments.  The task of logic became the efficient 
classification and relation of these arguments and in this Ramus was aided by the 
Agricolan method of dichotomising.  Logic was therefore grounded on the 
continuous twofold division of statements or things, culminating in their basic 
arguments.  The famous Ramist charts, so ubiquitous in the works of many of the 
Puritans and continental Reformed, were originally designed to represent these 
arguments in their dichotomous relationships in a kind of architectural ground-plan.
14
  
They also formed an important contribution to the „art of memory‟, providing a 
theologically sound alternative to the Lullist or even occult arts.
15
 
Ramus‟ dream was to organise all of knowledge methodically.  Applied to logic, 
which following a long Aristotelian tradition he regarded as „master science‟, the 
Ramist dichotomy yielded a definition in terms of the (Agricolan) dual operations of 
invention and judgement.  Invention, referred to by the English Ramist Dudley 
Fenner as „the spring of reasons‟, was the gathering and interrelating of arguments.  
Judgement, which Fenner defined as the „ordering of reasons‟, concerned the 
formulation of axioms as coherent logical statements.
16
  Both invention and 
judgement came to be regarded not only as fundamental processes of the intellect, 
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but as ways of tapping into the underlying order of creation in order to yield accurate 
„transcripts of reality‟.
17
   
However it was Ramus‟ account of method which was the most important feature of 
his dialectic and to which we can directly trace many features of Protestant 
Scholasticism.
18
  Although technically classified as a sub-division of judgement, 
method was given much more importance in the Ramist logic than in the Peripatetic.  
For Ramus method referred to a suitable arrangement of axioms in their natural 
order,
19
 and was governed by his famous three laws of justice, truth and wisdom. 
These held respectively that any subject must be treated only according to its relevant 
subject matter, only according to necessarily true precepts and always as moving 
from the more general to the more particular.
20
  Demonstrating their relative 
importance in the Ramist mindset, Fenner referred to method extravagantly as „a 
plaine and perfect way of handling anything‟, while syllogisms he simply defined as 
a „certaine frame of proving‟.
21
   
The spread of Ramus‟ thought after his untimely death was chiefly governed by a 
pedagogical dynamic.  While unpopular with many humanist professors, Ramist 
compendia, promising as they did a quick and easy route through any subject, were 
unsurprisingly popular with students.
22
  Together the works of Ramus and his 
assistant Omer Talon went through an extraordinary 750 editions.
23
  The most 
prominent centre of Ramism was in Germany but it also took root in Puritan England 
and New England as well as in Scotland, Ireland, Iceland and Transylvania.
24
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However as Hotson suggests Ramism had to adapt in order to survive.  Indeed pure 
Ramism in both England and Europe had a fairly brief lifespan.  A spate of Ramist 
logical works was followed by a resurgence of scholastic logic and the subsequent 
rise of what is known as semi-Ramism – the mixing of Ramist and Aristotelian or 
Melanchthonian thought.  Even this however was relatively short-lived and was soon 




A good example of semi-Ramism is found in Konrad Dietericus‟ Institutiones 
Dialecticae.  Dietericus‟ critical distance from Ramus is evident in his warnings 
about the potential dangers of compendia and he characterises his own logic as 
following a „safe‟ middle course between Ramus and Aristotle.
26
  This hybrid 
character is seen in his combining of an Aristotelian treatment of the predicables, 
antepredicaments, predicaments and postpredicaments with a Ramist treatment of the 
divisions of arguments according to a dichotomous pattern.  Throughout Dietericus is 
also concerned where possible to present the interpretations of both Ramus and 




Post-Ramism is exemplified especially by the thought of Bartholomäus Keckermann 
and Johann Heinrich Alsted, who, although they lauded Ramus for his attention to 
method, and especially the brevity, clarity and dexterity of his system, criticised 
vehemently both his attacks on Aristotle and his deformation of Aristotelian logic.  
According to Keckermann and Alsted, Ramus‟ own dialectic was both mutilated and 
confused.
28
  Keckermann characterised his own logic as „methodical peripateticism‟, 
indicating its combination of Aristotelian content with a Ramist attention to method.  
His works have a definite Ramist flow, moving from the praecognita (those general 
points such as the nature and definition of the discipline) through the systemata (the 
content of the discipline itself, again ordered from general to particular) to the 
gymnasia (the use and application of the discipline illustrated through examples) and 
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much of his material was capable of being rendered in dichotomous charts.  
However, in the further division of both praecognita and systemata into praecepta 
(themselves divided into definitions, divisions and canons) and expository 
commentaria, Keckermann showed a sophistication entirely foreign to Ramist 
pedagogy.  Likewise in opposition to Ramus, Keckermann took up key aspects of the 
Aristotelian thought of Jacopo Zabarella including both his distinction between 
method (as proving things singly) and order (as disposing them) and his twofold 
understanding of method as compositive and resolutive: the former concerning 
contemplative disciplines and proceeding syllogistically from cause to effect and the 




An important feature of both semi- and post-Ramism was their new and pronounced 
theological orientation.  While Ramus had written a methodical work on theology, 
the De Religione Christiana, he himself had recognised its preliminary character, 
expressly suggesting the need for a methodical dictionary of the commonplaces 
designed to refer to „singular heads of Christian doctrine‟ and to lead its readers 
through dense theological thickets „by a short and compendious route‟.
30
  Although 
incomplete, Ramus‟ De Religione, and more especially his methodical programme, 
exerted an enormous influence on the development of Protestant Scholastic 
methodology.
31
  An early example of this is found in Stephanus Szegedinus‟ 
Theologiae Sincerae Loci Communes of 1585, the whole of which is structured in 
tabular form.
32
  In England, Dudley Fenner‟s Sacra Theologia and the varied oeuvre 
of William Perkins represent prominent contemporaneous examples.
33
 
One of the most important Ramist works was Amandus Polanus‟ Syntagma 
Theologiae Christianae of 1609, the full title of which declared it to be „conformed 
according to the laws of methodical order‟.  Beginning from Ramus‟ own division of 
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theology into faith and good works, Polanus proceeded to encompass every aspect of 
divinity under an astonishing array of Ramist bifurcations.  Although implicitly 
Melanchthon‟s commonplace structure is still preserved in the Syntagma, the various 
loci are now fitted into a Ramist rather than scriptural architectonic.  Likewise 
Polanus‟ „symphonic‟ handling of the individual loci, according to patristic and 
scholastic as well as scriptural sources, is a far cry from Melanchthon‟s rigid 
exclusivity.
34
  In fact the Syntagma itself may be seen as a clear fulfilment of Ramus‟ 
desire for a methodical dictionary of the commonplaces.  In this Polanus was later 
followed by a large number of other semi-Ramist theologians including Wollebius, 
Sohnius, Wendelinus, Trelcatius and Gomarrus.
35
   
Another instance of Ramism‟s early theological orientation is found with Johann 
Piscator, one of the leading semi-Ramists at the Herborn Academy.  Following a 
trend which can be traced back to Melanchthon, whose primary desire in all his 
curriculum reforms was to instil pietas and eloquentia in his students, Piscator chose 
to illustrate his Animadversiones on Ramus‟ Dialecticae not with classical examples, 
as Ramus himself had done, but with scriptural ones.
36
  Precisely the same trend may 
be observed in Dudley Fenner and other English Ramists.
37
  Thereafter it became 
commonplace for semi-Ramists to invoke both scriptural and dogmatic examples, in 
an effort to demonstrate the theological (and Reformed) credentials of Ramist 
thought.
38
  In this we see yet another example of that pervasive sanctifying of logic 
we have already had occasion to highlight.   
Ramism was as important in the pulpit as in the theologian‟s study.  This may again 
be seen in Piscator, whose massive biblical commentaries, analysed according to 
Ramist method and rearranged as theological loci, travelled the length and breadth of 
Reformed Europe.
39
  In England two important examples, both with clear Ramist 
affinities, are Thomas Granger‟s Syntagma Logicum, an introductory textbook on 
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logic intended for divines, and Richard Bernard‟s The Faithfull Shepheard, a 
practical handbook instructing clergy in every aspect of their ministry.  For Bernard 
logic is „an especiall handmaid by the assistance of Gods Spirit‟ necessary for 
understanding any text of Scripture. As he says: 
By Logicke we see the method of the Spirit, we behold the arguments, 
the coherence and the scope; by it we collect doctrines, confirme them, 
enlarge the proofes, gather thence consequently apt uses and urge them 
by reasons upon the hearers.
40
 
We see from Bernard‟s Shepheard how intimately logic could become entwined with 
the preaching and teaching of the Gospel.  In unveiling the „method of the Spirit‟ 
contained in the Word, logic applied to Scripture is also seen to follow an implicitly 
Trinitarian dynamic. 
Ramism also provided a new dimension to the sanctifying of logic in its entwined 
theological and encyclopaedic aspirations.  The encyclopaedic impulse itself was 
entirely native to Ramism, and is manifest in Ramus‟ own Scholae in Liberales Artes 
as well as in the proliferation of semi-Ramist textbooks on a wide range of 
disciplines.
41
  As Hotson suggests, it derives from the Ramist desire to encompass all 
learning under one universal method.
42
  This reached its zenith in Keckermann‟s 
Systema Systematum (edited posthumously by Alsted) and in Alsted‟s famous 
Encyclopaedia.
43
  In both of these Keckermann‟s methodical structure of 
praecognita, systemata and gymnasia is transferred on a grand scale in the first case 
to the whole course of philosophy and in the second to the entire body of knowledge.  
Indeed, Alsted‟s Encyclopaedia has a clear Ramist pattern with both its macro- and 
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micro-structure capable of being laid out in dichotomous charts and the order of its 
parts moving very clearly from general to particular.
44
 
Central to the encyclopaedic programme of both Keckermann and Alsted was their 
desire to restore the image of God lost in the Fall.  Both regarded logic and 
philosophy as remedies provided to cure man‟s resulting natural ills.  As 
Keckermann claimed, it „is the greatest glory of logic that it strives to restore that 
outermost region of the image of God in man, that divine twilight still remaining in 
us, to a brighter light, to heal the failing of our mind as far as it is possible to do so in 
this life and to restore to the intellect its rectitude‟.
45
 Logic was therefore conceived 
of as the imitation of man‟s unspoilt nature.  Alsted likewise held that each discipline 
was designed to remedy a particular fault of man‟s nature.  Thus the whole cycle of 
disciplines – the Encyclopaedia – was intended to restore the entire image of God in 
man.  Here then we find a near merging of the categories of sanctification and 
logic.
46
   
In holding such a position Keckermann and Alsted were not alone.  A very similar 
encyclopaedic drive may be found in English Ramism and especially their doctrine 
of technologia. As enunciated by Alexander Richardson, technologia was a 
philosophy of the liberal arts, the main premise of which was that their diversity 
attained a unity in the mind of God.  The arts were therefore regarded as being 
radiations or emanations of divine wisdom, like rays of the Sun all leading back to a 
single source.  The metaphysics underling this was clearly exemplaristic, holding 
creation to reflect the character and dynamics of God‟s own nature.  Ramism was 
important in this scheme, as invention, judgement and method were all seen as 
reflections of the inherent order of reality.
47
  The Ramist machinery of analysis by 
dichotomising was simply the inverse of God‟s creative powers of genesis.  
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Mastering analysis was thus a way of conforming the human mind to the mind of 
God and, as with Keckermann and Alsted, of restoring the prelapsarian order of 
creation.
48
  As Granger said, „the maine end and height of logicke is knowledge, or 
science: that is the simple apprehension of truthes as they are in God and were from 
God‟.
49
  In this light English Ramism, as much as European, can be seen as a quest to 
attain the clarity and beauty of a pristine logical archetype.   
Similarly Ramism was important in bolstering the Puritan ideal of the practicality of 
all knowledge, especially in divinity.  In fact, Ramist technologia integrated conduct 
into the very nature of knowledge and in this way essentialised praxis.  Every art, 
regarded as an emanation of divine wisdom, thus carried encoded within it a divine 
purpose.  They were not intended merely for contemplation or as speculative aids, 
but as programmes of action and reform.  As Ames suggested, ideas themselves 
contained the seed of creative genesis and must either be developed or die.  For 
Ramists, theology, as the „art of living well‟, represented the authentically practical 
fruit of these seminal truths.
50
 
Overall therefore the true genius of Ramism for the Puritans was that it allowed the 
development of a comprehensive theological logic, grounded on a broadly 
exemplaristic metaphysics.  The warrants or guarantors of this logic were Granger‟s 
„Canons of Supernaturall Truth‟: the external authority of the Word and the internal 
witness of the Spirit.  As he suggested, „these Canons are the fountains of trueth, and 
causes of knowledges, and doctrines, from whence all arts, and sciences, have their 
beginnings, and progresse‟.
51
  This was both a grand vision and a profound hallowing 
of logic.  For Granger and the other English Ramists theology was therefore the 
spring welling up from the conjoined fountainhead of Word and Spirit and flowing 
out into Ramist channels.   
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2.2. Lullist Logic 
An even stronger exemplaristic impulse is found in Lullism, the system of the 
thirteenth-century Majorcan Ramon Lull.  Lull was a remarkable man, a visionary 
„born long before his time‟.
52
  After a dramatic conversion he pledged his life to 
Christ as a missionary and it became his life‟s work to seek convincing, rational 
proofs for the Christian faith.  These he derived from his Art – his methodical and 
combinatorial system of thought – which he believed he had received by divine 
revelation in 1274 and which he constantly refined throughout the rest of his life.  At 
the heart of this Art lay the attempt to comprehend every branch of knowledge 
through the science of the divine dignities. In this way Lullism, even more than 
Ramism, manifests an intrinsic encyclopaedic drive, manifest in Lull‟s own 
encyclopaedic works and the many „applications‟ of the Art that he wrote.
53
 
Central to the Lullian Art are the divine dignities, which are nothing other than the 
essential attributes of God.  Lull regarded these in exemplaristic fashion as the cause 
and archetype of all created being, maintaining that the whole of creation bore their 
stamp by participation and so reflected their likeness.
54
  In this way, as Hillgarth 
suggests, the Lullian world was one of „analogy and symbols, a translucent universe 
in which the least thing is a living token of the presence of God‟.
55
  The exact 
provenance of Lull‟s account of the divine dignities remains hotly debated among 
scholars, with Christian, Jewish and Islamic sources all having been proposed.
56
  
More important, however, than the exact source of Lull‟s ideas is the fact that the 
divine dignities were common currency in each of the three monotheistic faiths and 
so provided an important platform for Lull‟s universal Art.  In this light Lull may 
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simply be seen as an outstanding, perhaps the outstanding, example of the prevailing 
Neo-Platonic inspired Christian exemplarism of the earlier medieval period.
57
  
Similar examples may be found in John Scotus Eriugena, the Victorines and the early 
Franciscans, all of whom most likely influenced Lull.
58
 
In its final Ternary phase (so called due to its triadic pattern) the Lullian Art is 
founded on absolute, relative and correlative principles.  The absolute principles are 
simply the nine divine dignities: Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, 
Will, Virtue, Truth and Glory.  Corresponding to these are nine relative principles, 
organised into three triads: Difference, Concordance and Contrariety; Beginning, 
Middle and End; and Majority, Equality and Minority.  Lull considered these the 
means by which these dignities „mutually communicate their nature and diffuse them 
throughout all of creation‟.  Interacting with the divine dignities were the three innate 
correlative principles which may be described as abstract moments of activity or 
„substantial and intrinsic principles of action…valid for all reality‟.
59
  Taken 
together, the correlatives attain a closure highly reminiscent of God‟s own Triune 
being.  Indeed Lull held that the correlatives themselves emanate from the dignities 
and the Triune nature of God, and through participation imprint a Trinitarian image 
on every created being.
60
  Therefore through the correlatives especially, but also the 
absolute and relative principles, Lull‟s Art is seen to have a Trinitarian ground.
61
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Lullist logic, derived from his Art,
62
 differs considerably from its scholastic 
counterpart in being concerned not primarily with second intentions – the knowledge 
of a thing as known (by words or terms) – but rather with first intentions – the 
knowledge of things themselves.  Philosophically Lull was an extreme realist and his 
logic assumes an exact correspondence between reality and our conception of it.  In 
essence Lullist logic is simply a refining of scholastic logic according to his realist 
and exemplaristic metaphysics.  In this way it is what Lull calls a „natural logic‟, 
intended to reflect the nature of things themselves.
63
  Furthermore in its effort to 
relate everything to God, Lullist logic is also a „spiritual logic‟, proceeding by what 
Johnston calls „moralising arguments‟, which by means of the dignities, relatives and 
correlatives and Lull‟s own distinctive logical operations seek to relate all things to 
their end in God.
64
  Significantly this means that Lull‟s logic manifests a distinct 
Trinitarian pattern.  This may be seen, for example, in his treatment of syllogisms, 
which he views in terms of the mutual participation of the major and minor premise 
and conclusion in a kind of Trinitarian dynamic.
65
  It is also apparent in Lull‟s own 
demonstration „by equivalence‟ founded on the mutual conversion of the divine 
dignities with each other.  This Johnston terms a „logic of coessentiality‟ patterned 
on the Godhead and recalling the Trinitarian operation of Lull‟s correlatives.
66
 
Overall therefore in Lull we find not only a blurring of the traditional boundaries 
between logic, physics and metaphysics but a profound hallowing of logic.  This is 
manifest both in its exemplaristic grounding in the divine dignities, relatives and 
correlatives and in its analogical structure seeking to relate the created order to its 
Creator.  Furthermore, especially in its doctrine of the correlatives, Lullist logic may 
be seen to have a clear, if implicit, Trinitarian orientation. 
Lullism never became a major scholastic school like Thomism or Scotism but 
throughout the Middle Ages a steady trickle of Lullist works can be found.  The most 
prominent of these are Ramon de Sebonde‟s Theologia Naturalis and a number of 
sermons and other works of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, who also owned an extensive 
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  In the Renaissance however there was a sudden upsurge of interest 
in Lullism and Lull found a number of highly able exponents and commentators in 
Jacques Lefèvre d‟Étaples, Bernard de Lavinheta and especially Heinrich Cornelius 
Agrippa von Nettesheim.  In general Renaissance Lullists were interested in Lullism 
for its potential as a clavis universalis – a key to opening up all knowledge.  As a 
consequence Renaissance Lullism quickly became tainted by occult and magical 
associations, in a manner quite foreign to Lull‟s own thought.
68
 
Given this it might be thought that Lullism would hold no attraction to Reformed 
thinkers.  However in Johann Heinrich Alsted, himself an alchemist, we find one 
important exception.  In his early career Alsted had the ultimate aim of harmonising 
Aristotelian, Ramist and Lullist method for use in his encyclopaedic projects.
69
  His 
Clavis Artis Lullianae was written both to defend Lullism against the aspersions of 
Keckermann and others, and as a means of teaching the Lullian Art.  Keckermann 
had condemned Lullist logic due to it being an admixture of multiple disciplines – a 
great sin for any kind of Ramist – and its focus on first rather than second intentions.  
Alsted responded by saying that Lull‟s disrespect for disciplinary boundaries was due 
to his desire for a general art capable of discoursing on every knowable thing.  To the 
second accusation he replied with a quid pro quo, saying that if the Aristotelian 
predicaments may be counted as second intentions then so may all of Lull‟s logical 
operations.  Tacitly, however, he perhaps recognised the need for a universal logic to 
be a „natural logic‟ in the Lullist sense (i.e. a logic of first intentions).
70
      
Tommaso Campanella is another seventeenth-century philosopher who can be 
broadly placed within the Lullist tradition.  Campanella is known to have read the 
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works of Lull with great interest and appreciation as a young man
71
 and certainly 
there are striking similarities to be found between his doctrine of the primalities and 
Lull‟s exemplaristic metaphysics.  Campanella came to believe that being itself is 
intrinsically structured according to three transcendental principles of Power, 
Wisdom and Love, which he called primalities.  He therefore denied the Aristotelian 
claim that (finite) being was structured according to the transcendental principles of 
act and potency.  He also denied that the primalities could be considered in any way 
as accidental attributes of being or as physical principles separable from their own 
effects.  Rather he held that the primalities were „metaphysical principles inherent in 
the very effects which they produce‟.  It is therefore through the primalities that a 
being is said to be essentiated.  For this reason he also called the primalities the 
„proprinciples‟ or „pre-eminences‟ of being.
72
 
Campanella regarded the primalities as being „equally first in time, dignity, and 
nature and…one by a real and essential identity‟.
73
  While they differ in order of 
procession, with Power generating Wisdom and Power and Wisdom together 
producing Love, their procession occurs without any division of essence.  He 
describes this coinherence not as participation, which would be the case if one 
primality was shared partially by another, but as toticipation in which each primality 
is said to wholly possess the other two.  This means the procession of one primality 
from another is such that what proceeds is already contained in the primality from 
which it proceeds – an important example of the dictum that „nihil dat quod non 
habet‟.
74
  However while the primalities are essentially identical he does not hold 
that they are identical in every respect.  He therefore posits what he calls an „ideal 
distinction‟ between them.  This distinction is rooted in their different formal reasons 
and Bonansea suggests it is basically identical to the Scotist formal distinction ex 
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natura rei, although placing the emphasis not on the formal reasons or formalities 
themselves but on their apprehension by the mind.
75
   
From all this it is clear that the intrinsic dynamic of the primalities mirrors that of the 
Trinity itself.
76
  Furthermore Campanella believed that God himself possessed the 
primalities essentially and in an infinite and perfect degree.  In this way the 
primalities may be regarded in exemplaristic fashion as both cause and archetype of 
all created being.  In both these aspects then the primalities closely resemble the 
divine dignities and especially the divine correlatives of Lull‟s Art.  In fact they 
could even be said to be a hybrid of the two, mirroring Lull‟s triad of Power, 
Wisdom and Goodness (or Power, Wisdom and Will) as convertible divine attributes 
and his correlatives as dynamic principles.
77
  In this way the primalities constitute 
Campanella‟s own „Trinitarian World Picture‟. 
Jan Amos Comenius, the Czech polymath, was a philosopher strongly influenced by 
both Alsted and Campanella.  While not a Lullist per se he was strongly influenced 
by Campanella and also published a revised edition of de Sebonde‟s Theologia 
Naturalis.  In an English context Comenius is well known, with Hartlib and Dury, as 
one of the „three foreigners‟ whose work provided the intellectual motivation for the 
Puritan revolution and later laid the foundations for the Royal Society.
78
  His life-
work was the pursuit of a Christian philosophy, which he called „pansophia‟, 
adequate for all fields of knowledge.  Comenius intended pansophia to integrate the 
separate spheres of sense, reason and faith (or revelation).  It therefore drew 
extensively on the „two books‟ of God‟s Word and his works.
79
  Comenius‟ desire to 
conform his pansophia to a sanctified pattern of knowledge is evident throughout his 
works.  It is strikingly clear however from his extensive discussion of the „Temple of 
Pansophical Wisdom‟.  This he models on the Temple of Ezekiel‟s vision, the 
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sevenfold division of which Comenius relates to an ascent from common notions 
through sense, reason and revelation to God himself inhabiting eternity.
80
 
Comenius‟ pansophic method shows strong evidence of both Ramist and 
exemplaristic affinities.  The Ramistic elements of his thought were undoubtedly 
nurtured during the time he spent at the Herborn Academy under the tutelage of 
Alsted.  Although implicit they pervade his discussion of the pansophic method in 
the treatise on the Reformation of Schooles, the Ramist spirit of which is evident 
from Comenius‟ desire that the study of wisdom should avoid „any intricate and 
thorny difficulties‟ and seek a plain and easy path.
81
   For Comenius, method is the 
way appointed through the labyrinthine diversity of things and should proceed, as 
with Ramus, from general to particular and from the known to the unknown.
82
  In 
true Ramist fashion Comenius emphasises that method should always be oriented to 
use.
83
  This he gives a pronounced theological orientation, insisting that pansophical 
method should direct all things to their end in God.
84
  
Comenius‟ debt to Alsted specifically is most clearly seen from the encyclopaedic 
aspirations of pansophia.  It is also apparent however from the role of the 
praecognita as the roots of his pansophical tree and the subsequent system of 
definitions, ideas, axioms and distributions which form its central branches. These he 
refers to as the „measure of all methods‟ and they may be seen somewhat to 
resemble, in purpose if not precisely in form, Alsted‟s own universal methodical 
template.
85
   Furthermore, in a similar way to Alsted, Comenius saw the goal of 
pansophia as being the restoration of the lost image of God in man.  In fact going far 
beyond both Alsted and Keckermann he even spoke of this as deification, the 
inculcation of the image of God‟s omniscience.
86
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For Comenius pansophia was the „glasse or mirrour of the universe‟ and thus had a 
strong exemplaristic component.
87
  He insisted therefore that method should always 
be fitted to things themselves, manifesting throughout his life a profound dislike of 
„prickly‟ logical second intentions.
88
  This he expressed Platonically in terms of 
created things being patterned after their exemplars or ideas in the mind of God.  
Through exemplifying the divine ideas creatures could then be said to be stamped 
with God‟s own likeness.
89
  Following Campanella, whom he cites with great 
approbation in the Reformation of Schooles,
90
 Comenius recognised a Trinitarian 
ground to this exemplarism.   Thus he says that in his pansophical method „all the 
chiefest divisions of things are made by a trichotomie‟ reflecting the pattern of One, 
True and Good in the „first attributes of things‟.  The power and comprehensive 
scope of this Trinitarian method seem to have taken Comenius completely by 
surprise, for he says: 
Therefore not daring to oppose the truth of things, which represented it 
selfe so in a threefold mystery, but rather heartily embracing so great an 
harmony of the Sacred Ternary, I prosecuted it in other things also, 
without offering them any violence…but even as they divide themselves 
of their owne accord. 
Comenius also suggested that this method had the added advantage of being „very 
profitable for learners‟, proceeding methodically so as to aid them in remembering 
the natural divisions of things.  He concludes his discussion saying „Let therefore this 
Christian Pansophy, unfolding the Ternary mysteries be sacred unto that eternall 




Overall therefore Comenius‟ pansophical method reflects a fascinating fusion of 
Ramistic principles with a pronounced Trinitarian exemplarism.  Comenius 
                                                 
87
 Comenius, Reformation, 18. 
88
 Comenius, Reformation, 15; Pattern, 89-90. 
89
 Comenius, Reformation, 36-9. 
90
 Comenius, Reformation, 47.  Here he calls Campanella and Bacon „those famous restorers of 
philosophy‟. 
91
 Comenius, Reformation, 51-2. 
65 
 
expresses this using the language of „order‟ and „harmony‟.
92
  It is through harmony, 
he says, that the infinite multiplicity and diversity of things may be reduced to a few 
fundamental principles.  The concept of harmony adds a dynamism to his pansophia 
which he saw as lacking in the static systems of other encyclopaedists.  Indeed 
Comenius‟ desire for his pansophia was that it should be a living science reflecting 
its archetype in the Triune God.
93
 
2.3. The Theo-Political Method of George Lawson 
George Lawson was a divine noted for his interest in politics and especially for his 
Politica and his critique of Hobbes‟ Leviathan.  He was also the author of the Theo-
Politica, published in 1659.  This he intended as a „Body of Divinity‟, as its title page 
declares, describing it as a „method of those saving truths, which are contained in the 
Canon of the Holy Scripture, and abridged in those words of our Saviour Jesus 
Christ: Go and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the 
Son, and of the Holy Ghost‟.  Lawson, like Baxter, viewed this Triune Baptismal 
Covenant as „the ground and foundation of those apostolical Creeds and forms of 
confessions, related by the ancients‟.
94
  Likewise he regarded the Baptismal 
Covenant and the Creeds as compressed versions of Scripture, containing the nucleus 
of his own political method.  As Lawson described it, the „principal if not adequate‟ 
subject of Scripture is the Kingdom of God.  This fact, taken as a given from 
Scripture, determined his method.
95
  In this light theology was considered as „divine 
politicks‟ and its scope was to analyse in detail this Kingdom, its foundation, 
constitution and administration, its government by laws and judgements and its 
subsequent outworking in terms of rewards and punishments.
96
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It is apparent from the Theo-Politica that Lawson was also a Ramist.  In his epistle to 
the reader he speaks in thoroughly Ramist terms of his desire „by plain doctrine to 
inform the understanding, by clear method to help the memory‟.
97
  He also stresses 
that „practice must be the principal design, and knowledge so far as conducing 
thereto‟.
98
  His Ramism is confirmed by his discussion of logical affections or 
arguments which he lists as „cause, effect, subject, adjunct, whole, part and the rest‟, 
and which closely mirror those found in Ramus‟ own logic.
99
  It is also evident in his 
dichotomous schemes expounding the nature of Holy Scripture and of theological 
method, the government of God the Creator (the subject of the first book) and the 
government of God the Redeemer (the subject of the second book).
100
  In typical 
Ramist fashion these charts determine the arrangement of the whole work and of the 
individual chapters themselves. 
While clearly influenced by Ramism in arguing for a political approach to Scripture, 
Lawson saw his own methodology as both superior to and encompassing the 
standard Ramist division of theology into faith and obedience.  Thus he suggests that 
these two are only „duties to be performed by sinful man, redeemed, and called, 
according to the commands of their God-Redeemer; and so do not reach the utmost 
bounds of this heavenly doctrine‟.  In this way they may be subordinated to 
government and even then „belong onely to that one head, and part thereof, the 
commands and laws of God Redeemer‟ with faith itself simply being „but one part of 
this obedience‟.  Fascinatingly Lawson suggests that those who follow this division 
between faith and obedience „think they have a sufficient ground in the mandate and 
commission of our blessed Saviour‟, the Triune Baptismal Covenant.  Lawson 
likewise takes inspiration from these verses, but for him they describe the „rule of 
doctrine, concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, along with the three glorious 
works of Creation, Redemption, Sanctification‟, as „a divine and wonderful 
abridgement of all the doctrine of Scripture especially of that which is necessary to 
salvation‟.  For Lawson this credal method naturally unfolds into an analysis firstly 
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of God in himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, secondly of God in his government 
and works and finally of the Kingdoms of God the Creator and God the Redeemer 
(and Sanctifier)
101
  While accommodating his analysis to the Ramist dichotomy it is 
clear that Lawson is pushing towards a Trinitarian analysis of the Kingdom of God.  
His theo-political method can therefore be described as a Trinitarian and politicised 
Ramism. 
As should already be clear, Lawson desired to follow a scriptural method in his body 
of divinity.  For in treating of such high matters „it is necessary, that we have some 
certain rules to direct us: yet no direction, except from heaven, will serve the turn‟.  
This heavenly direction is for him Scripture and only Scripture.
102
  Lawson also 
holds that logic itself must be adapted in order to speak about God.  Thus in 
explaining the operation of our understanding he argues that we cannot reach things 
immediately but only at second hand and „cloathed with logisms, or logical 
affections, which we call arguments‟.  These affections or arguments are like 
„colours upon the surface of the thing, without which it is not perceivable by the 
eye‟.  For Lawson these arguments, as we have seen above, are of course the 
standard Ramist ones.  He goes on to say that God himself is represented to us in his 
attributes, which are analogous to the logical arguments and derive from Scripture: 
The word of God therefore is the rule of our understanding, and directing 
it in the knowledge of his essence, is our supernaturall logick, and the 
attributes are our divine topicks.  For the logick which we now have 
composed by man, serves only for a rule in the understanding of things 
created: we must have a far higher and more excellent logick, to 
understand the being of our God.
103
 
In Scripture then Lawson found a „supernatural logic‟ which alone was adequate for 
description of God.  This idea, as we shall see in Chapter Five, is found in a number 
of medieval Nominalists and is extremely significant for our understanding of 
                                                 
101
 Lawson, Theo-Politica, 13-17. 
102
 Lawson, Theo-Politica, 1. 
103
 Lawson, Theo-Politica, 19-20. 
68 
 
Baxter‟s own Trinitarian doctrine.
104
  Here then we find a further important 
dimension to the sanctifying of logic. 
3. Baxter’s Response to Scholastic and Ramist Logic 
3.1. Baxter and Scholastic Logic 
Apart from a grammar school education and a month‟s study with Francis Garbett, 
„the faithful, learned minister at Wroxeter‟, Baxter never received any formal 
training in logic.
105
  Left largely to pursue his studies alone, Baxter began a course of 
intensive personal study.  Having been a lover of method almost since childhood,
106
  
he focussed his attention especially on logic and metaphysics.  He remarked of these 
that they: 
...had my labour and delight, which occasioned me (perhaps too soon) to 
plunge myself very early into the study of controversies, and to read all 
the Schoolmen I could get; for next practical divinity, no books so suited 
with my disposition as Aquinas, Scotus, Durandus, Ockam and their 
disciples; for I thought they narrowly searched after truth and brought 
things out of the darkness of confusion; for I could never from my first 
studies endure confusion…I never thought I understood any thing until I 
could anatomize it and see the parts distinctly, and the conjunction of the 
parts as they made up the whole.  Distinction and method seemed to me 
of that necessity, that without them I could not be said to know; and the 




While the schoolmen clearly inculcated in Baxter an early love of method, in later 
years he was to temper somewhat his uncritical admiration for them, finding 
especially that an uninterrupted scholastic diet was too much for his mature 
theological palate: 
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I much value the method and sobriety of Aquinas, the subtlety of Scotus 
and Ockam...the excellent acuteness of many of their followers...but how 
loth should I be to take such sauce for my food, and such recreations for 
my business!  The jingling of too much and too false philosophy among 
them, often drowns the noise of Aaron‟s bells.  I feel myself much better 
in Herbert‟s Temple; or in a heavenly treatise of faith and love.
108
   
In fact at his most hostile Baxter can even echo the fierce attacks made on scholastic 
theology at the Council of Florence.
109
  Yet it is also clear that this hostility is not 
directed at scholastic philosophy per se, for throughout his life he continued to 
regard this in the highest terms, but rather from what he perceived as its overly 
speculative nature.
110
  Certainly, even a brief perusal of the Methodus or the 
Catholick Theologie should be enough to convince any reader that Baxter never lost 
either his taste for scholastic distinctions or his grasp of the scholastic corpus.  
Indeed, Trueman remarks that Baxter‟s knowledge of scholastic works was quite 
possibly second to none amongst seventeenth-century Protestants.
111
  It is clear then 
that this „scholastic strain‟ continued to be operative in Baxter‟s thought long after 
the partial eclipse in his admiration for the schoolmen.  
Nonetheless, as much as Baxter approved of many aspects of scholastic thought it 
seems that he never had, or at least did not retain, an appreciation for scholastic 
logic.  Despite his own Nominalist affinities
112
 and his admiration for Ockham we 
find little evidence that Baxter shared the same abstract concerns as the terminist 
logicians.  Similarly, despite his willingness elsewhere to admit the use of the Scotist 
formal distinction in theology, Baxter is critical of the numerous treatises de 
formalitatibus.  His concern in both cases is that in multiplying so many „beings of 
reason‟ scholastic logic loses its grip on the essential connection between words and 
things, and thus on reality itself.
113
 
Baxter is also critical even of conventional Aristotelian logic, remarking that „the 
artificial, organical part‟ of learning „was made so operous, as that it drowned real 
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learning instead of promoting it; and became but like a game at Chess, a devise 
rather to exercise vain proud wits by, than to find out useful truth‟.
114
  He was 
particularly critical of the Aristotelian predicaments, one of the most central themes 
of scholastic logic, echoing the Nominalist Hurtado de Mendoza‟s critique of the 
predicaments as congested,
115
 and holding that Aristotelian treatments of individual 
predicaments were hopelessly confused.
116
  Because the predicaments were not 
„fitted to the kinds of beings‟ he also regarded them as arbitrary.
117
  In this way 
scholastic logic again failed demonstrably to fit words to things. 
Baxter is also critical of the syllogism, the mainstay of Aristotelian logic, holding 
that the understanding of the true order of things is preferable to the ability to string 
many syllogisms together.
118
  He held that excessive syllogising distracted from the 
proper business of logic, playing into the hands of those cavillers who would twist it 
to their own purposes, disputing only about „mood and figure‟ with no desire to 
attain the truth.
119
  In his own disputes Baxter was always concerned to delimit the 
correct difference between words and things and was scrupulously careful never to 
let his logic descend into a game of words.  While Baxter could admit that the 
schoolmen, „where our grammarians deride them as barbarians, have often done well 
in fitting words to things, and making the key meet for the lock‟,
120
 he clearly 
regarded the propensity of scholastic logic to lapse into mere word-play as a major 
liability. 
3.2. Baxter and Ramist Logic 
Already in our discussion of Baxter‟s critique of scholastic logic the twin themes of 
order and method have begun to shine through, as has Baxter‟s fundamental concern 
that logic must always be conformed to things themselves and not be simply a 
scientia sermocinalis.  Unsurprisingly therefore, in his search for the right 
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theological method, Baxter was deeply attracted to Ramism.  Baxter was of course 
very familiar with Ramus and his library catalogue shows that he owned both 
Ramus‟ Dialecticae and De Religione Christiana.
121
  The general Ramist character 
of Baxter‟s thought has been noticed by a number of scholars but hitherto not 
investigated in any detail.
122
 
In their common desire for a clear, compendious, methodical approach which may 
easily be committed to memory, it is clear that Ramism and the catechetical 
enterprise of theology are closely connected.  Thus it is no surprise that Baxter‟s 
catechetically oriented theology was accompanied by an appreciation for Ramist 
method.  This we have seen already in his advice to the young divinity student that 
when he has gone through the catechisms he should proceed to „three or four of the 
soundest systemes of divinity‟ and „to the study of the clearest and exactest 
methodists‟.  Through study of these their goal was to understand theology „as 
methodized and joynted in a due scheme‟ and in this way to see its true beauty.
 123
  
For Baxter, as for the Ramists, any true exposition of divinity, whether theoretical or 
practical, must be grounded on right method.  In the Christian Directory therefore he 
instructs his readers to „labour to understand the true method of divinity and to see 
truth in several degrees and orders and not to confuse these‟, because „method or 
right order exceedingly helpeth, understanding, memory and practice‟.  He refers to 
divinity as „a curious well composed frame‟, comparing it to an intricate clock which 
in order to work must have every part in its place.
124
  Such allusions are entirely 
Ramist, as even more so are Baxter‟s frequent references to knowledge as a tree with 
innumerable branches and sub-branches.
125
   
Baxter‟s own pattern of trichotomous logic is a clear adaptation of Ramism and even 
after his methodological breakthrough he continued to advocate Ramist dichotomies 
in pure logical discourse.  Thus in the Methodus he follows Dietericus in maintaining 
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that „distributio, si subjectae rei natura patiatur debet esse bimembris‟ with the 
proviso that this be understood for things purely logical, such as affirmations and 
negations.
126
  Indeed, Baxter‟s extensive use of dichotomising is amply borne out by 
the numerous Ramistic charts contained in the Methodus, frequently combining 
dichotomies and trichotomies into one pattern of analysis.  Baxter in fact designed all 
of these charts before writing the text of the Methodus.
127
  Thus in true Ramist 
fashion they form the skeleton of the whole of the work, determining not only the 
overall chapter order but also the internal order of each individual chapter.  Like 
other Ramists Baxter also held these charts to be important memory aids and 
recommended to his reader that they should commit their basic outlines to heart.
128
 
Further evidence that Baxter was attuned to all the nuances of method may be found 
in his discussion in the preface of the Methodus.  Here he identifies four different 
methods: the synthetic method which is the congruence of doctrine to the order of 
being and working of things, the notificative or probative method which follows the 
order of knowing and which thus beginning from signs ascends to the things 
signified, the practical method of intention which begins from ultimate end and 
proceeds to the means, and the practical executive method which is from means to 
end.  Apart from the fact that Baxter reconstrues these four methods in terms not of 
causation but of his characteristic Augustinian pattern of signs and things, this is an 
entirely conventional discussion.
129
  Baxter follows the writers of theological 
commonplaces in viewing the synthetic method as the principal one to be employed 
in theology.
130
  Indeed, as we shall discuss below, the Methodus itself may be viewed 
as both a covenantally and a logically ordered series of theological loci.  Furthermore 
Baxter‟s discussion of a fourfold method clearly draws on the ideas of Zabarella so 
favoured by post-Ramists such as Alsted and Keckermann.  As Muller suggests this 
division between a compositive and resolutive method became common among the 
Protestant scholastics.
131
  In making a distinction between order and method, in 
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which order refers to the disposition of all the loci and method to the route through 
them, Baxter is again following a Zabarellan pattern.
132
 
Baxter‟s familiarity and sympathy with Ramism is further borne out by his 
recommendations of logic textbooks to theological students.  Baxter held that young 
men around the age of eighteen to twenty should spend time especially in improving 
their memories and he recommended that they should gain the „exactest acquaintance 
with the true precepts of logick‟ and learn „some epitome of logick without book‟.  
At this stage Baxter thought it important that the fundamentals of logic should 
become imprinted on their minds.  Later when their judgement was riper he 
recommended returning for a second course of study, especially refining logic in the 
light of physics and metaphysics – a point we shall return to below and in the next 
chapter.
133
  We may find Baxter‟s specific recommendations in what he calls the 
Poorest, Poorer and Poor Man‟s Library of his Christian Directory.  If, as Brouwer 
has suggested, Baxter intended these as a kind of seminary curriculum for Non-
Conformists then his advice here becomes even more significant.
134
   
Interestingly the majority of the logicians that Baxter recommends have some links 
to Ramism.  While George Downame is the only pure Ramist, Konrad Dietericus, of 
course, was a prominent semi-Ramist as was Heinrich Gutberleth.  Keckermann, as 
we have seen, was a post-Ramist and although Francis Burgersdijk was an 
Aristotelian his logical works are derived from Keckermann and may be counted as 
post-Ramist.  Although Johann Claubergius was a Cartesian logician he has a Ramist 
background.  Christopher Airay and Samuel Smith are included by Howell among 
the English „systematics‟ who mixed scholastic and Ramist logic.  In fact Samuel de 
Lublin and Martin Smiglecius, both Polish Catholics, are the only „pure‟ scholastic 
logicians recommended by Baxter.  Moving beyond logic we also find Baxter 
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In the preface to the Methodus Baxter includes a list of those methodical writers 
whom he regards as the best.  Apart from George Lawson, he lists Sohnius, Polanus, 
Gomarrus, Trelcatius, Wollebius, Wendelinus, Szegedinus, Faius, Spanheimius, 
Zanchi, Hommius, Calvin, Musculus, Martyr Vermigli, Olevian, Cluto, Cocceius, 
Cloppenburg, Maccovius and Dudley Fenner.
136
  The first thing to point out about 
this list is that it shows Baxter‟s comprehensive grasp of Protestant Scholastic 
theology.  Elsewhere we find ample further evidence of Baxter‟s wide reading and 
appreciation of both English and Continental Protestant scholastics including a 
number of prominent figures not on this list, such as Ames and Perkins.
137
 The 
second thing to note is the rough division between the older commonplace authors, 
the Ramist or semi-Ramist methodical writers and the covenantal scholastics such as 
Maccovius and Cocceius (concerning whom Baxter is quick to point out that while 
he approves of their method he does not approve of their doctrine).  The significance 
of this list is twofold.  First it demonstrates the continuity between the Methodus and 
the Protestant Scholastic tradition.  Secondly it suggests Baxter‟s concern in the 
Methodus to draw on a commonplace, Ramistic and covenantal method of theology. 
Despite his attraction and affinity to Ramism it is evident that Baxter ultimately 
became dissatisfied with it.  In the Reliquiae he dates this dissatisfaction to the early 
1640s.  Significantly he attributes it to the failure of the Ramist dichotomy to 
properly accommodate words to things.
138
  Likewise Baxter remarks elsewhere on 
the failings of modern logic saying: 
As to this day when logick and metaphysicks seem much cultivated and 
reformed, yet the variety of methods, the number of notions, the 
precariousness of much, the uncertainty of some things, the falshood of 
many, maketh them as fit for boys to play with in the schools, and to be a 
                                                                                                                                          
Aristotle Commentaries: Authors L-M‟, Renaissance Quarterly 31 (1978), 544-5; Gabriel 
Nuchelmans, „Logic in the Seventeenth Century: Preliminary Remarks and the Constituents of the 
Proposition‟, in CHSP, I.104-5.  It should be noted that the identification of Airay is uncertain. For the 
Ramist character of Baxter‟s three „libraries‟ and the significance of his recommendation of Alsted see 
Howard Hotson, „„A Generall Reformation of Common Learning‟ and its Reception in the English 
Speaking World, 1560-1642‟, Proceedings of the British Academy 164 (2010), 223-5. 
136
 Baxter, Methodus, „Praefatio‟. 
137
 See for example Baxter, CD, III.924, 927. 
138
 Baxter, Reliquiae, III.69-70. 
75 
 
wood into which a sophister may run, to hide his Errours, as to be a 
means of detecting them.
139
 
Clearly Ramism alone was not enough to hold up the superstructure of Baxter‟s 
theological method. 
4. The Hallowing of Logic 
The publication of the Methodus marked the culmination of a quest for method 
which had occupied Baxter for nearly forty years.
140
  The method he finally arrived 
at combined he insights of Ramism, Lullism and Lawson‟s theo-politics into one 
coherent system centred on the exposition of the Triune Baptismal Covenant.  This 
he understood, with all due humility, to have improved on all previous conceptions 
of method, whether Protestant or Catholic, because it marked a return to the true 
method traced out in the order of both Scripture and nature. 
4.1. Political Method of the Triune Baptismal Covenant 
According to Baxter‟s own confession, the proximate cause of his earliest 
methodological breakthrough may be located entirely in Scripture.  In 1647 in the 
course of writing the book which became his famous Saints Everlasting Rest Baxter 
found himself confronting the thorny issue of justification and the day of judgement.  
This drove him to prayer and Bible study and after a week of wrestling with various 
texts Baxter recounts experiencing an „overpowering light‟ giving him a „clear 
apprehension of those things, which I had often reached after before in vain‟.
141
  
Baxter later remarked on this experience that in one week of reading and reflecting 
on the Scriptures he learned more than in seventeen previous years of wrangling and 
debates.
142
  It was the fruit of these reflections, written down and further expanded 
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upon, which became the nucleus of his Aphorismes and informed his political 
method from its inception.
143
   
However while scripturally motivated it is also true that this method did not develop 
in a vacuum.  Both the pre-history and early history of Baxter‟s political method 
have been ably charted, as well as the significant influence of Grotius and Twisse on 
his thought, and for this reason will not be rehearsed here.  Of much greater 
relevance for our own quest for Baxter‟s Trinitarian method is the connection with 
Lawson. 
Lawson and Baxter lived in adjoining counties and they probably first became 
acquainted with each other through Baxter‟s invitation to his fellow ministers to 
comment on his newly completed Aphorismes.
144
  Lawson was one of the first to 
respond and it was his comments that Baxter came to value the most, describing him 
as „the ablest man…of almost any I know in England‟.  Baxter particularly 
appreciated his „methodical head‟ and his „great skill in politicks‟.  Furthermore he 
owed Lawson a debt in his encouraging him to make a detailed study of politics.
145
  
Writing in his Reliquiae Baxter paid Lawson the compliment of saying that no other 
work, apart from Grotius‟ De Satisfactione Christi, ever enlightened his mind so 
much (for „sudden sensible increase of knowledge‟) as Lawson‟s manuscripts had 
done.  In Lawson therefore Baxter found explicitly an attitude towards theology 
which not only confirmed his own theo-political intuitions, first codified in the 
Aphorismes, but more importantly gave him a new and broader context in which to 
view these same ideas. 
Of all Lawson‟s works Baxter valued most highly his Theo-Politica, that „excellent 
summ of divinity‟.  In fact Baxter tells us that this was written, in part, as a response 
to his Aphorismes and he therefore received an advanced copy for comment.  Baxter 
praised Lawson very highly for this work which he said „reduced theology to a 
method more political and righter in the main, than any that I had seen before him‟ 
and, together with the common catechisms, surpassed all „of our exactest 
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dichotomizers‟ – and this in spite of Lawson‟s own evident Ramism!  In following 
the catechetical pattern of the Triune Baptismal Covenant Baxter held Lawson to 
have approached the true Trinitarian method of Scripture.  Even more significantly, 
in the same passage Baxter makes it clear that this is the true „Scripture method‟ that 




In Chapter One we considered at length Baxter‟s catechetical understanding of 
theology and its intimate connection to theological method, remarking on the 
supreme importance of the Triune Baptismal Covenant for grounding Baxter‟s own 
method.  However we did not there address the question of when this first became a 
prominent theme in Baxter‟s theology.  In some of his earlier works, including the 
Aphorismes, it is conspicuous by its absence.  We do, however, find it beginning to 
take an important place in Baxter‟s work at the time that the Worcestershire 
Association was founded.
147
  Likewise the Reliquiae suggests that this became the 
coordinating centre of Baxter‟s own preaching to his Kidderminster congregation.  
For it was his practice to order his doctrine according to the main end and so he 
„daily opened to them, and with greatest importunity laboured to imprint upon their 
minds…the great fundamental principles of Christianity contained in their Baptismal 
Covenant‟.  Baxter was concerned also to teach his flock concerning the „right 
methodizing‟ of the truth and as we would expect taught particularly the „true and 
profitable method‟ of the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue and the „great points 
of faith, hope and love, holiness and unity, which must be still inculcated, as the 
beginning and end of all‟.
148
 
There is an obvious link with catechising here and it is surely no coincidence that 
Baxter‟s own enthusiasm for a catechetical method dates from around the time of his 
catechetical enterprise.  It is clear then that the seeds of Baxter‟s Trinitarian method 
were sown early, well before the publication of the Theo-Politica (although not 
before his friendship with Lawson).  It is after the Restoration however that we find 
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the Triune Baptismal Covenant becoming an explicit methodological theme.  In his 
Divine Life, written around 1663, we find Baxter confidently stating, after discussing 
in detail the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love and their relation to the 
divine persons and the divine relations with man, that: 
Were it not my purpose to confine myself to this short discovery of the 
nature, attributes and works of God, but to run deeper into the rest of the 
body of divinity, I should come down to the fall, and work of 
redemption, and shew you in the Gospel and all the ordinances, etc. the 
footsteps of this method of Trinity in Unity, which I have here begun; but 
that were to digress…
149
 
Likewise in November 1663 we find him writing the following to John Eliot, the 
famous apostle to the Indians: 
If we had a right scheme of theology (which I never yet saw) Unity in 
Trinity would go through the whole method: It's easy to follow it a little 
way, and to see how God's three grand relations of Owner, Ruler, and 
Father or End and chief God, and the correspondent relations in man, and 
the mutual expressions go far in the great parts of theology: But when we 
run it up to the numerous and small branches, our narrow minds are lost 
in the search. But the day is coming when all God's works of Creation 
and Providence, and all his truths shall be seen to us uno intuitu, as a 
most entire, perfect frame.
150
 
In both of these Baxter‟s enthusiasm for such a scheme is palpable.  Furthermore it is 
striking how much these brief snapshots resonate with the overall plan and purpose 
of the Methodus, begun a few years later in 1668-9.  To some degree it is 
speculation, but it seems likely that Lawson‟s own efforts, to Baxter‟s mind 




Whether this is so, it is undeniable, given Baxter‟s own words on the subject, that 
Lawson exercised a profound influence on the development of Baxter‟s Trinitarian 
theo-political method.  Certainly the Theo-Politica reads in many ways as a 
prototype of the Methodus.  The two are obviously congruent in their common desire 
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for a methodological exposition of Scripture according to the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant and theo-political tenets.  It is highly significant therefore that in the 
preface to the Methodus Baxter should single out Lawson‟s Theo-Politica (again 
along with „our more common catechisms‟) as offering the most important 
reflections on theological method to be found anywhere.
152
  Lawson‟s method we 
have described as a Trinitarian and politicised Ramism and this provides a very apt 
description of Baxter‟s own logic.
153
  Lawson‟s own adherence to a supernatural 
logic is yet another striking similarity. 
The two works also closely mirror each other in content, with both emphasising that 
the principal subject of theology is the Kingdom of God and subsequently organising 
their material on the basis of the constitution and administration of the Kingdom of 
Nature, the Kingdom of Grace and the Kingdom of Glory, or to put it another way 
around the successive epochs of God as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier.  We find 
also the by now familiar prolegomenal theme of the Triune Baptismal Covenant as 
the ground of all Creeds and the contraction of Scripture into its essential form, as 
well as the vital role of Baptism in co-ordinating and enabling the Christian‟s 
relationship to God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
154
  Similarly in Lawson‟s 
discussion of the Trinity we find him giving a central role to the three attributes of 
Power, Knowledge and Will.  While it would be going too far to suggest that Lawson 
himself arranges his exposition around these, he does relate the attribution of 
different works of Father, Son and Holy Spirit to the interaction of these divine 
attributes.
155
   
Of course there are also important differences between Baxter and Lawson and a 
brief review of these will enable the distinctives of Baxter‟s own Trinitarian method 
to stand out in sharper relief.  Thus while Lawson ostensibly seeks to structure his 
own theology on the pattern of Creation, Redemption and Sanctification, in practice 
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he tends to emphasise a twofold division in God‟s government of man with respect to 
God as Creator and Redeemer.
156
  This in part seems to be a consequence of his 
specific methodological constraints and is therefore perhaps evidence that his own 
Ramist bifurcations hindered him from a full Trinitarian exposition of the Kingdom 
of God.  We may certainly suspect this is how Baxter would have viewed the matter.  
Furthermore although Lawson is willing to endorse the triad of Power, Wisdom and 
Will with respect both to God and to man as created in his image, in the Theo-
Politica he does this with considerable hesitancy, emphasising in Augustinian 
fashion how imperfect the likeness is.
157
 While Baxter would doubtless agree with 
the sentiment, there is a marked difference here from his own confident employment 
of metaphysical triads and his frequent assertion of the human soul as a clear mirror 
of the divine being in all its Trinitarian splendour.
158
  The major difference between 
the two therefore, as Baxter himself confesses, is that Lawson „had not hit on the true 
method of the vestigia Trinitatis‟.
159
  To find this Baxter had to have recourse to the 
exemplaristic logic and metaphysics of the Lullists and their successors. 
4.2. Trinitarian and Exemplaristic Logic 
Lullist logic, as we have seen, was characterised by a strong Trinitarian exemplarism.  
Early in his quest for method Baxter obviously encountered the works of Lull and his 
followers, for he refers to having „long ago read Lullius and many of his 
commentators‟.
160
  At the end of his life Baxter owned works by Ramon Lull, Ramon 
de Sebonde, Nicholas of Cusa, Campanella, Alsted and Comenius, showing his 
continued fascination with the Lullist and exemplaristic traditions of logic and 
metaphysics.
161
  Despite this Baxter‟s attitude to Lull and the Lullian Art often seems 
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decidedly critical.  He thus refers to the Lullist doctrine of spirits as „drowned in a 
multitude of irregular arbitrary notions‟ and criticises Lullist physics in no uncertain 
terms.
162
  Likewise he brands Lullist philosophy as „palpably uncertain, and full of 
certain errors‟, saying that „Lullius and his followers fit not their method to the true 
order of the matter‟.
163
  Most damningly of all, however, Baxter expresses his 
approval of the mature opinion of Cornelius Agrippa, himself once a leading Lullist, 
that the Lullian Art is „of no other use, than only to show the pomp and magnificence 
of wit and learning, and is no way prevalent for the attaining of sound learning, 
having in it far more of confidence than efficacy‟.
164
  Clearly then, Baxter was no 
adherent of pure Lullism. 
Nevertheless it should be remembered that many of these comments occur in the 
context of Baxter‟s general critique of philosophy.  It is also quite possible that some 
of Baxter‟s own ambivalence to Lullism may be traced to its associations with 
Renaissance occultism.
165
  Likewise within Baxter‟s works there are at least as many 
positive comments on Lull as negative ones.  In his Reasons, for instance, he 
recommends both Lull‟s Articula Fidei and Ramon de Sebonde‟s Theologia 
Naturalis, as well as contemporary works by Alexander Gill and Bishop Lucy which 
sought to prove the Creed or the Trinity by recourse to „Lully‟s reasons‟.
166
  
Likewise in this work and at least one other Baxter cites approvingly Lull‟s proof of 
the non-eternity of the world.
167
  Furthermore Baxter evidently admired Lull‟s piety 
and deep love for God, quoting him in the Christian Directory as saying: „O Orator, 
in tua oratione plus dilige Deum quam teipsum et alia: et si hoc facis justus es et 
prudens, et de charitate et sanctitate habituatus‟.
168
  However Baxter‟s most 
important reference to Lull is again found in the Reasons when he refers the reader to 
Lull and Sebonde as important exemplars of his own doctrine of the divine 
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  In this way Lull plays an important role in Baxter‟s quest for method, 
as he admits even amidst his most hostile comments saying: „Lullius thought he 
made the most accurate Art of notions; and he did indeed attempt to fit words to 
things‟ and only „mist of a true accomplishment of his design, for want of a true 
method of physicks in his mind, to fit his words to‟.
170
   
Importantly Baxter found part of the remedy for this defect in his study of 
Campanella.  That Campanella exercised a decisive influence on Baxter‟s own 
Trinitarian method is clear from the preface of the Methodus where he says „ex 
lectione Campanellae (praecipue eius Metaphysices) lucis nonnihil mihi emicuit.  
Primalitates eius, seu trina rerum activarum principia ratione et probatione non 
carere percipi‟.
171
  It is even more apparent in the Reliquiae in which Baxter 
indicates that Campanella gave him the alternative to Ramist dichotomy that he had 
long been seeking and the „method of the vestigia‟ which Lawson‟s otherwise 
excellent Theo-Politica was lacking: 
I never yet saw a scheme, or method of physicks or theology, which gave 
any satisfaction to my reason: Tho‟ many have attempted to exercise 
more accurateness in distribution… yet I could never yet see any whose 
confusion, or great defects, I could not easily discover, but not so easily 
amend. I had been twenty six years convinced that dichotomizing will 
not do it; but that the Divine Trinity in Unity, hath exprest it self in the 
whole frame of nature and morality.  And I had so long been thinking of 
a true method, and making some small attempts, but I found my self 
insufficient for it; and so continued only thinking of it, and studying it all 
these years.  Campanella I saw had made the fairest attempt that ever I 
saw made, in the principles of nature (and Commenius after him)… 
172
 
His debt to Campanella and to Campanella‟s follower Comenius is of great 
significance.  In fact on hearing that Campanella had also written a Theology Baxter 
was put in hope that „he had there also made some attempt‟ (which in fact he had), 
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The nature of the method that his reading of Campanella suggested to him was 
trichotomy – the systematic threefold division and sub-division of things into their 
elemental components.  As Baxter says, again in the preface to the Methodus, 
referring to both Campanella and Lawson: 
Ex hisce omnibus patet quare trichotomiam eligo.  Diu credidi omnem 
legitimam divisionem esse bimembrem; et ad dichotomiam maxime 
propendebam…Quando vero a re subjecta sumenda est methodus 
plerumque trichotomiam praeferendam sentio.  Trinitas enim in Unitate, 
et Unitas in Trinitate a Deo ipso in omnia sua opera nobiliora activa 
clare impressa sunt.  A rebus autem methodus est.  Hoc sicut 
Campanella, D. Glissonus et scholasticorum plurimi observarunt, ita per 
totum patefacere ego conatus sum….Non mirum est igitur si eius vestigia 
per totam doctrinam S. Scripturae, et in Dei imagine in fidelibus 
sanctificatis, et in officiis Christianis, et in tota oeconomia evangelica 
inveniantur.  Si igitur in rebus ipsis explicandis hanc Trinitatem in 
Unitate non observarem, vera non esset explicatio.
174
 
Here for the first time then we find all of the components of Baxter‟s mature 
Trinitarian method and clear evidence for his revised logic patterned on the vestigia 
Trinitatis. 
It is necessary to remember that Campanella was by no means the only source for 
Baxter‟s doctrine of the divine principles and much less for his metaphysical 
exemplarism.  In fact Baxter‟s Methodus makes clear that the triad of Power, 
Wisdom and Love was ubiquitous in medieval theology, and elsewhere he suggests 
that he also had other sources for this doctrine.
175
  It would be wrong therefore to 
ascribe to Campanella the sole influence on Baxter‟s logical and methodological 
breakthrough.  Nevertheless it is important to be clear on his great significance for 
Baxter.   
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Campanella‟s primalities, as we have suggested above, may be viewed as a kind of 
hybrid of Lull‟s divine dignities and correlatives.  For Baxter in particular, who 
wanted a method adequate to the Trinitarian nature of God, we may surmise that they 
had three distinct advantages over Lull‟s similar account.  Firstly Campanella‟s 
scheme of the primalities was much simpler to apply than the combinatorial method 
of the Lullian Art.  In this way it clearly lent itself to a more elegant and streamlined 
physical and metaphysical system, while at the same time preserving all the 
advantages of Lull‟s exemplarism.  Secondly while Lull‟s thought was entwined with 
the Augustinian psychological analogy of memory, understanding and will, 
Campanella, as we shall see in Chapter Four, offered an alternative understanding of 
this which Baxter found much more convincing.  Thirdly, if one of the attractions of 
Lull‟s thought to Baxter was its thoroughgoing but sometimes implicit 
Trinitarianism, then this was even more true of Campanella‟s primalities in which a 
Trinitarian understanding of the structure of reality is made fully explicit. 
Nevertheless it still seems right to refer to Baxters‟ decisive breakthrough as a Lullist 
turn as much as a Campanellan one.  For Baxter‟s key realisation, as we have 
suggested, was that in order to reflect the true order of reality logic must be patterned 
in a Trinitarian fashion according to the divine principles.  Whether or not Baxter 
himself realised it, his own hallowed logic thus bears a marked resemblance to Lull‟s 
spiritual logic.  Both for example were seeking a logic of first intentions or things 
rather than a scholastic logic of second intentions or words.  In both as well we find a 
definite blurring of the distinctions between logic, metaphysics and physics, 
something entirely foreign to Ramism.  Most importantly both Baxter and Lull 
founded their refined, hallowed logic on an exemplaristic Trinitarian metaphysics.  In 
this way both can be said to have sought a logic of the vestigia Trinitatis, even 
though for apologetic reasons Lull wished this to be implicit rather than explicit in 
his system.
176
  Furthermore it was Lull, rather than Campanella, who first sought to 
refine logic in a Trinitarian fashion and in this (qualified) sense it seems entirely just 
to call Baxter a Lullist.   
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Finally it is Baxter‟s distinctive Lullism that most serves to distinguish his method 
from that of other Ramist or semi-Ramist theologians of his age.  In this sense he 
may be regarded as something akin to Alsted who likewise sought to blend Ramist 
and Lullist methods into one.  Yet Baxter is even more similar to Alsted‟s pupil, the 
man he called „pious Comenius‟
177
, whose pansophic method, we have suggested, 
should be seen as a synthesis of Ramism and Trinitarian exemplarism.  Baxter, as we 
have said above, recognised in Comenius‟ works one of the most promising 
approaches to the method of the vestigia.  It is indeed striking that both should have 
sought a method of trichotomy adequate to the nature of things themselves and in 
pursuing this have been strongly influenced by Campanella.  Far more important than 
the congruence of their philosophical stance, however, is their shared ardent desire to 
sanctify their logic to the Triune God. 
5. A Primer of Hallowed Logic 
At some point in his life Baxter evidently toyed with the idea of writing a textbook 
on logic.
178
  Unfortunately he never did this, probably due to his conviction that 
preachers should spend time ministering to their flock and not busy themselves 
writing such treatises,
179
 so the only source we have for reconstructing his hallowed 
logic is the Methodus itself.  Obviously we cannot hope here to cover every aspect of 
Baxter‟s trichotomous method in detail but we can at least lay down its fundaments 
and describe the major points of its application in the Methodus itself. 
For Baxter logic is founded on order.  This he refers to as a „most observable 
predicament‟, and Packer suggests that if Baxter had written a logic textbook he 
would have added order to the Aristotelian Predicaments.
180
  In the Methodus 
Baxter‟s discussion of order notably begins with something of an Agricolan 
rhetorical orientation: „Syllabarum partes sunt literae, verborum syllabae, 
sententiarum verba, orationis sententiae, cuius ORDO et debita compaginatio 
methodus est‟.  Already we see the close connection between order and method for 
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Baxter, which is characteristic of Ramism, although, as we have suggested above, the 
two are not entirely identical in his Zabarellan conception of method.  Baxter 
continues saying that order is either of things or of words and sentences and the true 
reason of method consists in the conformity of words to things.  This focus on a logic 
of things, or in scholastic terms first intentions, is, we have already suggested, a 
major theme of Ramist technologia and of Lullist logic itself. 
Baxter holds that without order no one can be said to merit knowledge.  His reasons 
for this are chiefly theological but also show strong evidence of his Ramist affinities.  
Firstly he says that, since God governs everything in perfect order, so we must also 
do everything in an orderly way, especially through conforming words to things.  To 
this he adds that: 
Qui methodice et ordine proprio res novit, non tantum qua veras, sed 
quasi praegnantes, et plurimarum veritatum evidentias indigitantes eas 
novit.  Veritatem enim est concatenatio; et qui proprio ordine pauca 
novit, eo facilius et verius is plura intelliget.  Methodus et intellectionis et 
memoriae magnum adjumentum est. 
For Baxter „veritates recte ordinatae tibi invicem lumen praebent‟ and it is in this 
context that he suggests that right ordering is much more important than syllogistic 
disposition.
181
  For Baxter, as for Alsted, method is clearly the clavis universalis, the 
key for unlocking the secrets of the universe. 
Baxter combines these reflections with an aesthetic focus, saying that symmetry and 
harmony are the „beauty of things‟.  Such symmetry Baxter recognises as the effect 
or impression of divine Wisdom, the second primality: for just as divine Power 
effects the existence and motion of things as necessity, so divine Wisdom effects 
laws and the order and harmony of things, and divine Love their amiability, 
perfection and felicity.  In this way Power may be called the efficient cause of all 
things, Wisdom their dirigent cause and Love their final cause.  Order therefore is the 
„demonstrative and glorifying effect of wisdom‟ and Baxter marshals a number of 
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scriptural passages from the Old Testament to show this.
182
  Order also has a clear 
Christological reference as he demonstrates citing from Ephesians: 
And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which 
from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all 
things by Jesus Christ: To the intent that now unto the principalities and 




It is from order therefore, as reflecting the second primality, that beauty arises in any 
discipline or pursuit, whether music or arithmetic, poetry or rhetoric.  Likewise 
morality is for Baxter nothing but the order of voluntary actions and habits. 
Returning to his first reason Baxter suggests that human wisdom consists in 
understanding and following the already established order of things as they are the 
effect and prescript of divine wisdom.  Thus although in God there are no parts nor 
order of parts, yet from God are all things and their consequent order, and so these 
may be said to be virtually and causally in God.  Above we found a very similar 
sentiment in Ramist technologia.  It is notable once again that Baxter should 
combine this with an attention to the Lullist divine principles. 
Such order, as we have already seen, is manifest in Scripture itself.  In fact it is here 
that order attains its highest expression, for as Baxter says elsewhere Scripture bears 
the intrinsic stamp of God‟s Power, Wisdom and Love.
184
  This order is also of 
course that of the Triune Baptismal Covenant, namely the exposition of the Creed, 
Lord‟s Prayer and Decalogue within a Trinitarian context.  This Baxter calls a „most 
beautiful and regulating method‟ containing „delectable beauty and evidence of 
truth‟.  Theology is therefore simply the conforming of human wisdom to divine 
order and beauty.  Once again Baxter stresses in Ramist fashion that „rerum natura, 
ordo et usus verae methodi sunt regula‟, adding the Lullist proviso that „rebus enim 
verba et secundae notiones sunt aptandae‟.  The material things of theology are „res 
verissimae, optimae, necessariae, utilissimae et pulcherrime ordinatae‟ compared to 
which the most part of the logical and metaphysical systems of philosophers are but 
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„childish trifles‟.  However, by implication, his own logical system drawn from 
Scripture and patterned on the vestigia Trinitatis is exempt from such criticism, for it 




Following „order‟, the next most important aspect of Baxter‟s logic is his attention to 
causality.  The inclusion of the causes in Baxter‟s logic rather than in his 
metaphysics per se is distinctively Ramist, for the causes themselves occupy a 
prominent place in Ramus‟ Dialecticae, forming the subject of his first logical 
argument.
186
  However Baxter of course treats the causes in terms not of Ramist 
dichotomies but of his own system of trichotomising, suggesting that there are three 
causes, rather than the standard Aristotelian four: the efficient, constitutive and 
final.
187
  We shall consider these in much more detail in the next chapter, but it is 
important to note here, as alluded to above, that these three causes may be correlated 
to the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love respectively, representing the 
enacting of order in its full Trinitarian panoply.  It is also under these causes that 
Baxter can accommodate every created thing and it is here therefore that the 
traditional Aristotelian predicaments find their home.  Some of the details of this are 
again filled out in Baxter‟s ontology and so must await the next chapter.  However in 
blurring the distinction between logic, physics and metaphysics Baxter demonstrates 
once again his Lullist colours. 
Theology itself, says Baxter, concerns the Kingdom of God in its threefold state of 
Nature, Grace and Glory. Here we see the first fruits of Baxter‟s Lullist analysis of 
theology according to the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love, with such a 
division also corresponding to God as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier.  Likewise 
these divine principles, as we shall consider in much greater detail in Chapter Six, 
entirely condition man‟s relation to God so that according to them God must be 
considered politically as man‟s Owner, Rector and Benefactor.  In this we see for the 
first time the clear convergence of Baxter‟s Lullist and political methods. 
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This convergence is seen particularly clearly in the elucidation of his tables that 
Baxter offers in the first chapter of the Methodus.  These, following Keckermann, he 
terms the praecognita of his logic.  For our purposes they establish its „political 
vocabulary‟.  Baxter insists that each of the natural, gracious and glorious states of 
the divine Kingdom must be handled in a threefold manner, meaning that their 
„active efficient constitution‟ must be treated before their „effected constitution‟ and 
this before their „actual regimen‟, with legislation likewise being handled before 
judgement and execution.  Here we see Baxter‟s threefold pattern of causation 
applied to his political conception of the divine Kingdom.
188
 
Baxter handles the constitutive structure of the various Kingdoms by means of a 
series of Ramist dichotomies.  Most basic of all is the division between God the 
Rector and his creatures ruled by him.  This is followed by a distinction between 
„antecedent‟ and „consequent government‟.  Antecedent government refers to the 
legislation or covenant established by God and is defined by Baxter as 
„illam…voluntatis regentis patefactionem, quae debitum obediendi, et officia 
absolute, et praemii aut poenae jus sub conditione statuit‟.  It is called antecedent 
because it comes before both the actions of the subjects and the consequent 
judgement and execution of the Rector.
189
   
Pertaining to antecedent government are those benefits and gifts distributed not under 
condition of obedience or as a reward.  Therefore antecedent government clearly 
relates to the acts of God as Owner, doing with us as he wills, and Benefactor, freely 
giving gifts.  Consequent government, by contrast, refers to God‟s government 
according to the laws he establishes as Rector.  In this way the dichotomy between 
antecedent and consequent government is important in establishing that dynamic 
interaction of Owner, Rector and Benefactor which so characterises Baxter‟s 
soteriology.  Baxter adds that God frames his laws according to the capacities of his 
subjects, suiting them to the threefold character of their faculties (vitality, intellect 
and will).  Thus the Triune God relates in a threefold manner to his triune subjects.  
We shall explore the ramifications of this Triune covenantal understanding further in 
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Chapter Six.  Finally Baxter‟s desire to conform this Trinitarian and political method 
to Scripture is evident from the fact that he chooses to treat this covenant according 
to a scriptural pattern grounded in „salvation history‟, rather than in logical terms 
according to a series of nested Ramist dichotomies: a „universal initial‟ (Adamic, 
Noachic), „universal initial and particular‟ (Abrahamic), „particular‟ (Mosaic) and 
„universal more perfect‟ dispensation (the new covenant of the Gospel).
190
 
Baxter concludes his discussion of logic with the following reminder of the grounds 
of his Trinitarian method, which is also helpfully illustrative of his entire logical 
system: 
ORDO scilicet FACULTATUM ANIMAE humanae, verae methodi totius 
theologiae index est; partim qua speculum seu imago est, Trinitatis divinorum 
principiorum, (primalitatum, seu attributorum) et ita ratio methodi ex causa 
efficiente indicanda est; et partim, qua methodi ratio sumenda est a subditis, 
et a facultatibus influxus efficientis RECEPTIVIS.  Nullum etenim nobis 
clarius speculum concessum est, ex quo de natura divina (analogice) 
concipere et dicere possumus, quam anima humana… 
For Baxter the whole of theology unfolds from this dynamic relation between the 
Trinity of Principles and the soul of man, whether construed in a personal or a 
political context.  He goes on to outline briefly the path of an analogical ascent from 
the human soul to God, followed by a descent from God to the soul through the 
divine influx of law and grace.
191
  This ascent and corresponding descent will be the 
topic of the rest of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three: The Physics and Metaphysics of the Vestigia Trinitatis 
1. Introduction 
The seventeenth century was a time of great flux and intellectual transition, 
witnessing the final dissolution of a longstanding medieval and Renaissance 
worldview and the establishment in its place of a new scientific and mechanistic 
hegemony, which sought to explain everything, eventually even life and the soul, as 
the effect of innumerable, invisible atoms.  Baxter stood right at the cusp of this 
development, yet as Packer suggests, by the time of the Restoration and the founding 
of the Royal Society, his method and ideas would have seemed thoroughly crude and 
old-fashioned to most of his contemporaries.  For this reason his physical thought in 
general and his Methodus in particular were almost entirely neglected.
1
   
Yet it would be premature in the extreme either to accept this judgement at face 
value or consequently to try and strip Baxter‟s thought of, what may seem to us, its 
physical or metaphysical husk, in order to reach a supposed purely theological 
kernel.  Instead Baxter‟s work demands a more sensitive and contextual reading in 
which his theology and physics are understood as wholly allied.  For Baxter is the 
defender of an older view of a harmonious and interconnected universe.  Such a 
worldview was one which sustained – even at times demanded – the vestigia 
Trinitatis.
2
  For in the mutual interconnection of its elements, in its hierarchical and 
even organic structure, and especially in the immanence of transcendent principles, 
almost every facet of creation was regarded as in some way reflecting the divine.  
Ultimately however this worldview was discarded with the rise of an exclusively 
mechanical science and the Enlightenment „disenchantment of nature‟. 
In this chapter, with Baxter‟s logic and its metaphysical presuppositions already 
having been examined in some detail in previous chapters, we shall now turn to 
consider Baxter‟s physics and his understanding of causality.  Not only will this have 
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further ramifications for our understanding of Baxter‟s Ramistic logic, but it will also 
demonstrate the remarkable coherence of Baxter‟s physical worldview and its 
foundations in both his scriptural convictions and Trinitarian conceptualisation of 
reality.   
In the second section we shall consider the intellectual context of seventeenth-
century physics.  This will lead directly in the third section into a discussion of 
Baxter‟s opposition to the contemporary atomists such as Hobbes and Descartes and 
his assertion of higher spiritual principles of physical operations.  In the fourth 
section we shall examine the tenets of Baxter‟s ontology considering both its 
hexaemeral ground in the text of Scripture and its Trinitarian shape in Baxter‟s 
account of efficient, constitutive and final causation.  This will allow a detailed 
metaphysical study of the general features of the vestigia Trinitatis, which will itself 
prepare the way in the following chapter for a study of Baxter‟s doctrine of the 
imago Dei. 
2. Historical and Intellectual Context 
The full story of the dissolution of the medieval worldview is complex but for our 
purposes it begins with a certain strong dissatisfaction with Aristotelian physical 
science that surfaced in early sixteenth-century Italy.  This was fuelled, at least in 
part, by the rise of the new Florentine Platonism in the previous century.  Among the 
chief of those dissatisfied, and often grouped on their own as Renaissance 
philosophers of nature, were Bernardino Telesio, Francesco Patrizi (called Patricius) 
and Tommaso Campanella.  All of these were united in advocating the need for a 
new philosophy of nature, a desire which was grounded negatively in their antipathy 




Two distinctive and related features of their thought are particularly worthy of 
mention.  The first is their conviction that nature could be explained through the 
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interaction of a very few fundamental principles.  For Telesio these were the 
incorporeal principles of heat and cold which penetrated all matter and were the 
source of all motion.  For Patricius the noblest active principle in nature was light 
which he understood as infinite in extent and permeating all things.  Combined with 
a Plotinian emanational scheme he postulated light, heat, space and fluid as the 
fundamental constituents of the world, explanatory of all phenomena.  For 
Campanella himself these were of course Power, Wisdom and Love, the three 
primalities of being.
4
  The second feature is their panpsychism – their belief that 
everything, not just animal and vegetative life, was endowed with soul or sensation 
to various degrees.  This is a prominent feature of Telesio‟s own thought but reaches 
its heights with Campanella‟s De Sensu Rerum.  There is no doubt that his ideas were 
influential on the science and philosophy of the seventeenth century, however much 
they were disapproved of in some quarters.  Leibniz, for instance, is known to have 
read and deeply appreciated Campanella‟s work and echoes of both the Campanellan 
primalities and panpsychism may be found in his Monadology.
5
 
As a group the Renaissance naturalists are a prime example of Amos Funkenstein‟s 
trend towards homogeneity – that drive to understand natural phenomena through as 
few fundamental principles as possible which resulted in a view of the universe as 
interconnected and animated and the blurring of distinctions between ontological 
orders.  This marks a return to a „symbolical‟ reading of the universe as permeated 
throughout by analogical signs of God‟s presence, reasserting this against the 
opposing Scotist and Nominalist doctrines, which, according to Funkenstein, 
postulated a univocal, unequivocal account of God and creatures.  In other words 
where Nominalist physics was associated with a univocal but heterogeneous account 
of the universe, Naturalist physics held to an analogical but homogeneous account.
6
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Against this backdrop Funkenstein holds that the seventeenth century must be 
characterised as asserting a homogeneous but unequivocal approach to nature,
7
  
maintaining that in no other century, either before or since, was there such a drive to 
unite the disciplines of theology and physics.
8
  Thus, while the Renaissance desire 
for homogeneity became one of the guiding principles of the new science, the 
symbolical vision of an animated and interconnected universe was eventually 
discarded.  This was marked by a metaphysical turn away from an analogical and 
towards a univocal understanding of being.
9
  Indeed, as Jean-Luc Marion suggests, in 
the seventeenth century mathematics became the univocal language of nature.  This 
may be seen especially in physicists such as Kepler and Galileo, the latter of whom 




Closely allied with this mathematical movement was a new expounding of atomist 
science.  This occurred in the context of what was in some quarters now a deeply 
entrenched opposition to Aristotelian physics and metaphysics.  An early pioneer in 
this movement was Pierre Gassendi, a Catholic priest as well as natural philosopher, 
who, from his reading of humanist authors, such as Ramus and Vives, and physicists, 
such as Copernicus and Galileo, conceived a great dislike of Aristotle.  To his mind 
Aristotle neglected the results of physical experiments and mathematics and instead 
concentrated his attention on chimeras like substantial forms.
11
  Influenced deeply by 
Epicureanism Gassendi suggested instead that the whole of reality is composed of 
atoms characterised by qualities of shape, size and weight.  These, he held, were 
created by God and endowed with motion.  In this way Gassendi clearly held that all 
(physical) effects were ultimately reducible to matter and motion.
12
 
Along with Gassendi and others such as Sennertus, René Descartes was one of the 
key early exponents of this atomist doctrine.  His expression of the laws of motion in 
                                                 
7
 Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 72. 
8
 Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 3. 
9
 Jean-Luc Marion, „The Idea of God‟, in CHSP, I.266-8. 
10
 Marion, „Idea of God‟, 268-70. 
11
 Barry Brundell, Pierre Gassendi: From Aristotelianism to a New Natural Philosophy (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic, 1987), 16.  
12
 Brundell, Gassendi, 54-6. 
95 
 
mathematical form gave particular impetus to the atomist project of describing all 
physical phenomena in terms of matter and motion.  Similarly his revision of 
metaphysics had a profound effect on seventeenth-century thought.  Indeed his 
reduction of everything to extension and thought represents a stark and attenuated 




In England this atomism quickly took root.  Hobbes, its acme, effectively ended up 
denying the existence of spirits.  Yet this movement towards a Hobbist atomism and 
a stripped-down Cartesian metaphysics certainly did not go unchallenged, for many 
were extremely worried about its theological and social implications.  It must be 
remembered that from a contemporary perspective the advances of the new science 
often looked suspiciously like the recrudescence of a suspect atheistic Epicureanism.  
In this context two groups are particularly worthy of mention: the clerical opposition 
to Hobbes, including notably Bishops Bramhall and Lucy, and the „spiritual 
philosophers‟, including Baxter‟s correspondent Henry More and his close friends 
Sir Matthew Hale and Samuel Gott.  These latter held that spiritual substance played 
an active and indeed predominant role in physical processes, serving as the principle 
of motion and all higher interactions.  Baxter himself was at the forefront of 
opposition to Hobbes, calling for the Leviathan to be burned as early as 1655,
14
 and 
has strong affinities with both groups. 
Contemporaneous with both the atomist and counter-atomist movements, and often 
associated with the forging of a theological physics, was the „Mosaicall Philosophy‟.  
Following in a long tradition of hexaemeral works,
15
 this drew on the Bible and 
especially the early chapters of Genesis as forming the blueprint for a scientific 
worldview.  It often drew as well on the concept of a pristine wisdom, the prisca 
philosophia, dating back to prelapsarian times and held to be conveyed by Moses in 
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the text of Scripture.
16
  The Mosaical philosophy itself was ubiquitous, cutting across 
all intellectual and confessional boundaries.
17
  In these terms, at least in its purer 
forms,
18
 it can be placed within the wider context of the sanctifying of human reason 
according to a biblical pattern.   
Here we have briefly tried to capture the main features of this seventeenth-century 
revolution in physics and metaphysics as evident from Baxter‟s own writings.  As we 
have already begun to discover, Baxter shares with the Renaissance natural 
philosophers a homogeneous and analogical view of nature, endorsing a scriptural 
physics and „spiritual philosophy‟.  By the end of his own century all three positions 
were largely discarded.  In scientific terms the real turning point was the publication 
in 1687 of Newton‟s Principia Mathematica with its elegant geometrical account of 
universal gravitation.  Coming just a few years after the Methodus this sounded the 
death knell for Baxter‟s own symbolical Renaissance understanding of the world.
19
  
As Funkenstein succinctly puts it: „The medieval sense of God‟s symbolic presence 
in his creation, and the sense of a universe replete with transcendent meanings and 
hints, had to recede if not to give way totally to the postulates of univocation and 
homogeneity in the seventeenth century‟.
20
  Indeed, with the advantage of hindsight, 
the lack of such a univocal and homogeneous mathematical description of nature is 
surely the biggest defect of Baxter‟s physical system.  Baxter unfortunately was in no 
position to supply such a system for he had little interest or skill in mathematics.
21
  
Nevertheless Baxter‟s scripturally-motivated physics did enable a sophisticated and 
nuanced metaphysical understanding of the presence of the Triune God in creation, 
theologically far superior to the bleak deterministic view of reality which was the 
first fruits of Enlightenment Deism. 
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3. Baxter’s Response to the Atomists 
Baxter himself recognised the dangers of such a pared-down view of the universe.  
One of his longest and most detailed critiques of atomist philosophy can be found in 
his Appendix to the Reasons.  This expounds the primary thesis that matter and 
motion alone are insufficient as explanatory principles of physical phenomena.  Only 
when this point is established is Baxter able to propose his own metaphysical 
framework of matter and active formal natures as a credible alternative.  In this 
section we will therefore review in some detail Baxter‟s arguments, in order to clear 
the way for a more detailed discussion of his ontology. 
In general Baxter opposes those who claim that „matter and motion, without any 
more, may do all that which you ascribe to incorporeal substances or souls‟.
22
  His 
arguments against this position are both theological and physical in character.  He 
begins by pointing out that all his opponents are „constrained to confess an 
incorporeal intellectual substance, even that there is a God, and that God is such‟.  To 
prove this Baxter rehearses his own variation on a conventional scholastic argument, 
pointing out that matter did not make itself and that, as motion is but its mode, 
cannot be said to have been produced by its own motion.  From this he deduces the 
existence of God the Unmoved Mover.  Granted this much, even if his opponents 
were to argue that matter itself was eternal in duration, Baxter is confident that he 
could still demonstrate to them the existence of an eternal incorporeal cause, since 
matter „is in it self so dull a thing‟ as to require explanation of its existence.
23
 
With his opponents also granting that God is an intelligent agent and the first cause 
of matter and motion, Baxter next argues that they cannot deny „that he still causeth 
both, by his continued influx or causing efficacy‟.  His main premise here is that 
„there can be no effect without a cause, and therefore when the cause ceaseth, the 
effect must cease‟.  From this he concludes that God must continually uphold all 
things in existence, so that if there were a cessation of this divine influx for one 
moment all things would cease in being: 
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And nothing is more abhorrent to all common reason, than that this stone 
or dirt, which was nothing as yesterday, should be a God to it self, even 
one independent self-sufficient being, as soon as it is created; and so that 
God made as many demy-gods as atoms.
24
 
Baxter‟s own view was that forces communicated to matter not only an external 
motion but also an internal principle of this motion and its continuation.
25
  This 
intrinsic principle, as we shall see, Baxter considered to be lowest in a hierarchy of 
active natures all upheld and sustained by God. 
From these considerations Baxter concludes: 
Seeing then it cannot by sober reason be denyed, that God himself is by a 
continued causation, the preserver and intimate first mover of all things, 
it must needs thence follow, that matter and motion are still insufficient 
of themselves: and that this is to be none of the controversie between us: 
but only whether it be any created nature, power, or other cause, by 
which God causeth motion in any thing, or all things?  Or whether he do 
it by his own immediate causation alone without the use of any second 
cause, save meer motion it self?  So that the insufficiency of matter and 
motion to continual alterations and productions, must be confessed by all 
that confess there is a God.
26
 
It is clear that Baxter believed matter itself to be inert.  In fact, as we shall consider 
below, he classed it as a passive nature in stark contrast to the active natures which 
moulded, activated and even breathed life into it.  This division between active and 
passive natures, between the sufficient and the insufficient, is of fundamental 
importance to Baxter‟s own physics and metaphysics and it is significant to see this 
perspective emerging (negatively) in his critique of atomism. 
Baxter next argues that „it is not a meer motion of the first cause, which appeareth in 
the being and motions of the creature‟.  For, as he notes, all things manifest first „a 
tendency in the creatures motion to a certain end, which is an attractive good‟, 
secondly „a certain order in all motions to that end‟ and thirdly „certain laws, or 
guidances and overrulings, to keep them in that order‟.  Taken together these imply 
that not Power alone but also Wisdom and Goodness are manifest in the motions of 
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the created order.  Without mentioning the Campanellan primalities by name Baxter 
thus seeks to demonstrate their existence and importance.  He argues that it is evident 
from nature that „the first mover doth more than meerly move‟ and indeed that he 
moves things according to his Wisdom and Goodness as well as his Power.  Granted 
this, which Baxter holds can be demonstrated from Gassendi‟s own works, Baxter 
proves to his opponents that „there is divine Power, Wisdom and Love, which is 
more than matter and motion it self‟.
27
   
Baxter finds further evidence for these principles of Power, Wisdom and Love (and 
their analogues) in a plethora of specific phenomena.  Here once again he attacks the 
atomists on their own ground.  For in each case Baxter is determined to demonstrate 
that matter, its various modes (analysed by Gassendi as magnitude, figure and the 
mysterious pondus) and motion are together insufficient to account for observations.  
A prime example of this is Baxter‟s critique of the atomist account of sensation.  
Asking his opponents for an explanation of how sense can arise from mere matter 
and motion Baxter argues that „atoms, as matter, have no sense, they smart not, they 
see not, they feel no delight‟.  He uses this in support of his own theory of active 
forms saying: „tell us how and why the change of meer magnitude and figure should 
make a thing feel that felt not before.  If you difference not matter by some natural 
difference of forms, or properties and virtues, you will never speak sense in proving 
sense to be in matter, by meer atomizing it, or moving it‟.  For Baxter this argument 
is conclusive for the existence of other principles beyond these.
28
 
The same applies for light and heat, which he calls motion‟s „great concomitants‟.  
Here he criticises the atomists, noting that „they cannot understand motion, without 
making nothing of light and heat, or greatly obscuring and abusing them‟.  Baxter 
does not intend to denigrate motion – „a most noble and observable cause of most 
that is done or existent in the corporeal world‟ – but rather to question the reason 
why it must be regarded as the solitary cause of all things.  Baxter therefore argues 
that heat and light are distinct principles with their own „proper, coequal and 
coordinate properties and effects‟.  Thus although motion contributes to heat, he 
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holds that „heat contributeth as much to motion at least, as motion doth to heat‟.
29
  
Once again therefore matter and motion alone are proved to be inadequate. 
The most serious flaw with atomism according to Baxter is its inability to account for 
intellect and volition.  As he asks rhetorically, „if no better a solution be given us of 
the nature of light and heat, what shall we expect from them about intellect and 
volition?‟ Baxter held the intellectual nature to consist of the three faculties of 
understanding, will and executive power.  For him the atomist focus on just one of 
these faculties – power construed as motion – begs the question of „how that which 
hath no participation of understanding or will should constitute an agent that doth 
understand and will?‟
30
   
Baxter‟s final and most damning arguments against the atomist position centre on the 
fact that it is dishonouring to God: 
Lastly, with nature you deny the being of morality.  For if there be no 
difference of beings, but in quantity, figure, motion and site; and all 
motion is locomotion, which moveth by natural necessitating force, then 
a man moveth as a stone, because it is irresistibly moved, and hath no 
power to forbear any act which it performeth, or to do it otherwise than it 
doth. 
The implication of atomism then is that there is no free will, no moral choice and 
ultimately no virtue or vice.  Man is reduced to no more than an engine, or „clod of 
earth‟, and his dignity stripped from him entirely.
31
  For Baxter therefore the 
dishonouring of God and the loss of man‟s dignity are the final, inevitable result of 
the atomist dogmas. 
In his advocacy of physical principles beyond matter and motion Baxter 
demonstrates a close similarity to the Renaissance natural philosophers.  This may be 
seen from his own „recipe‟ for natural philosophy: 
Cull out into one, and set together, but what Patricius hath said of light, 
and what Telesius hath said of heat, (and Campanella after him) and what 
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Gassendus and Cartesius have said of motion, and cut off all their 
superfluities, and you will have a better entrance into sound philosophy, 
than any one book that I know doth afford you.
32
 
While this may appear a somewhat eclectic „cut and paste‟ philosophy, as we shall 
see its disparate elements are given coherence through their relation to a Trinitarian 
scheme of the vestigia Trinitatis.  This Baxter only hints at here, suggesting, for 
example, of motion, light and heat that „in one essence they are three coequal vertues 
or faculties, the vis motiva, illuminativa et calefactiva‟ or that the three faculties of 
understanding, will and executive power are „marvellously conjunct and co-
operative‟.
33
   
All of Baxter‟s principal arguments against the atomists are founded, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, on the axiomatic principle that „nihil dat quod non habet, vel 
formaliter vel eminenter‟ which he cites as defended by Campanella in his De Sensu 
Rerum.
34
  Likewise while Baxter is emphatic that the „fanaticisms‟ of Telesio and 
Campanella are no „part of our physical creed‟ he was strongly influenced by both 
Campanella‟s panpsychism and that of Francis Glisson, its most influential English 
exponent.
35
   
Thus although Baxter denies that matter is imbued with any kind of sensation, he 
does advocate the crucial role of the primalities in active natures.  He also accepts 
that lower natures can imitate higher ones, meaning that „there is some image or 
participation of life in inanimates, of sense in vegetatives, of reason in sensitives and 
of angelical intellection in rationals‟.  In this way he clearly imbibes the Renaissance 
doctrines of Campanella and Glisson, while analogically seeking to temper their 
extremes.
36
  Indeed Baxter sums up his charge against the atomists saying that „they 
are deluded by taking the vestigia and images of things, for the things themselves‟.  
Because they cannot grasp this principle they end up reducing all the higher natures 
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to the lowest common denominator and thus „deny the differencing forms of all 
things‟.
37
  As Baxter himself succinctly puts it, „to violate the harmony of God‟s 
works, and to deny all the steps of the ladder save the lowest, is but an unhappy 
solving of phaenomena‟.
38
  Furthermore in denuding the universe of its rich 
analogical texture they do violence to the very essence of its harmonious order – 
subverting the principle of ordo so vital to Baxter‟s own hallowed logic. 
Once again then we find ourselves in the territory of the primalities, although 
Baxter‟s own circuitous route to this point is markedly different from Campanella‟s 
direct metaphysical and panpsychic approach.
39
  By demonstrating the insufficiency 
of matter and motion Baxter opens his readers‟ perspective to a whole spectrum of 
principles beyond them.  In effect his argument is that the plenitude of divine 
goodness cannot possibly be captured through only matter and motion.  Baxter here 
only hints at the fact that all of these necessary further principles can be 
comprehended under the primalities of Power, Wisdom and Love, but this is 
certainly implicit in his discussion.  As we shall see in ensuing chapters the 
foundation of his own position is very simple: „Know thyself‟ and in particular know 
thyself to be more than the effects of matter and motion, and to be endowed with a 
soul fashioned in the image of God. 
4. Tenets of Baxter’s Ontology 
The blurring of the distinction between the sciences is one of the key features of 
Baxter‟s thought, seen nowhere more clearly than in his concept of ontology.  For 
Baxter this marked the confluence of all the other disciplines and he characterised it 
as the „knowledge of real entities‟, both spirits and bodies, dividing it into its 
subcomponents of somatology, pneumatology and theology – respectively the study 
of bodies, of spirits and of God himself.
40
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Far then from being purely metaphysical, Baxter‟s ontology embraced logic, 
metaphysics, physics and theology.  Baxter affirmed the link between logic and 
ontology, noting that after having made the „exactest acquaintance with the true 
precepts of logick‟ the young Christian student should interrupt his study of this 
discipline in order to gain a thorough grounding in „ontologia‟.  With this in turn 
complete he advised that: 
When you have well stated your ontologie, or real science, then review 
your logick and organical part of metaphysicks; and see verba rebus 
aptentue; fetch then your words and organical notions from the nature of 
the things.  Abundance are confounded by taking up logical notions first 
which are unsuitable to true physical beings.
41
 
The consequence of this is apparent in Baxter‟s shift to a trichotomous blend of 
Ramist and Lullist logic, which he saw as mirroring the vestigia Trinitatis and the 
ontological order.  In this light Baxter‟s sanctified logic may be clearly seen as an 
embodiment of his ontology. 
Baxter held a similar position with respect to the relation between physics and 
theology remarking that: 
When you come to seek after more abstruse and real wisdom, joyn 
together the study of physicks and theologie; and take not your physicks 
as separated from or independant of theologie; but as the study of God in 
his works, and of his works as leading to himself. 
This marriage of physics and theology is clearly seen in his unified science of 
ontology, involving not only the study of moving bodies and of physical phenomena 
but also of spirits and of God himself.  Baxter held that these could only be 
understood properly with God taken as „first and last, the original director and end of 
all‟ and with the „due dependance‟ of bodies on spirits, passive natures on active 
natures upheld.
42
  In this way the coherence of Baxter‟s ontology relies on its 
theological grounding and implies a prioritising of the spiritual over the material and 
the invisible over the visible, demonstrating Baxter‟s thought to be markedly similar 
to the spiritual philosophers of his own day.  Likewise in seeking a scriptural 
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grounding, Baxter‟s ontology, as we shall see, represents a variety of the ubiquitous 
Mosaical Philosophy. 
In his ontology Baxter poses an important distinction between the „order of knowing‟ 
and the „order of being‟: 
When you study only to know what is true, you must begin at the primum 
cognoscibile, and so rise in ordine cognoscendi: but when you would 
come to see things in their proper order, by a more perfect satisfying 
knowledge, you must draw up a synthetical scheme, iuxta ordinem 
essendi where God must be the first and last; the first efficient governour 
and end of all.
43
 
What this indicates is that the traffic between physics and theology is necessarily 
two-way.  In the order of knowing we therefore ascend from the primum 
cognoscibile (either self-knowledge or sensible evidence) towards God himself at (or 
rather beyond) the summit of understanding, whilst in the order of being, in a proper 
methodical scheme such as the Methodus, we descend from God down the hierarchy 
of being.  In this way God is clearly „first and last‟ in the study of both physics and 
theology, which can be seen mutually to inform each other.  It is for this reason that 
chapter four of the Methodus on ontology comes after chapter two on the doctrine of 
God even though Baxter‟s doctrine of God relies to some degree on the metaphysical 
principles set out in his ontology.  In this thesis the order of treatment is again 
reversed so that having first discussed Baxter‟s refined logic, metaphysics and 
physics we may then go on to comprehend better his complex Trinitarian doctrine. 
With this in mind we turn now to consider in detail the two most important tenets of 
Baxter‟s ontology: its hexaemeral ground and its Trinitarian roots in the metaphysics 
of divine principles, which together will allow us a comprehensive grasp of Baxter‟s 
doctrine of the vestigia Trinitatis.  Before embarking on this however we must make 
one important caveat: in handling the topic of the vestigia Trinitatis, and later also its 
link with the divine Triunity, we must always be careful to distinguish between the 
order of being and the order of understanding.  In particular we must consider 
whether Baxter is talking from a purely natural standpoint of impartiality or whether, 
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as is more likely, he is already making a statement which is at some level informed 
by faith in the Triune God and belief in the coherence of his universe.  It is to be 
suspected that in dealing with the topic of natural theology in the seventeenth century 
there will be no neutral ground.  Indeed for Baxter „natural‟ theology and apologetics 
were always very closely intertwined.
44
 
4.1. The Hexaemeral Ground of Baxter’s Ontology 
As we have already seen, Baxter located his Trinitarian method in the pattern of 
Scripture as much as in the pattern of nature.  Indeed given the exemplaristic 
character of his „hallowed logic‟ it was entirely natural that Baxter should have 
sought to root this exemplarism in the text of Scripture itself and especially in the 
account of God‟s Trinitarian interaction with creation.  Indeed, Baxter declared that 
his logic of the vestigia was no more than the „Scripture method‟ set out in the first 
three chapters of Genesis,
45
  and that „the book of Job, and the Psalms, may acquaint 
us that our physicks are not so little kin to theology as some suppose‟.
46
  Overall then 
Baxter held that the Bible, and particularly the first chapter of Genesis, contained 
„sounder doctrine of physicks‟ than that of any philosopher who contradicts it.
47
  In 
Scripture particularly Baxter found justification for two major claims of his ontology 
– the distinction of active and passive natures and the action of the higher on the 
lower.  Coordinating these within a Trinitarian framework of the divine principles, 
which he saw as at least implicit in Scripture, Baxter was subsequently able to 
construct a coherent physics and metaphysics based on the biblical text itself.  In this 
way Baxter‟s own thought may be clearly seen as an outstanding example of the 
contemporary Mosaical philosophy. 
Importantly, Baxter‟s thought conforms very closely to that of his two friends 
Samuel Gott and Sir Matthew Hale.  Gott was a politician and keen natural 
philosopher most famous for his utopia the Nova Solyma.  He was a Baconian and 
peripherally associated with the circle around Hartlib, Dury and Comenius.  His 
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work the Divine History, was a massive and exhaustive hexaemeron much admired 
by Baxter
48
  Hale was a distinguished judge as well as a talented amateur scientist 
and philosopher.  Baxter made his acquaintance during his sojourn at Acton in 
Middlesex and they quickly became firm friends.  As Baxter says, „we were oft 
together, and almost all our discourse was philosophical, and especially about the 
nature of spirits and superior regions‟.
49
  In fact with some justification Hale may be 
referred to as the midwife of the Methodus,
50
 and it was Hale particularly who 
encouraged Baxter to integrate his physics with his theology.
51
  Given his admiration 
for both Hale and Gott we are justified in taking them as guides for our interpretation 
of Baxter‟s own hexaemeral thought. 
This may be found in highly compact form in both his Reasons and Methodus.  The 
work of the first day, Baxter says, refers to God‟s initial creation out of nothing of 
those natures closest to him in similitude and dignity: the active natures 
hierarchically arranged as „pure simple intellectuals‟, sensitive souls (of animals) and 
fire.  This was followed by God‟s subsequent creation of the passive elements of air, 
water and earth as the „matter of the elementary world in an unformed mass or chaos‟ 
over which moved the Spirit of God by his „action and formative influx‟.  God‟s first 
act was the „fiat lux‟ in which he spoke by his „Word of Power, Wisdom and Love‟, 
forming the „most noble active element‟ of fire and causing it to give light and 
through its threefold motive, illuminative and calefactive virtue to act on and shape 




On the second day, perhaps through the ministry of the angels and of fire, God 
separated out the attenuated and rarefied element of air, the highest of the passive 
natures, expanding it upwards from the earth as a firmament, intended to separate the 
clouds from the lower waters and to act as the medium for light.  On the third day 
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God separated out the rest of the passive elements to form the land and the sea, 
making individual plants by species „in their specifick forms and virtue of 
generation‟.  On the fourth day God separated out the pre-existing fire into the 
luminaries of the Sun, Moon and stars, appointing them to indicate times and 
seasons.  Then on the fifth day he made the „inferior sensitives‟, namely the fish and 
birds, again with the power of multiplying.
53
   
The sixth day marked the culmination of God‟s creative acts, first with the creation 
of the terrestrial animals and then of man in the image of God.  While Baxter 
suggests that the sensitive and presumably vegetative souls of plants and animals 
may have pre-existed in a separate state, he insists that man‟s intellective soul was 
created from nothing as a special act by God, marking his supreme dignity as the 
pinnacle of the visible creation.  Finally on the seventh day God rests and, beholds 
his good creation.  He loves himself in his own works (that is, the glory of his image 
in them) and has complacency in them, appointing this day for all time as a Sabbath 
to commemorate the creation and worship the Creator.
54
 
This in bare outline is Baxter‟s hexaemeral doctrine.  It is helpfully supplemented by 
his elaboration on the nature of God‟s own creative action.  Following Christian 
orthodoxy Baxter insists this was a creation out of nothing.  He holds therefore that 
the world was not created in space or time but in eternity, and not out of any pre-
existing material.  In this way the creation narrative of the six days refers to God‟s 
progressive and purposive ordering of the unformed, chaotic mixture into a good and 
fruitful world.  In this process Baxter tentatively suggests, perhaps following the 
much more confident pronunciations of Gott and Hale, that the active natures 
themselves had a secondary role.
55
 
Importantly Baxter affirms the intimate involvement of the Triune God in his 
creation right from the beginning.  In the Methodus Baxter formalises this in terms of 
the action of God the Father through the Son and Holy Spirit as eminent Creator and 
origin of all things, the action of the Son from the Father and by the Holy Spirit as 
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the ordination of all things and the action of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son 
and through himself as the perfection of things.
56
  He also is clear that God created 
all things through his essence and freely by his Power, Wisdom and Will, and denies 
the position of Aureolus that God created through a transient action acting as a 
certain mean between the Creator and the created.
57
  In fact he emphasises God‟s 
direct involvement at every stage of creation, even to the point of relativising the role 
of the active natures as secondary causes. 
The act of creation itself may be conceived, Baxter suggests, as if by emanation from 
the divine essence and free will holding in existence and continually sustaining all 
created things.  As he says, if God‟s efflux were to cease but for a moment all 
creation would return to nothingness.  Through creation as an act of God‟s Power, 
Wisdom and Love conjoined, his own likeness is impressed, to varying degrees, on 
those things he has created.  In this way the whole of creation is enclosed within 
God‟s eternal purpose, enacted in time, that he should behold and love himself in 
complacency in everything that he has made.  Strikingly creation itself, encompassed 




As well as providing Baxter, at least implicitly, with a Trinitarian framework for his 
ontology, Genesis also justified the important distinction between the active element 
of fire and the three passive elements of air, water and earth.  Likewise in its 
discussion of multiplication by seed according to kind it could be interpreted as 
referencing the higher vegetative and sensitive active natures.  In this way Baxter‟s 
hierarchical understanding of being, marked by its radical ontological distinction 
between active and passive natures, begins to unfold out of the very text of Scripture 
itself. 
If we take Gott as a guide for our understanding of Baxter then this is made fully 
explicit.  Like Baxter, Gott describes the action of the Spirit of God on the chaotic 
mixture, characterising it as a „supernatural incubation‟ and an act of improper 
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creation distinct from the earlier and proper creation ex nihilo.  As Baxter also 
implies in his own account, Gott held that the higher natures (which for him included 
the four elemental spirits as well as the sensitive and vegetative souls) were all latent 
in this elemental chaos from the beginning.  The action of God‟s Spirit therefore was 
to „prepare and predispose them by fit mistion and temperature of them all; and 




Following Aristotle, Gott also speaks of a distinction between matter and form.
60
  To 
his mind matter, which he understands as something known by corporeal quantity or 
extension, has a „common receptivity‟ of forms and through their activity bodily 
variations are „superinduced‟ onto matter.  He therefore understands forms as the 
architects of matter, fashioning and moulding it for a variety of purposes.  The forms 
themselves he says are known by their active qualities and he describes them as 
„active substantial entitys‟ or more generally as spirits.  These „spirits‟, wholly 
distinct from the matter they inform, are not only human or angelical but also 
material, elementary, vegetative, sensitive and even accidental.  As active principles 
they underlie the differentiation of homogeneous substance into heterogeneous 
substances,
61
 in operation throughout the six days of creation as a mode of improper 
creation.
62
  Furthermore Gott‟s conception of matter and spirit lies at the root of his 
antagonism towards Cartesian and Epicurean philosophies.  It is an axiom for him 
that matter tends naturally to rest whereas spirits „intend their acts and exercises to 
the utmost‟.
63
  Entirely like Baxter therefore he holds that matter and motion are 
insufficient to account for the variety of physical processes in the universe. 
Notable parallels may also be found between Hale and Baxter.  Like Baxter, Hale 
espoused a general worldview of the vestigia Trinitatis,
64
 holding against atomist 
reductionism that it was necessary to have recourse to the „infinite wisdom, power 
and goodness of the glorious God‟, as „essentiated‟ in the laws of nature, in order to 
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 Although philosophically much more sympathetic to 
Aristotle than Baxter,
66
 his own physics drew heavily on the same matter-form 
dualism that we have had already had cause to comment on. 
Hale therefore insisted on „an active principle…in a naturally passive material 
world‟.
67
  This he called „spirit‟, „form‟ or „ferment‟.  Hale‟s tract Magnetismus 
Magnus provides a good illustrative example of these spiritual principles.  In this he 
attributes the origin of the magnetic force to „self-moving intrinsick principles‟ in 
nature which he says „are not unfitly called essential virtues or essential forms‟.  
These principles are self-moving not in the sense that they are self-sufficient or 
independent of God, but rather in that „when they are once settled, they have the root 
of their motions and operations within themselves, so that no other created cause 
doth physically contribute to them‟ and „yet the sovereign cause, and his influence, 




Hale self -consciously positioned his own physical views on the matter-form relation 
as a mean between the extremes of mechanistic and vitalist philosophy.
69
  He 
avoided these by recourse to the theories of John Baptist van Helmont, who rejected 
Aristotelian teleology, replacing the Aristotelian notions of form and final cause with 
his own notion of ferments.  These were regarded by Helmont as a „vis‟ or „virtus‟ – 
terms which significantly echo Baxter‟s own – inhabiting passive matter with the 
ability to replicate and multiply in material bodies and govern physical processes.  
According to Cromartie, Hale chose to view ferments as manifestations or 
instantiations of God‟s law (and thus presumably also of his Power, Wisdom and 
Goodness).  As varied principles they could thus be used to explain a whole gamut of 
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phenomena ranging from the nature of light and magnetism to the characteristics of 
vegetative and sensitive natures and culminating in the description of man‟s soul.
70
 
Importantly Hale clearly viewed his physics not only as consonant with the text of 
Scripture but even as emerging out of it.  Thus as with Gott, it is the action of the 
Spirit of God moving over the face of the waters which first begins the 
transformation of this passive matter by imparting to it active forms or qualities.
71
  
Following the first impartation of active principles, the continuing work of the Spirit 
of God is coordinated with the action of the spiritual forms themselves.  Through 
light the chaotic matter is digested, allowing the other elements to separate out.  Then 
through the action of all the elements together the different spheres of nature – the 
heavens, the land, the sea – are established and ordered.
72
  Then, through the 
„fecundating principle‟ of the Spirit of God and by the „powerful energy of the fiery 
and luminous nature‟, the vegetative and sensitive natures are created.
73
  The 
culmination of this work is again the creation of man in the image of God and the 
Sabbath rest of God himself.
74
 
It is this spiritualised philosophy of Hale and Gott therefore which provides the 
proper context for our understanding of Baxter‟s hexaemeral ontology.  The Platonic 
aspects of this Mosaical Philosophy are readily apparent, especially in the theory of 
spirits or ferments so reminiscent of Augustine‟s „seminal reasons‟ – those seeds 
implanted by God at the beginning of creation with inbuilt potential to develop into 
specific kinds and subsequently actualised by him
75
 – and in its echoes of Plato‟s 
Timaeus.  It is thus evident why Baxter should choose to rest his own much stronger 
Trinitarian exemplarism on such secure hexaemeral foundations. 
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4.2. Trinitarian Metaphysics of Divine Principles 
Baxter‟s metaphysical project carries through to a complete reordering of the 
Aristotelian causal and constitutive structure of the universe on the basis of the 
divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love.  As we have seen this involved a 
collapsing of the traditional fourfold order of causality – efficient, material, formal 
and final – into a new threefold order – efficient, constitutive and final.  Furthermore 
for Aristotle, as Baxter points out, these four causes were equivocal.
76
  By contrast in 
Baxter‟s sanctified metaphysics these causes are effectively univocal and triune, 
given coherence again through the divine principles. 
For Aristotle the dynamics of causation was central to his entire thought.  Wisdom he 
described as „knowledge about certain principles and causes‟
77
 and he viewed the 
whole of philosophy prior to him as a quest for these same principles of causation.
78
  
For him metaphysics was not only the science of being qua being, but also at its roots 
the science of causation.  Furthermore his own theory of the four causes clearly binds 
his physics and metaphysics together.  Indeed the theory of substance which he so 
eagerly pursues throughout his works, and which is in many ways the crown of his 
metaphysics, cannot properly be understood outside this causal framework.
79
  
Likewise Aristotle‟s famous discussion of the Unmoved Mover, which was to prove 
so significant for scholastic theology, itself hinges on his theories of causal chains.
80
  
As Christopher Shields makes clear, the sophistication of Aristotle‟s theory of 
causation and its perennial relevance lie in its comprehensive explanatory power.  
For it was Aristotle‟s mature conviction that all conceivable phenomena could be 
comprehended by these same four causes.
81
   
A similar thing may be said about Baxter‟s own modified Trinitarian account of 
causation.  By placing his threefold order of causation at the heart of his hallowed 
logic Baxter clearly demonstrated its importance for every aspect of his thought.  
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Indeed we shall see that the deepest questions of his ontology are intimately linked to 
his metaphysics of causation.  Baxter‟s own peculiar genius was to express this basic 
framework of causation in terms of still deeper principles, the elementary primalities 
of Power, Wisdom and Love.  By doing this he was able to unify, in a powerful 
synthesis, his modified Aristotelian understanding of causation with a Trinitarian 
account of reality.  Although echoes of this idea may be found in Campanella,
82
 an 
even more impressive precedent, although interestingly not one cited by Baxter, may 
be found in Bonaventure who also connected an efficient, constitutive and final cause 
to the three principles of Power, Wisdom and Love.
83
  Here again therefore Baxter 
can be seen to draw from the deep wellsprings of medieval exemplarism. 
We shall first discuss the efficient and final causes, representing God as the Alpha 
and Omega, the fount and end of all being, and then move on to Baxter‟s account of 
constitutive causes and a wider discussion of his ontology.  Before detailing these 
however there is one further point of importance to note.  Although Baxter describes 
three different kinds of causes he also clearly states that in one sense they may all be 
considered as efficient, adding that just as there is a wonderful conjunction of the 
principles of Power, Wisdom and Love so there is a corresponding conjunction of 
causations.  This means, for example, that what is at one moment a constitutive cause 
at another may be considered an efficient cause.  Similarly a final cause considered 
from a different perspective will be either an efficient or constitutive cause.  
Therefore just as power has the primacy in the primalities so the efficient cause has 
the primacy in the order of causation.
84
   
This is important to remember because the seventeenth century witnessed a general 
decline in Aristotelian theories of causation especially with reference to final causes.  
As Von Leyden suggests, the „rise…of a mechanistic and deterministic explanation 
of nature was largely due to the predominance of the notion of efficient causation‟.  
It became common therefore either to reject final causation, as in the case of Spinoza 
and Descartes, or to treat it as simply an instance of efficient causation, as in the case 
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of Leibniz and Boyle.
85
  While at one level Baxter might be considered part of this 
trend, his Trinitarian account of causation rules out such a reductionist 
understanding.  From the vantage point of the primalities then Baxter considers the 
constitutive cause to be the effect of the efficient through wisdom and the final cause 
to be a kind of „active congruence‟ of the efficient through love.  This preserves the 
distinction between them, preventing their collapse into one, undifferentiated 
efficient cause. 
4.2.1. Efficient Cause 
For Baxter the efficient cause may be defined as „that by which the thing is‟.  He 
holds that it is threefold in character: 
i) Efficiens per Vires Potentiae 
ii) Efficiens per Lumen Sapientiae 
iii) Efficiens per Amorem seu Bonitatem 
In this way the efficient cause itself clearly mirrors the Campanellan primalities, 
which is another significant break from Aristotle.  Baxter has little to impart 
concerning the efficient cause through power, most likely because this is closest to 
its Aristotelian original.  He only states that it is familiarly called „to effect‟.  Instead 
he focuses attention on the efficient causes through wisdom and love, holding that 
both of these effect „morally‟ rather than powerfully per se and relating their action 
to the faculties of intellect and will respectively.  Such action he adds is „mystical‟ 
and outside the reach of human understanding.
86
   
By efficiency through wisdom Baxter says that he is not referring to the power of 
signs, such as laws or promises, to effect, which interestingly enough he classes 
under efficiency through power.  He compares the distinction between efficiency of 
power and wisdom with that between the different efficiencies operating when light 
causes primarily the intellection of evidence and secondarily a consequent volition.  
Efficiency of wisdom as mystical causation is outside of our active experience and so 
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can only be understood passively, and even then very obscurely and imperfectly, in 
the same way that we understand sensation through actually feeling it.
87
   
Baxter holds that the best analogy we have for this process – the efficient 
illumination of the intellect – is that of vision itself.  In Baxter‟s understanding, very 
different from our own, light may be termed both the exterior agent and primary 
object of vision (for we see light itself).  According to Baxter external light activates 
the eye‟s own „internal light‟ and it is in this congress of external and internal lights 
that vision is constituted.  In this way light is both constituting cause of vision and its 
efficient cause.
88
  What Baxter seems to have in mind here is quite general: the 
activation by an exterior (although in some respects similar) agent of a human 
potentiality which is mixed in character (i.e. capable of being both passive and 
active).   
Certainly it is in these terms that Baxter extends the analogy in order to understand 
the efficiency through wisdom.  Thus he suggests that a superior agent intellect 
(whether God alone or acting through an unknown second cause) activates our 
receiving intellect just as light from the Sun activates the eye.  In this causation, just 
as the intellect is held to differ formally from both other faculties, so the intellect‟s 
efficiency may be held to differ formally from their efficiency.  Therefore although 
the superior intellect‟s effect is primarily in the recipient intellect it also has 
secondary effects on the will and executive power of the recipient, namely by 
directing its volitions and acts.  Furthermore, since the ordination of external 
circumstances is eminently an act of divine intellect, it follows that efficiency 
through wisdom may be said to have a twofold effect.  In these terms God‟s wisdom 
is not only the principal cause of order but also rules the world in its own peculiar 
and peculiarly glorious manner, namely by ruling angelic and human intellects and 
wills either by its own influx or by the most wise ordination of circumstances.
89
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Here, as Baxter acknowledges explicitly, the language of formal difference between 
the various faculties is indicative of the Scotist formal distinction.
90
  This is 
significant for a number of reasons.  Firstly, in terms of our broader thesis it indicates 
the intimate connection between Scotist thought and Baxter‟s understanding of the 
Triune primalities.  Secondly, in narrower terms, it suggests that Baxter‟s 
understanding of causation is prevented from collapsing into an undifferentiated 
efficiency of power, precisely through this same formal distinction.  Here then the 
formal distinction makes room for the important category of moral, as opposed to 
physical, causation.  As we shall see in the final chapter this will turn out to be vital 
for Baxter‟s understanding of the relation between human freedom and divine 
sovereignty, allowing him to claim that God can determine events infallibly without 
impairing man‟s essential freedom. 
Baxter construes efficiency through love in an almost identical manner to efficiency 
through wisdom, emphasising that divine love is not only God‟s objective 
„amabilitas‟ but also an active principle which always works inseparably with vital 
power and intellect, yet has its own formally distinct influx and causality.  Thus God 
as the superior agent will works primarily in an inferior will by his own influx and 
secondarily by communicating goodness to circumstances as congruous objects for 
the recipient will.  To explain precisely what he means Baxter brings in another 
analogy with light.  Just as the heat of the Sun warms recipients by its own influx, 
formally (although importantly not substantially) different from the influx of light, so 
„love causes love‟.  This efficiency is again called moral and its operation is more 
mystic than that of purely natural or motive power. For this reason it is scarcely 
understood by most as being distinct from other causes, although it is again formally 
distinct.  Baxter adds that perfection and goodness are its peculiar effects.
91
 
4.2.2. Final Cause 
Although Baxter says that most understand the final cause not as good is the cause of 
love but rather as the goodness of the end moves the one loving to choose the 
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appropriate means to attain it, he rejects the division between them.  In this regard he 
describes the formal object of the will as the material goodness of the object desired 
and the formal object of the election of means as their „middle goodness‟, or their 
aptitude or „conducibility‟ to an end.  Baxter therefore declares his agreement with 
the „more subtle scholastics‟ that a good is loved not because it is an end or a means 
but rather that „bonitas ita amata est ratio talis amoris‟.  Therefore although the 
election of means to reach a desired end is important, for Baxter, it is secondary to 
the goodness of the end itself.
92
 
However this analysis presents him with a question of „great difficulty‟, namely 
„whether the end causes and what is its reason of causing‟.  Baxter believes that 
according to extrinsic reality a future end does not even exist and therefore cannot be 
said „to cause‟ in any meaningful sense at all.
93
  He says therefore that an end must 
be considered not according to extrinsic reality but rather „in esse cognito‟, that is as 
it is apprehended by the mind.  Consequently, since it cannot be denied that prior 
cogitations „in a certain manner‟ move posterior cogitations, Baxter says the 
proximate reason of final causality must be sought here.
94
 
Baxter expands on this further saying that God, „the greatest, most wise and excellent 
Creator‟, has given to mankind a particular appetite which is the principle of its own 
motions.  Furthermore, in order that all things should cohere among themselves in 
the most beautiful order, God has so arranged things that this natural inclination of 
appetite and the (objective) goodness or congruity of objects may „not unmeritedly 
be esteemed as causes‟.  This action as it is a volition or love of a good in species 
may be placed formally under the efficiency through love but occurs finaliter „from 
the unitive congruence of objects‟.  Thus although an object qua object is only a 
constitutive cause, Baxter holds that as it is an apprehended good „congruous and 
connatural‟ with this internal motion of the intellect and will, so it has its own proper 
and distinct causality which may be called final.
95
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Although Baxter emphasises the natural appetite of the will it would be a mistake to 
suggest that his account of final causality downplays, or worse denies, the objective 
goodness of the object desired.  In fact Baxter says that those who say things are 
good because desired or loved, rather than loved because they are good, are 
shamefully deceived.  To see that this is true we need only consider God as the 
supreme final cause.  Clearly it would be absurd to think that God‟s goodness is 
somehow derivative of his creatures‟ desire.  Instead Baxter holds „that GOD himself 
is the FIRST GOOD and total ULTIMATE and that our will has been made by his 
own will and to the image and complacency of his will‟.  Likewise Baxter says that it 
would be a mistake to consider the divine goodness as a merely passive object of 
desire.  For Baxter, following the scholastic tradition, God is to be considered as pure 
act.
96
  Therefore as he does not contain any potentialities he cannot be considered in 
any way passive. The point Baxter is drawing out here is that, ultimately, final 
causality is inseparable from God‟s active love working in the Universe.  As he puts 
it, „sicut amor eius est active efficiens, ita ut activus seu actus amorem et amantem 
sibi alliciens et amplectus, in congressu mutui amoris, voluntatis nostrae objectum 
finale seu ultimatum aestimandus est‟.  He adds that every created goodness as an 
effect of the divine goodness may be esteemed as its imago, similitudo or 
vestigium.
97
  Inverting Baxter‟s discussion this implies that the fulness of the vestigia 
Trinitatis must be understood from within the framework of final as well as 
constitutive causation.  Ultimately final causation comes down to the attractive 
power of the apprehended good and cannot be reduced further except as this 
goodness is itself rooted derivatively in the character of the Triune God. 
4.2.3. Constitutive Cause 
Baxter calls the constitutive cause the effect of the efficient cause.  As we shall see it 
seems in effect to be a conflation of the Aristotelian formal and material causes, 
although unsurprisingly differs markedly from Aristotle‟s own interpretation of 
these.  According to Baxter it is the root of all the diversity in the universe, 
explaining the distinction between active and passive, simple and composite, and 
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spiritual and material natures.
98
  Baxter holds that this metaphysical unity-in-
diversity is itself a reflection of God‟s own Triune glory.
99
   
The primary division in Baxter‟s metaphysics is between active and passive natures.  
This we have already seen from his hexaemeron, where fire, as the active element, is 
the producer of light and subsequently works and shapes the passive matter of air, 
water and earth.  Likewise in the later days of creation we also encounter the 
vegetative, sensitive and intellective formal virtues which are all active, shaping 
passive matter to their own ends.  These form an ascending scale from fire as the 
lowest to angels as the highest created active natures.
100
  In this way we see Baxter‟s 
hexaemeral categories informing his metaphysics, indicating again the tight bond 
between them. 
Delving deeper into the metaphysical structure of active and passive natures Baxter 
makes it clear that the constitutive causes of both are not „res diversae‟ but are 
instead intellectual parts or „conceptus inadaequati objectivi‟.  Baxter derives his 
understanding of inadequate concepts from Francis Glisson, as he acknowledges 
elsewhere.
101
  They were used by Glisson to indicate the different partial concepts of 
an object, formed due to the mind‟s inability to attain a single, adequate conception 
of it.  He was adamant however that these concepts formed by the mind had a 
foundation in the object itself and were not arbitrary.  For Baxter inadequate 
concepts often seem to indicate something akin to Scotist formalities although as 
interpreted from a Nominalist extrinsicist perspective, in which they are 




For active natures Baxter identifies these inadequate concepts as the following: 
substantialitas, substantiae pecularis dispositio and virtus or vis formalis.  These he 
says are „unica radicaliter, at trina exeunter et objective (seu ab objectis 
denominata)‟.  For passive natures Baxter also names three inadequate concepts, 
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materia, materiae dispositio and forma, which he suggests correspond to the 
Aristotelian understanding of matter, privation and form. These he makes clear are 
also not compositive but they do not have the same triadic metaphysical structure as 
the active natures.  The precise nature of these internal divisions within active and 
passive natures is, as we shall see, complex and even somewhat provisional.  For it is 
in their nature as inadequate concepts that they cannot be fully grasped and must be 
known indirectly through inference from our senses and through relation to each 
other.
103
   
It is clear that this characterisation of active and passive natures according to 
inadequate concepts is sufficient by itself to capture the Trinitarian structure of 
creation as it resides in the active natures.  As Baxter says concerning these, 
„analogica rerum SUBSTANTIA cum VIRTUTE per modum Creationis communicata, 
est imago haec gloriosa Dei in creaturis relucens‟.
104
  Thus the vestigia Trinitatis for 
Baxter are found in active natures and consist of some combination of substance with 
(formal) virtue.  In order to understand fully what Baxter means by this difficult 
statement, we turn now to examine in some detail his associated concepts of 
substance and formal virtue. 
For Baxter, who follows Glisson in this,
105
 substance is an inadequate „fundamental 
concept‟ of active natures to be compared with matter in material things.  By contrast 
virtue is an inadequate „formal concept‟ of active natures.  It is their „principium 
agendi‟ and their „potentiam-activam, vim et inclinationem‟.
106
  Baxter realises that 
these terms on their own, while suggestive, are also opaque and require further 
explanation, which he helpfully proceeds to give.  
For Baxter the name of substance is an ambiguous one, signifying different things for 
both theologians and philosophers.  Some he says understand this name „relative 
tantum quoad accidentia‟, taking virtue to signify the whole essence of spirits and, 
because it „stands under‟ (substat) accidents, calling it subsistence.  These take virtue 
to be the adequate concept of a spiritual essence.  Baxter identifies them as the 
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Thomists, who held, following Aquinas, that angels were pure form, existing without 
any metaphysical composition of form and (analogous) matter.
107
  Baxter however 
regarded this as too rash a position considering our ignorance and blindness to 
spiritual natures.  In particular he could not understand how there could be a stand-




Baxter says that those opposing this Thomist conception are agreed with it insofar as 
they hold that substance is „subsistentiam per se et non in alio‟, but differ in their 
view that it is also an „essentialem primam fundamentalem inadequatum‟ concept of 
a spirit.  For this reason virtue is not a total concept, but a partial and formal one.  
Baxter himself favoured this account of substance over its alternative, although he 
was certainly not unaware of the difficulties it entailed.  Principal among these was 
the problem that if spirits are understood as fundamentally true substances and 
formally true virtues then it will be no less difficult to distinguish substance from 
matter than to determine what a „stand alone‟ virtue might be.  For if we understand 
matter as only being visible or sensible then substance, with a reference to invisible 
as well as visible natures, must be considered a genus and matter its species.  Baxter 
however takes matter and substance as synonymous, leading him to suggest that we 
must instead distinguish between spiritual matter as insensible and corporeal matter 
as sensible.
109
   
The view that spirits could be considered as in some way material had strong 
patristic precedent and was certainly held by Augustine.
110
  While denied by Aquinas 
and Scotus (at least in his later works),
111
 it was affirmed by a number of Franciscan 
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doctors including Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure.
112
  It was also a topic of 
considerable contemporary relevance, and in support of his own view Baxter cites 
Scheibler, Crakenthorp and Glisson.
113
  In holding that spirits are material Baxter 
explicitly excludes three definitions of matter: „substantia quae potentia corpus est‟, 
„substantia incompleta in potentia ad omnes formas‟ (which he says is the prime 
matter of Aristotle) and „elementum‟ or „corpus aliquod‟.  Instead he affirms that this 




It is important to understand that this notion of metaphysical or spiritual matter is 
very different from our normal conception of matter.  According to Scheibler, at 
least, it is not simply a kind of very subtle matter which can prohibit penetration, for 
such would anyway be entirely equivocal to ordinary matter.
115
  Scheibler therefore 
distinguishes four hallmarks by which spiritual substances differ from material ones: 
that they do not have quantity, that they are not circumscribed by place, that they do 
not move by physical motion and that they are simpler than corporeal substance.
116
  
Nevertheless he does accept two senses in which angels (and therefore other spirits) 
may be said to be composed of matter and form.  Firstly as they consist of genus 
(matter) and difference (form) and secondly as they consist of act (form) and potency 
(matter).
117
  Following Damascene it can therefore properly be said that only God is 
incorporeal by nature, and others by indulgence or grace.
118
 
Baxter‟s own understanding of metaphysical matter combines Scheibler‟s account 
with a Glissonian metaphysics of inadequate concepts.  He affirms that „the 
metaphysical matter and form of the soul, being but the genus and differentia, are not 
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two substances, much less repugnant, and therefore have never the more a tendency 
to corruption‟.
119
  In the Immortality of Mans Soul he adds that: 
As I have oft said, Dr Glisson after others most subtilly laboureth to 
prove it of every simple substance, that its matter and form are not 
compounding parts, but conceptus inadaequati.  If the intellect 
compound and divide its own conceptions that maketh not a real 
composition of two substances in the objects, but as the Scotists call it, of 
two formalities, or conceptus objectivi…
120
 
In Baxter‟s terms spirits or active natures are both simple and incorruptible and able 
to be characterised by the two inadequate concepts or formalities of metaphysical 
matter and formal virtue, which concepts further answer to the division between 
genus and difference. 
At first sight the question of the substantiality of spirits may seem to belong only to 
the rarefied heights of metaphysical enquiry and certainly to have little reference to 
the business of practical theology.  However for Baxter this is emphatically not so.  
For him it is „scarcely of the least moment‟ to have a positive and true concept of 
what a spirit is, for if we do not then we remain ignorant not only of our own soul 
and the nature of angels but most importantly of God himself, the Father of all 
things.  Baxter also does not think it is enough to have only apophatic knowledge of 
spirits, that is knowledge about what spirits are not.  For him the Augustinian dictum 
that we are only able to love what we know means that to love God we must have 
some positive concept of him, however inadequate.
121
  The love of God is therefore 
the motivation for all metaphysical enquiry, and divinity the end of metaphysics. 
The question of forms Baxter regards as much easier to answer than the 
corresponding issue of substances.  For since formal virtues are manifest and may be 
understood through their acts, there must therefore be, underlying any action, a 
corresponding metaphysical power or virtue of acting.
122
  This is of vital importance 
for our purposes, for it is this formal virtue that is „communicated‟ through the 
                                                 
119
 Baxter, Reasons, 539. 
120
 Baxter, Immortality, I.92-3. 
121
 Baxter, Methodus, I.132. 
122
 Baxter, Methodus, I.31; cf. Campanella, De Sancta Monotriade, 20. 
124 
 
various modes of creation and which thus may be understood to „inform‟ the material 
or immaterial substance of an individual vestigium. 
Baxter‟s thoughts here are guided by the Campanellan principle that „nemo facit, id 
quod facere non potest‟.  Thus although an appeal to the senses does not suffice to 
solve the knotty problem of substantiality it may certainly be employed in order to 
give the requisite formal definitions.  For through the senses we may recognise and 
classify the external actions which flow from the internal „potentiae‟ of the active 
nature.  This as we shall see in Chapter Five is of fundamental importance for 
shaping the analogia entis which Baxter makes between the human soul and God.  
Furthermore although this principle does assert a vital connection between the „order 
of knowing‟ and the „order of being‟ it also privileges the „economic‟ aspect of 
reality, that is, those things which are manifest and clear to the senses.  As Baxter 
himself succinctly puts it, „formae cernuntur in operationibus‟.
123
 
For Baxter formal virtue, that is form according to its primary sense of „regent active 
principle‟ and not its secondary sense of „temperament resulting from all the 
parts‟,
124
 may be described as follows: 
And the form of simple beings, corporeal or incorporeal, elements or 
spirits, is neither another substance, distinct from the physical and 
metaphysical matter, nor yet an accident or mode: but that peculiar 
nature, consisting in certain powers or virtues, by which, as essential to 
it, that being is specifically differenced from others: which some call an 
essential quality, and some a substantial quality, and some a substantial 
form, because it is the perfection and essential nature of the substance in 
specie, and not another substance besides it.
125
 
The formal virtue of an active nature is therefore both its intrinsic dynamic and the 
specific difference within a genus.  This so far accords well with the Aristotelian 
understanding of substantial forms.  However we must not forget that for Baxter 
formal virtue, like substance, is an inadequate concept.   
Returning finally to our original question of how Baxter characterises the vestigia 
Trinitatis in active natures, it is apparent that he sees their substance and formal 
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virtue as identical although in some way distinct.  To the further question of how the 
formal virtue itself may be considered to be una-trina in nature, Baxter does not give 
a straightforward answer.  Certainly he does make clear that this is a true instance of 
triunity and not a mere triplicity.  Thus he holds that in every active nature this 
„image of the Trinity in Unity‟ is found, „without composition but in derivative 
simplicity‟.
126
  The intimate connection between the divine Triunity and the 
derivative triunity of active natures is that bond of creation through which God‟s 
likeness is communicated to his creation.  It is this connection that is the heart of the 
doctrine of the vestigia Trinitatis. 
The question of how this derivative triunity may be characterised is of great 
significance for how we describe God‟s own Triunity, yet Baxter does not give a 
clear answer to it, listing instead a whole array of scholastic proposals: the distinction 
of reason, the formal distinction, the modal distinction and the connotative 
distinction.
127
  All he will say is that everyone is agreed that this formal virtue is 
„essentially and really one‟ and that according to its external relations to objects (in 
scholastic parlance „denominatione extrinseca ex relatione objectiva‟) it is three.  
Baxter therefore here suggests that the best way to distinguish the faculties of the 
soul as diverse is „virtually and respectively according to their diverse acts‟.
128
  We 
will consider the nature of this virtual distinction in Chapter Five; it seems however 
to indicate a „Nominalised‟ form of the Scotist formal distinction.
129
 
5. The Ladder of Triune Being 
Our survey of Baxter‟s physics and metaphysics has revealed both its scriptural roots 
and its Trinitarian structure.  Exploring this has allowed us to understand Baxter‟s 
definition of a vestigium Trinitatis in terms of a combination of substance and triune 
formal virtue.  It is important to remember however that such a definition only allows 
us to capture the vestigia by use of inadequate concepts.  Thus it may be said that 
Baxter‟s use of inadequate concepts simultaneously reveals and hides the depth of 
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mystery at the wellspring of even the humblest (active) being, as it reflects the nature 
of its Triune Creator.  Taken together it might therefore be said that the manifestation 
of God‟s Triune glory at every level of creation through the vestigia Trinitatis is the 
fundamental motif of Baxter‟s ontology. 
Furthermore Baxter‟s dual axiom that the higher natures contain the lower ones 
eminently and that the lower ones image the higher ones shows an understanding of 
creation as a hierarchy of vestigia ascending towards God himself.  The link between 
each level we have seen to be forged by the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and 
Love.  In this chapter we have simply climbed the first rungs of this ladder of triune 
being.  It is for the next chapters to ascend even higher.    
127 
 
Chapter Four: The Soul as the Imago Trinitatis 
1. Introduction 
For Baxter the doctrine of the soul is the foundation of true theology.  This is a point 
that he reiterates again and again in his writings and especially in the Methodus,
1
  
stressing that the study of the soul is the most important part of physics.  In Baxter‟s 
integrated pre-Enlightenment worldview, psychology is therefore clearly at the 
pinnacle of natural philosophy.
2
  In fact throughout his life Baxter was fascinated by 
psychological questions.  One of his last works, the Certainty of the Worlds of 
Spirits, is devoted to documenting personal accounts of spirits and demons in an 
attempt to convince Sadducaical doubters of the existence and importance of the 
spiritual realm.
3
  While at first sight such an endeavour may seem of little relevance 
for this study, it is important to understand that for Baxter this was simply the 
empirical part of a larger and more ambitious science of spiritual natures, referred to 
by him and others as pneumatology.
4
  Baxter held that pneumatology clearly 
demonstrated his own claims that spirits were metaphysically embodied and 
endowed with some kind of vitality, understanding and will
5
 – hence Baxter‟s 
definition of a spirit as „a pure substance transcending our sensitive comprehension 




In this chapter we shall not consider Baxter‟s angelology, which is in any case 
comparatively limited in scope,
7
 nor his more extensive discussions of the existence 
of the separate soul.
8
  Instead we shall consider Baxter‟s psychology, his science of 
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the soul as an embodied spirit, and especially its striking Trinitarian contours.  Baxter 
held that man was created in the image of God and that his soul was therefore the 
gateway to understanding the Godhead.  As we shall see in Chapter Five it is through 
reflection on the mystery of the trinity within him that man is able to bridge the gap 
between the visible and invisible realms and ascend by analogy to the Triune being 
of God himself.  That is not to say that man is able to in any way comprehend this 
mystery within him, let alone the supreme mystery of God‟s nature and character, but 
simply that it is his privilege, as the highest of all visible creatures, to reflect the 
likeness of God in a special way.  Neither, as we shall see, is this naturalised 
trajectory of theology divorced from man‟s relationship to God.  For in the true 
scriptural and Augustinian tradition, it is as man worships God that he becomes more 
and more conformed to his likeness.   
This chapter therefore marks the final rung on our ladder of analogical ascent before 
reaching God himself.  It itself follows something of a hierarchical ascent, beginning 
in the second section with the general scholastic discussion of the relation between 
the soul and the body and of the lower vegetative and sensitive aspects of the soul.  
Here it will be seen that Baxter imported his own Trinitarian views into the 
conventional scholastic doctrine of the soul as vegetative, sensitive and intellective.  
In this way he viewed the soul as itself a hierarchy of trinities conditioned by the one 
overarching trinity of the intellectual soul. The soul is therefore a microcosm of the 
whole universe.  Here we shall also consider Baxter‟s distancing himself from the 
seventeenth-century trend of divorcing life and the soul, which is another important 
aspect of his reaction against somatist philosophy. 
In the third section we consider the important scholastic debate over whether the 
powers of the soul were essential and accidental.  Here Baxter takes the side of the 
Scotists and Nominalists, who argued for the essential nature of the powers, and we 
shall show that this ties in closely with his Trinitarian concerns.  In particular, as we 
shall discuss in the fourth section, it grounds Baxter‟s account of the triune 
interaction and coinherence of vital-active power, intellect and will in man‟s soul.  
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Here the self-confessed Scotist character
9
 of Baxter‟s psychology will become fully 
evident through what I have termed his „mitigated voluntarism‟. 
In the fifth section we examine Baxter‟s doctrine of the image of God in its 
scholastic context, showing that although he retained the essential structural and 
dynamic aspects of the tradition he departed from this considerably in his critique of 
the conventional Augustinian triad of memory, understanding and will.  This break 
from the medieval psychological tradition had major repercussions for his own 
Trinitarian doctrine, as we shall see in Chapter Five. 
2. The Soul and its Faculties 
For Baxter man is a hybrid creature, at one and the same time both body and soul.  In 
other words he is a metaphysical amphibian able to exist in both physical and 
spiritual reality.
10
  Today, if people believe in the soul at all, they tend to believe that 
possession of a soul is exclusive to man.  However for Baxter, as for many others of 
his own day, this was not so.  Instead, following a widespread Aristotelian 
assumption, which only began to be seriously challenged in the seventeenth century, 
he held that plants and animals also possessed souls.
11
  He therefore thought in terms 
of an inclusive ascending hierarchy, with plants possessing a vegetative soul, animals 
a vegetative and sensitive soul and man, as a rational animal, a vegetative, sensitive 
and intellective soul.  In this section our focus will be on the standard scholastic 
outlines of Baxter‟s psychology as well as his discussion of the vegetative and 
sensitive aspects of man‟s soul, together often termed the organic soul. 
The principal and prolegomenal question in an Aristotelian scheme of psychology 
concerned the relation of the human soul to the human body.  Aristotle‟s definition of 
the soul as the „first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially‟ entailed the 
understanding of the soul as the form of the body.
12
  This Aristotle expounded in 
                                                 
9
 See Packer, Redemption, 114. 
10
 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 200; cf. C. S. Lewis, Screwtape Letters 
(London: Harper Collins, 2002), 37. 
11
 Aristotle, De Anima, II.2, 413a20-b32.  The belief that plants and animals had souls was almost 
universal up until the seventeenth century. 
12
 Aristotle, De Anima, II.1, 412a22.  
130 
 
terms of the soul as the efficient, formal and final cause of the body,
13
 viewing the 
soul as the intrinsic principle of life and self-motion.
14
  This was markedly different 
from Platonic thought, which tended to view the soul as trapped or imprisoned within 
the body with no intimate connection to it.
15
  
Among the scholastics we find two major differing interpretations of the soul as the 
form of the body.  The first, that of Aquinas, is closer in spirit to its Aristotelian 
original.  While Aquinas was adamant on the immortality and self-subsisting nature 
of the human soul,
16
 he also contended equally strongly that this same intellectual 
soul was the form of a living body.  Aquinas‟ reasoning begins from the principle 
that „the prime endowment by virtue of which anything acts is the form of that to 
which the activity is attributed‟.  Following Aristotle Aquinas then states that the 
soul is the „prime endowment by virtue of which a body has life‟.  Thus he says that 
although life manifests its presence through different activities at different levels of 
existence, the soul is the ultimate principle of all of these and is therefore the 
formative principle of the body.
17
   
Scotus, by contrast, argued, based on both philosophical and theological 
considerations, that a man must possess at least two substantial forms: a bodily form 
explaining the body‟s identity and its basic structure, and an animating soul 
conferring life on the body.
 18
  In answering the Thomist objection that this position 
compromised the essential unity of man‟s nature, Scotus responded that two or more 
objects can unite to form a substance if the whole formed by them has properties not 
possessed by the parts alone.  In the case of man his body consists of the union of 
bodily form and matter which is then united with the intellective soul to result in a 
living human being.  According to Scotus the living human as tertium quid possessed 
properties, namely vegetative and sensitive ones, not possessed by either the soul or 
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body alone and so therefore could be viewed as a new hylomorphic unity.  In this 
way Scotus was able to describe the soul as the perfecting or completing form of the 
body even though the body itself has its own subordinate form.  As Richard Cross 
suggests, Scotus‟ account is markedly Platonic in its view of the soul as animating an 
already formed body. However it also retains an Aristotelian element in terms of the 
metaphysical union of soul and body and the understanding of emergent properties 
distinguishing the whole from the parts.
19
   
Baxter‟s own view of the relation of soul and body is complex and never entirely 
spelled out, and is further complicated by his theories of the soul‟s embodied 
metaphysical structure.  Nevertheless it is clear that while Baxter continues to use the 
traditional Aristotelian language of the soul as a form he interprets this quite 
differently.  Thus according to his primary sense of form as „regent active principle‟ 
Baxter describes the soul as the form of man but according to the secondary sense of 
form as temperament of the parts he clearly states that only the union of soul and 
body is called the form and not the soul alone.
20
  His own preference, indicated in the 
Reasons, is for calling the active principle the form proper, since the order of parts is 
only a mode of the substance, ceasing upon dissolution.
21
  This understanding is 
already clearly different from that of Aquinas, for whom these two aspects of form 
are inseparably one in his Aristotelian understanding of the soul as „dynamic 
configuration‟,
22
 and not „spread out‟ as they are in Baxter between the soul and the 
body. 
Having said this, Baxter‟s difference from Aquinas does not mean he espouses an 
extreme Platonic view of the soul as antithetical to the body and imprisoned within it.  
Instead he holds that there is a „narrow and wonderful union‟ between the soul and 
body such that „nothing completely is perfected by the soul in the body without the 
cooperation of the body‟.  This cooperation Baxter goes on to describe as being 
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facilitated by the igneous spirits, which were often understood as the connective 
between the immaterial soul and material body.  His understanding of this leads him 
to suggest that the acts of the soul are mixed, partly non-organic and partly organic, 
meaning, importantly, that the incorporated soul has a different mode of operation 
when within the body – namely through organs – than when separate from it.
23
 He 
concludes therefore that while the disembodied soul is a spirit it is not formally a 
soul.
24
  It is clear, then, that contrary to Plato, Baxter regards a soul lacking a body as 
impoverished, a position which of course makes perfect sense within the Christian 
context of the longed-for reunion of soul and body at the general Resurrection.
25
  Yet 
it is also evident that Baxter‟s understanding of the igneous spirits as the bond tying 
soul and body together is itself Platonic.
26
 
In this context Baxter can be seen as attempting to mediate between an Aristotelian 
and Platonic account of the soul.  He is also most likely influenced by the Scotist 
tradition.  Like Scotus, Baxter regarded the soul as the perfecting form, conferring 
life, intellect and sense on an already informed body.  In this way he held to a 
Franciscan plurality of forms.  He also considered the vegetative and (to some 
degree) sensitive faculties as unique to the composite of body and soul, and therefore 
as emergent properties, even though unlike Scotus he held that the soul‟s ability to 
sense persisted after death.
27
  Such a Scotist approach to the body-soul relation 
makes particular sense given Baxter‟s account of the soul as composed of 
metaphysical matter and formal virtue, for holding to this means he must of necessity 
eschew a Thomist understanding of the soul as informing (unformed) bodily matter 
directly.  
Another question of great importance within the scholastic and Aristotelian tradition 
concerned whether man had more than one soul and if so how these multiple souls 
could be related to each other.
28
  Both Aquinas and Scotus believed that the soul of 
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man was one, but a number of their contemporaries, especially among the 
Franciscans, held that the striking differences between the three faculties (vegetative, 
sensitive and intellective) could only be explained by postulating two or three 
different souls in man.
29
  In the Renaissance as well there were a number of bipartite 
theories of the soul.  Telesio, for example, notoriously held that man has two 
different souls: the one a tenuous, fiery body traduced from his parents and by its 
motions responsible for sensation and the lower operations, the other an immortal 
soul infused directly by God and responsible for higher operations.
30
  A similar 
dichotomous account is also to be found in Campanella.
31
 
Baxter is certainly attentive to these various currents of opinion.  His own view 
however is that the intellective and sensitive soul must be considered one whatever is 
said of the vegetative soul.
32
  Certainly in further discussion Baxter seems to assume 
the unity of the whole soul, referring to the soul qua intellective, sensitive and 
vegetative as well as more loosely to the intellective, sensitive and vegetative souls.  
If he is uncertain as to the status of the vegetative soul this is because of his 
uncertainty, which we shall discuss immediately below, as to whether it can truly be 
distinguished from the nature of fire and thus from the igneous spirits joining body 
and soul together. 
2.1.  The Vegetative Soul 
Baxter‟s description of the vegetative soul follows in a long Aristotelian tradition, 
further honed by medieval and Renaissance reflections, which described its faculties 
as those of nutrition, growth and reproduction.
33
  However his primary concern, that 
of the relation of the vegetative soul to fire, was only peripheral to Aristotle.  For 
although Aristotle touches on this in the De Anima, remarking that „some think that it 
is the nature of fire which is the cause quite simply of nourishment and growth‟, his 
own view is that fire is at most only a contributory cause to the acts of the vegetative 
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soul and so does not constitute its actual nature.  His reasoning is that fire by nature 
is uncontrolled whereas the vegetative soul has to act in a controlled fashion.
34
 
By contrast Baxter‟s understanding of the vegetative soul is shaped by what Henry 
More called his „psychopyrism‟.
35
  Thus Baxter viewed the soul in general as a kind 
of „eminent fire‟, although emphasising that it was not formally to be identified with 
fire itself.
36
  However, whereas he viewed the relation between fire and the higher 
sensitive and intellective souls as merely analogical, Baxter tended to assume its 
univocal ground, considering the vegetative soul itself as having a fiery nature, albeit 
an incorporated and harnessed one.  In order to understand this we must grasp 
Baxter‟s technical understanding of fire not as flame – merely its visible „body‟ – but 
as an invisible, spiritual substance possessed of a formal virtue.
37
  Baxter‟s high view 
of the dignity of fire was buttressed by both his wide reading of ancient and 
contemporary works and his hexaemeral studies.
38
 
However Baxter‟s understanding of the fiery nature of the vegetative soul is surely 
most influenced by his Campanellan view of its triune motive, illuminative and 
calefactive virtue.  To illustrate this he gives the example of plant life in which the 
motive effects of growth, the illuminative effects of diverse colours and the 
calefactive effects of odours, tastes and medicinal properties are all taken as resulting 
from the conjoint motion, light and heat of the solar rays.
39
  This connection led to 
him describing the vegetative soul either according to the Trinitarian motif of motive, 
illuminative and calefactive virtue or to the alternative higher analogue of active, 
discretive and attractive virtue.
40
  As is evident both of these descriptions derive from 
the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love. 
Whichever description he uses Baxter is clear however that, in an entirely 
Aristotelian fashion, the vegetative soul is an intrinsic principle of life and self-
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motion (where motion is taken in its broadest sense as including any kind of change).  
As an active nature it is likewise able to act upon and shape passive matter, which it 
does according to its intrinsic triune virtue.  In doing so, by its ordered and purposive 
self-motion (conditioned as we shall see by the higher souls) the vegetative soul 
provides the basic functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction.  Furthermore 
through the medium of the fiery spirits, which are its „most noble organ‟, the 
vegetative soul is itself „the nexus of the spiritual and corporeal nature‟.
 41
  Since 
these spirits are themselves threefold – motive, illuminative and calefactive – it 
follows that the operation of the vegetative soul can be described in terms of the 
complex interaction of active triune natures.  It is this complex mutuality between 
spiritual and corporeal which allows it to act as the ground of the higher sensitive and 
intellective functions of the soul. 
2.2.  The Sensitive Soul 
Like the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul can also be described as a spiritual 
substance possessing a formal virtue.  It is however higher than both fire and the 
vegetative soul and as such able to do all that either of these are able to without 
them.
42
  Yet, following what we are beginning to discern as a general principle in 
Baxter‟s thought, in its incorporated state it does not act without either of these active 
natures, nor without the body itself. 
As an active nature the sensitive soul is structured according to a triune vital-active, 
apprehensive and appetitive virtue, which clearly refers to the metaphysical triad of 
Power, Wisdom and Love expressed in a manner appropriate for sensation.
43
  In this 
way it is able to encompass within itself both the motive, illuminative and calefactive 
virtues of fire and the active, discretive and appetitive functions of the vegetative 
soul.  Baxter therefore holds that sensation occurs through a conjunction of the 
sensitive soul and the fiery animal spirits, suggesting that the spirits are like a body 
to the sensitive soul and describing them as „nothing but the igneous principle in a 
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  Such an understanding of spirits was in fact entirely 
commonplace.
45
  What is distinctive however is Baxter‟s understanding that the 
spirits themselves conform to the Trinitarian division of the vegetative soul, being 
predominantly motive, lucid or calid, although with all three remaining inseparably 
connected in a Trinitarian fashion.  This congruence of triune natures allows for an 
intimate association between the sensitive soul and the spirits (through the medium 
of the vegetative soul).  Yet this connection is by no means uniform, and thus the 
different „texturing‟ of soul and spirits as well as their differing locations within the 
body – whether fixed in the nervous system, cerebrum or heart, or mobile within the 
rest of the body – contribute to the complexity of sensation.
46
 
Baxter holds that sensation is not primarily a passion but rather an action of the 
sensitive soul upon the igneous spirits.  This action immediately gives rise to two 
types of sensation: placid sensations, in which the soul simply acts on the spirits, and 
dolorous sensations, which are truly called passions because they lead to the soul 
reflexively acting upon itself.  Placid sensations occur through harmony between the 
exterior agent and sense whilst dolorous sensations occur through disharmony when 
the motion of the spirits is in any way impeded.
47
  Baxter does not say so explicitly 
but it seems likely that we should relate these two modes of sensation to the standard 
scholastic division between concupiscible and irascible passions, with the former 




Further evidence of a Trinitarian structure to sensation is seen in Baxter‟s insistence 
that the diversity of motive, lucid and calid spirits is itself responsible for the 
diversity of the senses. Baxter holds that the formal specification of the senses is 
according to the triune virtue of the sensitive soul accompanied in act by the triune 
virtue of the vegetative soul and spirits.  Any other diversification he considers either 
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accidental or by some composition of the three.  For this reason he rejects the 




Following medieval and Renaissance developments in Aristotelianism, Baxter 
divides the senses according to whether they are inner or outer (the usual five 
senses).
50
  Within the inner senses he includes phantasy or imagination, which he 
divides into receptive memory, estimation and practical collection, and the common 
sense whose role is to unify the input from all the other senses.  Overall Baxter 
suggests that motion of the motive spirits is responsible for the sense of touch and 
hearing, motion of the lucid spirits for the three visual senses of sight, common sense 
and phantasy and motion of the calid spirits for the senses of smell and taste.  Clearly 
this division also corresponds to their external objects of sensation with, for example, 
hearing detecting air as motive by collisions, sight detecting air as luminous and 
smell detecting the air as „infused with calid vapours‟.
51
 
It is clear then that Baxter‟s accounts of sensation and appetite can all be explained in 
terms of the sensitive soul acting in conjunction with the vegetative soul and the 
motion of spirits through a complex sequence of interacting triune virtues.  
Furthermore Baxter holds that this Trinitarian action of the sensitive soul is itself the 
ground of the higher intellective functions.  This allows him to describe a close and 
direct connection between them, quite different from the usual Aristotelian (and 
Thomist) synthesis, suggesting that intellections and volitions themselves are only a 
more eminent and sublime form of sensation.  Philosophically he evidences this from 
the fact that „we feel ourselves to want what we will and to understand what we 




Following Scotus‟ arguments that the powers of the soul are essential, which we 
shall review immediately below, Baxter held that the „power of feeling‟ was of the 
essence of the soul.  Interestingly this led him to the opinion that man‟s ability to 
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sense persisted even after death.
53
  In suggesting this he was doubtless affected by a 
stronger Platonic understanding of the soul as self-sufficient and independent of the 
body than Scotus was willing to countenance.  Such a view is also congruent with the 
renewed emphasis on sensation found in both Campanella and Glisson.   
2.3. Man the Microcosm 
Baxter‟s essentially scholastic conception of the soul as an intrinsic principle of self-
motion conferring life and sensation marks him out from many of his 
contemporaries.  For the trend in seventeenth-century thought was to divorce life 
from the soul and thus focus narrowly on the soul as a thinking, incorporeal 
substance.
54
  Baxter held however that in reducing all the non-intellective actions of 
the soul to violent, reactive motion the new philosophers were in fact denying life 
itself.
55
  In holding to such an intimate connection between life and the soul, Baxter 
was therefore affirming an essentially Aristotelian position.  For taking motion in its 
wider sense of any form of change, it became possible to account for the whole 
multiplicity of faculties in plants, humans and animals as being rooted in the soul as 
the principle of self-determination.
 56
 
It is clear also that Baxter‟s conception of the lower organic soul wholly derives from 
his physics of the vestigia Trinitatis.  As Klinck suggests, even in the seventeenth 
century it was not unusual to locate vestigial trinities in all parts of the soul,
57
 for this 
was simply one aspect of a lingering Renaissance exemplarism.  Nevertheless 
Baxter‟s thoroughgoing Trinitarianism is distinctive, especially as manifest in his 
evident desire to establish a pneumatological science of the vestigia Trinitatis. This 
distinguishes him from many of his Protestant scholastic contemporaries who tended 
to be wary of the vestigia Trinitatis and certainly avoided extensive application of 
them in their thought.
58
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For Baxter however the science of the vestigia grounded his conception of the whole 
soul as fashioned in the image of the Triune God.  For following a very common 
Renaissance trope, present in authors as diverse as Calvin and Campanella, Baxter 
thought of man as a microcosm, comprehending within himself every order of 
being.
59
  As Gott put it, man was the „whole scale in himself‟ and the „epitome of 
all‟, comprehending within him the full sweep of intellective, sensitive, vegetative 
and material nature.
60
  This microcosmic nature was understood to be a special 
dignity conferred on man and an important and unique way in which he could be said 
to image God.  For it established man‟s right to rule over all of visible creation, 
marking him out from all other creatures and confirming him in the image of God‟s 
Majesty.
61
  Thus although Baxter‟s generous ontology conferred on the souls of 
plants and animals especial vestigial patterns, also manifest as lesser trinities in man, 
he maintained that of all visible creatures it was given to man alone to have 
fellowship and affinity with God and the angels.  In this way he preserved the 
integrity of the imago Dei. 
Furthermore Baxter‟s microcosmic understanding offers us a picture of the soul as a 
unity in diversity.  For the whole trend of his thought is to affirm both the unity of 
the soul (with the possible exception of the vegetative soul) and the rich diversity of 
its operations.  The soul itself may therefore be viewed as a kind of hierarchy of 
nested trinities all conditioned by the overarching trinity of the intellective soul.  In 
this way the „whole man‟ and not merely his intellective soul can be said to image 
the Trinity at every level of his being. 
3. Powers of the Soul 
We turn now to a matter which is central for our understanding of Baxter‟s 
psychology and which also acts as the ground of the analogy Baxter poses between 
the soul and the Triune God.  This is the debate over whether the natural powers of 
the soul (for Baxter its active power, intellect and will) are themselves the essential 
form of the soul or merely accidental to it.  As Baxter suggests, this was a debate 
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which had a long history in scholastic discourse and came down to the question of 
whether or not there is a real distinction between the faculties of the soul and its 
essence.
62
  On the one hand Scotus and his followers, as well as Ockham, Gregory of 
Rimini and those whom Baxter calls the „Nominalist cohort‟, denied such a real 
distinction, while on the other Aquinas and the later Thomists affirmed it, suggesting 
that the soul‟s faculties were simply accidental qualities by which the soul displays 
and issues its own operations.  Baxter, as we shall see, follows the Scotist line, 
orienting himself against the Thomist arguments of Zabarella.
63
 
Aquinas‟ position was philosophically based on the Aristotelian principle that 
actuality and potentiality must always fall within the same category.
64
  For him this 
meant that since the acts of the soul are accidental, its powers cannot be in any way 
identical with its substance.  Likewise he argued that if the essence of the soul were 
the immediate source of its activity – and thus its power – then to have a soul would 
mean to be always in a state of activity, something which is manifestly false.
65
  
Despite this Aquinas in no way intended to deny the intimate association between the 
soul and its powers, holding indeed that these should be considered midway between 
substance and accident and thus as „natural properties‟ of the soul.
66
  In other words 
he regarded the powers of the soul as „proper accidents‟ inhering in the soul as their 
subject and flowing from it as their cause.
67
  Although this preserved an intimate 
association it did entail that the soul and its powers had to be distinguished by a real 
distinction. 
Scotus denied such a real distinction, holding the powers of the soul to be identical 
with its essence though formally distinct from it.
68
 Thus, although like Aquinas he 
held that the powers of the soul were „proper‟ to it and that the essence of the soul 
was logically prior to its possession of causal powers, he denied that this meant the 
powers should be construed as proper accidents.  To his mind Aquinas‟ real 
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distinction, and thus real separability, of the powers and the soul, had the unfortunate 
consequence that the powers themselves became independent causal agents detached 
from the substance of the soul.
69
  Instead Scotus understood the powers as „unitively 
contained‟ within, and formally distinct from, the essence of the soul.  This allowed 
him to establish an important comparison between the inherence of God‟s attributes 
in his essence and the „affections of being‟ (unity, truth and goodness) in being itself, 
and consequently to assert the soul‟s metaphysical simplicity.
70
   
Nominalists such as Ockham went even further than Scotus.  Ockham, for example, 
denied not only a Thomist real distinction but also a Scotist formal distinction 
between the essence of the soul and its powers.  Instead he held that the powers of 
the soul were identical, connoting the same formally indivisible substance.  Thus 




Having reviewed the principal scholastic positions on the soul and its powers we may 
now turn to Baxter‟s specific refutation of Zabarella.  The argumentation here is both 
dense and subtle and we will simply highlight its most important features. What will 
emerge from our discussion is Baxter‟s employment of the Campanellan primalities 
within the context of his Nominalised Scotism in order to secure the triune character 
of the human soul, a pattern of argument which will be seen in Chapter Five to be 
vital for his Trinitarian conception of God. 
In articulating the contemporary Thomist position Baxter cites five arguments of 
Zabarella from his De Rebus Naturalibus, which he holds to represent a significant 
refining of the standard Thomist account of the powers.
72
  Zabarella‟s arguments 
hinge on two different metaphysical strategies.  The first, deployed in four out of the 
five arguments, depends on an account of the difference between act and potency and 
relies on the fundamental Aristotelian principle that act is „nobler‟ than and prior to 
potency.  Zabarella maintains that power in itself denotes a privation – an absence – 
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of act.  Since every operation is from act (rather than potency) it follows for him that 
the existence of powers presupposes a prior actual nature from which they must 
come forth, the essence of the soul itself.  This is essentially Aquinas‟ position, and 
like him Zabarella suggests that the powers are a mean between cause and operation, 
really distinct from the soul‟s essence although naturally flowing from it.
73
 
Baxter‟s response is to challenge Zabarella‟s metaphysical assumptions and 
especially his account of power itself.  Firstly he denies Zabarella‟s position that 
natural power must be regarded as an accidental quality.  Rejecting Aristotelian 
authority he maintains it must be proved, not simply assumed, that such powers are 
accidents.
74
  Secondly Baxter holds that Zabarella‟s Aristotelian framework has been 
superseded by his own Scotist metaphysics of inadequate concepts.  Thus to 
Zabarella‟s contention that because we call the soul a „virtuous substance‟ the virtues 
cannot be the substance itself, Baxter responds, according to a now familiar line, that 
substance and virtue are distinguished inadequately.  This means crucially that the 
two are not separable and so a real distinction cannot obtain between the soul and its 
powers.  Likewise to Zabarella‟s syllogism that as posse relates to esse so power 
relates to essence, but as in the soul posse differs really from esse so also power must 
differ really from essence, Baxter simply responds that essence qua essence and 
essence qua potent are diverse inadequate concepts of the same entity, differing not 
as diverse things but as genus and difference.
75
   
Baxter also views Zabarella‟s Aristotelian understanding of posse as posse agere as 
far too narrow in scope.  For Baxter, posse denotes not just posse agere but also 
posse esse.
 76
  As he says in response to another of Zabarella‟s arguments, power can 
be taken not just as active or passive potency but also as the form of the soul itself.  
Power therefore signifies the essence of the soul qua potent and is not as Aquinas 
held a mere accidental potency.  This allows him to establish the essence of the soul 
as the immediate principle of its own activity and so the simplicity of the soul, 
mirroring the divine simplicity, is maintained.   
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Baxter‟s distinction between posse esse and posse agere is clearly rooted in 
Campanella‟s radical reconfiguring of power and his own distinction between 
potentia essendi and potentia activa.  For the scholastics in general, as we have seen 
clearly in Aquinas, power (potentia) referred to potency and required actualising.  In 
their works we frequently find therefore the assertion that potency must be reduced 
to act by something which is itself already in act.  Compared to act power is therefore 
inferior.  Campanella however departed entirely from this conventional framework of 
act and potency.  Although he recognised that Aristotle had made act and potency the 
fundamental metaphysical principles of being, he himself divided act into the act of 
being and operation.  Since operation flows from the agent‟s power, this allowed him 
to claim that it cannot be a fundamental principle.  Likewise act, although it precedes 
passive potency, does not precede active potency, which itself is act.  By reduction 
Power remains the only principle of being, together, of course, with Wisdom and 
Love as its necessary and inseparable conjoints.  In this way Campanella effectively 
conflates, or as Bonansea suggests confuses, act and potency.
77
   
The consequence, as Bonansea remarks, is that „potency, as a mere potential 
principle of being, could hardly find place in his system of philosophy‟.
78
  Instead 
Campanella speaks of power as either potentia essendi, a constitutive principle of 
being identical with essence, or as potentia activa, which is again innate and to be 
identified with the agent himself even though it is distinguished from potentia 
essendi by flowing out of it.  While Campanella does speak of a third potentia 
passiva he attributes this either to privation or to the receptive power of matter.
79
  In 
summary therefore, for Campanella, power is that which empowers and is self-
actualising under God. There is no longer any sense in which it needs to be brought 
into act, for it is itself the source of all act.  This conception of power, along with the 
primalities themselves, must be regarded as one of Campanella‟s chief bequests to 
Baxter‟s thought. 
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Zabarella‟s second metaphysical strategy is to pose what seems to him an insoluble 
problem with the non-Thomist account.  He argues that if the soul is the same as all 
of its powers then necessarily these powers must also all be the same as each other.  
Since this is obviously not the case it follows that the soul and its powers cannot be 
identical and so must be really distinguished.
80
  This line of argument is not so easily 
dismissed and Baxter devotes considerably more attention to it.   
It is Baxter‟s chief desire to argue against Zabarella that the powers of the soul are 
both one and many.  That is, they are one realiter in essence as they are the form of 
the soul, but many either formaliter (as the Scotists hold) or at least relative as they 
are oriented to different acts (as the Nominalists hold).  Baxter recognises that 
postulating such distinctions between the one and many involves considerable 
difficulty, but argues that this applies as much to Zabarella as to himself.  
Interestingly Baxter defends his own position not so much philosophically as 
theologically, from his conviction that the form of the soul must be the image of the 
Trinity.  His implication is that without such essential unity in distinction within the 
soul this could not be the case. 
For Baxter God is most certainly three persons and three active principles of life, 
intellect and will in one essence.  The relation between essence, principles and 
persons in God will occupy much of Chapter Five but what is important to note here 
is Baxter‟s assertion that our (inadequate) conceptions concerning God must stem 
from our souls as created in his image.  Baxter maintains that the only way the 
appropriate unity-in-multiplicity can be maintained is through either the virtual or 
extrinsic distinction of the Nominalists or the formal distinction of the Scotists.  It 
follows for Baxter that if God‟s Power, Intellect and Will have such a unity in 
distinction then so also must his creating volitions, intellection and actions.  In this 
way the una-trina characteristic of creatures and supremely of the human soul as 
image of God may be accounted for.
81
 
Baxter here seems to envisage a kind of two-way epistemological traffic between our 
conceptions of God and our conceptions of the soul.  Just as we know God through 
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the soul, so also are we able to characterise the soul as una-trina through our 
knowledge of God‟s Triunity.
82
  This entails that just as God can be described as 
three persons in one essence, so his image in the human soul is both threefold in 
virtue and one in substance.   
Beyond this simple affirmation of the soul‟s triune nature however Baxter will not 
trespass.  He quite simply refuses to decide between the Scotist and Nominalist 
alternatives, remarking only that those who do not accept the formal distinction can 
cleave to Ockham‟s opinion instead that the powers are distinguished from the soul 
by extrinsic denomination.  Yet his own subsequent discussion is sympathetic to 
Scotus and he does include a long citation from Scaliger arguing that the powers of 
the soul can neither be said to be accidents nor absolutes of the soul but rather are its 
„proper affections‟ in the same way that unity, truth and goodness can be called the 
„proper affections of being‟, distinguished from each other as different formalities.
83
 
This as we have seen is a thoroughly Scotist point and begs the question of Baxter‟s 
own Scotism in this regard.  However since Baxter also leaves wide open the 
Nominalist alternative it seems best again to characterise his position in terms of his 
Nominalised Scotism.  More importantly still we should recognise that Baxter‟s 
scholastic arguments are deployed with the sole aim of preserving the triune 
character of the image of God.  Indeed as we have seen very clearly it is theological 
considerations that shape his metaphysics and not the other way round. 
4. Triune Faculties of the Soul 
Baxter‟s account of the higher faculties of vital-action, intellection and will is 
undoubtedly the crown of his psychology.  It is these which condition the triune 
nature of man‟s soul and form the principal seat of the image of God.  In his 
characterisation of these faculties as vitality, intellect and will rather than memory, 
understanding and will, Baxter, as we shall examine below, departs considerably 
from the Augustinian and scholastic mainstream.  As precedents for this move he 
cites specifically Suarez, Scheibler, Alsted and Grotius, although undoubtedly 
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Campanella, Comenius and later Glisson were prominent influences as well.
84
  
Earlier Baxter seems to have adhered to a view of the soul as possessing only the two 
faculties of intellect and will.
85
  However it was probably through reading these 
sources, as well as through the desire to develop a Trinitarian science of the soul, that 
he came to include power within the faculties as well.  This is important for it offers 
a contemporary context for Baxter‟s psychology and reiterates the complex three-
way interaction in his thought between the old and new scholasticism and the new 
philosophy. 
4.1. Vital-Active Virtue 
In the Methodus Baxter acknowledges the difficulty of distinguishing the vitality of 
the soul – its vital-active power – from its intellect and will, but holds that it must be 
so understood.  This is because he understands life as standing in relation to intellect 
and will as the first principle in a trinity of virtues.  Life itself is a universal notion 
comprehending the other virtues and so may be described as analogous to the Father 
in the Godhead.  Therefore just as the Son comes forth from the Father through 
generation and the Spirit from the Father (and the Son) through spiration so the 
intellect proceeds from power and the will from power (and intellect).
86
  From the 
very beginning of his reflections then, it is abundantly clear that the Trinitarian 
analogy Baxter secured in arguing for the essential nature of the soul‟s powers is 
crucial for his understanding of the co-working of the faculties.  Within the scope of 
this analogy power has the role of principium just as the Father does within the 
Godhead. 
Baxter holds that vitality in its own right is the principle of „action so far as it is 
action‟, seen especially in the „executive motions‟ of the soul, such as locomotion or 
the activity of inferior powers.  At first sight Baxter acknowledges that designating 
this the principal power of the rational soul seems demeaning, for both motive power 
and life are shared with animals and so unlike rationality are not a formal 
distinguishing feature of man.  For this reason he notes that many, including Glisson 
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in the De Vita Naturae, have placed motive power third after perceptive and 
appetitive power and as dependent on them.
87
  Furthermore, ironically, Baxter‟s 
elevation of motive power could easily be construed as an atomist move, for they 
above anyone would be sympathetic to the idea that intellect and will arise from the 
motive power of the body. 
Such an atomist construal however is, of course, entirely antithetical to Baxter‟s 
understanding of formal virtue.  Indeed, as he says against Gassendi, it is the powers 
of the soul which cause motion and not motion which causes the powers of the 
soul.
88
  Baxter‟s understanding is that animal life must be understood analogically 
and not as being of the same formal species as rational life.  He glosses this by 
Athanasius‟ reference to the highest form of life being that by which the soul moves 
itself.
89
  Motive power is therefore the soul‟s own self-motion, its eminent vitality 
through which it confers life to the whole composite of body and soul.  This means 
that although Glisson‟s ordering is entirely justified ad extra it must be reversed ad 
intra so that executive acts have priority over every faculty of the soul.
90
 
It is clearly this conception of vitality that grounds Baxter‟s understanding of it as the 
principium of all the soul‟s powers.  For, as the principle of action, vitality must 
underlie all of the soul‟s activity, even with respect to the higher functions of 
intellect and will.  Simply put, without life there could be no intellect or will.  Yet 
Baxter‟s understanding of life is also intrinsically Trinitarian, with intellect and will 
flowing inseparably from vitality itself and enabled by it as formally distinct active 
powers.  This is counterbalanced by the reciprocal action of the other faculties on 
power itself, so that just as power excites intellect and will, so the intellect 
understands power and will, directing them to determinate acts, and the will orders 
intellect and power towards the moral specification of actions.  In this way intellect 
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and will may be said to be concauses, necessary but not in themselves sufficient, for 
the executive acts of the lower faculties.
91
 
Due to the richness of its mutual interrelations with its co-powers Baxter does not 
wish to characterise vital power as simply „nude‟ or „indifferent‟.  Instead he 
suggests that it has a threefold natural inclination: firstly it is more inclined to acting 
than non-acting, secondly it is more inclined to congruous natural actions than 
incongruous ones and thirdly it is inclined for executing volitions.  Power can 
therefore only be properly understood in relation to the other faculties.  Significantly 
these inclinations are themselves, through repeated repetition and reinforcement, the 
ground of all the soul‟s habits, according to power‟s threefold habit of promptitude, 
fortitude and constancy.  Furthermore this triune habit of power subsequently 
grounds the habits of all the other faculties, enabling and sustaining them and giving 
them their distinctive Trinitarian shape. 
Furthermore this mutual interaction of vital power with its co-powers is also the 
foundation for the important distinction between natural and moral power.  Natural 
power refers to the action of power simpliciter, by mode of nature, whilst moral 
power is the action of power conditioned by intellect and will and directed to morally 
good or bad actions.
92
  Moral power is therefore the perfecting of the natural power 
of the soul, and is nothing less than its health or right disposition.  Like any other 
power moral power can also be habitual.  In this way the moral habit of power 
grounds the moral habits of intellect (divine knowledge, wisdom or faith) and will 
(divine love or holiness) and so may be described as the right disposition for 
immanent and outgoing operations as they relate to God.  In including within itself 
the right disposition of intellect and will for knowing and loving God it is, quite 
simply, the spiritual or divine life as it is directed towards the promptitude, fortitude 
and constancy of moral actions.
93
   
Baxter‟s discussion of moral habits relates very closely to his understanding of the 
image of God, which, as we shall see, is supremely seen in the health and holiness of 
                                                 
91
 Baxter, Methodus, I.178. 
92
 Baxter, Methodus, I.178. 
93
 Baxter, Methodus, I.179. 
149 
 
the natural man.  In these terms habits are not only the expression of a holy life but 
the very dynamic by which it is enabled.  They therefore thoroughly condition the 
interrelation of the Triune God and the triune soul of man as we shall discuss further 
in Chapter Six.  It is therefore this Trinitarian character of vitality that allows it to 
pattern the actual and habitual fabric of the entire Christian life. 
4.2. Intellective Virtue 
According to his Trinitarian model Baxter understands intellect as proceeding from 
vital power and consubstantial with it.  He emphasises that while the intellect is an 
active power with respect to inferior beings, it is passive with respect to God‟s 
operation,
94
  and needs the illumination of the Father of Lights.  He conceives of God 
as the „first universal intellect‟, acting in all created intellects, and in Platonic fashion 
as the intellectual Sun of the mind.
95
  Understandably therefore Baxter seeks to 
characterise intellection by a complex analogy with vision.  Just as the soul seeing is 
not at all acted on by inferior objects, so in the higher vision of intellection the soul 




Baxter describes the object of the intellect as not only truth, which he conceives of as 
exact congruity to the thing understood, but rather ens itself in its threefold 
transcendental affections of One (existing), True and Good.
97
  In saying this Baxter 
follows Scotus who had held this exact point against Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, 
who considered that its proper object was the quiddity of material substances or God 
respectively.  As Pasnau suggests, Scotus‟ position on the question represents a mean 
between these two extremes and by affirming ens as the object of the intellect Scotus 
is claiming that apprehension of being is common to all of its operations.
98
  For 
Baxter, who recognised a close relation between the „affections of being‟ and his 
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own divine principles, the advantage of this Scotist doctrine was surely that it 
suggested a Trinitarian structure to the processes of intellection.
99
 
However in his denial of species in cognition Baxter stands much closer to Ockham 
and the Nominalists than to Scotus and the earlier scholastic consensus.  Both 
Aquinas and Scotus held to a complex theory of cognition in which sensible species 
received from external objects were processed and abstracted by the active intellect 
to yield intelligible species which could be received by the passive intellect.
100
  In his 
earlier writings Baxter seems to have held the same opinion, for he speaks in 
identical language of species being „impressed‟ on the intellect.
101
  Later however, 
most likely through the influence of Campanella and Glisson as well as the 
Nominalists, Baxter changed his mind definitively, denying the distinctively 
Aristotelian position that the intellect in some way becomes the thing understood, 




Coming after Ockham, Baxter recognises that the question of species in cognition 
has caused a great deal of contention among philosophers, raising a number of thorny 
issues such as whether species continually emanate from sensible objects, how they 
are received in the phantasy and how they impress themselves on the intellect and 
move it for cognition.  His own view is that the notion of species has raised far more 
questions than it has managed to solve, and so he follows Ockham in denying both 
their role and their existence as conventionally understood.  While Baxter is 
particularly hostile to any emanation account of species from material objects,
103
 he 
also strongly critiques contemporary and more sophisticated species accounts, such 
as that of Sennertus which employed the language of spiritual or intentional species 
while maintaining that sensation itself was an immanent act of the soul.  These 
alternatives were common ways of retaining the language of species while 
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introducing new philosophical or scientific developments into theories of 
cognition.
104
  Baxter however holds that the language of spiritual or intentional 
species is equally muddled and does not solve the fundamental problem of whether 
species should be regarded as substantial, accidental or merely beings of reason.
105
 
To illustrate his own understanding of cognition Baxter offers a detailed description 
of how the soul cognises a visible object.  Light, he says, reflected off the passive 
object is conjoined in the eye with the soul‟s own interior light.  By this light the soul 
exercises its own visive faculty, the act of which flows immediately from the essence 
of the soul and is perception itself.  As Baxter says „by seeing we perceive ourselves 
to see and by feeling we perceive ourselves to feel‟.  Given the immediacy of this 
act, Baxter denies any role for species whether received externally or generated 
internally, holding instead that the cognised object becomes an object of the common 
(integrating) sense and phantasy through the continued apprehensive ad intra activity 
of the soul. 
As we saw above Baxter envisages the act of sensation itself in terms of motion.  
Thus the exterior act (presumably the „attingent‟ triple act of light, although he does 
not make this entirely clear) is described as triggering a sensitive motion ad intra, 
met by a primary motion of the soul emitted from the centre outwards.
106
  When 
these meet the soul reverts into itself ad intra and from these motions a variety of 
passions arise.  Nominally Baxter suggests that this act of the soul could be termed a 
„species‟ or „image‟, so long as by this no „efflux from the passive object‟ is 
understood nor „images depicted in air‟, nor indeed anything beyond the received 
solar influx, the act of the sensation itself and the habit it gives rise to in the internal 
senses of phantasy and memory.  Therefore by species he understands only the acts 
of the soul progressing from its essence, specified by terminating objects and known 
through the intuition of intellect.  This Baxter says assumes an intimate connection 
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between the sensitive and intellective faculties, implying that they are better regarded 
as two aspects of one soul rather than as two different souls.
107
 
By his reduction of intellection to motions of the soul, Baxter is also able to deal with 
the vexed question of the active and passive intellect.  For Baxter the soul must 
always be considered as being in act (at least immanently).  However he also 
recognises that the intellect as active is continually sustained by God as first cause, 
although he declares himself agnostic to the Averroist question of whether it is also 
sustained by a further universal intellect as second cause.  Thus with regard to the 
passive intellect Baxter accepts the intellect‟s passivity to God as well as its quasi-
passivity to its own immanent acts, but denies that material objects are in any way 
able to act upon it.
108
  In this way Baxter locates both the active and passive intellect 
in differing motions of the same soul rather than in distinct faculties. 
It may be objected that Baxter‟s reformulation of species as immanent acts of the 
soul does not truly solve anything but instead replaces the action of sensible and 
intelligible species with some equally unknown operations of the soul.  To say this 
however would not be entirely fair to the spirit of Baxter‟s exposition.  As we have 
already suggested the intimate bond between the sensitive and intellective soul is a 
vital axiom of Baxter‟s psychology.  The act of intellection therefore involves a felt 
perception that we are indeed understanding, a knowledge which Baxter calls innate 
and unconscious and says is to be distinguished from any subsequent artificial and 
discursive knowledge.  The first act of the intellect is thus said to be „its own intimate 




While the theory of intuitive cognition is usually traced to Scotus it was Ockham 
who made it a major plank of his intellectual and theoretical system.  The Scotist 
definition of intuition, which Baxter cites from Nicholas d‟Orbellis, is 
„knowledge…of an object as it self present, when a thing in its present existence, is 
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the moving object of knowledge‟.
110
  Ockham accepted this definition for natural 
intuition, although he repudiated it in general due to his controversial position that 
God according to his absolute power could cause intuitive cognition of non-
existents.
111
  In general however it is clear that intuition refers to a direct and 
unmediated cognition of an object, or a kind of higher „intellectual vision‟.
112
  
Theories of intuitive cognition attained some prominence in the seventeenth century 




Baxter‟s own position is that in this life we only have intuitive knowledge of our own 
acts and not of anything external to us.
114
  This marks an important limitation of the 
scope of (intellective) intuitive cognition.  In support of this he cites from Ockham‟s 
Quodlibet, in which he proves that the intellect knows its own acts intuitively.  
Fascinatingly Baxter compares this with Descartes‟ famous cogito and the 
experience of self-consciousness.
115
  In the Reasons Baxter adds a complication to 
this relatively simple picture, remarking that „by seeing other things, I am most 
certain that I see, and by hearing, tasting, smelling, etc. I am certain that I hear, taste, 
and smell; so is not the intellect here fitted intuitively to understand its own act of 
understanding; but by understanding other objects, it understandeth that it doth 
understand‟.
116
  Interestingly he glosses this with Descartes‟ affirmation that „the act 
of intellection is more perceived than the object‟ so „I am more certain that I think 
and understand, than I am of the nature of that which I think of and understand‟.
117
   
This should not be taken to mean however that the soul does not know its own 
substance intuitively.  Baxter, in fact, holds that the soul does know its own faculties 
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and substance directly, although he adds in clarification: „at primum perceptum non 
est substantia qua substantia, nec facultas qua facultas; sed facultas et substantia ut 
agentes primo et immediate percipiuntur‟.
118
  Significantly, from its intuitive 
knowledge of itself the soul is able to make an inferential leap to consider the nature 
of the pure intelligences, something which we shall see in Chapter Five is of great 
importance for the analogia entis between the triune nature of the soul and the 
Trinity.  As Baxter succinctly puts this, „the soul by knowing it self, doth gather the 




Although Baxter does not universally affirm the scholastic dictum that „there is 
nothing in the intellect which was not first in the sense‟,
120
 he does hold to a very 
close connection between intuitive and sensitive cognition.  This means both that 
intuitive knowledge itself may be regarded as an eminent kind of sensation and that 
in this life all our knowledge of sensible objects comes through the medium of the 
senses.
121
  This runs entirely counter to the diminishing view of sensation found 
among the mechanists and instead conforms to Campanella and Glisson‟s view of 
knowledge as primarily eminent sensation. 
Baxter‟s theory of intuition also helps us to make proper sense of the psychological 
processes operative in cognition.  His description of the sense object triggering a 
sensitive motion ad intra resembles Ockham‟s account of the first sensitive intuition.  
Likewise the act of the (presumably intellective) soul in meeting this sensitive 
motion and the soul‟s subsequent reversion into itself may be seen as constituting 
Ockham‟s second intellective intuition.
122
  Indeed Baxter explicitly notes the 
difference between these two kinds of intuition in his discussion of the views of 
d‟Orbellis.
123
  Elsewhere Baxter describes the nature of this intuition, saying that 
„every vital faculty hath a self-perception in its acting; which is an eminent sense: 
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intuition also of outward sensible objects, or immediate perception of them, as 
sensate and imaginata, is before all argument and definition, or reasoning action‟.
124
  
The act of intuition then, encompassed by the soul‟s internal motions,
125
 affirms once 
again the intimate link in Baxter‟s thought between sensitive and intellective 
cognition. 
Ockham‟s influence can also be seen in Baxter‟s account of the way in which the 
soul gains universal and particular knowledge.
126
  Baxter affirms, like Ockham, that 
the first object of cognition is „ens reale incomplexum‟ presented as it is imaged and 
sensed.  The second object of intellection is the act of intellection itself, through 
which we gain knowledge of what something actually is, as „ens complexum 
cognitum‟.  From this, through the operation of the mind ad intra, we are able to 
form universal concepts.
127
  The entire process closely resembles Ockham‟s account 
of abstracting universals from particulars, albeit with the important difference that 
Baxter holds something akin to a Scotist moderate realist position rather than to a 
full-blooded Nominalism.
128
  Furthermore Baxter like Ockham also dispenses with 
the need for species in the memory.  Instead he holds that the role of species can be 




Before we turn to consider the faculty of the will it is important to linger briefly on 
Baxter‟s account of intellectual habits.  For these are not only closely connected with 
the intuitive and sensitive awareness of acts, as per Ockham, but also with the triune 
interaction of the soul‟s faculties.  Baxter divides intellectual habits into three 
categories: „habits of knowledge‟ for speculation, „habits of prudence‟ for right 
volitions and „habits of art‟ for exterior acts.  These, as we have suggested, are rooted 
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in and enabled by the soul‟s vital-active faculty and themselves condition its 
volitional and executive activities.  Once again habits may be seen to embed the 
actions of the soul and help establish a network of complex triune interactions, 
establishing the distinctive Trinitarian stamp of Baxter‟s psychology.
130
 
4.3. Volitional Virtue 
Right from the beginning Baxter shows clearly his desire to place his discussion of 
the will in both a Scotist and a Trinitarian context.  He affirms firstly an Aristotelian 
conception of the will as naturally inclined towards happiness, as a weight is inclined 
towards the centre of the earth. Thus the will is in some sense a free-standing 
appetite, independent from determination by any antecedent principle.  This is 
immediately balanced, however, by Baxter‟s recognition of the „wonderful harmony‟ 
of the soul‟s powers, by which both power and intellect contribute to the act of the 
will.  Insofar as the will, as a motion towards a recognised good, must be preceded 
by both recognition of an object‟s existence and understanding of its nature, the 
action of the will must proceed from power and intellect together (of which existence 
and truth are, respectively, the proper objects). Nevertheless this does not lessen the 
will‟s dignity, for Baxter, in entirely Scotist fashion, argues that just as goodness, 
rather than existence or truth, is the most excellent affection of an object, so the will 
is called the perfective faculty of the soul.
131
    
In holding that the will was an appetite for good Baxter was simply following a 
scholastic consensus which endured well into the seventeenth century.  As an 
appetite the will is therefore analogous to the lower sensitive and vegetative 
appetites, although as a rational appetite it both exceeds them and is specifically 
differentiated from them, since its good is cognised.  Contrary to Aquinas, however, 
Baxter did not hold that the will desires good generally or universally but only as 
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grounded in individual instances.
132
  In holding this Baxter was again clearly 
following the Scotists, as he himself confessed elsewhere.
133
   
Likewise, although Baxter conceived of the will analogically as an appetite, he was 
careful never to treat it merely as such.  Unlike Aquinas, therefore, he did not think 
that the will was bound to adhere to happiness of necessity, but instead regarded it 
only as necessarily inclined, and always capable of refusing both its own happiness 
and the love of God, at least by suspension of its own act.  In this account of the will 
as both free and rational we see the beginnings of Baxter‟s Scotist conception of the 
will as a self-determining power.
134
 
Baxter further analysed the will according to a distinction of ends and means.  His 
division of ends is twofold, into an „end of nature‟ and an „end of reason‟.  
According to the „end of nature‟ the will is directed towards the happiness of the one 
willing, whereas according to the „end of reason‟ the will is directed towards God 
and his goodness.  When a particular thing is willed as means it is formally directed 
towards one of these two ends.  This complex network, Baxter remarks, was 
instituted by God in order that the will might be „naturally and necessarily inclined‟ 
towards loving him when recognised as God.  Even after the Fall the will therefore 
essentially retains these twin ends and inclinations, although their relation is now 
disordered, with the inclination to love of God and virtue largely effaced.  This 
means that through diversion of the will or deception of the intellect it can and does 
happen that God is not loved as he ought to be.
135
    
Although Baxter does not acknowledge it, his discussion of these twin ends of the 
will closely reflects Scotus‟ doctrine of the affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae.  
These two affections of the will, which Scotus saw as distinct formalities rooted in its 
nature, represent, respectively, the natural inclination towards the love of self and the 
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free inclination towards the love of God and others.
136
  It should immediately be 
stressed, however, that for both Scotus and Baxter the affectio commodi or „end of 
nature‟ is in no way a depraved appetite but instead is God-given and intended to 
complement the will‟s free nature.  Both therefore have a very proper Christian 
understanding of self-love.
137
  What is vicious is the disordered relation between 
these two affections resulting from the Fall.  In particular the continuing strife 
between flesh and spirit is seen from the fact that man is able to have simultaneously 
two contrary ultimate ends between which he must choose.  The soul is therefore 
always poised between two alternatives and it is this which characterises the 




Having outlined his basic account of the will Baxter moves on to the important 
question of the will‟s freedom.  Here Baxter is careful to avoid both the Thomist 
intellectualist position that the will‟s freedom is rooted in the intellect and the 
extreme voluntarist position that the will is able to determine itself to specific objects 
without the guidance of the intellect.  These he believes would diminish, 
respectively, the will‟s nature as a self-determining power and its status as a rational, 
rather than sensitive, appetite.
139
  He also denies the Molinist position, popular in the 
seventeenth century, that the will‟s freedom can be characterised as a freedom of 
indifference towards alternatives.
140
   
Baxter is emphatic that the freedom of the will is not a freedom from God or from 
divine help and so is not the power of determining itself as an independent or 
absolutely first cause.  He affirms instead that the will receives from God as efficient 
cause and returns to him as final cause.  This physical reception from God which 
antecedes the will‟s acts is not however what is meant by „to will‟, but is rather the 
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prior dependence on God which enables all of its acts.   In this way the will can be 
called a free cause of its own acts and yet subordinate to God.
141
  Baxter further 
asserts that God, as a higher cause, is able efficaciously to predetermine the will‟s 
action towards good (although not of course to evil, for this would be against God‟s 
nature), which he holds is not to the detriment or diminution of the will‟s natural 
power but rather greatly to the advantage of its freedom.
142
   
With the boundaries of this freedom outlined negatively, Baxter turns to its positive 
specification.  This he suggests consists fundamentally in three aspects of the will; 
firstly, that the will is a first cause of its own acts under God and has a „power of 
determining itself without some cause physically and efficaciously predetermining 
it‟; secondly, that the will has the power of commanding other faculties, including 
the intellect, although in different ways according to their diversity; thirdly, that the 
will is in no way able to be determined necessarily by any created power. Such 




While Baxter holds that the will can never be free from inclination, he maintains that 
it retains its basic freedom in three ways: the freedom of contradiction or exercise, 
the freedom of contrariety or specification and the freedom of competition or 
comparison.  The first of these he characterises as the will‟s freedom to will or not to 
will (or to nill and not to nill) and the second as the freedom to will or nill.  The third 
refers to the will‟s choice between two different things to be willed rather than one 
thing to be either willed or nilled.
144
  The notions of the will‟s freedom of 
contradiction and freedom of contrariety were common currency in the seventeenth 
century.
145
  Here Baxter‟s use of an additional third category, which he notes is 
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Armed with these subtle distinctions Baxter is able to proceed in his characterisation 
of the various types of freedom of will.  Like Scotus he holds that the will‟s most 
perfect freedom consists in its „most firm adhesion to the good and immutable 
constancy of willing well‟.  In our mortal state of pilgrimage our wills are weak 
through indetermination or indifference and thus the freedom of the pilgrim is 
properly the imperfection of the will, and the incertitude, fluctuation, mutability, 
vacillation and inconstancy of will that we experience are all symptoms of the will‟s 
bondage to sin.  By contrast the angels and souls of the blessed in a confirmed state 
have the highest kind of freedom attainable by created beings, which Baxter 
characterises as „necessarily and immutably by indissoluble adhesion to love God 
and holiness‟.  At the summit of freedom is God himself, whose will is said to be the 
most free of all since it is utterly immutable and never wills what it has not already 
willed from eternity.
147
   
Such an account of the will runs entirely counter to that of Aquinas, as is neatly 
brought out by Bonansea. He points out that for Aquinas freedom is essentially only 
freedom of contradiction.  Where no choice exists, therefore, there can be no 
freedom and so it is meaningless to talk about the will‟s freedom towards happiness, 
the freedom of the blessed to love God and especially of God‟s own freedom to love 
himself.  For Scotus, however, choice is in fact a mark of the will‟s current 
imperfection.
148
  This brings us right to the heart of Baxter‟s Scotist conception of 
the will, shared with many of his Reformed brethren, in which its freedom is in no 




Following his own Trinitarian metaphysics, Baxter seeks further to characterise the 
will of God and of the blessed in terms of the mutual interaction of the divine 
principles.  Thus although according to nude power God is said to be able to do all 
things possible, including evil, his power never acts without the conditioning of 
intellect and will and so he never wills anything which is not good and congruent to 
his nature.  His will however is entirely free and even such that he is able to hold 
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himself indifferently to indifferent things.  Likewise Baxter holds, following Scotus, 
that the blessed in their confirmed state retain the power to do both good and evil but 
according to their perfection of intellect and will are determined by „most free 
necessity‟ to the „bonum cognitum volendum‟ and adhere constantly to the willed 
good from the most free necessity of immutability.
150
   
In the life of pilgrimage Baxter sees a similar Trinitarian pattern in the interaction of 
power, intellect and will.  Here though it is the freedom of contradiction which is 
„maxime notabilis‟, extending itself to all objects.  Unsurprisingly Baxter‟s 
characterisation of this shows a marked tendency towards the Scotist voluntarist 
position, which held to the primacy of the will over the intellect, rather than towards 
a Thomist intellectualist view.  Baxter‟s precise position was that in any act of the 
will the intention of end precedes the choice of means but that in determining both of 
these the will must call upon the intellect for counsel.  In broad terms then he would 
have certainly upheld the scholastic dictum „nihil volitum quin praecognitum‟.  
Likewise in general terms Baxter held that the specification of an act (i.e. the 
choosing of a particular act) was from the intellect and its exercise from the will.  Yet 
such a simplistic picture was considerably complicated by the will‟s conditioning of 
the intellect such that its very power of specifying is (for the most part) dependent on 
the act of the will.
151
 
Baxter expressed this complex relationship between intellect and will using the 
distinction between simple and compared volitions.  He defined a simple volition as 
„that by which we will a thing by simple complacence, considered as simply good, 
before the understanding compare it with any other good, and call the will to an 
election‟.
152
   In these terms the will is therefore determined, of necessity, by the 
intellect so that it cannot refuse the simple volition of its own happiness and of any 
sensible good.  It is also determined of necessity towards any volition of something 
fully perceived to be its only means of happiness.  It is free however with respect to 
its love towards God and its simple volition of God as ultimate end as well as 
towards all of its comparative volitions regarding the election of diverse ends and 
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means.  It also remains entirely free with respect to its own exercise.  Baxter 
therefore affirms the will as a „self-determining principle‟ which is „Lord of its own 
acts‟ and „able to determine itself with due objects and helps, without extrinsick 
predetermining physical motion either of God or creatures‟.
153
  In the final analysis, 
then, the intellect is truly able to be called a „commanded faculty‟, both directly 
according to exercise and consequently according to the specification of an act.  
Furthermore, in a profoundly Scotist statement, Baxter maintains that the intellect is 
only free so far as it is commanded and that it only attains this freedom through 




What is notable in Baxter‟s discussion of the will and its freedom is his desire to 
harmonise a basically Scotist conception of the will with his own Trinitarian 
metaphysics.  Baxter‟s adherence to a Scotist account of the will is beyond question.  
Without doubt therefore Baxter may be called a voluntarist, although his 
voluntarism, like that of Scotus, is a thoroughly „mitigated voluntarism‟.
155
  In 
expressing the intimate connection between intellect and will both Baxter and Scotus 
were aided by their view of the powers as essentially inherent in the soul.  Both 
likewise employed the analogy of the soul‟s powers with the affections of being.  
However in his insistence on the essential equality of the three faculties and his 
desire to characterise them according to their triune interaction, Baxter goes 
considerably further than Scotus towards the development of a Trinitarian theory of 
the souls‟ faculties.  As he concludes: 
Facultates…mira concomitantia (ex radicali unitate) ita cooperatur, ut 
numquam agit voluntas sine intellectu et potentia-activa, neque intellectus 
sine potentia-activa: Et ad intra actu immanente, saltem profundo et confuse, 
plerumque simul agunt. Attamen ut actus ab objectis speciem et 
individuationem accipiunt, ex diversitate et separabilitate objectorum, 
diversificari et separari possunt facultatum actus.
156
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As equals in a triune partnership the faculties therefore enjoy perfect reciprocal 
action upon each other, yet conditioned by two provisos: firstly that this does not 
remove the dignity of each faculty to determine itself and secondly that the relation 
between the faculties is ordered and in some way hierarchical.  In other words for 
Baxter the faculties of power, intellect and will reflect the Triune interdependence of 
the three persons in the Godhead.  This, as we shall see in the next chapter, gives rise 
to a profound analogy between the Trinity and the human soul.   
5. Image of God 
Baxter believes the soul to be specially created by God (although he allows a role to 
human traduction),
157
 to be immortal,
158
 and to retain its individuality after the death 
of the body.
159
  He is clear however that the soul‟s chief dignity, crowning all these, 
is being fashioned in the image of the Triune God and therefore having the capacity 
to enter into eternal fellowship with him.  In formulating his own doctrine of the 
image of God Baxter drew extensively on the mainstream Western tradition.  The 
foundation of this, he rightly held, was found in Augustine‟s famous psychological 
analogy, as mediated subsequently through Boethius, Damascene and Lombard to 
nearly all of the scholastics.
160
  In his overview of the scholastic account Baxter 
refers extensively to Augustine, Lombard, Aquinas and Scotus and we shall take 
their combined thought as our starting point, reviewing it thematically, before turning 




A first point of importance concerns the precise difference between image and 
vestige.  The distinction between the general vestigia and the special image was 
firmly rooted in the tradition, found in both Augustine and Lombard,
162
 but was 
given formal shape in later scholasticism.  Aquinas affirmed a distinction between an 
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image as representing according to likeness of species and a vestige as an effect from 
a cause.  Thus he held that only the internal processions of the mind, through their 
specific likeness to the intra-Trinitarian processions, could be properly said to image 
the Trinity.
163
  Scotus held that a vestige represents a part distinctly and the whole 
indistinctly by way of similarity while an image represents the whole distinctly by 
way of imitation.
164
  While a vestige is unable to lead to the image of the Trinity as a 
„quasi-whole‟, this is precisely the function of an image.
165
  Like Aquinas, Scotus 
therefore placed the image of God only in the internal processions of the mind.
166
 
A second point of importance concerns the precise nature of this image.  Augustine 
established the basis of this in his De Trinitate in which he sets out a number of 
different triadic representations of this image, all of which found their way into 
subsequent discussion.  Two of these are of particular relevance for our discussion 
and are grounded upon the mind‟s reflexive knowledge and love of itself.  The first 
of these is the most basic triad of mens, notitia sui and amor sui.  These Augustine 
holds neither to be a confused mixture, nor three entities capable of being reduced to 
a homogeneous unity, but rather to possess both unity and threefold distinction at 
once through their Trinitarian pattern of interrelation.  Attempting to characterise 
them Augustine describes self-knowledge as a kind of mental word begotten of the 
mind and representing itself, and self-love as a separate procession, akin to appetite 
or will, by which the mind and its own knowledge are bound together in essential 
love and unity.
167
  The second of these is his more famous triad of memory, 
understanding and will, in which Augustine recognises the same process of begetting 
and binding through love as mirroring the intra-Trinitarian processions.
168
 
These triads, along with the more general Augustinian triad of the lover, beloved and 
their mutual love which grounds them, form the basis of scholastic discussion of the 
image of God.  Before considering this further however it is important to understand 
their rationale for including and prioritising memory.  For Augustine and the 
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scholastics, memory was not only a storehouse of knowledge, as it is for us today, 
but also a fecund or generative power of the mind, producing occurrent acts of 
thought or „mental words‟.  They thought that when an intelligible object (for many 
scholastics an intelligible species) was conjoined with memory, these were naturally 
and necessarily productive of knowledge as a word of the mind.  In this way memory 
was said to generate or beget understanding.  Extending this to the Godhead this 
theory, proposed by Augustine and elaborated on by his successors, became the 
foundation of the entire medieval psychological account of the Trinity.
169
  It is 
indeed readily apparent how these internal productions of the human mind could be 
said both to image the intra-Trinitarian processions and to provide insight into God‟s 
own Trinitarian nature. 
However while the scholastics generally agreed on the basic nature of this imaging 
they differed considerably on its precise interpretation.  One major area of contention 
was the question of the inherence of the image in the soul.  Aquinas held that the 
image of the Trinity was only to be found in the acts of the soul and not in its powers 
and therefore chastised Lombard for his view that the image resided in the three 
powers of the soul.
170
  Scotus however differed from Aquinas, following both 
Augustine and Lombard, in holding that the image of God resided in both the acts 
and the powers themselves.  As Francis Lychetus, Scotus‟ sixteenth-century 
commentator, summarised his views: „imago consistit simul in actibus primis et 




Another closely related issue concerned which of Augustine‟s two triads best 
represented the image of God within the soul.  Aquinas followed Augustine in 
preferring the triad of memory, understanding and will, even going so far as to 
suggest the first triad was „in part deficient‟.
172
  Both Lombard and Scotus however 
preferred Augustine‟s other triad.
173
  Thus Scotus says of Augustine that he 
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„pulcherrime assignat imaginem et perfectissime, quando dicit: mens, notitia, amor‟.  
His reasoning is that mind does not precisely express a fecund principle for begetting 
or spirating but rather a first act containing both of these virtually in itself.  In this 
way the mind suitably represents the Father as having both fecundities by himself, 
which Scotus holds to be the most appropriate way of ascribing the image of the 
Trinity in the soul.  By contrast Scotus holds that Aquinas‟ preferred triad primarily 
represents the unity of God rather than his Trinity, because its members are the same 
as the soul and thus do not represent the Triune productions.
174
 
A final issue concerned the different degrees of the image in man‟s soul.  Augustine 
held that the true image is found in the soul remembering, understanding and loving 
God himself.
175
  For Augustine memory is therefore the seat of self-transcendence 
through which man may ascend to God.
176
  Thus the true meaning of the imago Dei 
for Augustine is man‟s participation through wisdom in the Triune being of God, 
through which he comes to reflect God‟s own likeness.
177
  Aquinas held that the 
image of God was only properly found in the acts of the three faculties directed to 
God himself, yet he also distinguished three stages of imaging: firstly according to 
man‟s natural aptitude for this, secondly as he actually knows and loves God 
although imperfectly and thirdly as he does this perfectly.  These he called the image 
of nature common to all men, of grace found only in the just and of glory found only 
in the blessed.
178
  The Scotists held to a similar, although less stringent, hierarchical 
arrangement.  Summarised by Lychetus, there is in the soul firstly an imperfect 
image when it knows and loves inferior things, secondly a more perfect image when 
it knows and loves itself and finally a most perfect image when by act it knows and 
loves the Trinity.  In this it becomes not only the image of the Trinity but its 
similitude, since the act of understanding is the similitude of the object.
179
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Unlike the scholastics surveyed we do not find in Baxter a neat distinction between 
his doctrine of the vestigia Trinitatis and of the imago Dei.  For Baxter held that even 
the lower active natures, not just the human soul, had a derivative triune form.  He 
can speak therefore of all active natures as imaging God‟s own eminent Triune 
nature and of the whole universe as the Image-Glory of God.
 180
  In this way the 
boundary between vestige and image becomes somewhat blurred.  This perspective 
may be usefully compared with the vitalism of Campanella and Glisson, although 
they, of course, went further than Baxter in seeing some kind of triune impress in 
every being and not just every active being.
181
  An even closer precedent can be 
found in Lull‟s doctrine of the correlatives as intrinsic triune constituents of all 
created being. 
With regard to the question of the image‟s inherence in the soul Baxter 
unsurprisingly follows Scotus in holding that the image of God resides in both the 
soul‟s powers and its acts.  Specifically Baxter holds that the image is found radically 
in the powers themselves and actively in the acts, such that both concur for 
constituting the image of God.
182
  In his defence of the essential nature of the powers, 
reviewed above, Scotus was motivated throughout by a desire to preserve the 
essential inherence of the image of God in man.
183
  It is now clear that Baxter‟s 
defence of this served much the same purpose. 
To the related question of whether the image of God consists in inferior acts of the 
soul or only those directed towards God, Baxter declines the Thomist view that the 
image is only to be found in the latter.  In its place he develops an account of the 
natural image found in every exercise of the soul and a holy or moral image found in 
the soul‟s inclination and acts towards God as well as towards creatures in their 
possession of the divine image.
184
  This is clearly a truncated version of Scotus‟ 
account.  In addition Baxter also admits a third distinctive component to the image, 
found in man‟s role as Dominus, Rector and Benefactor under God to the creatures in 
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  In this way he shows the image of God to exist not only inherently in the 
soul but also through man‟s relation to God and other creatures. 
While Baxter follows Augustine closely in maintaining both the essential inherence 
of the image of God and its various degrees, he differs from him very considerably 
on the question of which triads best represent the image of God.  As Baxter baldly 
puts it, „Augustinus triplicem animi et virtutem et actum male nominavit: memoriam 
scilicet posuit loco potentiae-activae-vitalis‟.  Furthermore Baxter adds that this 
mistake, which he attributes to ignorance, was compounded by Boethius, 
Damascene, Lombard and nearly all the scholastics.
186
  
Baxter‟s discomfort with the Augustinian account stems from his understanding of 
memory.  In fact both Baxter and the scholastic tradition recognised two different 
kinds of memory, one in the phantasy of the sensitive soul and the other in the 
intellect itself.
187
 Citing both Durandus and Scotus, who describe intellectual 
memory as an active or pregnant intellect respectively, Baxter demonstrates that 
(intellectual) memory is not properly distinct from the intellectual faculty.  This 
poses a problem for the Augustinian account as he does not think that the imago 
Trinitatis can be properly grounded on only the two distinct faculties of intellect and 
will.
188
  Another contributing factor is that Baxter did not hold to a scholastic view of 
memory as a fecund generative power.  In fact intellective memory plays a marginal 
role in his psychology, certainly when compared to the scholastics.  Likewise, 
following the Nominalists Baxter, as we have seen, also rejected a species account of 
cognition.  Therefore the traditional scholastic account of conjoint memory and 
intelligible species generating a „word of the mind‟ could no longer make sense to 
him, although he retains some of the conventional terminology. 
In place of memory Baxter assigned power as principium of the image of God.  Here 
he was undoubtedly influenced by the Campanellan reconfiguring of power, as well 
as by other contemporaries such as Alsted, Comenius and Scheibler cited above.  In 
fact both Baxter and Campanella understood power to lie at the root of the scholastic 
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concept of fecund memory and viewed themselves as simply making this fully 
explicit.  Campanella himself sourced this idea in Bernard‟s discussion of the image 
of God and Damascene‟s conception of fecundity as „potestas exuberans se ad 
communicandum‟, even going so far as to suggest that Bernard‟s „efficacies‟ could 
be identified with his own primalities.
189
  Baxter likewise cites both Bernard and 
Damascene in connection with the primalities, as well as the view of Campanella 
(and of others it must be said) that by memory Augustine meant power or divine 
life.
190
  Baxter himself shared the Campanellan understanding of power as 
intrinsically self-communicating and therefore as grounding all the internal 
processions of the soul. 
Overall it is clear that while the Augustinian scholastic account of the image of God 
focussed on the begetting of the mental word through memory, in Baxter attention 
has shifted quite markedly to the coinherence of the three powers of the soul.  Thus 
his account is significantly different from that of Aquinas and much closer to that of 
Lombard and especially Scotus.  Despite this shift in conception Baxter still retains 
both the structural and dynamic features of the original Augustinian model; those 
aspects referred to by Gioia as the image of exemplar and the image of relation.
191
  In 
retaining the structural and exemplaristic account of the image residing in the soul‟s 
powers Baxter differs from many, although by no means all, of his Reformed 
contemporaries, who like Calvin tended to be suspicious of Augustine‟s 
psychological analogy.
192
  Nevertheless like Augustine and Calvin Baxter also 
emphasises the relational aspect of the image of God, making a careful distinction 
between the natural image in all mankind and the sanctified image of the blessed 
acquired through their relation to God.  Indeed it is this relational aspect, signified by 
the intrinsic dynamism of man‟s cleaving to the living God through his life, 
understanding and will, which has a fundamental place in Baxter‟s doctrine and, as 
we shall see in Chapter Six, wholly conditions the psychological aspect of the Triune 
Baptismal Covenant. 
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Chapter Five: Metaphysics of the Trinity 
1. Introduction 
The starting point for Baxter‟s discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity was the 
Triune Baptismal Covenant.
1
  As we have already seen Baxter held that it was in this 
Covenant itself, as the nucleus of all Scripture, that the full glory of a biblical and 
Trinitarian method of theology was manifest.
2
   In the last two chapters however this 
covenantal aspect of Baxter‟s theology has slipped quietly out of view, for our focus 
has instead been on elaborating his account of the general and special vestigia 
Trinitatis.  Now, in preparation for our wide-angle view of Baxter‟s theology in the 
final chapter, it is time to reconnect the scriptural and metaphysical strands of our 
discussion – strands which for Baxter were never truly separate.
3
 
In recent years there has been renewed interest in the Trinitarian theology of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
4
  It is evident that while the Trinitarian theology 
of the earliest Reformers was relatively basic, retaining the language of essence and 
persons but eschewing anything beyond this, their successors had frequent recourse 
to scholastic metaphysics and distinctions in the course of elaborating their doctrine.  
This was due in part to pressure from radical Biblicists and anti-Trinitarians on the 
one hand, who claimed that the doctrine of the Trinity was either unscriptural or 
unreasonable or both, and to pressure from their Catholic opponents on the other 
hand, who denied Protestants their catholic credentials, often lumping them together 
with the anti-Trinitarians.  In part it was simply a natural consequence of both an 
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increasing drive for systematisation, manifest from the beginning of Protestant 
Scholasticism, and an increasingly nuanced view of the ancillary role of reason in 
structuring theological doctrine.
5
   
The English context of seventeenth-century Trinitarian theology is particularly 
important for our understanding of Baxter.  The decade after Baxter‟s death in fact 
marked an escalation in anti-Trinitarian sentiment, and Baxter himself seems to have 
been attuned to the beginnings of this change.
6
  A particularly important question to 
ask therefore concerns the place of Baxter‟s own doctrine on the spectrum of 
orthodoxy.  As we saw in the introduction, in recent years Baxter‟s Trinitarian 
theology has been branded as rationalistic and denounced as paving the way for 
Unitarianism.
7
  Such concerns were also evident, at least implicitly, among a number 
of his contemporaries
8
 and in this light it is disconcerting to note the enthusiastic 
appropriation of Baxter‟s doctrine of the divine principles by the anti-Trinitarian 
Stephen Nye.
9
  In this chapter I shall argue however that the perception of Baxter as 
a rationalist and modalist is ultimately mistaken, although nevertheless entirely 
understandable given his economic bias, his minimal commitment to a developed 
Trinitarian theology and the unguarded nature of some of his comments. 
The first half of this chapter will be concerned with the basis of Baxter‟s doctrine of 
the Trinity, found in the Triune Baptismal Covenant and the metaphysics of the 
divine principles, the general outline of which is treated in section one.  The second 
and third sections will consider Baxter‟s distinctive theology of attribution and his 
departure from the Augustinian mainstream.   In the fourth section I will analyse in 
detail both the Scotist and scriptural contours of Baxter‟s doctrine of analogy and its 
actual outworking in his own analogia entis between triune man and the Triune God. 
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In the second half of this chapter we shall turn to Baxter‟s own relation to the 
scholastic doctrine of the Trinity, principally but not exclusively with reference to the 
main medieval schools of thought.  The fifth section will be concerned with Baxter‟s 
account of the divine attributes, persons and relations, showing particularly his 
critique of Thomist Trinitarianism and his desire to reconstrue these aspects of the 
traditional doctrine of God in terms of his own metaphysics of the divine principles 
and his Nominalised Scotism.  Building on this perspective the sixth section will 
consider Baxter‟s endorsement of the Nominalist Robert Holkot‟s „logic of faith‟ and 
the implications of this for our understanding of his Trinitarian doctrine.  Finally in 
the seventh section, drawing these diverse strands together, I will treat of the relation 
between the Trinity of Principles and Persons in Baxter‟s thought, arguing that in 
their intimate but never total coincidence and coinherence we find a dialectic of 
immanence and transcendence which belies the modalist and rationalist charges 
made against his Trinitarian doctrine. 
2. The Centrality of the Triune Baptismal Covenant 
In making the Baptismal Covenant the starting point for his Trinitiarian theology 
Baxter was following in a very long tradition stretching back even as far as the birth 
of the Church.  As we have seen, Baxter believed that the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant formed the nucleus of the early Christian credal statements and of the 
Apostles‟ Creed itself.  Both its dominical provenance and its uniquely clear 
statement of a basic Trinitarian grammar – three persons linked to one divine name – 
therefore gave it central importance in later Trinitarian discussions.
10
  In particular it 




For Baxter the Baptismal Covenant was important as the elemental expression of the 
doctrine of the Trinity.  For through the one name and three persons it reveals 
„Father, Son and Holy Spirit to be one, true, coeternal God; one namely in essence 
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and three in a certain manner incomprehensible to mortals‟.  Combined with „fiducial 
assent, consent and practical dedition‟ to God‟s covenanting roles as reconciled 
Father, reconciling incarnate Mediator and sanctifying Spirit this is all the Trinitarian 
doctrinal content that Baxter holds necessary for salvation.
12
   
All of this serves as an important reminder of the credal orientation of Baxter‟s 
Trinitarian theology as well as its essential simplicity.  Indeed it is noteworthy that in 
his initial planning for the Methodus Baxter had intended to bypass nearly all 
controversies concerning the Trinity and particularly wished to eschew all 
speculation over this doctrine.  Like many of his Reformed contemporaries Baxter 
believed that the medieval scholastics had erred considerably in their attempts to 
probe too closely the mystery of the Trinity.  Ironically, given what we shall discern 
as a Scotist orientation of his Trinitarian doctrine, he blamed Scotus as the main 
culprit for this.
13
  In fact it was only his conviction that the Trinity was the 
„foundation of true theology‟ and his desire to prevent injury to the Church from the 
many contemporary anti-Trinitarians that persuaded him to elaborate further on this 
tremendous mystery.  As ever, Baxter‟s concern was for the proclamation and 
defence of the Gospel and so he held that the true minister of Christ must be „probe 
armatus et instructus‟ in such important apologetic matters.
14
 
Baxter‟s emphasis on the Baptismal Covenant as the root of all Trinitarian doctrine is 
a clear indication that he intended his discussion of the Trinity to be scripturally 
based.  This remains true even though some of the terms and concepts Baxter uses to 
discuss the Trinity cannot be seen to derive immediately from scriptural sources.  
These he views as „drawings of water‟ from the ancient wellsprings of the Church 
Fathers and the older ecclesiastical doctors.  Furthermore although Baxter held that 
scriptural terms should not be changed lightly, in his opinion it is not the terms used 
that matter but rather the true meaning of the underlying concept.
15
  This was a 
principle given early expression by Athanasius in his fight against the Arians.
16
  Such 
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a „Catholic move‟ was also a hallmark of the Protestant Scholastic enterprise, found 
as early as Calvin‟s Institutes: 
The unerring standard both of thinking and speaking must be derived 
from the Scriptures: by it all the thoughts of our minds, and the words of 
our mouths, should be tested.  But in regard to those parts of Scripture 
which, to our capacities, are dark and intricate, what forbids us to explain 
them in clearer terms – terms, however, kept in reverent and faithful 




In subsequent generations, due to the pressures of mounting Socinian attacks on 
Trinitarian doctrine, the Reformed orthodox often made recourse to the founts of 
tradition in their systematisation of Trinitarian thought.
18
 
Baxter‟s emphasis on the Triune Baptismal Covenant and his essential continuity 
with Protestant Scholasticism are important to bear in mind throughout this chapter, 
not least because in its distinctive metaphysical elaboration through the divine 
principles Baxter‟s own Trinitarian doctrine differs markedly from that of many of 
his fellow Christians.  In the complexity of this it is therefore important to remember 
the very basic nature of Baxter‟s prime Trinitarian commitment, which is little more 
than a mere assertion of God‟s essential oneness and threeness.  
3. Theology of Attribution 
As will by now be becoming increasingly clear, Baxter‟s metaphysical elaboration of 
the scriptural locus of the Triune Baptismal Covenant was by means of the divine 
principles.  This is naturally true no less of his doctrine of the Trinity than of the rest 
of his theology.  Indeed it is arguably in shaping his Trinitarian doctrine so 
profoundly that the divine principles were able to have such a far reaching impact on 
the rest of Baxter‟s thought.  Their central importance was in providing a bridge 
between God‟s internal and external actions, or in contemporary theological parlance 
between the immanent and economic Trinity.  This was a role they were able to fulfil 
according to their attribution, or appropriation, to different divine persons.  The usual 
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ordering for this was to attribute Power to the Father, Wisdom to the Son and Love to 
the Holy Spirit.  Such attribution clearly allowed what Baxter referred to as the three 
„principles of operation ad extra’
19
 – Power, Wisdom and Love – to be connected to 
God‟s inmost Triune nature, significantly grounding both the doctrine of the vestigia 
Trinitatis and the analogical ascent from the soul to God.
20
 
Within Church History Baxter identifies two very different approaches to this 
theology of attribution.  The first is hostile, or at least suspicious, and Baxter takes 
Augustine as its origin: 
Augustinus autem omnium primus aut inter primos (ni fallor) attributa 
sapientiae et amoris divini essentialia qua Deus amat, et qua sapiens est, 
videtur negasse esse personis appropriatia: quem alii, praecipue 
Lombardus, secuti sunt, et eum scholasticorum plurimi. 
According to Baxter Augustine‟s reason for denying this was because he held that 
each principle, as the divine essence, was held in common by the persons and so 
should not be specifically attributed.
21
 
Baxter however was critical of this, objecting that those who, like Augustine, take 
Power, Wisdom and Love to be nothing other than the divine essence itself are 
unable to account for why, for example, Wisdom should be attributed to the Son and 
Love to the Holy Spirit rather than vice versa.  Since a strict Augustinian position 




At the opposite extreme were those who posed a strict identity between the divine 
persons and the divine principles.  These, he said, „suppose that the Divine POWER, 
INTELLECT and WILL (or Wisdom and Love) are the three constitutive persons in 
themselves, and the three principles of operation ad extra‟.  As examples he cites 
Origen, Ambrose and Richard of St Victor, „but plainlier and fullier‟ Damascene, 
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Bernard of Clairvaux, Edmund of Canterbury and Potho Prumiensis.
23
  His own 
view, as we shall see below, is that in posing such an identity these theologians went 
too far.  Yet although he does not endorse the full scope of their conclusions he is 
noticeably far more sympathetic to their theology of attribution than to the 
Augustinian alternative. 
The main features of this alternative school of thought are exemplified perfectly by 
Richard of St Victor, Potho Prumiensis and Edmund of Canterbury who are cited to 
this purpose in the Life of Faith, the Reasons and the Methodus.  In their writings we 
find either an implicit or explicit link between the divine principles and the divine 
persons.  Furthermore in Potho the connection is significantly provided by the triad 
of Creator, Governor and Sustainer, with the Father as Power creating wisely through 
Kindness, the Son as Wisdom governing kindly through Power and the Holy Spirit as 
Kindness conserving powerfully through Wisdom.  This provides important evidence 
that the pattern of attribution was not intended to divorce the principles (or the 
persons) from each other.  Likewise all three state explicitly that man images the 
Godhead in his three faculties of power, wisdom and will, or as Potho says of posse, 
scire and velle.  Finally in Edmund of Canterbury we find an important outline of an 
analogical ascent from man‟s own self-understanding to a realisation of God‟s 
Triunity as grounding his own analogous triunity.
24
 
As we shall see below all of these principles may be found prominently in Baxter‟s 
own theology of attribution indicating a definitive departure from the mainstream of 
Augustinian Trinitarianism.  The first difference is an inversion of Augustine‟s usual 
approach to the vestigia Trinitatis, which is by-and-large top-down; that is it begins 
from an awareness of God‟s own Triune being and proceeds to find analogues for 
this in human nature.  It is developed therefore chiefly as an illustrative tool from the 
perspective of faith.  By contrast the concept of the vestigia Trinitatis employed here, 
notably by Edmund of Canterbury, is bottom-up, beginning from man‟s own self-
contemplation and ascending to God‟s Triunity.  Although doubtless the initial 
seeking of such vestigia is by no means divorced from a prior awareness of the 
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Trinity and certainly in many cases is inspired by Augustine himself, this 
nevertheless represents a marked difference of approach.   
While the distinction between a top-down and bottom-up approach to the vestigia is 
not always so clear-cut in Augustine as I have suggested,
25
 it is very clear in Aquinas 
who holds to a strict demarcation between natural and revealed theology, such that 
reason is able to attain no a priori grasp on the doctrine of the Trinity.
26
  Within 
mainstream scholasticism these differing approaches to the vestigia Trinitatis led to 
two very different schools of Trinitarian thought.  The first, broadly Dominican, 
school followed Aquinas in using the psychological analogy of man‟s own faculties 
to illustrate the internal workings of the Trinity.  The second, broadly Franciscan, 
school, of which Richard of St Victor was a significant precursor, used the 
psychological analogy to evidence the Trinity.
27
  In fact, going beyond this, both 
Richard and Lull asserted that it was possible to find „necessary reasons‟ for the 
Trinity and in this way to prove the doctrine.
28
  Baxter, as we have seen, was 
influenced strongly by both the Scotists and the Lullist metaphysics of divine 
principles and in his assertions that we come to characterise God‟s Triune being 
through analogy with our own he differs considerably from Thomist Augustinianism. 
Baxter‟s second difference from Augustine lies in his break, reviewed extensively in 
the previous chapter, from an Augustinian account of the image of God.   
Importantly this caused him to re-envisage God in terms of posse, scire, velle rather 
than the more usual Augustinian (and Neo-Platonic) esse, scire, velle.
29
  This itself 
only served to bolster Baxter‟s distinctive theology of attribution.   For, as is 
apparent, esse itself fits uneasily, if at all, into any scheme of attribution.  Rather it 
seems not only to embrace both scire and velle but to indicate God as the 
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transcendent source of self-subsistent being very different from our own derived, 
dependent and remembered being.  By contrast posse has a direct correlation with 
power and thus fits easily into an attributive scheme, neatly linking the immanent 
and economic aspects of God‟s being. 
This points, finally, to the most deep-seated difference between Baxter and 
Augustine.  In denying a strict theology of attribution, and in stressing that the divine 
principles were held in common between all persons, Augustine surely intended to 
prevent too close an assimilation between God‟s immanent being and his economic 
working, which could lead to modalistic reduction of the immanent to the economic.  
Augustine‟s famous maxim that the works of the divine persons ad extra were 
undivided prevented any such partitioning of divine activity to distinct persons.  
Likewise by forbidding too close an analogy between man‟s threefold faculties and 
the Trinity, Augustine forestalled an obvious objection to his own psychological 
analogy – that it itself falls prey to modalism by allowing God to be compared to 
three faculties in one person.
30
  Furthermore scholastics such as Aquinas had 
additional reason to be cautious of the triad of Power, Wisdom and Love, for this 
featured prominently in the suspect Trinitarian theology of Abelard.
31
  Even so it 
must be clearly understood that neither Augustine nor Aquinas actually repudiated 
this triad; indeed, ironically given all our discussion, Augustine himself was one of 
its major sources.
32




Although Baxter surely sympathised with Augustine‟s concerns, he did not want to 
uphold them to the extent of sacrificing his own link between the immanent and 
economic principles.  Instead he found the resolution to the Augustinian problem of 
attribution in the works of the Thomist Estius, who he said speaks „most clearly of 
all‟ concerning this: 
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Inter appropriata divinarum personarum frequentatur in Sacris Literis 
(N.B.) et sanctorum scriptis hic ternio, Potentia, Sapientia, Bonitas; ut 
Potentia accomodetur Patri, Sapientia Filio, Bonitas Sp. Sancto.  Quibus 
tribus eodem ordine respondent et haec tria velut actus illorum, Creatio, 
Redemptio et Sanctificatio vel beatificatio. 
Baxter held that Estius, unlike the scholastics who blindly followed Augustine, was 
able to give sound scriptural reasons for his pattern of attribution.  Thus since the 
Father is considered the origin of all created things and principium of the divine 
persons themselves, power is „peculiarly accommodated‟ to him and to the work of 
Creation which is the foundation for the subsequent works of Redemption and 
Sanctification.  These latter works and their concomitant principles of Wisdom and 




In summary Baxter‟s solution was to eschew both the Augustinian denial of 
attribution and the alternative endorsement of identity.  Instead he held that the 
scriptural pattern of Creation, Redemption and Sanctification allowed a link to be 
made between the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love and the divine 
persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  This serves as a salutary reminder of the 
catechetical grounding and practical orientation of his Trinitarian theology.   In 
holding this view Baxter of course had no intention of separating the work of the 
divine persons from each other in a potentially modalistic way, but rather always 
maintained, like Augustine, that the works of the Trinity ad extra were indivisible.  
For Baxter however, as for his friend Lawson, the indivisibility of the works did not 
prevent a distinction of attribution being made between the persons.
35
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4. The Analogy of Being 
4.1.  Scriptural and Scotist Grounds of Analogy 
As a discipline wholly concerned with God, theology (like the Bible) assumes his 
existence.  Baxter‟s main concern in the Methodus, unlike in the Reasons, is not to 
prove the existence of God but to establish the conceptual apparatus by which he 
may be properly described.  Since, in this life, God cannot be seen in his essence 
immediately and intuitively, he must be known abstractively, tenuously and 
analogically through his created works.  These, he says, since they have been 
fashioned by an omnipotent, most wise and excellent God retain either the vestiges, 
likeness or image of his perfection and are therefore suitable „for truly demonstrating 
something of God to us by analogy‟.
36 
Baxter‟s affirmation of analogical knowledge of God goes hand-in-hand with his 
eschewal of pure apophaticism.  Baxter is adamant therefore that to speak or 
conceive only negatively of God does not suffice for true and saving cognition.  His 
reasoning here is due to his Augustinian conviction that it is impossible to love what 
you do not know.
37
  Yet to say this leads him immediately to the problem of 
theological language and the question of how human words may express truths about 
God.  The resources for dealing with this matter had been developed in the writings 
of the medieval scholastics and by the seventeenth century were well-established.  It 
is therefore to these that Baxter immediately turns. 
The major difference here is between the Thomist and Scotist schools.
38
   Aquinas 
held that all language about God is analogical and so terms are used of him neither 
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univocally (as having the same sense) or equivocally (as having an utterly different 
sense) but analogically (as having a related but non-identical sense).
39
  Scotus by 
contrast believed it possible to have univocal concepts of God.  His reasoning was 
entirely philosophical: he could not see how it was possible to ground any analogy 
between God and man without a shared univocal concept.
40
  Famously he held that 
being itself was a prime example of such a univocal concept.  However in holding 
this he did not see himself as reducing God to man‟s level but rather affirmed that 
divine and created being were infinitely different in degree through their respective 
infinite and finite „intrinsic modes‟.  Furthermore Scotus by no means held that 
human language about God was entirely univocal.  Rather he strikingly suggested 
that almost all of our concepts of God are in fact technically equivocal.
41
 
Baxter‟s first concern in discussing this issue is to stress the considerable common 
ground between the two schools: „De caeteris autem inter omnes convenit, formales 
et univocos nullos in intellectu mortalium de Deo inveniri conceptus, sed tantum 
analogicos‟.  Thus in Baxter‟s view, while the schools differed considerably in their 
technical specifics, the end result of both a Thomist and Scotist account of being was 
to ensure that our language about God remains (in some sense) analogical, and 
therefore sufficient to allow us to talk meaningfully about God without bringing him 
down to our level. 
Nevertheless it is clear from his subsequent discussion that Baxter in fact favours a 
definitively Scotist account of theological language and concepts.  Thus in discussing 
God‟s life, intellect and will he says: 
Et quamvis alii dicant, nec univoce nec aequivoce, sed analogice; hic 
Scotistae audiendi sunt qui probant (ut in Phil. Fabro, Meurisse, Rada 
Mayrone, Trombeta, et Lycheto, videre est) non dari tertium, sed quod 
analogice dicitur aequivoce dici.
42
 
This Scotist allegiance is made even clearer in his discussion of the Trinity: 
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Certissimum est nihil (praeter ens saltem) de Deo et creaturis univoce 
dici; et neminem mortalium conceptum formalem et proprium de Deo aut 
habere aut exprimere posse.  Ideoque quasi in speculo per conceptus 
improprios (revera aequivocos, ut probant Scotistae, quamvis analogiam 
alii quidam medium quid inter aequivocationem et univocationem esse 
vellent) de Deo necessario concipiendum est.  Revera plane metaphorici 
sunt omnes nostri de Deo termini.  Quamvis enim res expressa primario 
in Deo est, notio tamen exprimens primario ad creaturas adaptatur; et 
famosius significatum est res creata.
43
 
For Baxter, as for Scotus, such technical equivocity by no means renders our terms 
about God meaningless.  To illustrate this Scotus offers the example of light filtering 
through a piece of coloured glass onto a wall.  Although the glass remains hidden to 
us we may infer its colour from the colour of the image projected onto the wall.  In 
the same way although we cannot grasp God‟s essence directly we may dimly 
perceive it through the lens of such equivocal terms.
44
   As Baxter says, although we 
have only metaphorical terms about God, „yet it is not nothing to see as in a glass and 
enigmatically‟.
45
   Like Scotus Baxter also seems to have accepted that to make sense 
such equivocal terms must be grounded in a univocal concept of being.  Thus in the 
End of Doctrinal Controversies after ruling out a long string of potential candidates 
for univocal concepts Baxter states: „Scotus excepteth only ENS.  Which is true, as 




True to his purpose Baxter seeks to ground such analogies not just in scholastic 
thought but also in Scripture itself.
47
  The Bible he says speaks adjectivally 
concerning God but for the most part must be understood substantively.  Moreover, 
he adds, where Scripture does use a substantive and abstractive name for God it does 
so to denominate the divine essence „more purely and simply‟.  He indicates four 
names, in particular, as especially notable for describing God „according to the 
analogy of souls‟: 
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i) „I am who I am‟ – taking Exodus 3:14 as the classical locus on this Baxter 
notes that God‟s self-revelation of his name to Moses as „Sum quod Sum‟ 
or „Ero quod ero‟ is the „fundamental concept‟ of God.  For Baxter it 
establishes God as the „Ens Entium‟ or „Ens Infinitum Transcendens‟, the 
root of every created entity.   
ii) Life – this, Baxter says, is the first of three names notifying God to us 
under the concept of „formal virtue‟.  It derives from those places in 
Scripture where God is called „Deus vivens‟. 
iii) Light – for this name Baxter cites 1 John 1:5 and James 1:17 where God 
is called both „Light‟ and the „Father of lights‟ respectively.  Baxter sees 
the Son‟s title of „Sapientia‟ in Proverbs as related to this. He also notes 
from John 1:4 that light and life are really identical. 
iv) Love – this name Baxter cites from 1 John 1:8, 16.  He interprets it as 
meaning the perfection of divine will and as the one who is „OPTIMUS in 
se‟ and „bonitatis praegnantissimus, et nobis amabilissimus‟.
48
 
For Baxter to know God through such similes as these is precisely what it means „to 
know God and not to know God‟, or rather to know him analogically.  Such concepts 
of God are therefore by no means „empty‟ but are the „glory of our intellect, by far 
excelling every knowledge of mundane things‟.
49
  Even more importantly it is clear 
that these four terms are the scriptural analogues for God of the fundamental and 
threefold formal virtue in active natures.  Put another way, the analogical scriptural 
identification of God as Life, Light and Love reveals to us the three divine principles 
of Power, Wisdom and Love.
50
  This significantly reconnects his scriptural concept 
of analogical language to his Scotist metaphysics of inadequate concepts. 
4.2.  Analogia Entis 
Having described the theoretical and scriptural underpinnings of Baxter‟s concept of 
analogy we turn now to his employment of it.  As we have seen Baxter described the 
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ordo of the human soul as the methodical index of true theology.  In fact it is this 
same ordo which for Baxter grounds the analogia entis between God and man.
51
 
The starting point for this is the nature of the faculties of the human soul as „tres 
exeunter ad objecta, ex unica virtute radicali‟.
52
  According to Baxter we come to 
discover this through intuitive self-perception and through application of the 
Campanellan axiom that „nihil enim id facit, quod facere non potest‟.
53
  From 
understanding of our own capabilities we come to infer corresponding powers within 
us and finally to recognise the soul‟s threefold formal virtue and the nature of its 
substance.  In this way the analogical ascent which Baxter proposes is grounded on 
the inference from extrinsic acts to intrinsic essential powers.  As Baxter succinctly 
puts it, „knowledge of God begins from knowledge of ourselves, and whoever does 
not know the human soul it is necessary likewise that he does not know God‟.
54
   
Clearly for Baxter the human soul mirrors its source in God‟s own Triunity.  This 
allows us to find analogues between the soul‟s substance and formal virtue and that 
possessed eminently by God.  This has three specific consequences.  Firstly, just as 
in human souls the difference between substance and virtue is that between a general 
concept and a special or differential concept, so we may describe the divine 
principles analogically in terms of both their unity (genus) and their distinction 
(species).
55
  Secondly, just as these virtues of the soul are essential rather than 
accidental so are the analogous divine principles in God.  Baxter therefore insists that 
those who do not know God as essentially life, intellect and will are likewise able to 
say nothing about „what God is‟ beyond general or accidental notions‟.  It is 
therefore only through an analogous description of God according to this same 
formal virtue that we can come to have a formal understanding of God as a Trinity of 
Principles and (perhaps likewise) as a Trinity of Persons.
56
  Thirdly, it is Baxter‟s 
conviction that the whole essence of the soul is contained in this threefold virtue.  He 
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is likewise insistent that this should not be understood either partitively or such that 
the whole soul is any of these three virtues totaliter, but rather that each virtue 
expresses the soul‟s essence partially and inadequately, meaning that all three virtues 
are necessary to give any sort of complete description.
57
  Analogously Baxter holds 
that the whole divine essence is each principle (or person) and that therefore the 




Although this analogous pattern of essential predication is important for what we 
might call a static description of God‟s Triune nature, it does not suffice by itself to 
explain either the dynamic interrelation of the divine principles or the character of 
their subsistence.  For this an understanding of the soul‟s immanent acts is necessary.  
These Baxter understands to denote an act in which the soul not only affects nothing 
external to itself but also has no external object, and he tends to view them as 
essential to the soul.
59
  Baxter certainly views divine immanent acts as essential and 
broadly following the scholastic consensus suggests that God‟s living to himself (vita 
sibi), his self-knowledge (intellectus se intelligens) and self-love (amor sui), are the 
constitutive grounds of the divine persons themselves.
60
 
The other aspect of this „dynamic‟ analogy between the soul and God is the relation 
of these immanent acts among themselves.  We have already considered the 
Trinitarian structure of the intellective soul at length and its internal distinctions 
according to relations of origin and diverse formal characteristics.  In just the same 
way Baxter holds that the interaction of the divine principles is Trinitarian so that 
Power generates Wisdom, and Love proceeds from Power and Wisdom together.  
Likewise he holds that God cannot be said to live formally through divine intellect or 
understand formally through his will.  Then in a striking indication of the 
correspondence between principles and persons he adds that neither can the Father be 
said to live formally through the Son nor the Son to understand formally through the 
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  Indeed to say such a thing would not only violate the logical order of the 
processions but in so doing would also collapse the divine Trinity into an amorphous 
modalistic identity. 
At this point Baxter seems to suggest that we reach the boundary of human 
knowledge.  It is not that the analogia entis between the soul and the divine nature 
necessarily breaks down in the description of the immanent processions – although 
of course it may – but rather that the human intellect is scarcely able to comprehend 
or describe the nature of such fine distinctions.  Baxter held that to describe the 
distinctions in the human soul was something that has eluded the acumen of all the 
great scholastics from Aquinas to his own day, and is therefore simply too much for 
„our tardy and obtuse minds‟ to grasp.
62
  This is therefore all the more true of the 
character of the distinctions in God himself, whether those obtaining between the 
divine essence and principles, the divine principles themselves or, in Baxter‟s 
scheme, between the divine principles and persons.  As we shall see, Baxter only 
affirms as a bare minimum that the least distinction which can be affirmed is virtual, 
relative and denominated from the connotation of acts or by reason ratiocinated.
63
 
Having reached the borders of possible knowledge Baxter is both unwilling and 
unable to proceed any further in the description of the divine processions.  In a sense 
he has reached a limit with the analogia entis – a limit seemingly not dictated by the 
pattern of analogy but rather by the inability of human conceptual knowledge to 
grasp the nature of such fine distinctions.  In summary Baxter says that the formal 
virtue of the soul may be characterised as „unica quoad essentiam et centraliter at 
triplex certe virtualiter, exeunter, et per connotationem, et relationem ad actum 
triplicem‟.  Similarly he defines the divine principles and persons as „unicum 
radicaliter ut essentia, at tria saltem virtualiter, connotative et relative ad actus‟.  
However such compact definitions require a great deal of exposition and for that we 
turn to analyse the relation between Baxter‟s Trinitarian thought and that of his 
scholastic predecessors. 
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5. Scholastic Dimensions of Baxter’s Thought 
In turning to analyse the scholastic dimensions of Baxter‟s Trinitarian thought we 
should be aware that providing a metaphysical analysis of the Trinity often 
represented the apex of the scholastic project. As a consequence the treatment they 
give is both highly complex and highly subtle.  In their efforts to give an orthodox 
account theologians often made use of a whole array of fine distinctions which must 
be grasped before we can attain any understanding of their theology. 
In the Methodus we find six main kinds of distinction: 
i) Real distinction – that which obtains between two different „things‟ (res). 
ii) Distinction rationis ratiocinatae – that which obtains in one thing 
following an act of the intellect but is nevertheless grounded in re. 
iii) Formal distinction – that between two different formal reasons of one 
thing, inseparable even by divine power, which obtains „ex natura rei‟ 
before any act of the intellect. 
iv) Modal distinction – that which obtains between various modes of 
subsistence of a thing or various ways in which it exists. 
v) Distinction rationis rationans – the purely conceptual distinction 
obtaining in one thing following an act of the intellect without any 
grounding in re. 
vi) Extrinsic or Connotative distinction – that which obtains between a thing 
as it relates to or connotes objects extrinsic to it.
64
 
Armed with these distinctions it is possible to make sense of Baxter‟s theology.  It 
should be remembered however that for all of these distinctions, and especially the 
formal and connotative distinction and the distinction rationis ratiocinatae, there 
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were in general no standard definitions.  Their use and meaning must therefore be 
considered as much as possible in context. 
5.1. Divine Attributes 
Baxter believed himself to be the first to methodically describe the attributes.  What 
he meant by this we shall return to below but he was clearly dissatisfied with the 
treatment of the attributes found in other theologians.
65
  In the Methodus he even 
refers to their confused and unmethodical treatment of the attributes as a „most 
shameful blot‟ on very many of their endeavours.  For Baxter it is axiomatic that God 
is the author of order and so must be described in an orderly manner.
66
   
Characteristically Baxter suggests that the difficulty of „instituting the true method of 
the divine attributes‟ arises from ignorance concerning created things: 
Si Philosophi de rebus creatis claram, et distinctam haberent scientiam, 
et rerum series, categorias, et classes sine errore in tabulis suis possent 
delineare, hoc etiam in serie attributorom divinorum recte ordinanda, 
praestantissimum foret adjumentum. 
For Baxter the crisis in the description of the divine attributes therefore results from a 
wider crisis in the realm of knowledge.  Unsurprisingly, given his overriding concern 
for correct method, Baxter‟s complaint is that the organic sciences have not been 
adapted truly to the nature and order of things.  As he poetically puts it, the face of 
the Creator is being seen in a blemished and broken mirror.
67
  Baxter‟s purpose in the 
Methodus is to remedy this and so establish a true and methodical science of divinity 
grounded on the analogy of the human soul. 
With respect to the attributes this entails treating them as analogous to accidents in 
the human soul.  Of course Baxter recognises that since God is „simplex essentia‟ he 
cannot be properly said to have accidents at all.  Nevertheless Baxter suggests that 
the idea of (improper) accidents in God, as assumed from the modes of the human 
soul, is an important one for discussing the divine attributes.  Using essential (proper) 
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accidents as exemplars Baxter suggests two ways of discussing the divine attributes 
„quasi accidentia‟: firstly as they signify God‟s essence itself under the analogous 
notion of accident and secondly as they denote the relation of God to created things 
and so themselves connote created things.
68
 
Baxter also couches his discussion of the divine attributes in terms of his 
metaphysics of inadequate concepts, describing an attribute as an inadequate concept 
of the one and simple divine essence.  Since it is impossible for „our imperfect and 
narrow intellect‟ to know God by a „unique total and adequate concept‟ we must 
know him through multiple inadequate concepts – the divine attributes themselves.
69
  
This leads to the important question, debated extensively by the scholastics, of how 
precisely the attributes are to be distinguished from the divine essence.  Here Baxter 
identifies two different camps.  The first camp, consisting of the Thomists and 
Nominalists, hold that the attributes are distinguished only by reason, that is 
according to the act of the intellect in conceiving distinct concepts of something 
which in itself is one and indistinct.  The second camp, the Scotists, hold that the 
attributes are distinguished „ex natura rei, secluso omni actu intellectus‟, which is the 
classic formal distinction.
70
  The standard controversy here, as Baxter notes citing the 
Scotist Rada and the Nominalist Gregory of Rimini, concerned whether the formal 
distinction was consistent with divine simplicity, with the Scotists obviously 
maintaining that it was.  Baxter however unfortunately does not offer a resolution of 
this here.
71
  However his own view that the attributes are both inadequate concepts 
and connotative suggests that he may have held a view similar to that of Aureolus, 




A more important point for Baxter concerns the relation between the divine 
principles and the other attributes.  Baxter holds this to be confused due to the Scotist 
tendency to differentiate the attributes and the persons from the essence in precisely 
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the same way.  Furthermore he explicitly attacks the common scholastic view that it 
is possible to have a perfect and adequate concept of the essence which does not 
include the attributes, essential principles or even the divine persons themselves.  
While Baxter accepts that these are not the same as the essence or each other 
formally, he will not accept the strict formal distinction here if it entails cutting the 
principles off from the essence in any way.  His own view that the attributes, the 
principles and (in some sense) the persons themselves are inadequate concepts of the 
divine essence means they cannot be considered separately from it.
 73
 
It is clear that Baxter both privileges the essential principles over the other attributes 
– he is indeed emphatic that these must not be confused with each other
74
 – and holds 
to a very close connection between the divine principles and divine persons.  This is 
confirmed by his detailed discussion of the attributes.  Baxter holds that governing 
the description of all the divine attributes, which since they are analogous and 
inadequate concepts of God‟s essence are in fact nearly innumerable, is perfection, 
which he calls the „universal attribute of prior order‟ and the „analogous modal 
concept‟.
75
  Perfection he suggests may be an attribute of both the divine 
substantiality and of the divine formal virtue.  According to the former it leads to a 
description of God as „maximus‟ and according to the latter a description of him as 
omnipotent, most wise and most loveable.
76
  Perfection is thus comprehensive of all 
the divine attributes, including particular perfections of the divine essence such as 
simplicity, immensity and eternity, and is therefore a kind of universal attribute 
under which all others may be ordered.  Thus Baxter‟s thought can be regarded as a 
version of the Anselmian „perfect being theology‟ which held that God possesses all 
compossible pure perfections and could be used as a kind of heuristic tool for 
analysing the divine essence.
77
 
Furthermore Baxter‟s suggestion that the divine attributes may be understood 
through perfection applied to some combination of Power, Wisdom and Love gives 
the other attributes themselves a Trinitarian ground.  We saw above Baxter‟s 
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statement that the whole divine essence is contained in the three divine principles.  A 
corollary of this he suggests is that all the other attributes must also be 
comprehended under Power, Wisdom and Love, although according to their diverse 
names, such as justice, mercy and veracity.
78
  In each of the divine attributes we must 
therefore assume the conjoint operation of all the divine principles, although 
presumably according to different degrees of „eminency‟ in each instance. 
Baxter‟s express desire to be the first to methodically treat the divine attributes is 
clearly linked to his subsumption of them under the rubric of the divine principles. 
Overall it results from his application of the „analogy of souls‟ to God‟s own being.  
The consequence is a radical reconfiguring of the whole theory of divine attributes 
around the Trinity of Principles. 
5.2. Divine Persons and Supposita 
The nature of the divine persons is perhaps the central question of Trinitarian 
theology.  For it is only once a definition of person is in place that it becomes 
possible to ask the further question of how the unique divine essence may subsist in 
three distinct divine persons without either blurring the distinction of the persons or 
dividing the essence.  It is for this reason that the task of defining divine personality 
as well as being central to Trinitarian doctrine has also been one of its most vexed 
and complex issues.   
Baxter‟s discussion of person begins with Boethius‟ definition of person as an 
„individual substance of a rational nature‟, particularly as this was taken up by 
Aquinas.
79
   In his Summa Aquinas combined this with his own understanding of 
divine person as signifying a relation of origin in the Godhead.  In God he held that 
such relations must be the divine essence and so may be defined as „subsistent 
relations‟.
80
  To the question of „whether there are several divine persons‟ Aquinas 
responded that substance in Boethius‟ definition is not used for the essence common 
between the persons but rather according to the suppositum which signifies what is 
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distinct about the persons.
81
  Here suppositum is used as a logical term indicating a 
subject or underlying thing subsisting in the category of substance and not as a more 
general term indicating quidditas or essentia.
82
  
This leads on to the crucial question of „whether divine essence is the same as divine 
person‟.  In answering this Aquinas developed an account of the relations which both 
affirmed the identity of divine essence and persons while at the same time 
maintaining the distinction between the different persons.  This he was able to do by 
maintaining the key distinction that although persons as relations only differ from 
essence „by reason‟, they have a „real distinction‟ from each other by virtue of 
opposition.
83
  Thus although essence and persons together do not make metaphysical 
composition, persons compared together are different „things‟ and so not 
distinguished from each other by reason alone.  This is because as subsistent 
relations persons differ from each other by mode of origin as well as by formal 
definition, which is to say that since the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten and 
the Holy Spirit spirated (breathed out by Father and Son) they cannot all be 
considered the same person. 
It is clear that Aquinas‟ account of the subsistence of the three divine persons in the 
divine essence, and thus his account of the Trinity itself, hinged on his use of 
suppositum.  Crucially the notion of suppositum allowed Aquinas to express the real 
identity of the „three relations really distinct‟ with the divine essence, not directly 
qua essentia but indirectly qua suppositum.
84
  However Baxter‟s immediate response 
to this is rather dismissive – „I hope‟, he says, „that not all are damned who either do 
not understand this or are not able to agree‟.
85
  Such a riposte is typical of the 
practical orientation of his Trinitarian thought and signals his concern to avoid 
scholastic speculation.  However it also provides the first indications of his profound 
dissatisfaction with the Thomistic Trinitarian synthesis. 
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Baxter‟s own preference is for the definition of person offered by Scheibler of person 
as „suppositum rationale‟ or „suppositum intelligens‟, where suppositum was 
understood to be „substantia singularis completa et incommunicabilis‟.
86
  Scheibler‟s 
definition clearly drew on the alternative Victorine and Scotist understanding of 
person as an individual (and incommunicable) existence of an intellectual nature.
87
  
Scheibler viewed the Thomist definition of suppositum as problematic due to the fact 
that it may be applied to the divine essence as well as the persons.  The term 
„incommunicable‟ was intended to solve precisely this problem.
88
   
One reason that Scheibler‟s account was preferable to Baxter was that it solved the 
objections of Valla more clearly than Aquinas‟ Boethian understanding.  Valla‟s 
opinion, roundly criticised by Francis Cheynell also,
89
 was that a person does not 
signify an individual substance but rather a quality.  He therefore held that instead of 
talking of three persons in God, according to the Boethian or any other sense, we 
must rather speak of three qualities in God.  According to him this neatly avoided the 
problem of traditional scholastic accounts which seemed to entail there being three 
substances in God.
90
  Scheibler responded by denying the consequence that to speak 
of three persons in God is necessarily to speak also of three substances.  He 
maintained that person could be described concretely as essence and personal 
property together or abstractly as signifying something added to the essence.  He 
suggested that it is understood according to the latter when three persons are said to 
be in God, the sense of which is one divine essence subsisting under three personal 
properties.
91
  This led Scheibler to pose an analogy between the Trinity and the 
„affections of being‟.  Therefore just as One, True and Good are three as affections 
and one as being, so the Trinity may be considered „as if a Trinity of properties 
added to essence‟.
92
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Scheibler‟s view of created supposita as distinct from their nature by a positive mode 
differs considerably from both Aquinas‟ opinion that suppositum adds to a nature 
singularity and individual accidents and Scotus‟ opinion that it adds only negation.  
As Scheibler indicates it represents a refinement of the view of Fonseca and Suarez 
that suppositum adds „a most perfect mode of per se subsisting‟ to the nature.  
Although Scheibler is tentative about applying such an understanding to the 
Godhead, it seems he would understand the divine persons as perfectly subsisting 
and modally distinct from the essence.
93
 
Another understanding of divine person, contemporary to Baxter, was the Cartesian 
definition of person as a centre of self-consciousness.  This Baxter discusses in his 
End of Doctrinal Controversies where it is clear that he views it as being fraught 
with difficulties.  In particular Baxter holds that the act of self-consciousness cannot 
be said to constitute a person but is rather the act of a person already constituted.  He 
also argued that to speak of three minds in God leads both to tritheism and, since 
each mind has its own active power, intellect and will, to the assertion of three 
Trinities in God, an obviously unorthodox set of conclusions.
94
   
While Baxter indicates his preference for Scheibler‟s account of divine persons and 
supposita he says there still remains the considerable difficulty of discerning what 
these personal properties are and how they may be distinguished from the divine 
essence itself.  Baxter‟s own solution is to suggest a threefold conception of divine 
personality firstly as found „radicaliter in Trinitate aeterna principiorum‟, secondly 
as „in Trinitate aeterna horum principiorum ut in actu immanente in Deo ipso‟ and 
thirdly „quoad nos exeunter, in transitione ad extra‟.
95
  Likewise in the End of 
Doctrinal Controversies Baxter suggests a twofold relative or connotative 
understanding of divine person, firstly as connoting the internal relations of the 
divine principles to each other and to the divine essence and secondly as connoting 
their relations ad extra to effects.
96
  Baxter is insistent however both that this 
connotative account is not all that a divine person is and that these extrinsic 
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distinctions must be intrinsically grounded in God himself.
97
  Nevertheless its 
advantage is that it allows divine personality to be reconfigured on the basis of his 
own Trinity of Principles and according to the three economic relations of Creator, 
Redeemer and Sanctifier.  In this way the doctrine of the Trinity is brought back to 
its primary practical focus, eschewing the complexities of the scholastic accounts. 
5.3. Divine Relations 
The question of divine relations, like that of divine persons, was a vital one in 
Trinitarian thought.  In the scholastic period especially, the concept of relation as 
understood through the lens of Aristotelian thought came to the forefront of 
Trinitarian theology.  This was a matter which concerned Baxter greatly, relating 
closely to his proposal that the Trinity of Persons should be effectively treated as the 
Trinity of Principles.   
Within scholasticism numerous different accounts of relations may be found.  
However while these often differ widely in their understandings of relations they all 
share a standard description of relations according to their subject, fundament and 
termini.  The subject was understood to be that which received the relation, the 
fundament that which supports the relation and the terminus that which the relation 
respects.
98
  In terms of the Trinity, the Father is the subject of the relation of 
paternity, his generation of the Son is its fundament and the Son himself its terminus. 
Baxter held, following Scheibler, that the human intellect is blinded to both the 
nature of God as most perfect being and the nature of relations as the least of all 
beings.
99
  The nature of the intra-Trinitarian relations therefore proves doubly 
elusive.  Such pessimism, at first sight surprising in one often seen as a natural 
theologian of the Trinity, shaped Baxter‟s entire discourse on the divine relations and 
as we shall see gave his thought a certain Nominalistic cast. 
Baxter‟s own definition of a relation is that „relatio est rerum ordinatarum 
comparabilitas inter se, vel ad invicem‟, where comparability is understood as the 
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„passive capacity‟ by which things become objects of the intellect‟s act of 
comparison.  As he says further:  
Quae non est res alia ab ordine fundamentali, neque ipse ordo res alia 
(proprie dicta) a rebus ordinatis, neque aliis notionibus melius 
dignoscuntur quam nudis nominibus (cum experientia sensibilis 
perceptionis) ordinis et relationis. 
Baxter therefore holds, contrary to Scotus for example,
100
 that relations are not real 
but ordinal.  His reasons for suggesting this are clear: since he understands a relation 
as resultant from an intellectual act of comparing, it is self-evidently unable to exist 
outside the mind except as the ordered things themselves.
101
  Such a view clearly 
derives from Nominalists, such as Ockham, as Baxter himself confirms in the 
Catholick Theologie.
102
  However it must be remembered, and this is a crucial point 
for understanding Baxter‟s Trinitarian thought, that although relations themselves 
have no existence extra-mentally, except as ordered things themselves, this does not 
mean that the distinctions they signify are purely mental, for the intellect must have 
some ground of comparison to establish a relation.  Indeed Baxter holds that „ordo 
nobis notus est tantum inter diversa; sicut et relatio‟.
103
 
Still handling the preliminary topic of the metaphysics of relations Baxter denies 
both the Thomist view that relations are really distinguished from their fundaments 
and the Scotist view that they are formally or modally distinguished.
104
  Instead he 
declares his approval of the Nominalist position of Peter Hurtado de Mendoza, that 
relations are distinguished only by a distinction rationis ratiocinatae from their 
subject, fundament and termini. With Mendoza he also emphasises that the terminus, 
and not just the subject and fundament, is essential to the relation.
 105
  This highlights 
Baxter‟s view that a relation is „rei ad aliud comparabilitas‟ and so is said to be 
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either of or between both things.  The idea of a relation as being between two things 
rather than an accident inhering in both things separately is a significant change from 
the early scholastic account of relations and perhaps marks the influence of the 




Turning to the central question of the fundaments of the divine relations Baxter first 
discusses the standard account of the twofold procession of Word and Holy Spirit 
following the acts of the intellect and will respectively.  This was of course a topic of 
frequent discussion among the scholastics but, at least for the most part, Baxter held 
that they spoke obscurely.  Here, once again, Aquinas comes in for particular 
criticism.  Baxter‟s criticism of Aquinas is twofold.  On the one hand he suggests that 
Aquinas collapses the distinction between the divine relations through his insistence 
that their fundaments in the processions of Word and Spirit are only distinguished by 
reason.  As Baxter says if there is no real, modal or formal diversity in the divine act 
then it exceeds our understandings how an act completely the same „is really related 
to itself by the diverse relations themselves‟.  On the other hand he suggests that by 
placing the fundaments of his four real relations (paternity, filiation, spiration and 
procession) in the two processions of intellect and will Aquinas proliferates the 
number of relations in such a way as to make the relational quaternity 
incommensurate with the personal Trinity unless by rendering the identity of relation 
and person untenable.  Baxter‟s likely source here is the German theologian Johann 
Heinrich Posewitz who, he says, proffers many things „contra numerum Trinarium 
hac via statuendum‟, specifically trying to prove that persons are either many or 
none.
107
   
For Baxter Aquinas‟ defective account of the divine relations and persons is not an 
isolated instance but is in fact symptomatic of a deeper malaise within Western 
Trinitarian thought as a whole: 
Si, qui trinam facultatem in animis nostris percipiebant Aug. et 
Scholastici, non memoriam loco activitatis-vitalis posuissent, 
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proculdubio notiones suas de Trinitate aliter ordinassent, quam in 
plerisque iam ordinatas invenimus.  Et qui ex actu solum intelligendi et 
amandi Trinitatem probare aut illustrare coguntur, in eas se difficultates 
conjecerunt, quae plurimos a Trinitate per imaginem concipienda, 
deterrent.  Unde Thomas (et ex eo noster Alex. Gill in Symbol. contra 
Osiandrum et Murschil) laborare multum necesse habuit (et vereor ne 




Aquinas‟ failure is thus placed against the larger backdrop of the Augustinian 
scheme of memory, understanding and will.  By mistakenly substituting memory for 
vital-activity the scholastics have put themselves in an impossible bind.  Furthermore 
he says by denying the doctrine of attribution and consequently holding that the 




The alternative Baxter says may be found in the controversial notion, denied by 
Petavius as well as many other theologians in the strongest terms, that the divine 
persons are constituted by absolute properties.  If the schoolmen had construed the 
Trinity in terms of such absolute properties, he suggests, then the nature of their 
discussion would have been radically transformed.  For Baxter the absolute 
properties in question are simply the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and 
Love.
110
   
The roots of this doctrine of absolute properties are to be found in Scotus who in his 
earlier works was more sympathetic to an absolute rather than a relational account of 
divine personality.
111
  In support of this understanding Baxter therefore marshals a 
number of medieval Scotist voices, including Peter Aquila Scotelus who insisted that 
„actus notionales fundantur super essentiales immanentes‟, and John de Ripa who 
sought to prove „personalitatem includere quid absolutum‟.  From among his own 
contemporaries he cites Posewitz, whose discussion of the question is in fact drawn 
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  A more tentative voice is that of another Scotist, Rada, concerning 
whom Baxter says „Radae rationes quibus probat non haereticum esse personas in 
attributis absolutis ponere, validissimas esse judico.  Et ipse quidem eas proferendo, 
ita credere videtur, quamquam id profiteri contra plurimos non auderet‟.
113
 
As may be clearly seen from Posewitz‟s discussion (cited by Baxter), the debate over 
the constitution of the divine persons involved complex scriptural as well as 
metaphysical discussion.  The most plausible reason given in favour of the absolute 
account, by both Scotus and de Ripa, was that relations presuppose something 
absolute upon which they are founded.  As de Ripa expressed this, the acting 
supposit (person) is prior to its own action and since this action is prior to the relation 
founded upon it (the action being, for example, the generation of the Son by the 
Father) then so must the supposit be prior to the person.
114
   
Baxter does not explicitly cite de Ripa‟s argument but we may safely assume he 
would have accepted it.  He does however seek to solve two particular objections to 
this theory.  The general pattern of the first objection may be illustrated by an 
example: since the Son possesses the absolute property of wisdom this would seem 
to imply that the Father and Holy Spirit are not wise in themselves.  Baxter‟s 
response is that the divine essence is wise in itself and therefore the other two 
persons qua essence are also wise in themselves, even though the wisdom of the 
divine essence is formally the person of the Son.  It is no more inconvenient to say 
that the Father as Father is not formally wisdom or love than to say, for example, that 
divine vitality as vitality is not formally divine wisdom.  This brings the second 
objection that since on this account the Father must understand through the Son, so 
he must also be said to be from the Son.  Baxter denies this, saying it does not follow 
that the divine essence is from the divine intellect just because it understands only 
through the intellect.  He adds that confusion is often caused by those who say that 
the divine essence is not able to be in any person whole unless it is also present 
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totally.  Contrary to this Baxter insists that the whole essence is intellect, but that 
intellect does not totally express the whole essence.
115
 
In this way Baxter believes he has shown that the reasons offered by Augustine and 
others against the persons being constituted by absolute properties are invalid and 
that Scripture does not favour more those who say the persons to be three real 
relations than those (like himself) who place divine personality both in the Trinity of 
Principles (radically, immanently and relationally considered) and in God‟s relation 
to us as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier.
116
  Here again then we see the practical 
and economic bias of Baxter‟s discussion as he seeks to relate the immanent being of 
the Triune God to his extrinsic relationship with his creatures. 
The suggestion that the divine persons are constituted by absolute properties fits 
extremely well with Baxter‟s understanding of the Trinity of Principles.  However it 
immediately raises the problem of how these principles are to be distinguished from 
each other.  As we saw above, Baxter‟s major problem with the Thomist account is 
that if in the fundaments of the divine relations there is no difference, either real or ex 
parte rei, then it exceeds human understanding as to how real relations are able to 
arise between the persons.  Significantly Baxter himself neither affirms nor denies 
this real distinction between the persons, which was a hallmark not only of Aquinas‟ 
view but of the broader scholastic consensus.  He simply states that if it can be said 
that the persons are identical with the essence and yet really distinct from each other 
then there is nothing to prevent exactly the same being said of the primalities and 
their internal processions (although Baxter would of course insist against Aquinas 
that this distinction must have a ground greater than that of rationis ratiocinatae).
117
  
To add complication Baxter holds that relations in God and man are equivocal, 
which would seem to pose further problems for the intelligibility of the traditional 
relational account of the Trinity.
118
 
Baxter is very hesitant about offering his own view but near the end of his chapter on 
the Trinity he finally does so: 
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Quamvis quae eadem sunt cum uno tertio sunt eadem inter se, et ita hae 
proprietates et relationes et actus fundamentales immanentes, sunt idem 
quod essentia, et inter se in essentiae unitate idem sunt, ab invicem 




Just before this Baxter also expresses his approval for Posewitz‟s „virtual distinction‟ 
saying: 
Sed sive aliqua inexplicabilis, inter ipsas virtutes in se, sit differentia 
quae cum Posewitz realiter virtualis dicenda est; an potius virtus 
omnimodo eadem in se, sit virtus ad triplicem actum seu effectum, certe 
differentia haec non male virtualis nominatur. 
As Baxter suggests, Posewitz viewed his virtual distinction as the same as Scotus‟ 
formal distinction (real although not actual).  He adds however that the Nominalists 
regard Posewitz‟s virtual distinction as simply their own distinction of connotation or 
denomination of the same virtue from the diversity of its acts or effects.
120
  Baxter‟s 
meaning is a little difficult to disentangle here but it seems that although he accepts 
the validity of the Scotist formal distinction „ex natura rei ante actum nostri 
intellectus‟ he regards this as inexplicable and so prefers to characterise it 
connotatively with the Nominalists.
121
  Such an answer affirms the Nominalised 
Scotist structure of his Trinitarian thought.  Yet Baxter‟s hesitation, his caution, his 
frequent assertions that some question or matter lies beyond our ken and his 
persistent refusal to be pinned down on any matter concerning the Trinity, in 
themselves call for an explanation.   
6. Holkot and the Logic of Faith 
Perhaps the most fascinating and insightful feature of Baxter‟s doctrine of the 
Trinity, his advocacy of Robert Holkot‟s „logic of faith‟, is mentioned almost in 
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passing as a resolution of the problem of how God can be both Three and One.  The 
issue is stated concisely by Baxter from Durandus of St Pourçain: 
...aeque difficile vel impossibile sit quando aliqua sunt penitus idem re, 
quod unum realiter differat ab aliquo a quo non differt realiter alterum – 
si enim illa quae sunt unum et idem in tertio, sunt necessario unum et 
idem inter se; illo modo, fortiori ratione quae sunt omnimodo unum et 




This issue had wide currency in scholastic thought.  Before Durandus, Aquinas had 
recognised this same problem, attempting to solve it by asserting real relation in the 
procession of the Word „per actionem intelligibilem‟, but Baxter unsurprisingly was 
hardly satisfied with this resolution.
123
 
According to Baxter, Durandus‟ quandary is rooted in the Aristotelian dictum that 
„quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se‟.  One prominent solution to this, 
that of Vasquez, was that „hoc principium esse verum in rebus creatis, non autem in 
divinis propter infinitatem‟.  Baxter glosses this as follows: 
At rationem ille reddit quare infinitudo requiratur ex parte antecedentis, 
non ex parte consequentis, quia identificatio extremorum non tollit 
oppositionem eorundem inter se, et in rebus creatis nunquam extrema 
quae identificantur cum tertio sunt realitates. 
In other words Vasquez invokes divine infinitude as a means of transcending the 
Aristotelian constraint on real relations.
124
 
Vasquez‟s views are refuted by the Scotist Meurisse, whose work Baxter highly 
recommends.  Baxter however does not offer a definitive opinion but merely states 
that „Deus quidem non esset Deus si nobis esset comprehensibilis et plane 
effabilis‟.
125
  Although he deftly sidesteps this issue Baxter then adds that it is 
possible to say „sano sensu‟ with Robert Holkot that: 
Rationalis logica fidei alia esse debet a logica naturali: philosophi non 
viderunt rem esse unam et tres. Ideo de ea in suis regulis mentionem non 
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fecerunt.  Sunt in logica fidei tales regulae: Quod omne absolutum 
praedicatur in singulari de tribus, et non in plurali.  Alia, quod unitas 
tenet suum consequens ubi non obviat relationis oppositum.
126
  
Holkot was a fourteenth-century Dominican who developed his logic of faith in order 
to avoid the problems of the Trinitarian paralogisms.  These were expository 
syllogisms such as: „The Father is the divine essence, The Son is the divine essence: 
Therefore the Father is the Son‟.  While theologians prior to Holkot had attempted to 
solve these by the use of various distinctions, especially Scotus‟ formal distinction, 
or by detecting some kind of fallacy in the syllogism, by the 1330s attention began to 
shift away from preserving the validity of Aristotelian logic at all costs towards 
asserting a new logic appropriate to the Trinity.  Holkot was part of this movement 
but in his assertion that Aristotelian logic was only formally valid within the created 
order went much further than most, although by no means all, of his 
contemporaries.
127
  His own logic of faith supplied rules – such as those quoted 
above – according to which the internal relations of the Trinity could be construed.  
It should be noted that Holkot did not believe his logic of faith violated the law of 
non-contradiction but viewed it as entirely rational.
128
 
For Baxter therefore, as for Holkot, it escapes natural logic how it is possible for 
anything to be simultaneously one and three.  Put another way the concept of 
„Triunity‟ makes no sense naturally and so is excluded from the rules and systems of 
philosophy.  The „logic of faith‟ however recognises that in divinis a different set of 
rules must be applied.  Crucially, however, it attempts no explanation of the 
difference, for it recognises that from a created perspective none can be given.  
Holkot‟s assertion is important as a reminder that the grounds of Christian doctrine, 
although entirely reasonable in that they conform to the pattern of the „logic of faith‟, 
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can never be commensurate with any system of natural logic.  In accordance with 
Baxter‟s practical and economic focus the logic of faith also represents an effective 
restraint on metaphysical speculation.  We have already noted that Lawson has his 
own logic of faith and it is quite possible that he influenced Baxter here.
129
 Certainly 
Baxter‟s espousal of Holkot‟s „logic of faith‟ took the hallowing of logic to new 
heights. 
7. The Trinity of Principles and Persons Compared 
Central to the whole Baxterian account of the Trinity is the relation between the 
Trinity of Principles and the Trinity of Persons.  Yet in neither the Methodus nor any 
of his other works does Baxter make clear the precise relation between them, nor 
indeed does he think this can or should be done: 
Quod Trinitas Essentialitum sit eadem quae Trinitas Personarum ego 
numquam vel verbis vel mente affirmavi, neque affirmandum puto.  Hoc 
solum assero, dum Trinitas haec Essentialitum seu Primalitatum, per 
totam rerum naturam sua vestigia ostentat, si non est Trinitas 
Personarum eam tamen facile credibilem mortalibus reddit.  Nulla enim 
ratio reddi potest, dum Trinitas una in essentiae unitate ex lumine 
naturae in Deo notissima sit, quare altera ullo modo incredibilis maneat.  
Non igitur eandem esse assero, sed alteram-revelatam ex altera-naturali 
ratione certissima credibilem probo.
130
 
By asserting the Trinity of Principles to be known through natural reason Baxter‟s 
purpose is therefore not to prove the doctrine of the Trinity of Persons but rather to 
render it rationally credible.  Elsewhere in the Methodus Baxter reaffirms the 
apologetic thrust of his Trinity of Principles, saying that by seeking to explain 
rationally the mystery of the Trinity he has been able to mollify the objections of 
Socinians and other doubters and thereby to have rendered them „placabiles, si non 
placatos‟ to the Christian religion.
131
 
By way of illustration, in his Reasons Baxter identifies two different schools of 
Trinitarian thought which he expressly tells his readers not to consider heretical: 
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those „who say, that the three persons are Deus seipsum intelligens, Deus a seipso 
intellectus and Deus a seipso amatus‟ and those, like Potho Prumiensis or Edmund of 
Canterbury, who „expresly say, that Potentia, Sapientia and Amor, are the Father, 
Son and Holy Ghost‟.
132
  Baxter however will join sides with neither: 
But for my own part, as I unfeignedly account the doctrine of the Trinity, 
the very summ and kernel of the Christian Religion (as exprest in our 
Baptism) and Athanasius his Creed, the best explication of it that ever I 
read; so I think it very unmeet in these tremendous mysteries, to go 
further than we have God's own light to guide us: And it is none of my 
purpose at all to joyn with either of the two fore-mentioned parties; nor to 
assert that the mysterie of the blessed Trinity of Hypostases or Persons is 
no other than this uncontroverted Trinity of Essential Principles.
133
 
Here we are reminded again of both the catechetical and scriptural orientation of 
Baxter‟s doctrine.  Furthermore we see clearly Baxter‟s view that neither reason nor 
faith is able to say anything further about the relation between the „natural Trinity‟ of 
the divine principles and that revealed in Scripture.  Indeed to attempt to comment 
further on this relation or to equate these two Trinities would for Baxter be 
trespassing beyond „God‟s own light‟. 
Baxter therefore continues: 
All that I endeavour is but as aforesaid, to shew that this doctrine is 
neither contradictory, incredible, nor unlikely, by shewing the vestigia or 
image of it, and that which is as liable to exception, and yet of 
unquestionable truth. And if the three hypostases be not the same with 
the Trinity of Principles aforesaid, yet no man can give a sufficient 
reason, why Three in One should not be truly credible and probable in 
the one instance, when common natural reason is fully satisfied of it in 
the other. He must better understand the difference between a person and 
such an essential principle in divinis, than any mortal man doth, who will 
undertake to prove from the title of a person that one is incredible or 
unlikely, when the other is so clear and sure: or rather, he understandeth 
it not at all, that so imagineth. For my part, I again from my heart profess, 
that the image or vestigia of Trinity in Unity through the most notable 
parts of nature and morality, do increase my estimation of the Christian 
Religion, because of the admirable congruity and harmony.
134
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Importantly we see from this that for Baxter it goes beyond the scope of mortal 
minds to characterise the difference between a divine person and an essential 
principle.  In this one assertion of impossibility is comprehended Baxter‟s entire 
critique of the scholastic descriptions of divine persons and relations that he lays out 
so laboriously in the Methodus. 
While Baxter believed the existence of God to be demonstrable by reason,
135
 he did 
not think it possible formally to prove God‟s Triunity.  In this he differed 
considerably from Ramon Lull especially, but also from Campanella, who offered a 
detailed explanation of the relation between the divine primalities and persons.
136
  At 
most he thought it possible to persuade a doubter of the truth and coherence of the 
doctrine by an appeal to the manifold vestigia seen throughout the natural order.  For 
Baxter then we can only affirm the Trinity of Persons through faith and through 
Scripture, even though through reason we can detect their „footsteps‟ everywhere in 
the created order.  However even from Scripture while we can certainly know that 
God is Triune we cannot know how he is Triune.  In this way Baxter‟s ambivalence 
about the precise relation between the Trinity of Principles and the Trinity of Persons 
can be seen to function as an important safeguard of the divine ineffability. 
This calls into question a significant aspect of Carl Trueman‟s evaluation of Baxter‟s 
Trinitarian thought.  As we saw in the introduction to this thesis, Trueman suggests 
that Baxter‟s resort to the Campanellan Primalities not only brings the Trinity within 
the sphere of natural theology but also breaks down the traditional divide between 
faith and reason.
137
  Yet, as we have suggested, it is Baxter‟s very refusal to make 
such an equation between the Trinity of Principles and the Trinity of Persons that 
prevents any such merging of the categories of faith and reason.  For while it is 
undoubtedly true that Baxter goes further than many of his Reformed contemporaries 
in his use of the vestigia and the analogia entis to construct theological doctrine, it 
remains equally true that he stops short of the kind of detailed characterisation of the 
divine persons and relations that many of them were willing to engage with.  Indeed 
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anyone coming to the Methodus for the first time would be much more likely to 
regard Baxter as cautious and hesitant concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, rather 
than speculative or overconfident. 
It is also untrue that Baxter‟s advocacy of a Trinity of Principles places him outside 
the pale of Reformed orthodoxy.  Not only did Baxter regard the existence and 
character of the divine principles as an entirely biblical idea, but he also affirmed 
their long history in the mainstream of Trinitarian discussion.
138
  Furthermore 
although many of the Reformed Orthodox distanced themselves from the kind of 
rational argumentation employed by Baxter, making use of analogies and similes 
only to expound the doctrine of the Trinity once received, there were also a number 
willing to give at least some credence to the concept of the vestigia Trinitatis and of 
divine principles.  Two prominent examples, both of whom go beyond Baxter in their 
assertion that the reflexive acts of intellect and will entirely constitute the divine 
persons, are Keckermann and Burman.
139
  Another example closer to Baxter‟s own 
exposition may be found in the work of the impeccably orthodox Francis Cheynell 
who posited an analogy between the transcendent „affections of being‟ and the 
subsistence of the divine persons and even went so far as to suggest that the relation 
of the affections mirrored the procession of intellect and will in the Trinity.
140
 
It is also wrong to characterise Baxter‟s theology as modalistic.  For Baxter always 
remained uncompromising in his assertion of God‟s essential threeness, affirming the 
Athanasian Creed, that most strident expression of orthodox Trinitarianism, as the 
most perfect statement of the doctrine of the Trinity.
141
  However to be fair to Packer 
(as well as to Nye!) it is easy to see how Baxter‟s doctrine could be misread in this 
way, especially in his assertion that the persons should be distinguished by extrinsic 
or connotative denomination.  At first sight this looks suspiciously as though Baxter 
holds the divine persons to be manifest only economically as modes of the divine 
presence in the world.  Likewise Baxter‟s uncertainty about how the persons are 
Three could easily be misinterpreted as doubting that they truly are Three.  
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Nevertheless both in characterising the persons in terms of absolute properties and 
distinct immanent acts as well as in holding that the extrinsic denomination of the 
persons is somehow formally rooted ex natura rei Baxter belies the dual charges of 
modalism and Unitarianism, accusations which would indeed have horrified him.  
That Baxter cannot characterise God‟s threeness further than this is not a problem 
either for him or for his doctrine, since according to the logic of faith this must of 
necessity transcend all of our attempts to logically grasp it. 
One final question of great relevance is how Baxter‟s Trinitarian thought relates to 
scholastic discussions of the Trinity.  From all that we have said it is very clear that 
Baxter strongly dissents from Thomism here.  Following Posewitz he sees a 
contradiction at the heart of Aquinas‟ doctrine of the Trinity, recognised most clearly 
in the incommensurability of divine person and relation.  In fact, as we also saw, in 
Baxter‟s opinion such a failure was unavoidable under the Augustinian scheme of 
memory, understanding and will, and was only compounded by Aquinas‟ doctrine 
that the powers of the soul are merely accidental, a view that effectively undercuts 
Baxter‟s desire for an analogia entis between the soul and the Trinity.   
By contrast there is a definite Scotist accent to Baxter‟s Trinitarian theology.  Indeed 
as Packer suggests Scotist ideas lay at the very heart of the faculty analysis which 
underpinned what we have called Baxter‟s analogia entis.
142
  Taking this further it is 
Scotus‟ univocal and equivocal concepts which form the mirror in which Baxter 
seeks to perceive God‟s essence, however dimly.  In this way the Scotist doctrine of 
univocity allows the kind of inferences necessary for Baxter‟s own doctrine of 
analogy to thrive.  There is also a considerable congruence between Baxter‟s and 
Scotus‟ approach to God‟s Triune being.  In general terms this may be seen from 
Baxter‟s strong recommendation of Meurisse‟s Tractatus de S.S. Trinitate which 
draws heavily on Scotus and Scotist ideas.
143
  More specifically it may be seen in the 
fact that Scotus, unlike Aquinas, thinks it possible to have natural knowledge of the 
Trinity.  Although he does not think such knowledge is strictly probative (in a 
technical sense) he still deems it highly persuasive.  Under this account the vestigia 
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provide convincing, although not conclusive, evidence of the existence of a Triune 
God.
144
  This view is similar to that of Baxter in which the existence of the Trinity of 
Principles is intended to persuade people of the existence of a corresponding Trinity 
of Persons.  With regards to God‟s Triune being ad intra, Baxter, as we have seen, 
shared Scotus‟ uncertainty about the language of divine relations.  This is evidenced 
particularly by his appropriation of de Ripa‟s suggestion that divine persons are 
constituted by absolute properties, which had its origin in Scotus‟ own deliberations 
on the question.  Furthermore in modelling the Trinity Baxter draws on the 
distinctively Scotist analogy with the „affections of being‟. 
Yet having said all this Baxter also departs from Scotus in a number of important 
ways in his description of the intra-Trinitarian relations.  Thus, for example, he does 
not commit himself to Scotus‟ description of the formal distinction between the 
persons and the essence and the persons themselves (although he does suggest an 
intrinsic distinction quite similar to that of Scotus).  Nor does he make extensive use 
of the elaborate Scotist form of the psychological analogy, preferring to talk instead 
in his own terms of the Trinity of Principles.  However the greatest difference 
between the two undoubtedly lies in Baxter‟s professed agnosticism about so many 
features of God‟s Triune being and his avoidance of the kind of scholastic subtleties 
which earned Scotus his sobriquet of the „Subtle Doctor‟. 
For this reason Baxter‟s Scotism is best viewed, once again, as having been 
reinterpreted through a Nominalist perspective.  This seems particularly true of his 
understanding of Posewitz‟s virtual distinction as a Scotist formal distinction 
envisioned in terms of a Nominalist connotative distinction.  The suggestion that 
Baxter often employs a Nominalist logic in theological discussion has already been 
made by Trueman.  However he did not follow up the further ramifications of this for 
Baxter‟s doctrine of God.
145
  As noted above this period of late scholasticism was 
characterised by a considerable scepticism about the possibility of giving precise 
logical expression to the doctrine of the Trinity.  Such scepticism however did not 
indicate any diminution of faith but rather a new and dawning awareness of the utter 
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inability of human concepts to penetrate the divine nature.  This note of caution may 
be found for example in the work of Thomas Bradwardine, a fifteenth-century 
Nominalist and Augustinian, whose discourse on man‟s little knowledge of God was 
greatly admired by Baxter and held up as an example to follow.
146
  As Heiko 
Oberman has noted, the theme of the incomprehensibility of God is an important one 
in Bradwardine‟s theology and certainly we find many echoes of this idea in Baxter‟s 
own work.
147
  What we have in Baxter is therefore best described as a kind of 
Trinitarian agnosticism. 
In this regard Baxter‟s approval of Robert Holkot is especially telling.  For Holkot‟s 
assertion of a transcendent logic of faith is itself an attempt not only to move beyond 
the impasse of scholastic debate on the intra-Trinitarian distinctions but also, more 
importantly, to articulate a theological vision in which the ineffability of God‟s 
Triune Majesty is given its rightful place.  From all we have discussed it is clear that 
Baxter‟s own theology resonates with this same concern and that this best explains 
his reticence in describing the inner workings of God‟s being; a reticence otherwise 
surprising in one who chooses to index his theology on self-knowledge and the 
vestigia Trinitatis.  This is also a further reminder of the practical nature of Baxter‟s 
Trinitarian theology, rooted as it is in catechetical norms and not scholastic 
speculation, in which it is man‟s duty to glorify the Triune God and not pry into 
things he has not chosen to reveal.  Yet having said this we must not forget that 
Baxter was also motivated by apologetic needs.  Ultimately then we might say that 
Baxter‟s resort to an analogy of being grounded on the primalities marks an attempt 
to preserve the divine transcendence and inscrutability while at the same time giving 
a rationally defensible account of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.    
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Chapter Six: Theo-Politics 
1. Introduction 
At the very beginning of the Methodus Baxter issues the following stark warning to 
his readers: „Qui methodum theologiae politicam nolunt, cum atheistis ad mere 
physicam ut confugiant necesse habent‟.
1
  Clearly, for Baxter, there could be no 
alternative between wholeheartedly endorsing a political method of theology and 
descending into a sub-theological, purely mechanistic account of God‟s relations 
with man.  This is not of course to suggest that Baxter sought to denigrate physics in 
any way – far from it – but rather to acknowledge that for Baxter man‟s special 
dignity as created in the image of God, and thus as being himself triune in nature, 
made him a subject both capable and befitting of moral government. 
It is no surprise then to find this sentiment echoed elsewhere in Baxter‟s works.  
Thus writing for students in his Christian Directory he has the following memorable 
advice to offer: 
The doctrine of politicks, especially of the nature of government and 
laws in general, is of great use to all that will ever understand the nature 
of God‟s government and laws, that is, of religion… And it is a 
preposterous course, and the way of ignorance and errour, for a divine to 
study God‟s laws, and a lawyer man‟s laws, before either of them know, 




At the start of his tome on Politicks, in the fourth part of this work, Baxter reiterates 
this, indicating his judgement that „much more of the doctrine of politicks or civil 
government belongeth to theology, than those men understand, who make kings and 
laws to be meer humane creatures‟.
3
  For Baxter indeed the theologian must be a 
„iurisconsultus Christianus‟.
4
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In Chapter Two we examined the roots of Baxter‟s Trinitarian theo-political method; 
now we shall consider Baxter‟s theo-politics in detail as it directs his account of the 
threefold Kingdom of God.  Here our focus will be on the temporal outworking of 
the Kingdom of God throughout salvation history, and particularly on the Triune 
Baptismal Covenant as governing the relationship between God and man, whether 
globally and objectively or personally and subjectively.  However it must always be 
remembered that for Baxter this itself is rooted in God‟s eternal counsel and decree, 
which Baxter expresses in terms of the mutual intrinsic conditioning of God‟s Power, 
Wisdom and Love.
5
  In particular it is important to emphasise that the perichoretic 
relation of law and love which we shall discern as a major dynamic of Baxter‟s 
soteriology, while rooted proximately in the governmental Trinity of Owner, Rector 
and Benefactor, is grounded ultimately in the Trinity of Persons and Principles.
6
 
In light of this, this chapter will begin in the second and third sections with a detailed 
analysis of the Kingdom of God in Baxter‟s thought and especially its threefold 
character of Nature, Grace and Glory.  This will demonstrate conclusively my claim 
that the Methodus represents the methodological unfolding of the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant.  In the fourth section we shall turn to the operation of God upon man‟s 
soul.  Here we shall first consider Baxter‟s account of divine concurrence and 
premotion, showing him to fit into a Scotist and Durandist mould, and then of the 
working of grace in the soul according to its psychological and habitual mechanisms.  
This will demonstrate the central importance of the Triune Baptismal Covenant in 
the life of the individual believer, affirming it as the cardinal doctrine of Baxter‟s 
theology and the hinge between theory and praxis.  In the fifth and sixth sections we 
shall consider the Trinitarian dynamic of faith, hope and love and show finally that 
Baxter‟s theology is an important exemplar of the Scotist primacy of love. 
2. Baxter’s Doctrine of the Regnum Dei 
Foundational to Baxter‟s theo-political method is his doctrine of the Regnum Dei.  
Indeed, as we have seen, theology itself he defined as scientia-affectiva-practica of 
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the Kingdom of God among man.
7
  Baxter came to understand this Kingdom 
according to a threefold division into the successive eras of Nature, Grace and Glory, 
together spanning the whole of salvation history.  In this section we shall consider 
this doctrine of the threefold Kingdom and its Trinitarian grounding.  This will reveal 
the centrality of the Triune Baptismal Covenant as encapsulating the salvific actions 
of the Trinity and man‟s response, and establish a global, objective framework – the 
works God has wrought and the laws and covenants he has established – for Baxter‟s 
full account of the interrelation of God and man. 
Baxter‟s doctrine of the Regnum Dei encompasses the whole of the Methodus and so 
here we can only give an overview of its main features.  Perhaps its most striking 
feature is the sophisticated coordination which Baxter attempts between three 
different „aspects‟ or representations of the one Triune God: the biblical description 
of him as a Trinity of Persons, the metaphysical description of him as a Trinity of 
Principles and the political description of him as a Trinity of Governmental 
Relations: 
Mark how wisely God hath ordered it, that the three essentialities in the 
Divine Nature, Power, Intellection and Will, Omnipotency, Wisdom and 
Goodness, and the three persons in the Trinity, the Father, the Word and 
the Spirit; and the three Causalities of God, as the Efficient, Directive 
and Final Cause (of whom, and through whom and to whom are all 
things) should have the three most eminent specimina or impressions in 
the world, or three most conspicuous works to declare and glorifie them; 
viz, Nature, Grace and Glory, And that God should accordingly stand 
related to men in three answerable Relations, viz, as our Creatour, our 
Redeemer, and our Perfecter (by Holiness initially, and Glory finally).
8
 
Indeed evidence for this coordination permeates much of Baxter‟s developed work 
and may be seen as a hallmark of his theology. 
Baxter‟s Trinitarian division of the Kingdom of God into the Kingdoms of Nature, 
Grace and Glory draws on his theology of attribution: 
Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa: but so that each hath an eminency 
in his own work, though not as separated or a solitary principle or cause.  
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The Father and Divine Vital Active Power, was eminently glorified in the 
creation; the Son and Divine Wisdom is eminently glorified in the 
making of the remedying medicine; And the Divine Love and Spirit is 
eminently glorified in the operation of it, to the health and salvation of 
the soul.  The Son, and the Wisdom or Word doth not finish all the work 
himself, but with the Father and Divine Power, sendeth the Holy Spirit, 
and communicateth to man the Love of God.  And all together will be 
glorified in our glorification.
9
 
Such eminent ascription was intended to capture the biblical dynamic in which by the 
Spirit and in and through the Son we come to the Father.
10
  Indeed without it, it is 
difficult to see how the intra-Trinitarian relations could be regarded as having any 
meaningful impact ad extra, an eventuality which would truly reduce the persons to 
mere modal principles.
11
  Significantly then the account of the Kingdoms assumes an 
intimate link between Baxter‟s Trinitarian metaphysics and his economic, covenantal 
perspective.  In this he affirmed both that „there is no salvation but by the whole 




3. The Threefold Kingdom of Nature, Grace and Glory 
The Kingdom of Nature is the realm of Creation and of the eminence of the Father 
and Power.  Yet Creation is also of course the work of the Trinity entire and so 
according to his pattern of attribution, grounded on the ordering of the internal 
processions, Baxter ascribes different roles to each of the persons in creating.  Thus 
the Father according to Power is assigned the eminency as Creator and origin of all 
things, the Son according to Wisdom the ordination of all things and the Spirit 
according to Love the perfection of all things.
13
   
From Creation stems the Trinity of Governmental Relations, alluded to above, which 
plays such a vital role in Baxter‟s theology.  These it is clear are simply the economic 
and theo-political correlates of the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love: 
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Consider next, in what relation such a creature must needs stand to such a 
Creatour.  If he made us of nothing, it is not possible, but that he must be 
our Owner, and we and all things absolutely his own.  And if he be our 
Maker and Owner, and be infinitely powerful, wise and good; and we be 
reasonable free-agents, made to be guided by laws or moral means unto 
our end; it is not possible but that we should stand related to him, as 
subjects to their rightful Governour.  And if he be our Creatour, Owner 
and Ruler, and also infinitely good, and the grand Benefactor of the 
world: and if the nature of our souls be to love good as good; it cannot be 
possible, that he should not be our End, who is our Creatour; and that we 
should not be related to him as to the Chiefest Good, both originally as 
our Benefactor, and finally as our End.
14
 
The Governmental Relations therefore result from God and man as compared, yet as 
the Methodus explicitly adds their deepest foundation lies in the divine essence 
itself.
15
  In this way the Governmental Relations mirror the Trinity, with the relation 
of Dominus the source of the others, and Creation affirmed as the ground of all 
government.
16
   
Baxter holds that man, as a moral subject, is capable of the highest form of 
government – that according to laws.  Significantly Baxter frames his own 
understanding of law in a Trinitarian context, resonating with his mitigated 
voluntarism.  Thus he defines law in a voluntarist fashion as a sign revealing the 
Rector‟s will rather than in an intellectualist fashion as an immanent expression of 
the Rector‟s intellect.  Furthermore, in a move worthy of both Scotus and Ockham, 
he upholds God as Legislator as being above his own laws, able to abrogate or 
change them at will.
17
  Nevertheless he tempers his definite voluntarism in two 
crucial ways.  Firstly he adds that God cannot change the law lightly and certainly 
not in way which contradicts his own essential nature.  Baxter can thus speak in a 
Thomistic vein of certain laws as „images of his imperant nature‟ and unalterable as 
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flowing from divine perfection.
18
  Secondly Baxter insists that without in any way 
disrupting the structure of the law it can be made to serve ends other than the purely 
legal.  Thus although rectorally law‟s prescriptive aspect is considered primary and 
its executive aspect secondary, in the regimen of the Benefactor this can be turned 
completely on its head.  Here then is manifest a „wonderful concordance‟ of divine 
principles and relations, which we may describe as a kind of perichoresis of law and 
love.
19
  As we shall see, it is this distinctive Trinitarian characterisation of law which 
entirely shapes Baxter‟s understanding of the covenanting between God and man. 
Baxter held that in the Kingdom of Nature God governed according to what was 
often called the Covenant of Nature or of Works.  This was that binding covenant 
made between God and Adam which Baxter understood as consisting in the law of 
nature, obliging man to due obedience to God as his Owner, Rector and Benefactor, 
and the supernatural added law (the command not to eat the fruit of the Tree of 
Knowledge).
20
  Viewed from this perspective human sin was a covenant violation 
which ruptured the intimate bond between God and man, causing him to forfeit all 
but the natural remnant of the image of God, and incurred his necessary punishment.  
Yet in enacting this God punishes not only as Owner and Rector but also as 
Benefactor.  Here then, already, we find an „inseparable twist‟ of God‟s law and love 
founded on his Trinitarian character.
21
  For as Legislator above the law God chooses 
to save some from their deserved punishment of eternal death and in doing so relaxes 
the strict obligation of the law.  Yet because his law is grounded on his essential 
nature, and so cannot be changed lightly, he does this only upon consideration of his 
future satisfaction through Christ.
22
  
All of this is encapsulated by the prophecy of the protoevangelium – the promise that 
the seed of the woman will crush the serpent‟s head – which inaugurates the 
Covenant of Grace.
23
  Following both Reformed covenantal thought and a scriptural 
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trajectory Baxter identified a total of four editions of the Covenant of Grace before it 
attained its definitive form in Christ: the universal Adamic, Noachic and Abrahamic 
covenants made with (or in the case of Abraham with reference to) the whole world 
and the special Mosaic covenant made only with the people of Israel.
24
  Baxter gives 
to each of these covenants an incipient Trinitarian shape, suggesting that Abraham, 
for example, was saved by his assensus, consensus and fiducia to God as Dominus, 
Rector and Benefactor exercised through his faculties of intellect, will and executive 
power, and was justified by dedicating his whole self to God by the grace and gift of 
the Holy Spirit and by obeying God the Redeemer.
25
  
With the advent of Christ, the promised seed, the Covenant of Grace reaches its 
fullness and perfection.  Following Creation‟s pattern Baxter attributes the work of 
Redemption eminently to the Son as well as to the whole Trinity conjunct: 
Sicut potentia fuit eminentissima in regno naturae, et Pater Creator ibi 
Rex: ita sapientia est eminentissima in regno gratiae, et ibi logos filius 
specialiter Rex; at non sapientia separate vel in se tantum considerata; 
sed ut est amoris et ad amorem; et ita Regnum Gratiae sapientalis est via 
ad Regnum Gloriae, ubi amor (non ut hic obnubilatus, sed) 
eminentissime et gloriose regnat.
26
 
The Kingdom of Grace thus marks the transition between the foundational Kingdom 
of Nature and the perfecting Kingdom of Glory, manifesting again Baxter‟s 
coordinate Trinitarian account of the Kingdom of God. 
The Kingdom of Grace is itself founded on the mediatorial work of Christ in 
reuniting God and man, which Baxter describes as being rooted in eternity in the 
desire of the whole Trinity to save and redeem the elect.
27
  Its enacting in time begins 
with the Incarnation which, following the lead of the Gospels, Baxter interpreted in 
Trinitarian fashion.  Thus we have the Father sending the Son, the Son as the eternal 
Wisdom of God taking flesh and the Holy Spirit accomplishing his miraculous 
conception, fashioning for him a body and soul and communicating to Christ the man 
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the perfection of God‟s image.
28
  Building on this, Baxter shaped his entire 
Christology around the conjunct action of the Trinity, holding that both the 
hypostatic union and the pattern of Christ‟s life as very man and very God could only 
be fully grasped when placed in a Trinitarian dynamic.  As he says quite explicitly: 
Quamvis enim non Spiritus Sanctus, sed Filius, unione hypostatica 
naturae humanae fuit adunatus, operatio tamen in naturam humanam est 
operatio ad extra; ideoque omnium personarum S. Trinitatis; et ita ut in 




Furthermore as the true Image of God the person of Christ is said to be luminous to 
the Trinity, revealing to the world God‟s nature and radiating his divine Power, 
Wisdom and Love.  In this way Christ is able to enact the obedience which should 
have been Adam‟s.  Through his full endowment with the Holy Spirit, concurrent 
with his own divine nature, he is therefore said to be perfected (though never not 
perfect) in his three human faculties of intellect, will and executive power.  As 
habitually and actually holy he exercises perfect resignation, obedience and love to 
God as Owner, Rector and Benefactor, so qualifying himself for the work of 
mediation, which is thus seen as being accomplished throughout his whole life as 
well as in the pivotal events of his death and Resurrection.
30
 
In Baxter‟s doctrine of Christ‟s satisfaction he once again invokes his own 
Trinitarian account.  Through the Son‟s full submission to his Father and in the 
power of the Holy Spirit he steps into the breach, interposing between man and the 
just wrath of God.  He takes upon himself the punishments for the sins of the world, 
although not the sins themselves, and thus satisfies not the letter of the law but God 
himself, the lawgiver.
31
  The alternative, upheld by many of Baxter‟s Reformed 
brethren, that Christ became sin or was reputed a sinner in our stead, he regarded as 
philosophically untenable and theologically dubious.  Specifically Baxter held that 
this, combined with the doctrine that Christ satisfied the exact requirements of the 
law, was the straight road to his feared Antinomianism and a blasphemous sullying 
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  It was these considerations particularly which lay behind his 
much-vaunted Grotian doctrine of solutio tantidem rather than solutio eiusdem – that 
is of Christ‟s sacrifice as an equivalent and not exact payment of the debt of sin – as 
well as his denial of the strict imputation of Christ‟s righteousness.
33
 
For Baxter, then, Christ satisfied for our sins not through fulfilling the law but by 
enabling it to be relaxed on our behalf.  While this doctrine of „relaxation‟ is often 
viewed in a negative light, as a kind of watering down or externalising of God‟s 
justice along Grotian lines,
34
 in fact Baxter views Christ‟s act of representation or 
„sponsion‟, his taking upon himself the punishments for our sin, as the very essence 
of this relaxation.  Since the initial stipulations of the law made no mention of the 
possibility of substitutionary satisfaction,
35
 Christ‟s death on our behalf must be seen 
as an act of pure mercy and benefaction: 
Et qui legibus obediens est, non eo inobedientem aliquem reddit 
praemiabilem. At Benefactor sua natura benignissimus, et Rector 
sapientissimus paterno affectu regens, dum ad ignoscendum et 
benefaciendum maxime propensus est, alterius bonitatem et obedientiam 
potest accipere, ut medium ad iustitiae suae demonstrationem et 
satisfactionem sufficiens, et ad omnia veniae incommoda devitanda 
idoneum: praecipue si mediator promerens, sit modo aliquo peccatorum 
Dominus (id est, Proprietarius), ita ut recte suos vocare eos possit; quia 
quod suis datur, sibi-ipsi quodammodo datur: ideoque qui sibi aliquid 
meretur, et suis sui-ipsius gratia meretur.
36
 
It is in this very doctrine of relaxation, then, that the Trinitarian dimension of the 
atonement becomes fully explicit.  Here once again the barrier between law and love 
is shown to be artificially erected, since both together are expressions of God‟s 
eternal, unchanging, simple Triune nature.   
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At the heart of Baxter‟s theology of atonement is the Cross.  This he says is the 
„truest ladder, by which you may ascend from earth to heaven‟,
37
  and as we shall see 
below it is the believer‟s subjective participation in the work of the Cross that is the 
gateway to the new life in Christ.  In this way Baxter seeks to combine an Anselmian 
emphasis on objective satisfaction (according to a voluntarist account of relaxation) 
with an Abelardian perspective of the Cross as the true pattern of the Christian life.
38
  
In explaining the work of the Cross Baxter thus draws on the whole tradition, 
integrating the doctrines of satisfactio, imitatio Christi and Christus victor into a 
coherent theo-political unity.
39
  Baxter is clear as well that the transaction of the 
Cross involves the whole Trinity conjunct.
40
  Once again then Baxter‟s Christology is 
only fully understood when placed in front of its Trinitarian backdrop. 
Baxter is also fully aware that Christ‟s Death on the Cross cannot be separated from 
his subsequent Resurrection and Exaltation.  Both events are not only inseparable but 
are together foundational to the Kingdom of Grace.  For it is the central thesis of 
Baxter‟s soteriology that by Redemption Christ has won a new right as Owner, 
Rector and Benefactor over the entire human race.
41
  This he says is not something 
openly displayed while Christ is hanging on the Cross, but is demonstrated in his 
Resurrection and Ascension, his intercession with the Father and his subsequent 
pouring out of the Holy Spirit.  The whole Trinity is thus involved in the establishing 
of Christ‟s Kingdom of Grace, but it is Christ himself in his glorified human nature 
who is the political head of both Church and world and who therefore has the 
eminency.
 42
   
Christ then, analogously to the Father in the Kingdom of Nature, is established as 
Owner, Rector and Benefactor by right of Redemption. Since Baxter understands 
redemption as universal in scope it follows that Christ‟s rule must also be universal, 
for he is insistent that unless Christ died for all he cannot possibly be said to rule 
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over all in the new dispensation of grace.
43
  As Owner Christ has the right of 
disposing with all as he chooses and distributing his benefits unequally; as Rector he 
has the right of governing and judging all according to the laws and conditions that 
he establishes and as Benefactor he gives freely to all the offer of the universal 
remission of sins, reconciliation with God, the heavenly Kingdom and the Holy 
Spirit (confirming this specially and efficiently for his elect) and thus has the right to 
the love, gratitude and obedience of all.
44
   
Baxter expresses exactly these same truths according to the paradigmatic Protestant 
language of Christ as Prophet, Priest and King.  Thus as Prophet Christ proclaims his 
doctrine and confirms it by testimony of his Holy Spirit, as Priest he satisfies and 
intercedes with the Father and as King he issues the new law and sends down the 
Holy Spirit.
45
  Furthermore there is evidence that Baxter viewed Christ‟s threefold 
office as itself structured in a Trinitarian fashion.  For not only does he suggest that 
the prophetical, priestly and kingly work of Christ, as continued in the Church‟s 
ministry, may be connected to the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love but 
he also asserts that „it is more proper to call them three parts of one office, than three 
offices‟
46
 and that their operation is „so woven and twisted together by infinite 
wisdom, that all do harmoniously concur to the attainment of the ends of each one; 
and if you lay by one, you lay by all‟.
47
 
As King, Christ is also lawgiver, and so following his Resurrection and Ascension he 
issues a new law, revealed by his Holy Spirit and his Apostles in Scripture, 
superseding both the old Covenant of Nature and the previous editions of the 
Covenant of Grace.  Having merited the relaxation of the law, through his fulfilment 
of the old law and the special mediatorial law of sacrifice, Christ as Owner, Rector 
and Benefactor (with the Father and Holy Spirit) is entirely free to change the law.  
This he does, declaring that anyone who believes in him, and wholeheartedly and 
sincerely takes him for his Lord and Saviour, will be released from the punishments 
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due them for violating the Covenant of Nature and will freely receive the gift of the 
Holy Spirit and eternal life.
48
 
The Covenant of Grace, like the former Covenant of Nature, is a conditional 
covenant.  Baxter holds that the particular condition which God establishes as the 
sine qua non of the conferral of covenant benefits is faith.  His reasons for doing this 
are twofold: firstly because of his freedom to change the law and the conditions 
which meet that law as he chooses, and secondly due to faith itself having a natural 
and moral aptitude for the role that God assigns it.  On the one hand then we have 
what Richard Sibbes called an „evangelical mitigation‟ of the law, with God 
accepting faith and sincerity in the place of perfection,
49
 and on the other hand faith 
itself involves a full submission to God and therefore establishes the grounds upon 
which a new relationship with him is able to flourish.  Faith thus invites a real 
participation in Christ through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.
50
 
Faith, as we shall see below, Baxter describes as a triple motion of the soul initiated 
by and directed towards the triple object of the Triune God.  Faith, including the faith 
that justifies, is therefore faith in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  For this 
reason he suggests that the fullest description of the Covenant of Grace is in fact the 
Triune Baptismal Covenant itself.
51
  This, we have seen, he viewed as the essence of 
the Christian religion itself and it therefore makes sense that he should view the faith 
which defines the Christian as a heart covenanting and fellowshipping with all three 
persons of the Trinity.   
It is no exaggeration then to suggest that this Trinitarian definition of faith, 
reconfigured around the Triune Baptismal Covenant, is the cornerstone of Baxter‟s 
theology.  Its most immediate implications are in the territory of justification.  Here 
Baxter differed markedly from the Protestant consensus of forensic justification and 
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imputation of Christ‟s righteousness.  By contrast, firstly, Baxter defined the object 
of justifying faith not only as being Christ, in all three of his offices, and not just his 
priestly office, but as being all three persons of the Trinity in all the Governmental 
relations.
52
  Secondly he denied the strict imputation of Christ‟s righteousness, 
instead holding that believers must have their own personal, inherent righteousness, 
which he called evangelical righteousness, in order to fulfil the Covenant of Grace 
and merit its benefits.
53
  Thirdly and finally he strenuously denied that faith was an 
instrument of justification and instead asserted it as merely a condition sine qua non 
of the conferral of covenant benefits.
54
   
The outline of Baxter‟s doctrine of justification is well-known but what has not 
before been noticed is that each of these three features can be related in his mature 
thought to his Trinitarian conception of faith.  Thus the first follows from Baxter‟s 
understanding of faith as a motion of the whole soul, through assent, consent and 
obedience, to the whole Trinity in all the governmental relations.  To be justified 
through sincere faith now required not only assent and consent to Christ‟s priestly 
work, as for other Protestants, but obedience to him and to the whole Trinity as King.  
This, as we shall see below, had far reaching implications.   
The second follows from this, for Baxter defines evangelical righteousness as a 
personal, inherent righteousness which is not „without us in Christ‟ but consists in 
our own actions of faith and obedience as fulfilling the conditions of the Covenant of 
Grace.
55
  This he explains in his notorious analogy of the peppercorn rent, holding 
that in the same way that a landlord requires the annual giving of a peppercorn to 
secure the possession of a property so God as Rector requires our evangelical 
righteousness, something which like the peppercorn is valueless in itself, as 
necessary for securing salvation.
56
  This is another example of Baxter‟s mitigated 
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voluntarism, for the „acceptation‟ of our evangelical righteousness is an act of mercy 
and a relaxation of the law. 
Reaction against Baxter has been very strong, with some viewing the idea of 
evangelical righteousness as tantamount to blasphemy.
57
  Without wishing to wholly 
defend Baxter‟s views we would suggest that his critics have been too harsh.  Baxter 
himself views this notion as entirely scriptural, deriving it especially from his 
exegesis of Matthew 25 – foundational to his entire theo-political method – and his 
distinctive harmonisation of Paul and James.
58
  He is also insistent that „we cannot 
perform these conditions without grace (for without Christ we can do nothing) and he 
enableth us to perform them ourselves‟.
59
  Christ therefore works this evangelical 
righteousness within us, although, as we shall consider below, not without our 
subordinate cooperation.   
Baxter‟s denial of faith‟s instrumentality also tempers his view of evangelical 
righteousness.  For him, to hold that faith is an instrument over-exalts its nature as a 
human action and he therefore denies that it can have any efficiency in procuring 
justification.
60
  He holds instead that the only instrument of conferring covenant 
benefits is the covenant itself and regards faith as simply a condition sine qua non; 
that is as a necessary condition established according to a prior agreement or 
covenant.  This is another clear indication of Baxter‟s Nominalist sympathies.
61
  
Furthermore as a condition faith, and therefore we must say evangelical 
righteousness, is enacted by God himself and falls under the unconditional benefits 
of his ownership and benefaction.
62
  Far then from being exclusive or independent of 
grace, Baxter‟s concept of evangelical righteousness is itself entirely graced.  
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Extending his own analogy we might say that not only does God require a 
peppercorn but that he himself actually gives us the peppercorn with which we pay 
the rent. 
Combining these three aspects it becomes possible to see the full scope of Baxter‟s 
Trinitarian and covenantal reconfiguration of justification.  In particular it is apparent 
that this entails a distinctive dual understanding of justification.  Thus on the one 
hand justification can be described as being by faith and loving obedience so that 
Gospel works were viewed not only as a necessary sign of true and sincere faith, as 
most Protestants held, but as themselves necessary for covenantal fulfilment.
63
  Yet 
on the other hand Baxter can still maintain that justification was by faith alone, 




The seeming contradiction in this position can be reconciled on two levels, by 
recourse firstly to Baxter‟s Trinitarian reconceptualisation of faith and secondly to 
his covenantal understanding of justification.  Admittedly the outlines of this first 
change are somewhat implicit in Baxter‟s thought.  They will however become even 
clearer below when we examine the Trinitarian dynamic of faith, hope and love.  It 
seems therefore that Baxter can hold quite consistently that we are justified by faith 
alone according to a contracted and unified definition in which faith as principium 
inseparably and virtually contains its following acts of obedience, and that we are 
justified by faith and obedience according to an expanded definition in which faith 
itself is spread out in threefold fashion spanning acts of assent, consent and fiducial 
obedience.
65
  Expressing this a different way Baxter says „we are not said in 
Scripture to be justified by hope or by charity, but by faith: but it is such a faith as 
hath aliquid spei et amoris in it and will operate by these graces‟.
66
  In his 
Aphorismes he therefore affirms that we are justified by faith working through love.
67
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This simple picture is further complicated by the fact that Baxter stretches the 
traditional notion of justifying faith not only conceptually, to include love and 
obedience as its inseparable (triune) conjuncts, but also temporally.  Initial 
justification requires only faith as a condition but continuing and final justification 
(at the last judgement) also require love and obedience, manifested through Gospel 
works.
68
  In posing such a division between initial and final justification Baxter was 
motivated by two important factors.  The first was the famous parable of the Sheep 
and the Goats in Matthew 25 – the scriptural locus of Baxter‟s political method.  For 
Baxter this conclusively demonstrated that salvation, and thus final justification, was 
not through faith alone but through faith and works conjunct.  Further reflection on 
Scripture undertaken over many years only confirmed him in his view that this 
passage was merely the tip of the exegetical iceberg.
69
  The second was Baxter‟s 
pronounced covenantal perspective.  Baxter often explained the relation between 
Christ and the believer using the both political and intimate analogy of a marriage 
alliance between a Prince and a beggar-woman.  The act of marriage itself is 
analogous to faith in that all that is required is the making of the marital vow of 
fidelity.  Yet to remain married, Baxter says, the making of the vow alone is not 
enough but the keeping of the vow is also necessary.  In the same way faith and 
actual obedience must be held necessary for continued justification.
70
  In Baxter‟s 
covenantal reconfiguring of soteriology, faith therefore becomes full and sustained 
adherence to the Covenant of Grace. 
Baxter‟s distinctive doctrine of justification draws on a number of diverse sources 
and, as Boersma suggests, his soteriology can often appear as a pastiche taken from a 
whole array of Reformed theologians.
71
  This is true even of his more distinctive 
doctrines such as that of justification by faith working through love, which had 
precedent in Maccovius‟ doctrine that faith must include the love of complacency, 
                                                 
68
 Baxter, Methodus, III.336; cf. Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 299-316. 
69
 Baxter, Aphorismes, 204-5.  For a selection of scriptural references see Confession, 57-64.  Baxter 
says that there are „many score or hundred‟ references to this in Scripture (Scripture Gospel Defended, 
57). 
70
 Baxter, Aphorismes, 167-78. 
71
 Boersma, Hot Pepper Corn, 322-3. 
227 
 
and his discussion of faith and works which echoes that to be found in Davenant and 
Twisse among others.
 72
   
Also evident in Baxter‟s doctrine of justification is a strong scholastic influence.  
This is particularly apparent in his doctrine of merit.  Certainly Baxter never 
attributed any causal or efficient role to works in procuring justification, regarding 
them, like faith, as merely a condition sine qua non of conferral of covenant 
benefits.
73
  Nevertheless it is striking that he was willing to give his consent to 
almost the whole of the Tridentine doctrine of justification.
74
  Furthermore, although 
Baxter sometimes sought to eschew the term merit itself as unhelpful,
75
 his own view 
of merits, save for his denial of their instrumental efficiency, seems to have been that 
of Scotus himself.
76
  He believed that acts are meritorious as relating to God‟s 
covenant or promise to reward them and in no way make God a debtor.
77
   
In his espousal of a Catholic doctrine of merit Baxter even went so far as to accept 
the common scholastic distinction between congruous and condign merits.  Merit of 
congruity, he held, conformed to the Puritan doctrine of preparation for grace, in that 
both make the person a more congruous receiver of grace without obliging God to 
give them grace as a reward.  Merit of condignity he equated to the scriptural sense 
of worthy, suggesting a Scotist interpretation of this as „ex pacto‟, with its 
meritorious nature resulting from God‟s decree and free acceptation.
78
  Baxter was 
also adamant that the scholastic doctrine of merits he adhered to denied any form of 
merit from commutative justice, making all human merit subordinate to that of 
Christ.   As he put it, and here he did differ considerably from Trent, without the 
gracious pardoning acceptation of Christ any one of man‟s „good‟ works would be 
enough to send him down to hell.
79
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Prominent then in Baxter‟s reordering of the doctrine of justification is his Scotist 
and Nominalist account of the covenant and of God‟s merciful acceptation of human 
works.
80
  This he quite naturally seeks to place within a Trinitarian context.  Thus in 
his Catholick Theologie Baxter points out that the standard Aristotelian division 
between commutative and distributive justice is „narrow, ambiguous‟ and „inept‟ and 
that the „true distribution of justice is from the three grand moral relations‟ (i.e. 
Owner, Rector and Benefactor).  Thus God is said to have a right to ourselves, our 
obedience and our love and gratitude, and our merits and demerits are denominated 
variously and ex pacto with respect to these relations.
81
  Here again then we find a 
subtle combination of Baxter‟s Nominalised Scotism and his Trinitarian perspective.  
Finally, and in a similar vein, it is notable that although Baxter‟s doctrine of 
justification is in some respects highly eclectic, in his mature thought the whole is 
given coherence through his Trinitarian perspective.  In particular it may be viewed 
according to both a temporal and conceptual unfolding of faith‟s internal dynamic.
82
 
This brings us to sanctification and the breaking-in of the Kingdom of Glory upon 
the Kingdom of Grace.  Although strictly the Kingdom of Glory has an 
eschatological referent, to apply such a rigid division would belie Baxter‟s 
Trinitarian framework of Creation, Redemption and Sanctification and have the 
effect of pushing the principal work of the Holy Spirit out of the sphere of this world, 
something entirely contrary to Scripture: 
Regnum NATURAE CREATORIS fuit Regnum POTENTIAE eminentis, 
sed cum coaequali Sapientia, et Amore conjunctae.  Regnum GRATIAE 
REDEMPTORIS fuit Regnum Sapientiae (Medicinalis) cum coaequali 
Potentia et Amore.  Et ante Christum Incarnatum Sapientia regulativa 
cum Potentia terribili magis eminebat.  At postea magis Sapientia cum 
Amore.  Quia post Spiritus Sancti effusionem Regnum Gratiae et 
Sapientiae fuit quasi propolis, crepusculam, arrhabo Regni Gloriae.  Sed 
REGNUM GLORIAE est REGNUM AMORIS eminentissimi, etiamsi cum 
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There is, then, a substantial overlap between the Kingdom of Grace and the Kingdom 
of Glory, effected by the Holy Spirit.   
Within the Kingdom of Grace, the work of the Holy Spirit is carried out under the 
eminency of the Son, a point which Baxter stresses in his discussion of 
sanctification.
84
  It is Jesus, rising from the dead and ascending to glory, who attains 
the right from the Father of sending the Holy Spirit and with the Father pours out the 
Holy Spirit.  The work of the Holy Spirit therefore, of course, includes the work of 
the whole Trinity: 
Sicut operatio Filii non excludit, sed includit operationem Patris; ita et 
operatio (et honor itidem) Spiritus Sancti includit operationem Patris et 
Filii (et eorum operandi gloriam): A Patre enim et Filio etiam in 
operando ad extra procedit vel datur Spiritus Sanctus.
85
 
While the Holy Spirit is therefore active in all of God‟s works inseparably from the 
Father and the Son, it is sanctification in which he has a special role. 
Within Baxter‟s theology, justification and sanctification are almost two sides of the 
same coin.  Almost, but not quite, for Baxter is clear that along with considerable 
overlap there are also significant differences between the two: 
At in negotio sanctificationis, res longe aliter se habet.  Ibi enim fidei 
actus operatur iuxta naturam objecti.  Ad sanctificationem fides operatur 
per propriam efficientiam, etiam in ipsum intellectum fere per modum 
naturae, et in voluntatem per modum objecta ostendentis, moraliter et 
metaphorice saltem.  Cum credo Dei bonitatem, fides amorem suscitat, 
cum fidelitatem fiduciam, cum majestatem obedientiam, etc. At non ita in 
jure beneficiorum obtinendo, ubi fides solum conditio est sine qua non, et 
foedus seu testamentum instrumentum efficiens est; et Deus omnia 
beneficia sua donavit quoad jus, sub integra una conditione fidei in 
Christum qua Christum: et ex una hac indivisa fide, per unam 
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However, while both differ according to the efficiency of faith, it is clear that they 
are extremely tightly interwoven in Baxter‟s theology, with both ultimately 
stemming from faith‟s Trinitarian nature and ground. 
Sanctification as holiness, whether active, habitual or relative, is thus described by 
Baxter with reference to the Trinity: 
Est activa, dispositiva, et relativa separatio (dedicatio, devotio) hominis 
ad Deum ut Patrem nostrum, id est, ad Patrem, Filium et Spiritum 
Sanctum, ut sui ad Dominum, ut subditi ad Regem, ut amici et 
beneficiarii ad Amatorem, Benefactorem et summe Amabilem; in sancta 
vitalitate, lumine, et amore, per Spiritus Sancti vivificationem, 
illuminationem et conversionem in nobis operatis; aversionem itidem a 
carne, mundo et diabolo, ut Dei et sanctitatis adversariis, includens.
87
 
Simplifying this even further, Baxter refers in biblical fashion to loving God with 
one‟s whole mind, heart and strength as the true description of sanctification.
88
  
Sanctification is therefore nothing less than that complete submission to the Triune 
God according to which the whole Trinity comes to inhabit and indwell the soul of 
the believer.  It is the perfecting of the image of God lost and almost completely 
effaced in the traumatic events of the Fall.  As Baxter summarises, „the Gracious 
Redeemer hath his standing witness in the sanctified, even his Holy Spirit, the divine 
nature, the new creature, the image of God, the Father, Son and Spirit dwelling in 
them, by divine Life, Light and Love, so as shall keep up a Church of holy ones to 
Christ, in despight of all the powers of Hell‟.
89
  Sanctification, in other words, 
represents the highest possible earthly fulfilment of the Triune Baptismal Covenant. 
By its very nature, sanctification establishes the Church as a community in 
fellowship with the Triune God.  The life of the sanctified Church is thus thoroughly 
Trinitarian, constituted by the evangelical law given by the Father, administered by 
the Son and dispensed by the Holy Spirit.  Furthermore, in subordination to its Head, 
its ministers fulfil Christ‟s prophetic, priestly and kingly ministries by participating 
in the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love and manifesting these both 
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  This is true also of the Church‟s sacraments, with Baptism 
representing the initial covenanting with the Triune God and Holy Communion its 
enriching and deepening.
91
  This Trinitarian order extends from the microscopic to 
the macroscopic scale and thus from individual families, in which the father is 
subordinate Dominus, Rector and Benefactor, to the level of Church councils and the 
universal Church.
92
  The impact of the Church is seen outside its walls in the political 
structures of Christendom, with the engines of government themselves reflecting 
both the divine principles of Power, Wisdom and Love and the Governmental 
relations of Owner, Rector and Benefactor.
93
  This gives the mission of the Church a 




Entering the fullness of the Kingdom of Glory, here the Holy Spirit is truly eminent, 
although of course his work is inseparable from that of the Father and the Son.
95
  
This is therefore the consummation of the reign of the Trinity, marking the very peak 
of divine government.  With all God‟s enemies vanquished God the Father as 
Omnipotent Dominus is free perfectly to enjoy his own, wholly purified from sin, in 
whom shines the image and glory of his own omnipotence.  God the Son, as Most 
Wise Rector, sees the work of reparation and salvation completed, yet retains the 
honour in his bought works.  He will always shine on the City of God as its most 
perfect Sun and in his light the blessed will live for eternity with the greatest delight 
as the image and glory of his wisdom.  Finally, God the Holy Spirit, the Most Loved 
Benefactor, communicates fervours of love to the blessed, filling them to the utmost 
with beatitude and revealing to them the divine goodness.  By the magnetic attraction 
of his love he compels them to give back the same love, so that they become the 
image and glory of his goodness.
96
  In this way God takes complacency in his own 
Power, Wisdom and Love. 
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The state of the blessed in the Kingdom of Glory is therefore to behold in final 
complacency the glory of the Triune God and of his Power, Wisdom and Love.  As 
such they enjoy unimpaired fellowship with God, receiving from him by the Holy 
Spirit the most perfect communication of his Power, Wisdom and Love through vital 
energy, illumination and holy love.  Through this ineffable communion the threefold 
faculties of their souls and consequently their relation to God as Dominus, Rector 
and Benefactor are now finally made whole, rendered free from all impediments of 
sin and imperfection.  Likewise their body, now glorified, is no longer in rebellion 
and works in perfect harmony with its regent triune soul.
97
  Perfectly beholding the 
face of God they perfectly know his will: 
Leges ibi erunt radii divini luminis, amoris et potentiae activae, ad 
mentem et voluntatem pertingentes, et ibi se communicando, divinam 
voluntatem inscribentes; et magis operationes efficaces erunt, quam 
signa tantum moraliter agentia, ut in Regno Sapientiae…leges hae 
mentibus insculptae, erunt natura sancta et obedientalis. 
Such a nature Baxter says will be love itself but conjoined with vital power and 
wisdom in the greatest perfection, allowing the greatest possible communion with 
divine Power, Wisdom and Love.  Furthermore the dictates of this nature will be 
such that freedom and happiness will perfectly co-exist, so that any sin or violation 
of this law of love will be morally impossible.  As Baxter summarises, „AMARE et 
AMARI erunt Regni Gloriae et LEX et OPUS et Finis perpetuo fruendus‟.
98
  In this 
we see the true passing over of law into love, the intimations of which we have seen 
throughout our discussion of the threefold Kingdom, as well as the eschatological 
fulfilment of the Triune Baptismal Covenant, revealing this as both finis and initium 
of the Christian life. 
4. God’s Operations on Man’s Soul 
So far we have only considered the global and objective side of Baxter‟s soteriology.  
For as rich and complex as we have seen his doctrine of the Regnum Dei to be we 
have not yet described the personal, and, to use the word very carefully, subjective 
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side of his soteriology.
99
  This final section will therefore be something of a 
recapitulation of all that we have just discussed, as seen from the perspective of the 
individual believer rather than the Kingdom of God.  In this we shall see fully the 
interaction of the Triune God and the triune believer, as founded solely on the divine 
prevenient initiative.   
Here then we see all the elements of Baxter‟s worldview coming together into one 
coherent whole.  Tracing the shape of this powerful synthesis will allow us finally to 
rebut the charge of moralism levelled against Baxter.  For we shall see that all the 
emphasis he places on merit and the role of works in justification is radically 
undercut by his Trinitarian and Augustinian account of grace.  Furthermore this 
allows us to establish a new paradigm for our understanding of Baxter‟s theology, 
building on, but in its Trinitarian scope going beyond, earlier perspectives.  This, 
especially, refocuses our attention on the centrality of the Triune Baptismal Covenant 
and the shape of the Christian life of faith, hope and love as it is lived in the prospect 
of glory.  Finally, passing beyond the shores of this world into the realm of glory 
itself, we see the Christian transfigured, gazing on the Triune God.  Through this 
Beatific Vision, or more aptly Beatific embrace – which Baxter construes in a wholly 
Scotist fashion – love becomes the primary dynamic of eternal life, as it represents 
the convergence and profoundly ineffable union of the Holy God and sanctified man. 
4.1. Divine Concurrence and Premotion 
Baxter‟s understanding of God‟s operation on man‟s soul begins with his account of 
divine concurrence and premotion.  Concurrence refers to God‟s participation in his 
creatures‟ actions not only so as to conserve them and all relevant features of their 
action in existence but so as to make a genuine causal contribution to their acts so 
that they may be said in some sense to be produced immediately by both God and 
creatures.  It is to be distinguished on the one hand from occasionalism, which holds 
that God alone causes effects in nature with no causal contribution from the creature, 
and on the other hand from conservationism, which holds that the creature alone 
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causes effects in nature with God acting only to conserve them and their powers in 
existence.  Concurrence itself was usually further divided into general concurrence, 
referring to God‟s concurrence with all things, and special concurrence, referring 
only to his concurrence with acts of salvific value.
100
 
Divine premotion is a particular species of concurrence signifying „a divine motion 
by which our will is reduced from the potency of willing to the act of willing‟.
101
  
More specifically it is a motion passively received in the secondary cause by which 
this is induced to act according to its nature, and is not to be confused either with the 
divine uncreated action or the action of the secondary cause itself.  In the case of 
man‟s free will it is divine premotion which causes him to act freely.  Premotion was 
considered to be causally prior to the action of the secondary cause although 
simultaneous with it.  According to the Thomists this premotion was both physical 
and predetermining.  In it, therefore, God moved the will physically according to its 
own inclination, not morally by way of „objective attraction‟, and in an irresistible 




Throughout his works Baxter is vehement in his opposition to a physical account of 
premotion, a doctrine he lays at the door of both the Dominicans and the Hobbists.  
At first sight these make unlikely bedfellows.  However, although recognising their 
very different motivations, Baxter is adamant that both espouse an account in which 
all human actions are regarded as being physically necessitated, whether by God in 
the case of the Dominicans or a prior chain of causes in the case of Hobbes.
103
  Here 
we shall focus mainly on the Dominican and Thomist doctrine which Baxter refutes 
at length in the Catholick Theologie and elsewhere.
104
  For since the cruder Hobbist 
version of physical premotion was more obviously beyond the pale, Baxter tends to 
concentrate his attention on its subtler companion. 
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For Baxter the doctrine of „divine physical efficient predetermination‟ – to give it its 
full title – brings with it two consequences entirely destructive of morality and the 
Christian faith.  The first, and without doubt most serious, is that it makes God 
responsible for sin and thus blasphemously contravenes his holiness.  In his own 
theology Baxter was particularly exercised to avoid this pitfall.
105
  To his mind, 
however, the Dominicans became unavoidably snared by their doctrine of physical 
premotion.  For if God physically determines every human act then it becomes 
impossible to say that God is not the author of sin.
106
   
An almost equally devastating corollary of physical premotion was the complete 
undercutting of any notion of free will.  For, even if such premotion is only taken as 
applying with respect to good or salvific acts, it still exerts unacceptable pressure on 
the will, squeezing out any viable notion of human freedom.  The result is that man is 
reduced to a machine, his dignity and responsibility utterly stripped from him.
107
  
This is seen particularly clearly in Hobbes‟s thought of course, and indeed was 
recognised as one of its chief dangers by his contemporary opponents, but Baxter 
also maintains it as a consequence, however unwitting, of the Dominican doctrine.  
As he says, if it is asserted to be naturally impossible for the will to determine itself 
without physical predetermination from God, then this clearly destroys the will‟s 
freedom to will contraries, reducing the free act of the will to nothing more than the 
„natural motion of the will caused by the necessitating cause of nature‟.  This, he 
says, is identical to the „doctrine of infamous Hobbes‟.
108
   
Instead of acting by physical premotion Baxter holds that God operates on the human 
soul morally.  By this he does not mean the „mere moral suasion‟ of the Arminians, 
but rather God‟s ability to render a future act infallibly certain through moral means 
without physical predetermination or any violation of man‟s free will.  Here Baxter 
stresses that the power of determining itself as immediate efficient cause is essential 
to the will itself.  By contrast the intellect and the object of the will are said to 
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determine it only morally and finally.
109
  It seems likely therefore that the essential 
difference between moral and physical premotion is that between the efficiency of 
power (God‟s direct action on the will) and the efficiency of wisdom and love 
conjoined with the operation of final causation.  Indeed we noted above the mystical 
nature of such causation for Baxter, operating as if by magnetic attraction, through 
love drawing the will to its goal.
110
  Baxter does not enlarge further on any 
mechanisms for this but he did believe it possible for a habit to be strong enough to 
determine the will without absolutely necessitating it, so that by conferring such 
gracious habits God is able to determine the will morally and infallibly.
 111
   
By his own confession Baxter‟s doctrine of moral concurrence mirrors that of Scotus 
and the Scotists.
112
  Scotus held that through his love God can infallibly draw us to 
act and yet still preserve our freedom, since such an act is simply the will acting 
according to its own nature and highest end.
113
  Indeed, like Scotus, Baxter believed 
that God‟s moral predetermining action perfected the will‟s liberty.
114
 This he placed 
in stark contrast to the physical predetermination of the Dominicans which according 
to Baxter‟s Scotist understanding could only be a violation of the will‟s liberty.  
Overall, therefore, it might be said that for Baxter the Dominican doctrine of physical 




Baxter further develops this account in terms of two kinds of divine causation: 
natural causation by universal concourse and special causation through grace or 
miraculous intervention, which clearly correspond to the general and special 
concurrence highlighted above.  Through natural causation Baxter held that God as 
the first cause of nature only concurs to the act as act and does not cause its moral 
species, whereas through special causation God causes holy acts in the regenerate, 
determining their moral species.  By separating these two kinds of causation Baxter 
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was therefore able to claim quite consistently that God is not the cause of evil moral 
actions.
116
   
Baxter understood such natural causation as God‟s conservation of the substances, 
formal natures, powers, natural qualities, objects, concauses and necessary 
circumstances of all agents by continuous sustaining and active influx, describing 
this as the universal concourse sufficient to act.  It was his view, contrary to the 
Thomists,
117
 that powers are naturally inclined to action and therefore they are able 
to act without any further influence.  However this did not mean that the will 
exercised its power of self-determination independently from God.  For universal 
divine concourse remained a necessary (but not sufficient) requirement for the will‟s 
self-determination.  Moving from natural divine to special divine causation we find 
that here God not only enables the action of the will but also efficaciously and 
infallibly determines its moral specifying act.  Indeed to deny infallible special divine 
causation would call into question both divine providence and divine power, since 
for Baxter it is axiomatic that the scope of God‟s omnipotence extends to anything 
which does not entail a logical contradiction.
118
   
Here, as he explicitly admits, Baxter draws his doctrine from both Durandus and 
Scotus.  His view of general concourse is therefore in all essentials the same as 
Durandus‟ conservationism.
119
  While most theologians were opposed to this, 
viewing it as inconsistent with the theory of concurrence, Baxter considers 
Durandus‟ view as entirely consonant with Scotist and other forms of concurrentism.  
He therefore interprets God‟s continual conservation of man‟s powers and being in 
Durandus‟ account as equivalent to Scotus‟ doctrine that God is a partial (although 
superior) concause of all human actions.
120
  According to this God accommodates 
himself to the nature of the free will that he has created, coordinating his action with 
his creature‟s such that both are partial, but not total, causes of any act of the 
creature.  A common and picturesque analogy used to explain this was that of two 
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men drawing a boat out of the water, in which the coordinated action of both is 
necessary for the desired effect.  The failure of a beneficial action to obtain may then 
be described as a deficiency in the inferior human cause, and a negative action may 
be ascribed to God only as partial, conserving cause.
121
 
In summary Baxter‟s combination of Scotist and Durandist tenets had the advantage 
of allowing God to infallibly determine the will without violating its integrity as a 
self-determining power.  Here the difference between moral and efficient causation 
was vital and this we have already seen to be rooted in Baxter‟s Trinitarian 
reflections.
122
  Baxter‟s discussion of moral concurrence therefore represents a 
powerful synthesis of Scotist-Durandist concepts with his own Trinitarian 
metaphysics. 
4.2. Grace and Habitual Mechanisms 
God‟s operation on the soul through moral means is the cornerstone of Baxter‟s 
doctrine of grace.  As the complement of divine predestination God‟s prevenient 
grace represents the enacting in time of his sovereign will to save those he has 
chosen.  While objectively, through the death of Christ upon the Cross, God‟s offer 
of salvation is universal, Baxter is always clear that only the elect will be finally 
saved and that they alone receive grace which works infallibly.  In this way Baxter 
retains a strongly Augustinian framework to his soteriology, stressing always God‟s 
prevenient initiative and the utter impossibility of earning salvation. 
Baxter describes this using the scholastic language of habits and habitual 
mechanisms.  His understanding of these, as we have seen, reconfigures the 
conventional account in a way conforming to his metaphysics of the divine 
principles, conferring on habits a Trinitarian structure and dynamic.  This is crucial, 
for it provides the necessary connection between the divine operations and the soul‟s 
response.  Baxter‟s language of habits thus fleshes out his broader account of moral 
causation. 
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It is axiomatic to Baxter‟s metaphysics to suggest both that threefold agents act on 
threefold subjects in a threefold manner,
123
 and that the higher nature always acts on 
the lower.  Nowhere is the conjunction of these two principles seen more clearly or 
more significantly than in the interaction of the Triune God and triune man.  God is 
of course the highest cause, compared to whose perfect activity everything else is to 
be considered passive.  As such he also acts through a variety of threefold causes and 
instruments.  Firstly, he acts directly on the human soul according to his divine 
essence.
124
  This action Baxter considers either in scriptural terms, according to the 
Trinity of Persons working in the life of the believer, or metaphysically, according to 
the Trinity of Principles, through their contact with man‟s own threefold faculties 
and habits, enacting and ennobling human activity.  However any separation between 
these two perspectives is entirely artificial.  For when Baxter describes the action of 
Christ and the Holy Spirit on the believer, he not only describes the intimate 
connection between the work of Christ and the Spirit – with Christ as the mediator 
between God and man obtaining the benefit of the Spirit and pouring him out on 
those whom he chooses – but he also characterises the activity of both according to 
the Trinity of Principles so that both Christ and the Spirit are seen to be essential 
Power, Wisdom and Love acting on the human soul.
125
 
Likewise Baxter places the conjunction of Word and Spirit in the believer‟s heart 
within a similar framework of Triune causes.  Thus the Word or Gospel is God‟s 
primary instrument, bearing the inherent stamp of his Power, Wisdom and Love, 
operating in conjunction with the Holy Spirit, who works through the Word to bring 
the truth to bear: 
No other doctrine could it self bear Gods image of Power, Wisdome and 
Goodness so exactly, nor make such an impresse of the same image on 
the souls of men: Nay, though this same doctrine by the Spirit of God be 
adopted to such an effect, yet would it not do it for want of powerfull 
application, if God by the same Spirit did not set it home: so that the 
sanctification and renovation of souls, is a divine attestation of this 
sacred Gospel.  And besides all the past testimonies (of Christs and his 
Apostles miracles) here is a double testimony from God still vouchsafed 
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to all true believers to the end of the world; the one is Gods image on the 
holy Scriptures; the other is, the same image by this Scripture (and the 
Spirit that indited it) printed on all true Christians souls.  Divine Power, 
Wisdome and Goodnesse, hath imprinted it self first upon the sacred 
word, or doctrine, and by that produceth unimitably, holy Life, Light and 
Love in holy souls.
126
  
Here then we see clearly God‟s Triune action in the Holy Spirit, through the Word as 
both instrumental and intrinsically dynamic, communicating itself to the soul of the 
believer and engendering life, light and love in man‟s threefold faculties of vital-
active-power, intellect and will.  This action, as we shall see below, is conceived of 
by Baxter as a holy, indwelling nature and in biblical terms represents the 
fellowshipping of man with Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
Baxter is clear that a necessary precondition to any discussion of divine operations 
on the soul is a proper understanding of the nature of grace.  As a new power given 
to the soul Baxter holds that the grace must be of a different species to the soul‟s own 
powers, and cannot be any kind of created substance or spirit but rather a kind of 
accident.
127
  Importantly grace‟s accidental character is indicative of man‟s entire 
dependence on God, and not on his own natural resources, for spiritual life. 
Although he considers the nature and operation of grace as a spiritual accident, 
thoroughly mysterious, Baxter nevertheless attempts to capture something of it by 
analogy to physical motion.  Following a broadly Aristotelian understanding he 
believes that motion was communicated from one body to another through contact 
and through the active impression of a formal virtue, which when transferred 
becomes inherent in the second body.  Extending the analogy, Baxter suggests that 
spiritual operation also occurs through transcendent contact and motion, and 
especially by the communication of a „spiritual vis impressa‟.  This he describes as a 
passive excitation from which action follows, or in technical language an „excitatio 
facultatum excitata‟ as distinct from an „excitatio Dei excitans‟.
128
  This concept of 
spiritual impress is as far as Baxter will go in seeking to describe God‟s primary 
operation on man‟s soul, but it is enough, at least, to demonstrate the absolute 
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prevenience of divine grace.  It is enough also, as we shall now see, to lay the 
foundation for Baxter‟s subsequent account of the complex internal dynamic of the 
habits arising from grace. 
For Baxter, spiritual impress is itself threefold in character, as befits the triple formal 
virtue of active natures.  Therefore the Spirit of God, through excitation, 
communicates to the three faculties of the soul an impressed force for vital-activity, 
intellection and volition, through which the faculties are „suscitated to holy activity, 
knowledge and love; the habit of which is holy life, and light, and love abiding‟.  In 
this way sanctifying grace is said to repair each of the three faculties damaged by the 
effects of human sin, with the Holy Spirit quickening, illuminating and converting 
the soul with love.
129
 
The first effect of the divine spiritual impress on the soul is the excitation of action.  
This excitation differs in degree and is constrained by a whole variety of factors.  
Here Baxter‟s integrated psychology especially comes into play, so that the motions 
of the faculties are inseparably linked to the motions of the igneous spirits within 
man, with the faculties stirring up the spirits and the spirits facilitating the smooth 
excitation and action of the faculties.  Baxter therefore attributes a significant share 
to the sensitive faculties, namely the emotions and passions, in all effectual operation 
or conversion.
130
  It seems that the impress of grace triggers a kind of chain reaction 
moving down from man‟s intellectual faculties and rippling through his sensitive 
faculties to encompass the whole of his being. 
According to Baxter‟s understanding, the exciting of acts within man‟s soul precedes 
the formation of any habits.  However, holding this view did not prevent him from 
using the traditional scholastic language of acquired and infused habits.  He simply 
modifies this so that an infused act or acts – those excited by the spiritual impress we 
have been discussing – goes before the subsequent establishing of an infused habit.  
Yet it must also be said that in Baxter‟s usage the distinction between acquired and 
infused habits is pared down to a minimum.  For as he insists infused habits (usually) 
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have the same mode of acquisition as acquired habits and are certainly of the same 
species.
131
   
This common mode of acquisition he describes as follows: 
Motion tendeth to further motion.  One act of the soul disposeth it to or 
furthereth another.  And as water that hath got a chanel, is set in motion, 
floweth still the same way, and fire by burning, the more forcibly 
proceedeth to burn; so the soul by acting, the more readily holdeth on 
that course of action.
132
 
Here it is the igneous spirits particularly which become the channel for the active 
intellect and will to flow in.  In these terms the soul‟s inbuilt inclination towards the 
true and the good act is a kind of natural gravity or pondus, enabling the very 
spiritual „flux‟ necessary for habit formation.
133
   
Beyond this however Baxter is clear that habit formation is complex and operates on 
a number of levels.  In fact he distinguishes as many as ten different excitations and 
propensities likely to be involved.  Thus while the essence of a habit stems from the 
cumulative reinforcing (to various degrees) of the soul‟s natural inclination to act, 
Baxter also makes a fascinating distinction between its surface manifestation and its 
motivational depths.  Thus in any generic act of understanding and will, directed 
towards an end and including the election of means, Baxter suggests that one of these 
(generally the will ad finem) is usually deep and most of the time goes unobserved 
sensibly, while the other is uppermost and attended by motions of the spirits, senses 
and phantasy.  Yet it is the underlying tidal tug of this „deep insensible action‟, rather 
than the unstable, surface froth of sensible motions, which predominates in the habit.  
This primary action Baxter describes as the soul „knowing it self, loving it self, 
intending its own felicity, deeply, secretly, insensibly, without using the memory and 
imagination‟.  It is such, he says, „that a man may doubt whether it be not the very 
thing which we call a habit‟.   
Significantly the metaphysical root of a habit may be found in the continuous 
reflexive act of a soul knowing and loving itself.  For an infused habit this immanent, 
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reflexive act is that excited and sustained by God and continually directed towards 
him as ultimate goal and is undoubtedly the operation of the Holy Spirit.
134
  We 
might add that the habit‟s reflexive nature is again suggestive of its intrinsic 
Trinitarian form, and goes some considerable way to explaining the mediation of 
action between God and man. 
Now returning to his original question concerning the nature of grace Baxter 
describes both God‟s received influx and the habits of grace in the soul as a moral or 
analogical power „necessary to the natural powers performance of the act‟, although 
not of the same species as man‟s own natural powers.  Such moral power falls short 
of both act and habit, for as a potency it determines only the a priori possibility of 
action and not the enacting of the action itself.  It is thus perfectly possible to be 
morally potent towards a salvific action and yet never perform it.  Yet if the 
imparting of moral power should eventually lead to sustained salvific action then it 
surely represents the necessary, although insufficient, predisposition to that infallible 
moral premotion which we have already seen Baxter espouse.  To emphasise it once 
again, therefore, grace is but the excitation of man‟s own power and only morally 
and analogically a power in its own right.  Similarly a habit is less than man‟s own 
natural powers in point of substantiality since it is merely an accident, but is more 
than both natural and moral power in order of perfection to the act, since it ensures 
prompt action and not just action itself or its mere possibility.
135
 
Baxter‟s complex account of divine operation affirms two important theological 
principles.  Firstly he makes it clear that his discussion of the difference between 
natural and moral power, grounded as we have seen on habitual mechanisms, is, in 
his view, sufficient to establish an Augustinian rather than Pelagian soteriology.  
Thus to the question of whether every man is able to believe and love God, he 
answers that every man has a natural faculty with sufficient natural power to do so 
supposing the presence of necessary concurrents.  Yet he also insists that although an 
unwilling will has natural power to act otherwise than it does, since it is morally 
indisposed it cannot do so unless God assists it or turns it by his grace.  Since all 
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human wills are habitually indisposed through original sin it follows that no one can 
believe salvifically without God‟s grace.  The advantage of this conception of natural 
and moral power, Baxter suggests, is therefore that it allows a proper Augustinian 
distinction to be made between power and will, with the will itself said to have a 
proper and natural power to act but its habits and acts better known by the name of 
willingness and unwillingness than of power.  For Baxter this conception exposes the 
weakness of the extreme Calvinist and Arminian positions on this question.  Thus on 
the one hand the Calvinists say that no wicked man has the power to repent and so by 
calling grace a power say that God damns man for not doing what he is utterly 
unable to do, making God unjust.  On the other hand the Arminians do not make 
grace a determiner of the will, but, by saying it gives man a power, affirm that by his 
own free will man is able to decide to make use of it or not as he chooses.  In this 
way Baxter says they reduce grace to a common thing like nature and open the door 
to Pelagianism.
136
   
Secondly the habitual mechanisms that Baxter proposes are vital for his conception 
of the divine nature.  Although from the part of man grace appears as an accident or 
an analogical superadded power, Baxter makes it clear that „ex parte Dei‟ this divine 
influx is commonly thought to be „nothing but God himself‟.
137
  This follows both 
from the doctrine of divine simplicity and from his denial of Aureolus‟ claim that the 
divine operations are intermediate between the Creator and created.
138
  Grace is 
therefore not only the action of God but God himself indwelling and empowering the 
soul.  In this light the network of interconnecting habits excited and sustained by 
God, yet intrinsic to the soul, constitute the divine nature given to man as a gift.  The 
habits therefore characterise the manner in which the Trinity is said to indwell man‟s 
soul. 
With this realisation we return to what we have proposed as the central theme of 
Baxter‟s theology: the Triune Baptismal Covenant.  Again and again in his later 
writings Baxter makes it clear that the central Christian act is the heart covenant 
between the believer and the Triune God secured in man‟s three faculties of 
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understanding, will and practice.  This he says must be a „delivering up of yourself to 
God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost‟.  Its practical expression is „a resolution for 
obedience‟ which is „absolute and peremptory‟, „an unchangeable everlasting 
covenant‟, a „reliance on the sufficiency of Christ‟ and „a habitual resolution to prove 
you have a new nature inclined and habituated to God‟.
139
  It involves particularly the 
habitual consent of the Christian to all the relations and duties owed to God the 
Trinity as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier and Owner, Rector and Benefactor.  It is 
formed only when a habitual predominant love of God and Christ over self is 
established.
140
  This is the tipping-point, if you will, when not only is man‟s natural 
power converted to moral power, but when this moral power is itself activated by 
grace to form the habitual and, by God‟s sovereignty for the elect, unbreakable filial 
bond between the Triune God and triune man.  In this way the habit of holiness 
formed through grace, rooted as it is in the threefold habits of vital-active power, 
intellect and will, may be viewed as the experiential and subjective aspect of the 
Triune Baptismal Covenant.  In other words Baxter‟s language of habits and habitual 
mechanisms is simply the metaphysical expression of the Christian‟s union and 
fellowship with Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
5. The Trinitarian Dynamic of Faith, Hope and Love 
In the course of his discussion of the manner of God‟s working by spiritual impress 
and habits Baxter alludes to the scholastic controversy over whether grace and the 
theological virtues really differ.  Here Baxter firmly repudiates the Thomist view that 
grace is a gift of the Holy Spirit implanted immediately into the essence of the soul 
and therefore to be really distinguished from the accidental virtues.  In his opinion, 
supported by the Thomist Malderus, Aquinas‟ account of a real distinction between 
grace and the theological virtues correlates with his prior assumption of a real 
distinction between the soul and its powers.  Unsurprisingly Baxter is much more 
sympathetic to the Scotist-Durandist account which held that man‟s (infused) holy 
                                                 
139
 Richard Baxter, Directions for a Sound Conversion in William Orme, The Practical Works of the 
Rev Richard Baxter (London, 1830), VIII.460. 
140
 Baxter, CD, I.188-91. 
246 
 
nature, the prior habit of grace, is identical to, and at most formally distinct from, the 
theological virtues of faith, hope and love themselves.
141
 
Such an intimate connection between the Trinitarian habitual mechanism of grace 
and the theological virtues strongly implies that Baxter‟s account of the latter will 
also be found amenable to a Trinitarian analysis.  He confirms this explicitly in his 
Reasons saying: 
He that will give you a scheme of divinity in the true method, will but 
shew you how all God‟s works and laws flow from these three 
essentialities or principles; and the three great relations founded in 
them... And how all our duty is branch‟d out accordingly in our 
correlations: He will shew you the Trinity of Graces, faith, hope and 
love; and the three summary rules, the Creed, Lord‟s Prayer and 
Decalogue; and, in a word, would shew you, that the Trinity revealeth it 
self through the whole frame of true Theology or Morality.
142
 
In theological history it was by no means uncommon to treat the theological virtues 
as wholly interconnected and mutually conditioning.  As alluded to in the first 
chapter, a prominent example of this is to be found in Augustine‟s Enchiridion.  It 
was also not entirely unprecedented to suggest a link between them and the divine 
principles of Power, Wisdom and Love, as may be seen from the De Statu Domus 
Dei of the twelfth-century Benedictine Potho Prumiensis.
143
  An even more striking 
example may be found in Comenius whose Consultatio Catholica correlates man‟s 
posse, scire and velle with faith, hope and love, in a one-to-one correspondence with 
hope linked to posse, faith to scire and love to velle.
144
 
Aquinas‟ and Scotus‟ scholastic reflections on the theological virtues , both rooted in 
the Augustinian tradition, provide an important base of comparison for Baxter.  
Aquinas offers a threefold definition of the theological virtues as those virtues which 
i) have God as their object, in that they direct us aright to him, ii) are infused by God 
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alone and iii) are revealed only by divine revelation.
145
  Their purpose, he says, is to 
direct man to supernatural happiness by perfecting his intellect and will.  For this, 
one habit (faith) is required in the intellect and two in the will: hope, according to 
which the will is directed towards the end as something attainable and love, 
according to which the will is joined by spiritual union with the end and even 
transformed into it.
146
  Aquinas further distinguishes the theological virtues 
according to their order of generation and order of perfection.  In the order of 
generation, according to their acts, faith precedes hope and hope precedes love but in 




Scotus also begins his discussion of the theological virtues from a recognition of 
their connection to man‟s essential powers.  He rejects the position, not even raised 
by Aquinas, that faith, hope and love could each be habits of individual powers, since 
hope is manifestly neither an intellectual habit nor a habit of the memory 
specifically.  Significantly, like Aquinas, Scotus also distributes the theological 
virtues unequally, assigning faith to the intellect and hope and love to the will.  In 
fact he regards hope and love as supernatural habits of the formally distinct affectio 
commodi and affectio iustitiae.
148
  This is, in fact, similar to Aquinas who also 
regarded love as the principle by which we adhere to God for his own sake and hope 
and faith as principles by which we adhere to God for our own benefit.
149
 
Baxter, as we shall see, like both Aquinas and Scotus rejects a simplistic account of 
the connection between the powers and the theological virtues, in which the virtues 
are simply regarded as habits of individual powers.  Arguably however his own 
discussion is even further complicated by the fact that he sees all three of the soul‟s 
powers as involved in the act of faith rather than just those of intellect and will.  The 
same is true for his account of hope which cannot, as with Scotus, be simply reduced 
to a habit of the affectio commodi.  Nevertheless his own account definitely takes 
inspiration from these much earlier scholastic discussions and particularly from their 
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recognition of an intimate connection between the essential powers and the 
theological virtues. 
For Baxter the treatment of faith, hope and love marks the terminus of his theological 
system and the fulfilment of his ambitious project.
150
  This is fitting for, as we have 
seen, the habits of faith, hope and love are the divine nature itself, the indwelling of 
the Trinity in man.
151
  They are therefore not only the terminus of his Methodus but 
its crown and culmination, the rubric under which the whole of the Christian life is 
encompassed.  Having come full circle it is thus apparent that faith, hope and love 
are the supreme expression of the Triune Baptismal Covenant.  As we have 
intimated, Baxter‟s attention to them demonstrates perfectly the catechetical shape of 
his theology.  It also justifies our assertion that the Triune Baptismal Covenant is the 
cardinal doctrine of Baxter‟s theology, both in its surpassing importance and in its 
role as „hinge‟ between theory and praxis.  Furthermore, having now descended a 
little from the lofty, theoretical heights of Baxter‟s Trinitarian metaphysics, his claim 
that the doctrine of the Trinity is the fount of all practical theology is rendered much 
more perspicuous.   
We now turn therefore finally to consider faith, hope and love both separately and in 
their relation to each other.  The result will be a cumulative picture of the theological 
virtues in their triune interaction.   It should be noted that while Baxter was uncertain 
what role would remain for faith and hope in the Kingdom of Glory, he inclined to 
William Pemble‟s view that these virtues would not cease but have their analogues 
even in heaven.
152
  He was certain however that in glory man‟s own triune faculties 
will be perfected through his union with the Triune God. 
5.1. Faith 
Faith according to the epistle to the Hebrews is the „substance of things hoped for, 
the evidence of things not seen‟.
153
  The very essence of faith Baxter suggests is 
therefore found in the opposition between hope and presence.  It is therefore a kind 
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of sight elevating the soul above the way things are or appear, to the way they could 
be and will be according to the certain promise of God.  In this way faith transcends 
sense and is seen to purify reason.
154
  Faith itself rests on divine veracity and gives to 
man‟s soul an infallible apprehension and knowledge which is such as to determine 
the will to its necessary consent and choice, to move the affections and to rule in our 
lives.  As Baxter succinctly puts it, „faith by beholding this glorious end, doth move 
all the faculties of the soul‟.
155
  True faith is therefore „an effectual spring of a holy 
life‟.
156
   
It is apparent that faith is not to be thought of as a single act or apprehension, but 
rather as a principle and way of life sourced in the actions of the Holy Spirit.  Baxter 
suggests that in its capacity to make the invisible and future glory present to the mind 
faith thus enables their affective and attractive forces to be exerted on the believer‟s 
heart.  In this way the dignity and power of faith stems principally from its final 
object, the love and fruition of God.
157
  It is already evident then that faith involves a 
dynamic as it empowers hope and moves through to the fulfilment of love.  Likewise 
since the object of faith, hope and love is things unseen, it follows that faith is the 
motivating force of the other theological virtues.
158
  In both these ways faith is 
numbered first among the „Trinity of Graces‟.  Yet as we shall see faith itself can 
also be considered in some sense as actuated by hope and love, especially as both are 
contained in the desire to participate in the glory of the Triune God. 
For Baxter, as we alluded to above, faith is the threefold motion of the soul initiated 
by and directed towards the Triune God as its object.  There are hints of this as early 
as the Aphorismes where Baxter describes faith as the „compleat entire motion of the 
whole soule, to Christ its object‟.   Here likewise he held that faith does not involve 
any partitioning of the offices or work of Christ, but instead is exercised towards 
Christ as Prophet, Priest and King conjunct, and therefore as both Lord and 
Saviour.
159
  While partially implicit in the holistic perspective of the Aphorismes, 
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especially in the idea of faith as a covenanting with God in Christ, Baxter‟s full 
Trinitarian conception of faith is fully seen in his Methodus, where he defines it in 
the following terms: 
Quoniam in omni actu humano seu morali proprie et plene sic dicto, tres 
facultates semper conjunctim, nulla autem sola operatur, fides igitur in 
Christum qui dicimur iustificari non unicae, sed triplicis facultatis actus 
aestimandus est; activa, scilicet, intellectualis et voluntaria fiducia.
160
 
The very formal nature of faith is thus Trinitarian, involving the threefold action of 
man‟s faculties in the assent of intellect, the consent of will and the fiducial 
obedience of executive power.  Likewise faith‟s object is also Trinitarian: assent, 
consent and fiducia to the Triune God in all three of the Governmental relations.
161
  
Faith for Baxter is therefore always faith in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.   
This „deep structure‟ of faith, seen especially in its Trinitarian scope and its Triune 
object, we have already suggested is the result of its covenantal reconfiguring along 
the lines of the Triune Baptismal Covenant.  What is important here is that Baxter‟s 
mature redefinition of faith in Trinitarian terms throws particular light on the relation 
of faith, hope and love. As early as the Aphorismes Baxter described the link 
between faith and other virtues using language and analogies redolent with 
Trinitarian associations: 
Affiance and sincere obedience, and works of love, are the necessary 
immediate, inseparable products of faith; as heat and light are of fire; or 
rather as reasoning is the product of reason: or yet rather as actions most 
properly conjugall, are the effects of conjugall contract.
162
 
In this way affiance, love and obedience may be described both as essential to faith 
and as its (Trinitarian) fruits.  Since, as we shall see below, affiance and obedience 
are intimately linked to hope and love respectively we begin to see implicitly the 
triune inseparability of faith, hope and love. 
We may see further evidence for this in Baxter‟s discussion of the relation between 
faith and love.  Put briefly Baxter suggests that we must here distinguish between 
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faith taken narrowly or in a larger sense.  In narrow terms (as in James 2) faith is 
often taken as the bare assent of the intellect.  If this is so then (narrow) faith differs 
formally from love as the act of the intellect does from volition.  However faith taken 
in a larger and proper sense conforms, as we have seen, to the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant.  In these terms faith contains the consent of the will and so „must needs 
have some initial love in it as it acteth in desire‟.  Faith in God contains both desire 
and volition of God, and thus, as we shall see below, contains both hope and love as 
well.  Nevertheless although faith contains love Baxter is clear that they are distinct 
virtues and should not be seen as identical.  He therefore maintains that formally 
speaking love presupposes faith rather than contains it.  For this reason faith and love 
may be held to differ according to ratio formalis.  As Baxter says: 
It is eminently called faith, when giving up our souls to Christ to be 
saved in practical affiance is the great work of the soul, though it have 
something of love essential to it.  And it is eminently called love 
(morally) when the complacency of the soul in Christ thus trusted, and in 
God our end, is the great work or business of the soul.
163
 
This offers us grounds for suggesting that there might be something like a formal 
distinction between faith and love, at least in their core significations.  If so then 
conceivably Baxter might consider the relation between faith, hope and love to 
parallel the Scotist model of the Trinity.  This is a point we shall take up further 
below. 
It is apparent therefore that in Baxter‟s reconceptualisation of faith we have as many 
as four different Trinitarian „layers‟.  Firstly, we have his account of faith as relating 
to all three faculties of man as assent, consent and fiducia.  Secondly, beyond this we 
now have faith as necessarily productive of the formally distinct „Trinity of Graces‟.  
Thirdly, we also have a definition of faith which, in its understanding of faith as the 
sight of things hoped for or desired, implicitly contains this triune dynamic of faith, 
hope and love.  Finally, we have the Triune God as both the object of faith and its 
final and efficient cause.  Furthermore as the Methodus suggests faith exists and is 
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nourished within a complex network of subordinate triune agents.
164
  In these terms it 
would be hard to imagine a richer Trinitarian understanding of faith. 
5.2. Hope 
Hope according to Baxter is the anchor of the soul.
165
  His writings are saturated with 
references to the hope of heaven and it is clear that hope is a major theme of his 
personal faith.  Thus although there are few explicit discussions of hope per se, in 
comparison to those concerning faith and love, this does not mean that hope plays a 
lesser role in Baxter‟s thought.  Indeed, as we shall see, hope is intimately connected 
to both faith and love as their mutual bond. 
In his Aphorismes, as we have seen, Baxter holds that some degree of love must be a 
part of justifying faith and not simply its fruit.  For Baxter hope is essentially the love 
of an object as absent, or in other words the expression of desire for that object.  He 
therefore defines it in the Methodus as a composite affection consisting of desire, 
expectation and inchoate joy or complacency.
166
  It follows that hope is inseparably 
linked to both faith and love.  For on the one hand faith is the „substance of things 
hoped for‟, while on the other hope is itself a desire or love for God as in some way 
absent.  Hope is thus the necessary connective between faith and love, binding them 
inseparably together. 
While as we have said it is too simplistic to consider Baxter as correlating the 
theological virtues to individual powers of the soul, he makes it clear in the 
Methodus that there is a sense in which hope may be regarded as empowering the 
other virtues.  Thus after God has begun to cleanse the soul and to reveal to man the 
probability of divine things, Baxter suggests he causes a fear of punishment and a 
desire to evade it.  Through these he then excites a certain measure of hope, 
preceding his gift to the soul of an inclined power of believing as a „seed of faith‟.  
Hope and the „seed of faith‟ excite an act of faith and through frequent acts and the 
influx of the Holy Spirit a habit of faith, hope and love is effected, increased and 
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confirmed in the soul of the believer.
167
  Two things are particularly fascinating 
about this portrayal of hope: firstly the suggestion that hope is a kind of quasi-power 
that together with the supernatural seed of faith is sufficient to excite its act and 
secondly the link that Baxter proposes between hope and fear, which echoes the 
scholastic tradition.
168
  In this way hope is properly viewed as a kind of holy fear. 
The link between faith and hope, as well as between both of these and love, is further 
explored by Baxter under the rubric of affiance.  This term, often rendered in Latin as 
fiducia, is used by Baxter in subtly different senses to refer to the „essence of faith‟, 
the „substance of hope‟ and a „special volition‟.
169
  Although this is confusing it at 
least serves to indicate the intimate connection between the three theological virtues 
and here especially between faith and hope.  Affiance itself is best described as a 
practical trust in God, whether taken as essential to faith or consequent to faith but 
inseparably connected to it.  Baxter seems to understand it especially as that act of 
the will which serves to distinguish salvific, heartfelt faith from merely intellectual 
faith.
170
  However he also carefully distinguishes, with Ames and Chamier, between 
the „affiance of faith‟ which respects God as present and the „affiance of hope‟ which 
respects him as absent.  Here therefore the dialectic between presence and absence 




In his Life of Faith Baxter further links affiance to man‟s three faculties, so that 
affiance in the understanding is an assent to the fidelity of the one promising, 
affiance in the will is an act of election or choice and affiance in the vital power is 
fortitude or venturing all.
172
  It is significant, then, that in his Right Method Baxter 
should remark: 
Indeed the schoolmen say that affiance is nothing but strengthened hope.  
Affiance in the properest sense is the same in substance with hope; only 
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it more expresseth a respect to the promise, and indeed is faith and hope 
exprest both together in one word.
173
 
Affiance then as practical trust is the blending of faith and hope and yet substantially 
is hope itself.  This indicates a kind of identity between faith and hope and hints at 
the possibility of a formal distinction between the two in their different referents.  
Speculating further it seems likely that Baxter may have thought hope itself to have a 
Trinitarian structure and thus also to be a „compleat entire motion of the whole 
soule‟. 
Baxter‟s reflections on hope give his theology a necessary eschatological thrust.  In 
particular they help to make sense of the providential movement from the Kingdom 
of Nature through the Kingdom of Grace to the Kingdom of Glory.  Hope, like faith 
and love, is basic and essential to the Christian life.  As Baxter suggests, hope both 
presupposes faith, since nothing can be hoped for unless sincerely believed, and is 
constrained by it, unable to transcend the degree of faith from which it arises.
174
  
Likewise hope also presupposes love, for it is „nothing but a desirous expectation of 
the good so promised and believed‟.
175
  Unlike faith (save through affiance) Baxter 
never makes the Trinitarian structure of hope explicit.  Yet the chapter on hope in the 
Methodus makes clear that hope is also sustained by a complex network of triune 
connections.
176
  Chief among which is the action of the Triune God himself: 
Quantum Spiritus Sancti motu, lumine et calore pleni sumus, tantum 
coelestium spe iucunda et sitiente pleni erimus.  Idem enim est spiritus 
fidei, spei et amoris, et per influxum suum coelestem, naturam, 




There is a beautiful image from a French poem which captures at least something of 
Baxter‟s understanding of hope, whether as connective between faith and love or as 
their joint empowerer or even its seemingly diminutive status.  This is of faith, hope 
and love as three sisters walking hand in hand.  Faith and love are the two elder 
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sisters with hope walking between them.  At first it looks like faith and love are 
pulling their little sister along, but when we look closely it is actually hope as the 




Love according to Baxter is „the complacencie of the appetite in apprehended good‟ 
and can be either sensitive or rational depending on the mode of apprehension.  As 
we have seen, the human soul has a natural God-given inclination for self-love and 
self-preservation.  This, we may suspect, corresponds to the deepest foundation of a 
habit in the soul‟s immanent reflexive acts of self-knowledge and self-love.  In any 
case for man this self-love is not merely instinctive but subject to both intellect and 




It is clear from all our previous discussion that man‟s love of God is caused by God 
himself.  Just as God uses the fears of punishment and the knowledge of heavenly 
things to excite hope, so he uses man‟s own self-love and desire to avoid harm as a 
means of exciting love of God, first in order to achieve his own felicity and then as 
the highest end in itself.  It seems that such self-love is something like a „seed of 
love‟ which through God‟s (threefold) influx is able to blossom into true love of 
God.
180
  Baxter holds that almost all of God‟s preparing grace consists in exercising 
and improving this principle of natural self-love in man.
181
  In fact even in its highest 
form love of God does not exclude love of self, for Baxter says God never allows the 
two to be separated.
182
  Here then it seems that something of the fruitful Scotist 
tension between the affectio commodi and the affectio iustitiae enters definitively 
into Baxter‟s account of the theological virtues. 
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Having seen something of what love is in itself we may now turn once again to that 
„great…and tender‟ matter of the relation between faith and love.  The resolution of 
this is in fact contained in the dynamic between self-love and love of God that we 
have been considering.  Baxter is clear that love is unable to exceed knowledge.
183
  
For this reason love obviously comes after faith, even though it is also somehow 
included within faith „in fieri‟ or, as we have suggested, through triune inseparability. 
The first motion of the soul in conversion then is intellectual and is the apprehension 
that there is a God.  Following this, as we have described, man gains the hope of 
another world and of salvation, and at last having attained sincere faith commits 
himself to Father, Son and Holy Spirit in his baptismal vows.  It would seem that 
with this we have reached the end point of conversion (although not of course of 
sanctification).  According to Baxter however this is not so.  While the understanding 
acknowledges God to be God and to be loved above oneself, the will (usually) has 
not yet attained this love save in desire.
184
  Such a desire, characterised as volo velle, 
is not direct love of God.  Put plainly it is apparent that the will has not yet caught up 
with the understanding.   
It is important that we not be misled here.  The faith that we have been describing is 
truly sincere and justifying faith and is the beginning of the work of regeneration.  It 
is not a mere „seed of faith‟.  Yet all the same this faith is imperfect for it is 
characterised by predominant love of self rather than of God.  Likewise it is not yet 
(it seems) a proper union with God but only the promise and relative right to Christ 
and the Holy Spirit.  Such faith therefore brings the divine nature only in an 
embryonic form, as the first sproutings of the „seed of love‟
185
.  Once again the influx 
of the Holy Spirit, concurring with the believer putting his own faith into practice, is 
required to produce the fullness of love.  Through this divine cooperation, so 
characteristic of Baxter‟s theology, the believer‟s love for God increases.  In Baxter‟s 
picturesque language faith is itself the „bellows of love‟ and the obedient exercise of 
faith inflames love all the more.  Yet only when the soul rises to a habitual and 
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predominant love of God and holiness for their own intrinsic worth, rather than its 
own self-benefit, is the Christian said to receive the Spirit of adoption.  This 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit is said to constitute a new nature, for it inclines us to 
love God for himself just as the old nature inclined us to love ourselves.  Therefore 
strikingly love and not faith is the essence and crown of the divine nature.
186
 
Throughout our discussion of faith, hope and love we have seen strong intimations of 
their Trinitarian structure.  This, it is apparent, is highly complex and is certainly not 
reducible to the Trinitarian structure of the soul‟s faculties, although it remains 
intimately connected to this.  The reason for this is that faith, hope and love 
encompass the soul‟s three powers not only ad intra in their mutual interrelation but 
also as directed ad extra in their differing relations to the Triune God.  In this life, at 
least, they also operate according to a dialectical pattern of presence and absence as 
well as between the two poles of the affectio commodi and affectio iustitiae.  In the 
conclusion to his Of Saving Faith Baxter includes a helpful summary of the relation 
and distinction of the three theological virtues: 
I suppose that as there is (as aforesaid) aliquid dilectionis in desire, and 
yet it is to be called desire and not love; and aliquid dilectionis in hope 
essentially, and yet hope is not love, nor so to be denominated; every 
grace being denominated not from all that is in it, but from that which is 
eminent and special in it, as to the object; even so there is aliquid fidei in 
spe, and aliquid spei in fide, and aliquid amoris in fide et spe, and yet 
faith is not hope, nor hope faith, nor love faith.
187
 
From this it is apparent that faith, hope and love all share an essential core but are 
distinguished according to their eminent features and formal object.  In this way they 
mirror the pattern of attribution by which the divine principles are distinguished 
according to their eminency in conjunct action.  Furthermore, from what we have 
seen, it seems likely that the theological virtues may also be distinguished by 
relations of origin with faith generating hope and faith and hope together producing 
love which completes and perfects them in perfect triune closure.  In this way faith, 
hope and love together may be seen to form the „Trinity of Graces‟, characterising 
the indwelling presence of the Triune God in the triune soul of man. 
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6. The Primacy of Love 
For Baxter it is clear that love is the highest of the three theological virtues.
188
  Such 
an understanding is of course biblical, for in a famous passage in 1 Corinthians, cited 
by Baxter at the very end of the Methodus, Paul says „and now abideth faith, hope, 
charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity‟.
189
  However, as we shall now 
consider, it is also indicative of Baxter‟s position in an important scholastic 
controversy as to whether the act of the intellect or the act of the will was to be 
considered superior, both in general and specifically with reference to the state of 
beatitude.  As may be imagined the Thomists and Scotists had markedly different 
opinions on these questions.  Aquinas held that the intellect was superior to the will 
and that the intellectual vision of God was formally man‟s perfection, while Scotus 
by contrast held that the will was superior to the intellect and that its act formally 
marked the perfection of man in the state of beatitude.
190
 
In Baxter‟s writings it is possible to find two contrasting opinions on this 
controversy.  Thus on the one hand we have him saying in the Methodus: 
Frustra inter scholasticos disputatur, utrum actus intellectus an 
voluntatis, Dei scilicet visio, an amor sit praecipuus, et hominis perfectio 
et faelicitas.  Sicut enim non ex unica sed triplici facultate seu virtute, 
animae forma consistit, vitali-activa scilicet, intellectiva et volitiva, ita in 




Here Baxter echoes Campanella, who in his Metaphysics included a passionate plea 
for the Thomists and Scotists to end their quarrel about the primacy of the intellect 
and the will.
192
  This shows Baxter‟s conviction, which endured through his own 
uncertainty on this question, that his own Trinitarian psychology had decisively 
altered the terms of the debate.  On the other hand, in his Catholick Theologie Baxter 
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contradicts this first opinion, stating that „undoubtedly the Thomists err in placing it 
chiefly in the intellect…and the Scotists (of whom Rada well handleth it) are far 
righter‟.  Here he also cites approvingly an argument from Giles of Rome (no Scotist 




What is interesting here is not so much Baxter‟s change of mind but rather his 
evident realisation of a tension between his voluntarism and his own Trinitarian 
account of the human faculties as coequal and coinherent.  Fascinatingly his Treatise 
of Knowledge and Love Compared, published later than both the Catholick Theologie 
and the Methodus although probably written around the same time as both,
194
 
includes a resolution of just this issue: 
Aquinas and some other schoolmen make the vision or knowledge of 
God, to be the highest part of mans felicity: And I deny not but that the 
three faculties of mans soul, (vital activity, intellect and will) as the 
image of the Divine Trinity, have a kind of inseparability and coequality. 
And therefore each of their perfections and perfect receptions from God, 
and operations on God, is the ultimate end of man: But yet they are 
distinguishable, though not divisible; and there is such an order among 
them, as that one may in some respects be called the inceptor and another 
the perfecter of humane operations; and so the acts of one be called a 
means to the acts of the other. And thus though the vision or knowledge 
of God be one inadequate conception (if not a part) of our ultimate end; 
yet the love of God, and living to God, are also other conceptions or parts 




Not only does this add important confirmation to our own thesis that Baxter‟s 
voluntarism is mitigated by his concern to give a Trinitarian account of the human 
soul, but it also shows Baxter‟s employment of a (formal) distinction between the 
faculties of the soul in order to solve the dilemma he faces and reconcile his Scotist 
and Trinitarian accounts of beatitude. 
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Baxter develops his view of love as the perfecter of all other acts, offering four 
different proofs, some of which echo Scotus‟ own,
196
 for the primacy of love over 
faith and the other graces.  The first proof stems from the order and use of the 
faculties of the soul.  Baxter holds that our souls are not satisfied with „bare 
knowing‟ if delight or complacency in that knowledge does not follow.  This means 
that the acts of the intellect „meerly as such, without their respect to some will (either 
of God or man) are not so much as formally amiable, desirable or good‟.  Following 
Ockham, Baxter holds in true voluntarist fashion that the act of the will completes 
that of the understanding by conferring on it moral dignity (as well as freedom).
197
  
The second proof is from the objects of intellect and will. For Baxter holds that it is 
not „meer intelligibility‟ that blesses a man but that goodness which is the formal 
object of the will although the material object of the understanding.  It is therefore 
the goodness of God which is the „ultimately ultimate object of mans soul, to which 
his intelligibility is supposed‟.
198
  The third proof is from the constitution of the acts.  
Baxter reminds us that knowledge, as an „introductive act‟, does not suppose love, 
but that love includes knowledge.  Therefore „both together must needs be perfecter 
than one alone‟.
199
   
Baxter buttresses these three metaphysical proofs by marshalling a long but by no 
means exhaustive set of Scripture references.  This demonstrates again his abiding 
concern that his metaphysics should be regulated by biblical principles.
200
  Together 
these show that love is a precondition for the indwelling of God and that love is 
God‟s very essence.  Of decisive importance are 1 Corinthians 13:13 („the greatest of 
these is charity‟) and 1 John 4:8 („he that loveth not, knoweth not God‟).
201
  Baxter‟s 
conclusion is that „the knowledge of creatures is not desirable ultimately for it self, 
but as it leadeth up the soul to God.  And the knowledge of God, though desirable 
ultimately for it self, yet not as the perfect, but the initial part of our ultimate act or 
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Love for Baxter as well as for the scholastics is the „form of every grace‟.  His own 
interpretation of this general statement however is very specific: love is the form of 
all the other graces as they may be considered means to a single end of loving God.  
In this way the „mediate acts of grace, as mediate, are essentially animated by the 
love of the end, and participate of it‟.  Interpreted in this way, Baxter says, the 
scholastic doctrine of love informing the other graces is „not only true, but of very 
great weight, and giveth light to many other points‟.  Once again this is a Scotist 
point, and Baxter cites Rada in support of it.
203
  Fittingly then Baxter again uses 
Scotist tools to help forge an enduring connection between his voluntarism and his 
Trinitarian perspective. 
Love then is the final principle of the universe and the fulfilment of faith and hope, 
yet not in a way that compromises the triune character of this „Trinity of Graces‟.
204
  
Love is the „heart of the new creature‟, that by which he is „morally to be reputed or 
denominated‟ and the „final grace which animateth or informeth the rest as means‟.  
If any grace is taken to be sincere and saving it must be proven to participate in the 
love of God and goodness.
205
  Love is also fertile: just as faith is the „bellows of 
love‟ so „love kindleth love, and is a kind of generative principle of grace‟.
206
  In this 
way not only does faith move through hope to love but love perfects both faith and 
hope (casting out fear)
207
 and brings everything full circle.  The vitality of this whole 
process, the very life of the new creature, is from God himself, in fact is God 
himself.   
Our love for God is a love of friendship, a „desire of a kind of union, communion or 
adherence‟, although not the union between equals but between those who are 
infinitely disproportionate.  Once again demonstrating its centrality in Baxter‟s 
thought, the ground and initium of this loving relationship is the Triune Baptismal 
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  In all of this the initiative is God‟s.  The fruition of love between 
himself and man is entirely an unmerited gift of his grace.  Likewise the final 
purpose, the driving force for everything in all creation as it moves towards its 
teleological fulfilment, is God‟s.  The end of all things, which is also their new and 
everlasting beginning, is the complacency of God‟s will in his creation.  For man this 
is the Beatific vision, or more properly the Scotist Beatific embrace – his ineffable 
participation in the inmost life of the Trinity.  For the rest of creation, which in its 
activity bears the impress of the Triune God, this is the full and resplendent 
manifestation of his glory.  In this, love – the love of the Triune God for himself and 
his creation – reigns supreme.  „All the good of the whole creation is as the heat of 
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The Ramistic picture of theology with which we opened – as a tree branching out 
from the Divine Unity into the Trinity and thence onwards in trichotomous fashion – 
provides a fitting and fertile depiction of Baxter‟s Trinitarian method.
1
  For it brings 
to life the static charts of the Methodus, revealing not only their Trinitarian structure 
but also their Trinitarian dynamic, something impossible to capture in the pages of a 
book.
2
  It reminds us also, that as well as being an affective and practical science, 
Baxter‟s theology is a living science, rooted in God‟s Word and watered by his 
Spirit, the very sap and lifeblood of which is the Trinity itself.
3
 
In this thesis we have considered extensively Baxter‟s hallowing of logic.  In 
providing a Trinitarian method applicable to all disciplines this has been seen to have 
had implications much broader than the scope of pure dialectics, setting in train a 
Trinitarian reformation spanning the entire field of Baxter‟s thought.  From the 
vantage point of the Methodus this marks a significant change in perspective, the 
wider consequences of which have hitherto gone largely unnoticed, and to a degree 
(retrospectively) justifies posing a distinction between Baxter‟s early and mature 
works.  While it may be true that the contours of Baxter‟s soteriology remained 
relatively fixed after the completion of the Aphorismes, the Methodus represents a 
significant innovation of theological context, forcing us to reassess our understanding 
of Baxter‟s theology and to reorient it around the twin poles of the Triune Baptismal 
Covenant and the Trinitarian metaphysics of divine principles. 
The account of Baxter‟s rich and complex Trinitarian method that we have sought to 
give also belies its common caricature as unfortunate and extravagant window-
dressing on Baxter‟s theology.  By contrast it has emerged as a carefully thought-out 
construct of Ramist and Lullist principles erected on the dual foundations of the 
Triune Baptismal Covenant and divine principles.  Above all, we have suggested, it 
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was Baxter‟s desire for an exemplaristic logic of first intentions, adequate to the 
Triune nature of God, that prompted his distinctive logic of the vestigia Trinitatis.  
Baxter may therefore be seen as a paramount example of the sanctifying of logic that 
we traced, in outline, from the beginnings of Protestant Scholasticism through to the 
start of the Enlightenment.  In particular Baxter‟s Trinitarian exemplarism places him 
near the end of an important philosophical and theological tradition with deep 
patristic and medieval roots, which attained profound contemporary expression in the 
thought of Campanella, Comenius, Bisterfeld and Leibniz himself.  This gives us a 
much broader context than has hitherto been available within which to understand 
and evaluate Baxter‟s own theological system.  It also highlights the often complex 
three-way interaction taking place in Baxter‟s thought between the old and new 
scholasticism, and both of these and contemporary philosophical and scientific 
developments. 
Baxter‟s scholasticism itself has been a major theme of this thesis and we have traced 
its profound influence in almost every area of his thought.  While Baxter could often 
be critical of scholastic speculation, this should not be allowed to mask his enormous 
debt to the medieval and early modern scholastic doctors.  Indeed it would be no 
exaggeration to say that much of the Methodus‟ doctrine is grounded on the insights 
of more than five centuries of scholastic reflection, as well as on the rich 
contemporary storehouse of Reformation and Protestant Scholastic theology.  Thus 
although Scripture continued to occupy the paramount place in Baxter‟s theology, 
scholastic reflections often provided an important heuristic for its interpretation. 
While it would be thoroughly anachronistic, as well as alien to the character of both 
Protestant Scholasticism and Baxter‟s own intentions, to assign him a school 
allegiance, it remains undeniable that much of his thought has a distinctive 
Nominalised Scotist character.  Despite its cumbersome nature the term 
„Nominalised Scotist‟ is not to be despised, for it provides a convenient and reliable 
key to the often-complex terrain of Baxter‟s theology.   Indeed although Baxter‟s 
thought generally displays a pronounced Scotist accent, it often proves impossible to 
disentangle its Scotist and Nominalist aspects.  A case in point is the Scotist formal 
distinction which, despite some misgivings, Baxter retains as a crucial aspect of his 
265 
 
thought, although significantly reinterpreting it in the context of Nominalist 
extrinsicism.  Precisely the same could be said of Baxter‟s ubiquitous metaphysics of 
inadequate concepts which he interprets in terms of both Scotist formalities and 
Nominalist external connotations. However in accepting an intrinsic ground in re for 
both the formal distinction and the logical universal Baxter departs from strict 
Nominalism, which justifies our placing him finally in the Scotist tradition.
 4
 
Having said this it is perhaps possible to make a useful distinction between Baxter‟s 
psychology and his soteriology which, by his own confession, have a Scotist 
orientation, and his Trinitarian theology in which his Scotism passes into a 
Nominalistic logic of faith.  Here indeed Baxter fits well into the late medieval 
tradition of the search for simplicity, paring down Scotus‟ elaborate Trinitarian 
reflections to their absolute minimum and definitively eschewing Aquinas‟ relational 
account.  Baxter was therefore a Trinitarian minimalist, even an agnostic, and his 
thought stands in stark contrast to the robust Trinitarianism of high scholasticism 
which had its apogee in Scotus.
5
  He was not, however, a Trinitarian sceptic, for in 
his eyes one of the chief merits of his Trinitarian metaphysics of divine principle was 
its apologetic potential to render the Trinity credible to Socinian doubters.  Nor was 
he a rationalist, except insofar as anyone affirming the scholastic ideal of fides 
quaerens intellectum should be tarred with this brush.  Instead his thought exists 
within the fruitful dialectic of divine immanence and transcendence.  In this light it 
could even be said that Baxter‟s distinctive Trinitarian doctrine serves at one and the 
same time both to reveal and hide the ineffable mystery of the Triune God.  In 
expressing this in terms of the logica fidei Baxter took the hallowing of logic to new 
heights. 
Another contemporary advocate of the logic of faith was Baxter‟s friend George 
Lawson, whose thought also significantly reveals the theo-political dimensions to the 
hallowing of logic.  Baxter, as we have seen, rated Lawson‟s Theo-Politica above all 
the systems of the „exactest dichotomizers‟.  For Lawson employed a political 
method, focussing on the exposition of the Kingdom of God, its constitution and 
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administration, according to Scripture.  Even more importantly Lawson encompassed 
this political method within the rubric of the Triune Baptismal Covenant.  He 
focussed therefore on the threefold Kingdom of the Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier 
and in this way set an important precedent for Baxter‟s own Trinitarian method.  In 
fact it seems apparent that the Theo-Politica was an important methodological 
paradigm for the Methodus itself.  Certainly, by Baxter‟s own confession, his 
Trinitarian method was inspired by both Campanella‟s primalities and Lawson‟s 
theo-politics.  Indeed his synthesis of the two was intended to correct the one major 
defect that he saw in Lawson‟s methodology – its lack of a method of the vestigia 
Trinitatis. 
In the past Baxter‟s political method has caused a considerable degree of confusion 
and occasionally come in for particular opprobrium.  While the term political 
method, coined by Packer but clearly rooted in Baxter‟s own writings, has an 
important use, we should not allow ourselves to be misled by it.  In particular it 
would be wrong to conceive of the political method as something external, 
artificially imposed on Scripture – a kind of political „straitjacket‟ as Packer 
tendentiously puts it.
6
  Rather, on the whole, the political method emerged out of a 
close and canonical reading of Scripture.  Certainly this is true of Lawson, who 
although thoroughly versed in politics, shows an overwhelming desire in his Theo-
Politica to regulate everything according to biblical principles.  Likewise it is true of 
Baxter, whose political method, we must not forget, was birthed in his wrestling with 
the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats in Matthew 25.  Similarly Baxter said himself 
to be capable of marshalling hundreds of biblical passages in favour of his 
controversial „hot pepper corn‟ – the doctrine of evangelical righteousness.
7
  To cite 
just one further example, although of great importance, I am particularly struck by 
the biblical arguments Baxter provides in favour of the doctrine of the relaxation or 
„evangelical mitigation‟ of the law, that mainstay of voluntarist soteriology.
8
  This 
alone raises a welter of important questions about the connections between Baxter‟s 
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Nominalised Scotism and his exegesis of Scripture which cannot, unfortunately, be 
pursued further here. 
Baxter‟s mature theo-political method then should be characterised as a 
methodological unfolding of the Triune Baptismal Covenant within the context of the 
Trinitarian metaphysics of divine principles.  Significantly this Trinitarian 
perspective offers us a new approach to the somewhat vexed issue of Baxter‟s 
soteriology.  Certainly the categories given us by Packer and Boersma – the Grotian 
political method and the Twissian method of the twofold will– remain indispensable 
for any correct interpretation of Baxter.  Arguably however these may themselves be 
enclosed within a broader Trinitarian movement in Baxter‟s theology and especially 
within that perichoresis of law and love that we have sought to highlight.
9
  In this 
God‟s love transcends his law and his law can only be understood as it is an 
expression of his love – the two are therefore inseparable within a Trinitarian 
dynamic.  Indeed in focussing on the Owner-Rector context of Baxter‟s thought, 
God‟s role as loving Benefactor, turning the law on its head for his own purposes, 
has been largely neglected.  Again this is perhaps an innovation of context more than 
explicit content, yet nevertheless it is of great significance.  For it places Baxter‟s 
soteriology within an overarching framework of grace, providing a necessary 
counterbalance to those accounts which have focussed solely on his evident interest 
in duty.   
In this way it also helps deflect the charge of moralism often levelled against Baxter.  
For Baxter certainly did not think one could earn salvation – for him this would be 
rank Pelagianism – but instead always retained a thoroughly Augustinian emphasis 
on God‟s prevenient grace, interpreted within the framework of his Scotist doctrine 
of moral concurrence.  This allowed him to claim that it was God who worked in us 
that which he required, without going down the, for Baxter, inadmissible route of 
asserting an efficient physical premotion.  In particular he suggests that it is God who 
fulfils the conditions of his own covenants both universally in Christ‟s atoning death 
and Resurrection and specifically through the Holy Spirit working in the elect.  
Turning to Baxter‟s controversial doctrine of justification it seems to me that the 
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understanding of evangelical righteousness as itself graced at least blunts the edge of 
the accusations.  Likewise Baxter‟s mature Trinitarian and covenantal 
reconfiguration of faith – a consequence of course of his full-blooded Trinitarian 
method – reveals the intimate connection in Baxter‟s thought between faith, love and 
obedience.  True faith cannot help but be productive of love and thus, like the late 
medieval Augustinians, justification is said to be by faith working through love.  
Similarly faith itself, taken over a lifetime of pilgrimage and not just as one „event‟, 
represents the fulfilment of covenantal obligations.  Here though, through an act of 
benefaction and relaxation, sincerity is accepted instead of perfection.
10
 
Furthermore the reconstruction of the habitual mechanisms and the „Trinity of 
Graces‟ that we have offered gives an important context for this inevitable movement 
from faith through to love that takes place in the heart of a believer.  Baxter 
expresses this biblically in terms of the restoration of the image of God and the 
indwelling presence of the Triune God, revealing yet another important link between 
his scriptural worldview and scholasticism.  Likewise Baxter‟s carefully worked out 
Trinitarian psychology illuminates considerably the „subjective‟ aspect of the Triune 
Baptismal Covenant.  It is an axiom of his that a threefold agent works on a threefold 
object in a threefold manner, and nowhere is this more evident or important than in 
his account of the relation between the Triune God and the triune soul of man.  This 
is particularly conditioned by what I have called Baxter‟s mitigated voluntarism, 
which functioned both to create room for the Trinitarian interaction of the faculties 
and to buttress his Scotist assertion of the primacy of love.  For it was Baxter‟s 
conviction, borne out of years of intensive scriptural and metaphysical reflection, that 
man‟s highest endeavour and purpose could be found in the life of faith, hope and 
love exercised in the prospect of glory and the eager expectation of the full 
disclosure of the Triune God of Love. 
This brings us full circle, back to Baxter‟s assertion of the faculties of the soul as the 
methodological „index of theology‟, and his reflections on the soul as imago 
Trinitatis, which first motivated his analogical ascent toward the Triune God.  It has 
been the claim of this thesis that this Trinitarian method constitutes the key to 
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Baxter‟s mature thought.  Indeed, while initially alien to us, this scriptural 
metaphysics without doubt repays careful consideration.  For it is this same 
Trinitarian method which is the ultimate expression of Baxter‟s desire to sanctify 
every field of knowledge to the Triune God, which while in this life always an 
unattainable goal remains a noble ambition and an enduring challenge.  For it was 
this which fired Baxter‟s own lifelong quest for method and which is the true 





Appendix One – The Creed, Lord’s Prayer and Decalogue 
The Creed 
The Creed begins with the words „I believe‟ and so Baxter first discusses the concept 
of „believing‟ and what exactly it signifies in the Creed.  To believe he says means to 
believe something as true.  In the same way, to believe what someone says is to 
believe that they are trustworthy.  In more technical language we may say that the 
material objects of faith are the things that must be believed and the testifier‟s 
trustworthiness is the formal object of faith.  For this reason Baxter says „the matter 
is as the body of faith, and the form as if its soul‟.  Divine faith rests thus rests on 
God‟s reliability and since God cannot lie must be completely certain.  The formal 
act of faith can therefore properly be called trust.  Since faith concerns the „whole 
man‟ it must extend to the three powers of man‟s soul: the understanding, the will 
and the executive:  
And so it is in one, an assenting trust, a consenting trust, and a practical 
trust.  By the first, we believe the word to be true, because we trust the 
fidelity of God.  By the second, we consent to God‟s Covenant and 
accept his gifts, by trusting to the truth and goodness of the promise.  By 
the third, we trustingly venture on the costlyest duty. 
Faith then has a Triune form: things to be believed are inseparably related from 
things to be desired and things to be practiced.  As Baxter suggests „trust then, or 
affiance, is the vital or formal act of faith.  And assenting, consenting and practice, 
are the inseparable effects, in which as it is a saving grace it is alwayes found.‟
1
   
Importantly the object of faith is also Triune, being God the Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit.  It is to all the persons therefore that Baxter says assent, consent and practice 
are to be directed.  Consequently Baxter says it is by this comprehensively Triune 
faith that we are justified and not just by believing in Christ‟s righteousness imputed 
to us.  This is an important point, for it shows Baxter‟s soteriology to be deeply 
embedded in his Trinitarian thought.  Having established the nature of belief Baxter 
proceeds to a lengthy analysis of the Creed according to each article.  In what 
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follows we shall simply highlight those features which reveal the Trinitarian 
character of his ideas. 
The first section of the Creed begins „I believe in God the Father Almighty...‟  It is 
here that Baxter chooses to expound on God‟s Triunity and attributes.  This he 
presents as a truly scriptural doctrine, although his discussion of it hinges almost 
entirely on the divine primalities.  However although, as in the „Short Catechism‟, 
his discussion is technical, Baxter eschews taking an absolute stance on matters of 
Trinitarian dogma.  For example concerning the important question of the persons of 
the Trinity – which he says has caused a great deal of confusion – he seems to take as 
preliminary truth the scholastic idea that God‟s reflexive Power, Wisdom and Love 
constitute the Trinity as „immanent‟ while the same attributes outwardly directed 
constitute it as „economic‟, seen especially as operative in the salvific economy of 
nature, grace and glory.
2
  However he also makes it clear that to believe this 
concerning the notion of „person‟ is not necessary to salvation.  Instead he says that it 
is vitally important that belief in the Trinity must be thoroughly practical.  „It is the 
Trinity as related to us, and operative, and therein notified, that we must necessarily 
understand and believe, even as Our Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier, that the Love 
of God the Father, and the Grace of the Son, and the Communion of the Holy Ghost, 
may be believed, received and enjoyed.‟
3
  Such a practical focus is as we have seen 
characteristic of his theology. 
Within this „economic‟ or operative Trinity Baxter suggests that it is possible to 
distinguish the persons from each other by their own distinctive attributes.  Thus 
Power is „eminently‟ ascribed to the Father, Wisdom to the Son and Love to the Holy 
Spirit.  However to say this is not to isolate each attribute or person from the other.  
Therefore just as the Father is Almighty, so also are the Son and the Holy Spirit.  By 
implication all three persons must also be all-wise and all-loving.
4
  Exactly the same 
can be said concerning God‟s acts of salvation: 
Though the persons are undivided in their works on the creature, yet 
creation is eminently ascribed to the Father, Incarnation and Redemption 
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to the Son, and Sanctification to the Holy Ghost.  The Suns power of 
motion, light and heat are inseparable.  And yet it is as the light as such 
that with our eye doth cause the same act of sight, as united to it.
5
 
What emerges from this is that all three persons participate fully in each attribute and 
work, it is the „eminence‟ of their participation which therefore offers grounds for 
any distinction to be made. 
For Baxter the Trinitarian dynamic at work in the Creed can therefore be seen in 
terms of Creation, Redemption and Sanctification both as appropriated to each 
person of the Trinity and in their indivisible operation.  Thus although the Father is 
called Almighty and Creator in the Creed he only gives all things their being by the 
„Power of his Will and Word‟, which indicates the involvement of the Son and Spirit 
in the work of Creation as well.  In the same way God‟s sustaining of the Universe 
may also be seen as a co-operation of his Power, Wisdom and Love, expressed for 
his creatures in the triad of Owner, Rector and Benefactor.  Thus although Creation 
is eminently the work of the Father, this certainly does not exclude the other two 
persons of the Trinity.
6
 
The work of redemption is seen in the Son as Redeemer, which is expounded in the 
second section of the Creed.  Here the Trinitarian pattern can be seen, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, throughout the pattern of Incarnation, Crucifixion, 
Resurrection, Ascension and Parousia.  As mediator between God and man Baxter 
says that Christ must be both God and man by an inexpressible union of natures.  
This is the ground for the incarnation in which Baxter says the Holy Ghost did not 
act on the second person of the Trinity or the whole Godhead but instead 
miraculously caused a soul and body to develop in Mary‟s womb united to the 
eternal Word.  However the operation of the Holy Ghost in the incarnation of the 
Word can still properly be expressed as an action of the whole Trinity since although 
„Gods perfecting operations are usually ascribed to the Holy Ghost... the Father and 
Son, are still supposed operating by the Holy Spirit‟.
7
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A similar Triune pattern can be seen in the other great Redemptive events. Thus 
Baxter holds that although the Godhead itself cannot suffer, Christ as both God and 
man was able to suffer in body and soul on the Cross.  In fact he endured the pains of 
Hell which are God‟s punishment of man for sin.  However Baxter does not think 
that he can be considered in any way hated of God or forsaken by his Holy Spirit.  
This allowed him both to be an expiatory sacrifice for sin while at the same time 
preserving the integrity of his Godhead particularly from any stain of sin.
8
  A 
solution which is only possible due to the unique Trinitarian dynamic at work in 
Christ‟s crucifixion and death.  Following the Crucifixion is of course the 
Resurrection which Baxter calls the vindication of Christ‟s divine Sonship.  
Combined with his Ascension it provided the grounds for the „great executive parts‟ 
of his saving work which Baxter suggests particularly lay in his interceding with the 
Father and his sending of the Holy Spirit.  It also sets the stage for the dramatic 
future foreclosing of history with his Second Coming when he will judge the world 
according to the conditional covenant that he has secured.
9
  In Baxter‟s 
understanding this covenant is of course the Triune Covenant entered into by 
Baptism. 
The work of sanctification expounded in the third section of the Creed is the 
province of the Holy Spirit.  It is his work to illuminate the understandings of the 
elect, convert their wills to God and strengthen them and quicken them to do their 
duty.  He is to be in them „a Spirit of power and love, and a sound mind‟.  For this 
reason Baxter says the „Holy Ghost is an intercessor within us to communicate LIFE, 
LIGHT and LOVE, from the Father and the Son, and excite in us those holy desires, 
thanks and praise, which are meet for Gods acceptance‟.
10
  Again therefore we see 
the way that the other two persons of the Trinity also participate in the eminent work 
of the Spirit. 
Baxter also suggests that belief in the Holy Ghost is included in the article „I believe 
in the Holy Catholic Church...‟  It is through the Holy Spirit that the Church is called 
Holy for it is his role to work in people the „same essentiating qualifications‟.  These 
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Baxter lists as the seven unities of Ephesians: One body, one Spirit, one hope, one 
Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all.
11
  However once again all 
three members of the Trinity are brought into the equation, for the Church is Christ‟s 
Kingdom and he gathers it to himself, it is also for the Father „who will be sanctified 
in all that draw near to him...and will have all his children holy as he is holy.  Baxter 
himself puts it this way „formally their common union with and relation to God the 
Father, Son and Holy Ghost, that is, to Jesus Christ their head, bringing them home 
to God the Father by the Spirit‟.  In the same way the articles on the „Communion of 
Saints‟ and „Forgiveness of Sin‟ are both expressions of the Trinitarian character of 
the Church which has its eschatological consummation in the „Resurrection of the 
Dead‟, the last judgement and the eternal presence of the Triune God with his people. 
The Lord’s Prayer 
Prayer, Baxter says, is „holy desires expressed or actuated to God‟.  It is commanded 
by God and made the condition on which his mercies are to be received.  It also 
disposes the soul for receiving God‟s grace. Due to its importance Christ therefore 
instituted a specific pattern of prayer as standard: 
The Lord‟s Prayer is the Summary and Rule of mans love and just 
desires.  It directeth him what to will, ask and seek.  And therefore must 
needs contain that duty of love which is the heart of the new creature, and 
the fulfilling of the Law.  The will is the man.  And love is the will.  




Its use Baxter says is to form the „acts and habits of the heart itself‟ according to this 
formula and its material and manner.  For this reason he says that unless the desires 
of the heart are formed habitually to this method they will be impious.  It is therefore 
„as if the heart of organic and objective religion‟ in comparison to which the Creed 
and Decalogue are its eyes and its hands.
13
  We may therefore think of the Lord‟s 
Prayer as the „heart-consent‟ of faith, which logically must follow assent to the Creed 
and is also presupposed in the practice of the Decalogue. 
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The method of the Lord‟s Prayer Baxter says is „more perfect than any of the 
Philosophers writings‟.
14
  The nature of this method he says in the Methodus is 
circular, like the circulation of blood in the veins and arteries. It is also characterised 
as partly synthetic and partly analytic.  It therefore begins from God and is defined 
by God in God.  It also begins in God‟s praises and ends in the same.  Having 
descended „according to the order of intention, beginning at the highest notion of the 
ultimate end, and descending to the lowest‟, it then ascends again „according to the 
order of execution and assecution, beginning at the lowest means, and ascending to 
the highest‟.
15
  The first part of the prayer (the descent) therefore contains what we 
must desire as end and the second part (the ascent) what we must desire as means. 
Importantly Baxter also notes that the tenor of the whole prayer is Trinitarian.  It 
therefore supposes faith in God as omnipotent, most wise and most excellent and 
assumes reconciliation to the Father by the Son and effected through the Spirit of 
adoption.
16
  This pattern can be seen throughout each of the six petitions as well as in 
the preface and conclusion to the prayer.  As with the Creed where it is not explicit 
we may, and indeed must, take it as implicit. 
The opening words of the Lord‟s Prayer act as a prolegomenon to the whole.  In 
saying „Our Father‟ Baxter says we address God as our ultimate end.  It invokes him 
particularly „as our reconciled Father in Christ, described in his attributes, by the 
words „which art in Heaven‟ which signifie the perfection of his Power, Knowledge 
and Goodness, and the Word Father, „which‟ signifieth that he is Supream Owner, 
Ruler and Benefactor‟.  We see therefore that as in the Creed Baxter has a Trinitarian 
interpretation of the word Father: „As the word Father signifieth God as God, it 
comprehendeth the Son, and the Holy Ghost: and as it signifieth the first Person in 
the Trinity, it excludeth not but implyeth the second and the third‟.  Likewise Baxter 
also grounds his „governmental‟ Trinity in an „eminent and transcendent‟ conception 
of the word Father as being Owner, Ruler and Benefactor to his children.  Thus God 
can be called Father to all men by creation, to all lapsed men by sufficient 
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redemption and to the regenerate by adoption and effective redemption.  Implicitly 
then we have also in the Lord‟s Prayer the schema of Creator, Redeemer and 
Sanctifier so central to the Creed.
17
   
As indicated by the quote above Baxter also gives an explicitly Trinitarian exegesis 
to the second part of the opening, the clause „which art in Heaven‟.  He suggests that 
these words refer firstly to God‟s real substantiality and secondly to his 
„incomprehensible perfection in power, knowledge and goodness‟.  The heavens he 
says by their vastness and sublimity show forth God as omnipotent.  Heaven, which 
is called God‟s dwelling place, is therefore „that most perfect region, whence all 
good floweth down to earth‟.  It contains all of our life, light and good and is 
therefore the place to which all our prayers must be directed.  Every prayer then must 
be the „souls aspiring and ascending towards Heaven, and the believing exercise of a 
heavenly mind, and desire‟.
18
 
Baxter suggests that the first petition of the Lord‟s Prayer „Hallowed be thy name‟ 
contains the highest notion of our ultimate end.  God‟s name he defines as his 
„proper notices or appearances‟.  He suggests it is manifested in objective signs such 
as words or works, by inward conceptions received by these signs and finally by 
God‟s own self-revelation.  To hallow God‟s name means to use it „holily‟.  It is thus 
to imprint his name and his holiness on every faculty of the soul.  As Baxter says „the 
Spirit of God moveth on the Soul, to actuate all his graces; and plead for God and our 
Redeemer, and bring him to our remembrance, to our affection, and to subject us 
wholly to his will and love‟.  Ultimately then hallowing God‟s name means to love 
him as dwelling in our souls and to live in habitual communion and conversation 
with him.  This demonstrates very clearly the Trinitarian nature of Baxter‟s affective 
theology. 
In his exposition of the second petition, „Thy Kingdom come‟, Baxter manifests the 
thoroughly political nature of his theology.  This must be he says the second thing in 
our desires, positioned below the hallowing of God‟s name.  It refers to that in which 
God‟s grace and glory shine most eminently – his Kingdom.  The administration of 
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this Kingdom is such that God himself is absolutely supreme and Jesus Christ is the 
vice-gerent and administrator.  These acts of administration can be defined as 
legislative, judicial and executive.  In this capacity Christ also publishes the final 
edition of the Covenant of Grace secured by his death and resurrection.  „And he 
commandeth all believers to devote themselves thus to God the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Ghost, by a solemn vow in baptism, and live in the communion of saints, in 
his Church, and holy worship, and the frequent celebration of the memorial of his 
death in the sacrament of his body and blood.‟
19
 
The third petition „Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven‟ Baxter says fulfils the 
third of our desires.  It represents the effect of God‟s Kingdom on earth.  It is also a 
prayer against self-will.  In praying this Baxter suggests man seeks to conform 
himself to God‟s will.  Again there is a Trinitarian pattern to this as God‟s will is that 
of owner, rector and benefactor.
20
 
In the final three petitions Baxter says means ascend to the order of execution.  For 
this reason we first pray „Give us this day, our daily bread‟ for in order to live to God 
our lives must be sustained.  Then we need to pray „And forgive us our trespasses, as 
we forgive them that trespass against us‟.  This is because with our lives supposed 
we next require deliverance from the sin and guilt that we have contracted.  This 
petition therefore reminds us of Christ‟s sacrifice and the Covenant of Grace that he 
has secured.  Finally we pray „And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from 
evil‟.  This is a prayer against the temptations of the devil which Baxter says can 
deceive the understanding, pervert the will and corrupt our practice. 
The conclusion of the prayer is „For thine is the Kingdom, the Power and the Glory 
for ever Amen‟.  This Baxter says ascends from the lowest to the highest by means of 
praise.  It is put last in the prayer „because the praise of God is the highest step next 
heaven‟.
21
  This can be seen in the ordering of the triad Kingdom, Power and Glory.  
Kingdom means that it belongs to God to rule and dispose all things, Power means 
that he is able to accomplish this and Glory refers to the future consummation when 
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all things will be ordered as he wills „for ever‟.  Finally we say „Amen‟ Baxter says 
in order „to express both our desire, and our faith and hope, that God will hear the 
desires which his Spirit giveth us through the mediation of Jesus Christ‟.  The 
conclusion of the prayer like the beginning is therefore thoroughly Trinitarian. 
The Ten Commandments 
The Ten Commandments or the Decalogue are the third and final element of Baxter‟s 
catechetical theology.  They provide a rule for practice and therefore correspond to 
the executive faculty of man – the first of the triad of life, understanding and will.  
Baxter suggests that the original authority of the Commandments was due to their 
having been conveyed by God to Moses on Mount Sinai.  In this dispensation they 
also acted as a summary of the Law of Nature.  Later they were confirmed and re-
issued by Christ and so have a double authority for Christians as „God‟s own 
transcript of the law of nature‟ and as the comprehensive Law of Christ.
22
 
Like the Creed and the Lord‟s Prayer the Decalogue also follows a Trinitarian 
pattern.  Its nature is such Baxter argues that it may be contracted into the law of 
love: 
God who as absolute Lord, owneth, moveth and disposeth of all, doth as 
Soveraign Ruler give us Laws and execute them, and as Love and 
Benefactor giveth us all, and is the most amiable object and end of all.  
So that as to love and give is more than to command, so to be loved is 
more than as a commander to be obeyd.  But ever includeth it, though it 
be eminently in its nature above it.  So that 1. Objectively, love to God, 
our selves and others in that measure that is exercised wisely, is 
obedience eminently and somewhat higher. 2. And love as the principle 
in man, is the most powerful cause of obedience, supposing the reverence 
of authority and the fear of punishment, but is somewhat more excellent 
than they... In that measure that you love God, you will heartily and 
delightfully do all your duty to him...
23
 
The Decalogue therefore concerns obedience to God as Owner, Rector and 
Benefactor.  Coupled with sincerity obedience is an important principle of Baxter‟s 
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theology.  Here it reflects the practical outworking of faith, where the assent of the 
Creed and the consent of the Lord‟s Prayer are presupposed. 
Baxter divides the Decalogue into three parts which represent he says three species 
of duty.  The first he says is public and therefore wholly of piety and directed directly 
at God the Supreme Rector.  The second he says is mixed, partly public and partly 
private, it therefore concerns both piety and humanity and particularly divine 
officials and societies.  The third type is private and so concerns humanity.
24
  This 
tripartite division also assumes the traditional division into the Two Tables of the 
Law.  Where the first table is concerned with duty to God and the second table duty 
to neighbour.  Baxter modifies this suggesting that the first four precepts are the first 
table, the fifth precept the hinge between the two tables and the last five precepts the 
second table. In our discussion we shall not therefore give a detailed discussion of 
each precept. Instead we shall focus on the first, fifth and tenth precepts respectively 
which Baxter sees as amply expressing the whole tenor of the Law. 
 Coming before any of the precepts of the Decalogue is what Baxter calls the preface: 
„I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house 
of bondage‟.  This he says expresses the Constitution of the Kingdom of God, which 
precedes its Administration as portrayed in the Decalogue itself.  This means it 
describes the nature of God‟s Sovereignty.  In relation to him Baxter says we are his 
own, his subjects and his beneficiaries.  Thus the Decalogue considers the Kingdom 
of God in its Triune nature.  The words „that brought thee out of Egypt‟ indicate an 
obligation of Redemption to the Lord as well as the prior obligation of Creation.  As 
the Decalogue is the Law of Christ Baxter interprets them Christologically as „I am 
the Lord thy God who redeemed thee from sin and misery by Jesus Christ‟.  
Furthermore God‟s Kingdom is also paternal and so the relation of Benefaction is 
also entailed. 
Baxter puts particular weight on the first precept of the Decalogue: „Thou shalt have 
no other Gods before me‟.  In this precept he says the consent and faithful 
observance of the Covenant are commanded to men.  For this reason he says the first 
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precept is the foundation of all the others and like the soul of the Decalogue.  It gives 
a general obligation to all duties for which the other precepts are specific 
enumerations.  It also establishes the relation of subject and orders the duty of this 
relation in general.  Once again this is of Trinitarian import for the duty of subjection 
is according to the assent of the intellect, the love of the will and the deeds of the 
executive power.  It thus acknowledges God in the true nature of his deity as greatest, 
wisest and excellent; in the Trinity of persons and fundamental relations as Father 
and Creator, Son and Redeemer and Spirit and Regenerator; and in his formal 
relations as Proprietor, Rector and Friend.
25
  This is therefore the „summary of all‟ 
and the fulfilment of the first and greatest commandment of the law which Christ 
says is „to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and soul and might‟.
26
 
The fifth precept „Honour thy father and mother‟ Baxter refers to as the hinge of both 
tables of the law, belonging partly to one and partly to the other.  As referring to both 
it provides the link between divine and human government.  For this reason it obliges 
both to natural governors like parents as well as to human governors who rule by 
contract.  It is also in this commandment that Baxter places familial duties as forming 
the vital link between public and private piety.  Here also he places the obligation for 
parents to catechise their children.  As he says Christian families are Christian 
societies and „all Christian societies must be sanctified to God‟.  We see again 
Baxter‟s ideal of the „Holy Commonwealth‟. 
The tenth and final precept Baxter regards as a summary of the second table of the 
law.  It comprehends therefore Christ‟s command „to love thy neighbour as thyself‟.  
In this way it is the „summe of all mortification‟ and in obedience to it lies the 
„greatest victory in the world‟.  As the first precept models an ordinate love of God, 
so the tenth precept models an ordinate love of self and neighbour.  Thus like the first 
commandment it is particularly concerned to root out idolatry and the selfishness 
which lies at the root of every idol.  It also teaches that to love others is essentially to 
love the image of God in them.  Therefore in exactly the same all-encompassing arc 
as we saw in the Lord‟s Prayer, everything is finally brought back to the love of God.  
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For love is the fulfilling of the preceptive part of the Law.
27
  It is also the final end of 
humanity.  As Baxter stresses again and again in his writing „faith is but the bellows 
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Appendix Two – Baxter, Glisson and Inadequate Concepts  
In the Methodus Baxter‟s metaphysics is grounded on the notion of inadequate 
concepts.  This Baxter derived from Francis Glisson, a noted anatomist and a Fellow 
of the Royal Society, who was also physician to Baxter‟s friend Sir Matthew Hale.
1
  
We know from Baxter‟s Additional Notes that Glisson tended Hale in his final 
illness,
2
 and it is therefore not impossible that Baxter met Glisson then or even 
perhaps on one of his own frequent trips to London for medical consultations earlier 
in his life.
3
  Whether or not this was so, Baxter would surely have been very familiar 
with Glisson‟s ideas through Hale, well before the publication in 1672 of Glisson‟s 
De Vita Naturae.
4
  Thus even though this work was published after Baxter had 
already completed the charts and most of the written sections of the Methodus, this 
does not necessarily mean, as Packer holds, that Glisson exerted no major influence 
on Baxter‟s ideas.
5
  In fact Baxter‟s works demonstrate a very strong interest in 
Glisson.  In his Christian Directory, for example, he recommends Glisson‟s De 
Rachtide of 1650 and his Anatomia Hepatis of 1654.  His most extensive discussion 
of Glisson is to be found in his Of the Immortality of Mans Soul where he defends 
Glisson‟s ideas against Henry More‟s accusations.
6
  Finally in the Methodus itself 
Glisson is cited with Campanella as an important exemplar of a triadic view of the 




Glisson discusses inadequate concepts at length in his unpublished Tractatus de 
Inadaequatis Rerum Conceptibus as well as in the De Vita Naturae.  While Baxter 
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was unlikely to have been familiar with the first, it is quite possible that he would 
have been aware of its concepts through Hale.  Many of these in any case are to be 
found in the preface to the De Vita Naturae and scattered throughout its pages.  First 
therefore we shall review the ideas of both before going on to consider Baxter‟s own 
understanding of inadequate concepts in comparison with Glisson and the Thomist, 
Scotist and Nominalist schools.  This will also allow us, as far as possible, to answer 
the important related question of whether Baxter was a realist or Nominalist in his 
epistemology. 
Following the later scholastics Glisson divided natural intellection into intuitive and 
abstractive knowledge.  He denied however their understanding of intuitive cognition 
as knowledge of a present object and defined it instead as a kind of analogous vision.  
Glisson regarded intuitive cognition as the „door of the intellect‟ through which the 
first rudiments of all higher knowledge enter, and held that it was intimately 
connected to sense perception.  He believed that due to their immediate presence in 
the mind, intuitive ideas were clearer and more vivid than abstractive ones.  However 
Glisson also highlighted a number of imperfections of intuitive cognition, especially 
its narrow scope, its concern only with sensible singular objects, and its inability to 
penetrate the metaphysical structure of things themselves.
8
 
Glisson suggested that the role of abstractive cognition was to remedy the defects of 
intuitive cognition, providing knowledge of universals and a whole array of 
quidditative metaphysical concepts.  Imperfect or confused abstractive cognition did 
this in a preliminary way by abstracting only from the presence of the object and 
from its extrinsic circumstances and not penetrating to the intrinsic, entitative or 
essential part of the object.  This gave only an imperfect universal concept, to be 
refined later by further abstraction and comparison to a yield a perfect universal.
9
  
Genuine abstractive knowledge on the other hand yielded the true inadequate 
concepts.  This considered an object as divided into different objective metaphysical 
parts or reasons (rationes).  These Glisson divided into two groups: inadequate 
concepts of presence and similarity, called kinships (communitates), and inadequate 
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concepts of absence and dissimilarity, called differences (differentias).  True to his 
profession Glisson described the process of abstracting these inadequate concepts as 
analogous to anatomy.  In this the intellect acts as an anatomist, separating parts from 
parts, elements from mixed bodies, accidents from essence, supposita from natures, 
essence from existence, potency from act and penetrating right down even to the 
finest distinctions of all (those that obtain within things which are really (realiter) 
identical).  This anatomy he says is the subtlest of all.
10
 
Glisson is insistent that his inadequate concepts are not mere „beings of reason‟ but 
have a foundation in things themselves.  He therefore immediately denies the 
Nominalist position that these are entirely mind-dependent realities.  Beyond this 
however he is not entirely explicit as to whether he interprets the objective reasons in 
things or the inadequate concepts resulting from them in a Thomist or Scotist 
fashion.  As far as possible this must therefore be inferred from his writings.  
Certainly Glisson had a high regard for Aquinas, to whom he refers as „divus 
Thomas‟ in the De Vita Naturae.
11
  Likewise in his discussion of how these 
inadequate concepts apply to simple natures Glisson holds that these are not 
composed really (realiter) nor „ex parte rei‟, but have these only „ratione sola cum 
fundamento in re‟.
12
  The latter term is standard Thomist terminology for the 
distinction rationis ratiocinatae while the former is usually used to refer to some 
kind of Scotist formal (or modal) distinction.  In the preface to the De Vita Naturae 
Glisson describes his inadequate concepts as existing in a kind of spectrum ranging 
at one extreme from the distinction only of reason (he does not say whether this is 
the Thomist distinction rationis ratiocinatae or the Nominalist rationis ratiocinans, 
but we may suspect the former) to at the other extreme the real distinction.  In 
between these he refers to a middle distinction „ex parte rei‟ although he does not 
indicate precisely what kind of distinction this might be.
13
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Glisson‟s most detailed discussion of the founding of inadequate concepts in reality 
occurs in his Tractatus.  Here Glisson, in denying that his inadequate concepts are 
merely „beings of reason‟, admits that all things have a certain aptitude to be 
understood by a perfect intellect through a single adequate concept, at once and 
distinctly.  However due to the imperfection of the human intellect we perceive 
whole things in a „mancus‟ and confused fashion through inadequate concepts.  He 
adds that all things also have a propensity, inasmuch as they relate to our intellect, to 
be conceived inadequately according to their different objective reasons (rationes).  
In this way the intellect is not free to make arbitrary inadequate concepts, but instead 
the reasons of each must be founded in nature (in natura fundari).
14
 Returning to the 
test case of simple things Glisson suggests that these may be resolved by our intellect 
into diverse inadequate concepts through „extrinsic habitudes‟ as far as they are 
compared to other things present or absent, similar or dissimilar. While these 
habitudes themselves are „beings of reason‟ Glisson is adamant that the intrinsic 
objective reasons that they are grounded upon are real features of the object („res 
ipsas ut per istas habitudines distinctas‟) distinguished from each other „ratione cum 
fundamento in re‟.
15
  What Glisson seems to be referring to here is the Nominalist 
extrinsic denomination used to indicate intrinsic features of an object distinguished 
from each other through the operation of the human intellect by the Thomist 
distinction rationis ratiocinatae rather than the Scotist distinction „ex parte rei‟. 
Glisson expounds further on this distinction rationis ratiocinatae in a later chapter of 
the Tractatus.  Here he suggests that it obtains „inter diversas incompletas objectivas 
rationes, nempe inter similitudines et dissimilitudines eiusdem rei inter se collatas‟ 
adding that „inadaequati conceptus in intellectu hisce objectivis rationibus 
respondentes dicantur proprio sensu formaliter inter se differre; et verisimile forte 
est, eodem sensu, Scotum suam formalem distinctionem inter objectivas rationes 
asseruisse‟.  Such concepts, he says, are called in the intellect formal concepts, since 
they are distinct from each other as diverse forms or ideas.  Thus although outside 
the intellect they differ only as diverse objective reasons of the same thing, in the 
intellect they differ as ideas or forms fully diverse.  This is because these inadequate 
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concepts as they are abstractive prescind from that consideration in which the 
objective reasons themselves coincide.  This the intellect only perceives when it 
reflexively compares its own inadequate concepts with their objects as they exist 
outside the mind.  For then it understands these diverse objective reasons and their 
formal concepts to be in nature one and the same thing, which on account of their 
various similitudes and dissimilitudes with other things put forth various objective 
reasons concerning themselves and therefore are represented by fully distinct formal 
concepts.  Thus, he concludes, it is easy to see why these concepts do not differ in re 
but „ratione tantum cum fundamento in re‟.
16
  From this it may be seen that in this 
crucial case where the inadequate concepts are those of one and the same thing, 
Glisson metaphysically follows Aquinas in denying a distinction „ex parte rei‟ 
between the various objective reasons and upholding one of reason (ratiocinated) 
alone, while epistemologically he holds that these inadequate concepts may be 
formally distinct in the intellect. 
Baxter‟s most extensive discussion of the relation of inadequate concepts to human 
cognition is to be found in the Methodus.  Unlike Glisson he has no Tractatus de 
Inadaequatis Conceptibus and so the rest of his theory must be gleaned from 
references elsewhere.  Baxter holds that humans are born with their intellect as a 
tabula rasa.  The intellect is said to possess connate principles according to its 
natural disposition for knowing principles of things but not according to its actual 
knowledge of them.  Baxter holds that all intellection is of singulars and that the first 
object of cognition is „ens reale incomplexum‟ and the second object is the cogitatio 
itself.
17
  As discussed in Chapter Four Baxter follows the Nominalists in denying 
sensible and intelligible species any role in cognition.  Like the Nominalists as well 
he accepts both intuitive and abstractive cognition, although he restricts intuitive 
cognition to the soul‟s knowledge of its own acts.  
For Baxter all intellection is of singulars and he holds that the knowledge we have of 
them is confused and partial due to the imperfection of the human intellect.  We 
know things therefore through what he calls „partial inadequate concepts‟, which are 
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clearly his analogues of Glisson‟s inadequate concepts.  Like Glisson Baxter 
suggests that a universal concept may be understood in a twofold way: 
Conceptus universalis est, vel conceptus inadequatus partialis de re 
singulari; vel notio secunda, seu ens rationis, seu mentis instrumentum, 
ut ad plura eiusmodi singularia adaptatum. 
In the first sense Baxter says a universal is „nihil reale‟ save as it is discovered in an 
existing individual („nisi ut reperitur in existente individuo‟).  In this rather negative 
sense to know a universal is merely to know an individual thing partially or 
inadequately.  In the second sense however Baxter understands a universal as realiter 
an act or operation of the mind ad intra which has its expression ad extra in a 
„nomen instrumentale logicum‟.  Baxter also has two different opinions concerning 
the value of universals.  On the one hand he says so far as a universal is inadequate 
or „mancus‟ concerning singular things it is a concept that comes forth from the 
imperfection of intellect.  It is as though he says one were to catch sight of a man 
walking and recognise only an animal or a body.  On the other hand so far as a 
universal expresses something processed by the intellect, which has been collected 
from the cognition of singulars, then universals may rightly be viewed as an effect of 
a nobler faculty than sense.
18
 
It is clear from the context that these inadequate concepts are very similar to those of 
Glisson.  In fact Baxter‟s first and second universals closely resemble the confused 
and distinct universals of Glisson‟s two kinds of abstractive cognition.  In his Of the 
Immortality of the Soul Baxter confirms that his use of inadequate concepts derives 
from Glisson.
19
  Here he also highlights his own Scotist interpretation of Glisson: 
As I have oft said, Dr Glisson after others most subtilly laboureth to 
prove it of every simple substance, that its matter and form are not 
compounding parts, but conceptus inadaequati.  If the intellect 
compound and divide its own conceptions that maketh not a real 
composition of two substances in the objects, but as the Scotists call it of 
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two formalities, or conceptus objectivi, which if you will call a logical 
composition or intellectual, if you explain it, the matter is small.
20
 
In his End of Doctrinal Controversies Baxter expands on this further in his 
discussion of the powers of the human soul: 
Not that man‟s soul is there by three forms, for all are but one form.  But 
man‟s narrow mind cannot conceive of them but by three conceptions, 
which yet are not fictions, but as Scotus calls them, FORMALITATES, 
and as Campanella, Primalities or Essentialities; or as the Nominals 
extrinsick denominations, and relative by connotation of the objects and 
effects.  He that hath a wit subtile enough to conceive of Scotus his 
FORMALITIES, as noting only a fundamentum objectivum distinguendi, 




In both these places then Baxter affirms explicitly, and elsewhere he does so 
implicitly, that he views inadequate concepts as closely akin to Scotus‟ formalities.
22
  
It is also evident that like Glisson Baxter characterises these in Nominalist fashion 
according to their extrinsic denominations or connotations.  However Baxter seems 
to differ from Glisson in grounding these extrinsic habitudes in a Scotist rather than 
Thomist metaphysics. 
Yet the important question remains of how Baxter himself characterises these 
formalities.  Baxter bemoans on more than one occasion the inability of the 
scholastics to clearly distinguish between their own distinctions.
23
  In his Treatise of 
Knowledge and Love he expresses his frustration with the number of divergent 
accounts of the formalities specifically saying: 
And the Scotists may yet write as many more treatises de formalitatibus, 
before men will understand indeed what a conceptus formalis with them 
is, and whether diverse formalities be diverse realities, or only ejusdem 
conceptus inadequati. But thus learning is become like a poppet play, or 
the raising of the dust.
24
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Likewise in the Methodus he says of the formalities that they are so subtle as to flee 
the understanding.  Yet elsewhere in the same work he comments „quamvis cum 
Scotistarum libros de formalitatibus lego, filum valde subtile et tenue esse percipio, 
doctrinam tamen eorum negare non audeo‟.
25
  From this and evidence gathered in 
the rest of the thesis it seems that while Baxter considered the doctrine of the 
formalities to be very subtle, even ineffable, he did accept, at least in some cases, the 
validity of a Scotist formal distinction „ex parte rei‟. 
This is confirmed by the discussion in the Methodus of his own views on the Trinity: 
Quamvis quae eadem sunt cum uno tertio sunt eadem inter se, et ita hae 
proprietates et relationes et actus fundamentales immanentes, sunt 
eadem quod essentia, et inter se in essentiae unitate idem sunt, ab 
invicem tamen ratione nobis ignota magis distinguuntur, ex natura rei 
ante actum nostri intellectus.
26
 
This at least is conclusive in demonstrating that Baxter understood the nature of at 
least some objective reasons, in this case the intra-divine properties and relations, as 
being „ex parte rei ante actum intellectus‟.  In the seventeenth century this can never 
be assumed for there were a number of thinkers who, for example, equated Scotus‟ 
formal distinction with the Thomist distinction of reason, as Baxter himself remarks 
on.
27
  Furthermore that Baxter accepts such an objective distinction „ex parte rei', at 
least in broad terms, marks him out from Glisson who as we have seen held a formal 
distinction between the objective reasons to obtain only in the intellect and not in the 
thing itself.  It should be noted however that this does not necessarily mean that all 
cases of inadequate concepts that we meet in Baxter correspond to Scotist 
formalities.  It is quite possible that some, perhaps the divine attributes for example, 
map precisely onto Glisson‟s understanding of the intrinsic objective reasons as only 
distinct rationis ratiocinatae. 
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Baxter‟s near equation of the Scotist formal distinction and the Nominalist extrinsic 
or connotative distinction, remarked on above and very apparent in both his 
discussion of the soul and the Trinity, deserves further comment.  In broad terms the 
Nominalist connotative distinction sought to assign distinct features to one absolutely 
simple thing „on account of the different ways that this one simple thing relates to or 
connotes various things that are, in one way or another, extrinsic to it‟.  Thus for 
example the divine intellect and the divine will may be distinguished through the 
different acts that they connote.
28
  Baxter suggested that in making such an extrinsic 
distinction the Nominals accepted a „sufficient ground for the denomination, which 
some call virtual, and some relative‟.
29
  Baxter would therefore have agreed with his 
contemporary the Scotist Bartolomeo Mastri who maintained that the connotative 
distinction must be preceded by some kind of intrinsic distinction whether this might 
be the strict Scotist formal distinction or the (Thomist) virtual distinction.
30
  Yet this 
also suggests Baxter‟s sympathy with a Nominalist extrinsicist view in which 
metaphysical aspects of things are characterised not as with Scotus‟ formalities as 
parts to whole but rather as parts to external reality.
31
  It must be admitted then that 
there is a fundamental tension in Baxter‟s thought between a Scotist and Nominalist 
position.  On the one hand Baxter portrays himself as exasperated at the number of 
Scotist treatises on the formalities and eschews detailed analysis of metaphysical 
distinctions, often preferring like the Nominalists to characterise such things 
extrinsically and connotatively, while on the other hand he confesses that he does not 
dare to reject Scotus‟ formalities and cannot therefore simply deny the possibility of 
a distinction „ex parte rei‟.
32
  Overall then it would seem safest to characterise 
Baxter‟s position neither as pure Scotism nor Nominalism, but rather as a kind of 
„Nominalised Scotism‟. 
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That in the case of his metaphysical epistemology the accent should fall on Baxter‟s 
Scotism rather than his Nominalism is apparent from his view of universals.  By 
Baxter‟s account, as we have seen, there are two kinds of universals those founded 
on immediate intuition/confused abstraction (he does not allow us to distinguish) 
which are imperfect, and those grounded on further comparison and abstraction 
which are more perfect.  Of this first type Baxter adds, as we saw, that they are 
„nothing real except as they are discovered in the existing individual‟.  In his Treatise 
of Justifying Righteousness Baxter helpfully clarifies this further saying: 
And as nothing can be defined but a species, so a species, or any 
universal, is nothing but a notion or ens rationis, save as it existeth in the 
said individual.  And in the individuals it is nothing but their being as 
partially, or inadequately taken, or a conceptus objectivus partialis 
(whether it be of a thing really, or only intellectually partible, or any 




The provisos suggest, contrary to a Nominalist like Ockham, that universals do have 
a real existence outside the mind.
34
  This is further confirmed by Baxter‟s acceptance 
of the Scotist „haecceity‟ as a principle of individuation, which may be seen from the 
following two examples: 
i) Do you think any dust, or drop, any atome of earth or water, loseth any 
thing of it self, by its union with the rest?  Is any substance lost?  Is the 
simple nature changed?  Is it not earth and water still?  Is not the 
haecceity, as they call it, continued?  Doth not God know every dust, and 




ii) That the parts are the same in union with the whole, as when they are all 
separated.  Their nature is the same, and as Epicurus and Democritus say 
of their atoms, they are still distinguishable, and are truly parts, and may 
be intellectually separated.  The same individual water which you cast 
out of your bottle into the sea, is somewhere in the sea still; and though 
contiguous to other parts, is discernable from them all by God.  The 
haecceity, as they say, remaineth.
36
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For Baxter, as for Scotus, then we may infer that the haecceity is that which 
individuates the common nature.  It thus makes, for example, a dog with the common 
nature of dogginess to be this individual dog.  Scotus held that the haecceity was 
distinguished from the common nature by a formal distinction.
37
  Baxter remains 
undecided on this question, seemingly leaving open a wide spectrum of realist 
opinion.
38
  Yet that he holds to any kind of haecceity at all distinguishes him 
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Appendix Three – The Eternal Foundation of Divine Government 
For Richard Baxter the foundation of God‟s government lay in his enacting in time 
his eternal and thus timeless counsels.
1
  His discussion of this, comprehended in his 
doctrine of divine power, intellect and will, both draws on scholastic norms and 
attempts to refine them in light of his own Trinitarian metaphysics.  True to his 
epistemological principles Baxter insists that all of our notions concerning God‟s 
intellect and will are but „inadequate analogical conceptions‟.
2
  He therefore warns 
that: 
It is a dreadful thing to be over-bold, rash and presumptuous in speaking 
and asserting any thing without clear proof, of Gods knowledge and will; 
especially to reduce them all to the modes and methods of a man, even as 
to the order of his acts: seeing we are forced to confess, that even 
intellection and volition are spoken of God with exceeding great 
impropriety, and mans acts which are the prius significatum, are further 
below Gods, than a worm is below a man. 
Baxter emphasises therefore that it is only scholastic presumption in these matters 
that have forced him into giving his own account in defence of the truth.
3
  Elsewhere 
he remarks in a fascinating aside that only concerning the Trinity has the 
schoolmen‟s „profane curiosity and audacity‟ been equal to their discussion of the 
order of intention and execution in divine decrees. As Baxter rightly recognised 
Scotus was responsible for many of these innovations.
 4
  Unsurprisingly Baxter 
eschewed these Scotist (and Thomist) innovations completely, holding instead to a 
simplified Nominalist account grounded on his Trinitarian metaphysics and the 
principle of extrinsic or connotative denomination.   
i) Divine Power 
Among the scholastics, as Baxter indicates, it was a source of major controversy as 
to whether God‟s power was to be considered in any way distinct from his intellect 
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or will.  While Vasquez denied this Baxter, following Durandus and Suarez, affirmed 
that power was a distinct „inadequate concept‟ in God.  He pointed out that the 
reason some denied this was largely because of their „misconceiving of the potentia 
vitalis in man, as if it were only executive ad extra, or in the inferior faculties‟ and 
their subsequent analogical extension of this to God.
5
  By contrast, as we have seen, 
Baxter considered active power to be the fundamentum Trinitatis in both God and 
man and therefore to be co-equal in dignity to both intellect and will. 
Baxter‟s own conception of power makes a distinction between power considered on 
its own, sometimes called nude power, and power considered with respect to the 
other two divine principles.  For this reason he suggests that God‟s power may be 
denominated omnipotency in relation to three different objects.  Firstly as to „all 
things which belong to power‟ according to which God can do all things called 
possible.  Secondly as to „all things meet or congruous to the divine intellect to be 
willed and done‟ so that God can do all things which are meet to do and nothing 
which is unmeet.  Thirdly and finally as to „all things which he willeth to do‟, which 
is of course the actual realm of our experience of divine power and action.
6
 
In holding this Baxter significantly encompasses the standard scholastic distinction 
between God‟s potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata within the framework of his 
divine principles.  In scholastic usage it generally referred to the conceptual divide 
between what God is able to do hypothetically and absolutely, i.e. anything which 
does not violate the principle of non-contradiction, and what he chooses and ordains 
to do actually.  While this distinction had its roots in early medieval discussions it 
became prevalent in late medieval discussions, establishing itself as a cornerstone of 
the Nominalist and voluntarist worldview.  It has often been held responsible for the 
speculative character of much of late medieval thought, with its endless exploration 
of hypothetical and often outlandish questions such as the notorious examples of 
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whether God could have become incarnate as an ass or whether he could command 
someone to hate him.
7
 
Among the Reformed we find two differing responses to this distinction.  The first, 
generally early, response was a complete rejection of any division between God‟s 
absolute and ordained power.  This is exemplified by Calvin who was horrified by 
the speculative excesses that this distinction had led theologians into and therefore 
excised it from his theology.  The second, later and more moderate, response was to 
retain the distinction but seek to mitigate its use.  Even Calvin seems to have 
recognised some scriptural validity to the basic idea underlying this distinction and it 
was natural therefore that his Protestant Scholastic successors should have sought to 
restore its theological credibility.  In the seventeenth century it therefore became 




Following his Reformed contemporaries Baxter‟s own account of divine power 
should likewise be considered an attempt to domesticate this distinction between 
God‟s absolute and ordained power.  Unsurprisingly Baxter disapproved strongly of 
the use of this distinction to buttress any theologically questionable implications.  He 
also maintains that no one should speculate on the power of God antecedent to his 
constitution of things, in this way limiting the scope of any discussion of God‟s 
absolute power.
9
  Baxter‟s own discussion of divine power significantly prevents the 
separation of God‟s absolute and ordained power.  This is because power is never 
treated alone, as nude power, but only according to the conditioning of the other two 
divine principles.  While the Nominalists may not have intended to separate absolute 
and ordained power from each other
10
 their (perceived) abuses of this distinction 
were often traced to their extreme voluntarism in detaching the divine will from its 
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proper mooring in the other divine attributes.
11
  This was not a problem for Baxter‟s 
mitigated voluntarism, which allowed him to retain those aspects of the Nominalist 
synthesis he saw as theologically valid – such as God‟s power to dispense with his 
own law – while ruling out of court any excesses of „nude power‟ transgressing the 
divine intellect or will.  Such a solution hinged, of course, on his Trinitarian 
metaphysics and his account of the coinherence of the divine principles. 
ii) Divine Understanding 
Baxter‟s threefold division of divine power is mirrored by a corresponding division 
in the realm of understanding.  Thus in the first instant God „knoweth all possible, in 
his own omnipotence: for to know things to be possible, is but to know what he can 
do‟.  Secondly God knows all things as „congruous, eligible and volenda: and this out 
of the perfection of his own wisdom: which is but to be perfectly wise, and to know 
what perfect wisdom should offer as eligible to the will‟.  Finally God knows „all 
things willed by him as such (as volita): which is but to know his own will, and so 
that they will be‟.  In making these distinctions Baxter is clear that we are referring to 
God‟s knowledge as being eternally rooted and therefore in a situation where the 
objects of his knowledge do not yet have any being.  In fact Baxter says properly the 
object of God‟s knowledge is God himself and his own Power, Wisdom and Will.
12
  
Once again therefore it is important for Baxter that God‟s knowledge should be 
reflexively defined and always considered only as it participates in the other two 
primalities.  In this light the different (logical) instants of divine understanding can 
be correlated with God‟s understanding of his own power, his own wisdom and his 
own will. 
Such a reflexive, even Trinitarian, account of divine knowledge was not of course 
unique to Baxter but was in fact common among scholastic theologians, both 
medieval and early modern.  All God‟s knowledge was therefore considered as 
grounded upon his self-knowledge.  This could be considered either in respect to the 
mutual knowledge of the divine persons or to the way in which God‟s understanding 
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stood in relation to his power and his will, both of which could be backed up with 
scriptural citation.  Furthermore, in knowing himself God also knows the possibility 
and actuality of all things and in this way could be considered to know everything 
which is knowable and so be omniscient.
13
  A further refinement to the scholastic 
account of divine knowledge was expressed in the common distinction between the 
scientia simplicis intelligentiae and the scientia visionis.  These referred respectively 
to God‟s knowledge of the entire realm of possibility and his corresponding 
knowledge of the entire realm of actuality.  In other words they referred to a kind of 




Here once again we see how Baxter‟s own Trinitarian account enfolds the traditional 
distinction between the knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision.  
However, although clearly drawing on this heritage, Baxter is in fact quite critical of 
this fundamental division remarking: 
From what is said, you may see, that the common school distinction of all 
God‟s knowledge, into scientia simplicis intelligentiae et purae visionis, 
is not accurate, and the terms are too arbitrary and dark to notifie the 
thing intended…and that a fitter distinction is plain and obvious.
15
 
Baxter expands further on this evident distaste in his Apology, pointing out that this 
distinction was intended to mirror that in the human intellect between abstractive and 
intuitive knowledge.  This he holds to imply a prior and posterior within the divine 
act and therefore he rejects it.
16
  Elsewhere in discussing God‟s knowledge of future 
contingents he admits that this scheme has a certain merit and subtlety to it but again 
rejects it, presumably for a similar reason, that it assumes too near an analogy 
between divine and human understanding.
17
  In the Catholick Theologie Baxter 
further suggests that its effect is to „mince‟ God‟s knowledge into „scraps‟ of 
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One may suspect also, especially given the revisionist tenor of the Methodus and 
Catholick Theologie, that Baxter viewed his own account as being more explicitly 
Trinitarian than those of his Reformed contemporaries.  In particular, Baxter may 
have felt that the standard twofold division, in subsuming his own category of 
eligible knowledge into an essentially amorphous possible knowledge, failed to do 
proper justice to God‟s moral character. As Trueman points out Baxter‟s use of 
Trinitarian metaphysics to structure his account of the divine understanding 
represents more than a mere difference in organisation from other Reformed 
systems.
19
  We should remember that Baxter‟s account of divine action, both 
immanent and transient, is wholly grounded on the mutual conditioning of the divine 
principles.  His developed Trinitarian understanding thus saw the whole realm of 
God‟s knowledge as captured intuitively within the eternal, perichoretic motion of 
these selfsame principles.  This prevented him from espousing any account of the 
intra-divine based on analogies with man‟s intellectual processes, including that 
employing any distinction between the knowledge of simple intelligence and vision.  
Thus here, just as with their positing of the intra-Trinitarian pactum salutis, Baxter 
regarded his Reformed colleagues as overly speculative. 
Another area in which Baxter was highly critical of the scholastic consensus was in 
respect to the doctrine of the divine ideas.  Here Baxter notes the existence of two 
divergent traditions.  The first tradition was that of Aquinas and the Thomists who 
considered the divine ideas as eternal separate forms according to the likeness of 
which God created all things and which also act as the ground of his understanding 
of all things.  He did not see the multiplicity of such ideas as contravening divine 
simplicity, for he held that an idea is simply God‟s essence as it is necessarily the 
likeness of all things.  An idea is therefore „that which‟ is known and not a species 
„by which‟ knowledge is attained or which informs the divine mind.
20
  As Baxter 
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summarises it for Aquinas „essentia divina cognita ut imitabilis a creatura per 
modum exemplaris est idea‟.
21
   
The second tradition was that of the Scotists.  Scotus agreed with Aquinas that the 
divine ideas were formal exemplars according to the pattern of which all things are 
created, but rejected the concept of ideas as the ground of divine understanding.  As 
Harris summarises it for Scotus the idea is „simply the creature itself as known, the 
product, not the condition of the divine cognition‟.
22
  In order to explain the 
inherence of the ideas within the divine essence Scotus introduced a new category of 
esse cognitum which he defined as „esse formale et proprium quod creatura habet 
distinctum ab esse sua causa; in quo in divino intellectu creaturae ipsae per 
intellectionem producuntur‟.  Scotus was clear that this esse cognitum was in no way 
real or intermediate being but was instead „ens rationis purum‟.  For this reason ideas 
as esse cognita could be held entirely consistent with divine simplicity.  Taken 
together this yielded Scotus‟ own definition of a divine idea as „ratio aeterna et 
incommutablis in mente divina, secundum quam aliquid est formabile extra tanquam 
secundam propriam rationem eius‟.
23
  Furthermore building on this account of the 
divine ideas Scotus hypothesised a complex doctrine of divine understanding largely 
based on analogy with human intellectual processes.
24
 
Despite their impressive intellectual pedigrees Baxter was however critical of both 
these conceptions of divine ideas.  Although he does not quarrel with other divines 
for using the term „idea‟ he himself admits to being „afraid of presumption‟.
25
  
Scotus, in particular, comes in for attack.  Describing the Scotist division of God‟s 
intellect into his essence as the primary, immediate and motive object by virtue of 
which all things are known and the creature known in his essence as his secondary, 
mediate and terminative object, Baxter simply says „here they are at the greatest 
loss‟.  Similarly he regards the whole concept of esse cognitum as a „dance and 
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shew…of meer words‟ in which „a creature that is no creature is said to have an esse 
which is no esse‟.  Finally he also denies the Scotist view that God knows creatures 
only in themselves (as products of divine cognition) and not in his own essence 
holding that creatures must at least virtually – presumably that is as effects are in 
their cause – be in God‟s essence.  Although Aquinas does not come in for such 
direct attack, in the same place Baxter denies the equivalent Thomist proposition that 
God knows creatures only in his own essence and not in themselves, suggesting that 




Behind these critiques lay Baxter‟s conviction that „intellection in God both in the 
form and mode doth so infinitely transcend and differ from humane intellection, as 
that it is not the same thing; so we are very unfit in this woful darkness to talk so 
peremptorily of things unknown, and to conclude that God hath not a more perfect 
knowledge of things, than by ideas, or any thing fitly so called‟.
27
  Thus it may be 
said that while Baxter was more than happy to posit an analogy between the faculties 
of the human soul and the Godhead, he rejected the extension of this analogy into 
discussing the interior processes of divine operation.  For this reason he refuses to 
characterise the working of divine intellection beyond the points circumscribed by 
his own framework of the divine principles, just as we saw him refusing to speculate 
on the intra-Trinitarian relations. 
Baxter‟s own position on divine knowledge represents a considerable simplification 
in comparison to the Thomist and especially Scotist doctrine of divine ideas.  It 
hinges especially on his Nominalist account of relations and extrinsic denomination.  
In his Catholick Theologie Baxter affirms both Peter Hurtado de Mendoza‟s doctrine 
that God is able to have real relations with his creation and Ockham‟s view that a 
relation has no real being but is simply an external denomination.
28
  Both these 
principles give Baxter‟s doctrine of divine knowledge a distinct Nominalist slant, as 
he freely admits at the start of his discussion of this in the Methodus.  In particular 
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they gave him the freedom to denominate divine acts of intellection according to 
their diverse respects.  Thus, for example, when something comes into existence it is 
quite correct to say that a new relation arises in the divine intellect since it now has a 
new object as terminus.  Since relations have no real being it follows that Baxter 
does not here impugn a classical theist position.  As he succinctly puts it: 
Sicut Deo intellectionum diversitatem adscribimus, sine injuria adversus 
divinam simplicitatem et unitatem, pari ratione intellectionum novitatem 
et cessationem ei adscribimus sine injuria adversus eius immutabilitatem. 
Baxter summarises his position saying divine acts may be called incipient and 
mutable not really „ex parte Dei‟ but only relatively, connotatively and by extrinsic 
denomination.
29
   
Nevertheless Baxter is very clear that the ground of these temporally denominated 
divine acts is in eternity.  Thus he says that if God‟s acts are denominated not as 
terminated in temporal objects and these objects are not considered as measured by 
time –  that is if both time and the objects themselves are considered in „indivisible 
eternity‟ –  then it is quite correct to say that God always sees all things as really 
existing in eternity.  Thus God both most perfectly knows our instants of time and 
space by distinguishing and also comprehends our time and space in his eternity and 
immensity.
30
  In the Catholick Theologie Baxter expands further on his views of time 
and eternity.  Time he holds to be no „real being‟ but simply the „duration of beings, 
which is nothing but their existence not ceasing‟.  Eternity likewise he says is 
nothing really distinct from God himself but is „Gods existence considered as having 
no measure of duration, no beginning, no middle, no parts of duration and no end‟.   
However although properly and in it self indivisible eternity may be regarded as 
intellectually divisible according to inadequate concepts.  In terms of the co-
existence of time and eternity this means both that all of eternity co-exists with any 
one instant of time and, according to our intellectual conceptions of the matter, one 
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moment of time may be mapped onto one „moment‟ of eternity, allowing eternity in 
some ways to be treated as an analogous timestream.
31
 
Baxter clarifies this with reference to the scholastic quandary of the co-existence of 
creatures with God in eternity.  He himself affirms the Augustinian line that „fore-
knowledge in God, is the same with the knowledge of things present‟ so that past, 
present and future are all seen by God in one, undivided, eternal, present intuition.  
Yet as this matter is not „digested‟ by Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel Biel, Gregory of 
Rimini and many others, he also gives his own „reconciling‟ solution to the problem.  
Following the principles of his Nominalist logic Baxter therefore argues that the 
eternal God may be denominated by extrinsic denomination as the terminus of a 
relation to temporary creatures.  Since he also considers this to be a reciprocal 
relation, contrary to Aquinas and Scotus, it follows for Baxter that eternity may 
communicate „somewhat of its name to the multifarious fluid creature, as its 
terminus‟.  Furthermore since eternity is not partible it may even be held that „as 
indivisible eternity co-existeth with the creature, so the creature co-existeth with an 
indivisible eternity, and so with all eternity, and not with a part‟.  The essence of 
Baxter‟s position then is that there is a relation between the temporal and eternal 
which means that although the temporal comes into existence at a particular instant 
of time, this instant is itself comprehended in God‟s undivided eternity, which of 
course admits of no succession of moments.  This means that both seemingly 
contradictory positions of the controversy can be affirmed as true: eternity both ever 
co-exists with creatures and it also de novo begins to co-exist with creatures.
32
 
The relation of time and eternity also shapes Baxter‟s doctrine of futurition.  
According to Baxter both the possibility and futurity of things are not accidents or 
relations but are instead „termini diminuentes‟ and so „are spoken of nothing‟.  As he 
says „to say that a thing may be, or will be, which now is not, is to say that now it is 
nothing‟.  Since they are nothing this implies that they can have no cause whether 
temporal or eternal so Baxter can conclude that „God is no cause of any eternal 
possibility or futurity‟.  However although he holds futurition to be a nothing and 
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therefore a mere being of reason, Baxter does not say the same about propositions 
involving the futurity of things.  He holds instead that a proposition concerning 
futurity is in fact something and so „to know the futurity of a thing, is most properly 
to know the truth of that proposition it will be‟.  Furthermore although God‟s 
knowledge is not by means of propositions he certainly knows propositions as and 
when they are existent and so must know the truth of all true propositions of futurity.  
Baxter does not make the next steps of his logic altogether clear but from the 
hypothetical that if there were such propositions in eternity God would know their 
truth he argues that in a transcendent and incomprehensible way God knows the truth 
of all true propositions of futurity even though such propositions are not themselves 
eternally existent.
33




Baxter‟s argument is essentially an extrapolation back from God‟s „temporal‟ 
knowledge of the truth of all propositions, crucially including propositions of 
futurity, to his necessary eternal knowledge of this truth.  Importantly therefore 
Baxter is able to expose what he sees as the inherent contradictions in the notion of 
futurity as presently existing without jeopardising in any way God‟s knowledge of 
future events.  Of course this extrapolation is not the only way that Baxter is able to 
argue for God‟s knowledge of the future.  He is also able to conclude this much more 
simply from his own account of God‟s possible, eligible and volitional knowledge.
35
  
However by denying futurity Baxter is able to detach God‟s eternal knowledge of the 
future – something which he like all orthodox divines wants to affirm – from his 
causation of events.  It is only this further move which for Baxter fully safeguards 
God from the accusation of being the author of sin.  As he summarises this „Gods 
mere fore-knowledge, nor his meer will without efficient power or action causeth not 
the thing future, and therefore is not the cause that it will be.  But where knowledge 
and will with active power cooperate, they are true causes of the thing‟.
36
  God is 
therefore only said to be a cause of something in the full conjunction of the divine 
principles (here presented in their order as to transient and not immanent acts) and in 
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this we may begin to discern how Baxter‟s Trinitarian approach to God‟s knowledge 
has important ramifications for his account of divine government. 
Finally we may discern a similar pattern of argumentation in Baxter‟s discussion of 
future contingents.  Thus Baxter says „that God knoweth the truth of all conditional 
propositions that are true, is past all doubt, if we may suppose that God had eternal 
propositions‟.  He adds that there is no doubt that he knows their truth now as they 
are present in the human mind.  The controversy, as before, concerns whether there 
are such things as eternal propositions.  If not then Baxter argues that from eternity 
God had the foreknowledge of his creatures‟ conditional propositions, although of 
course in a transcendent and non-propositional manner. While this may be so, he 
here adds an important stipulation to this argument: „if we say or must say that God 
from eternity fore-knew our propositions of future contingents, which are 
conditional, yet we must not say or think that his knowledge quoad actum is 
conditional‟.  In fact God‟s knowledge may only be denominated as conditional by 
extrinsic denomination, not of course in itself.  He emphasises therefore that God‟s 
knowledge is in no way dependent on the creature but is simply terminated on the 
creature as its object.
37
   
The Methodus seeks to relate Baxter‟s own solution to this problem with the various 
scholastic opinions concerning this matter.  In particular he identifies four proposals 
as to how God may know future contingents.  The first is the proposal of the 
Thomists that God may know them through the coexistence of future things with him 
in eternity.  The second is that adopted by the Scotists that God knows them „in esse 
volito‟, that is through his knowledge of his own decree of predetermination or 
permission.  Although Baxter recognises these as ingenious solutions he does not 
accept either of them in full.
38
   
The Thomist argument, in particular, is susceptible to all the controversies 
concerning the co-existence of creatures with God in eternity.  Baxter does not say 
this explicitly but it seems likely that his own resolution of this issue according to 
extrinsic denomination will not help the Thomists here, since this says nothing about 
                                                 
37
 Baxter, Catholick Theologie, I.i.42. 
38
 Baxter, Methodus, I.47, 77. 
305 
 
the cause of God‟s knowledge but only about how time and eternity may be properly 
related.  The Thomist position was often illustrated by an analogy in which God‟s 
knowledge of all of time is compared to a man whose prospect from a very high 
tower gives him a view of everything at once in all directions, hidden to those on the 
ground by their restricted perspective.  Therefore although the man travelling on a 
road does not see those who come after him the man on the tower sees all those 
travelling on the road and their position relative to each other.  In the same way God 
beholds at once all instants of time and their relations.
39
  Baxter however says that by 




The Scotist position of course avoids all the problems involved with the co-existence 
of creatures with God in eternity but according to Baxter runs into other equally 
formidable problems.  Citing Pierre d‟Ailly Baxter argues that Scotus falls into the 
trap of attributing priority and posteriority to God in his complex theory of different 
instants of understanding and willing.  In particular in making one act the medium of 
another Scotus reduces divine intellection to the temporal processes of human 
understanding.  Furthermore Baxter objects that even if God knew other things „in 
esse volito‟ he could not know evil or the existence of sin in this way since, as he 
argues elsewhere, such things are not said in any way to be willed by God.
41
 
The third solution that Baxter analyses is that of the middle knowledge of the 
Molinists.  This was the proposal that through God‟s perfect knowledge of both the 
disposition of the human will and its attendant circumstances God is able to foresee 
its ultimate decision.  Baxter however is highly critical of this approach holding that 
it creates more problems than it solves.  For if the Molinists are speaking of causes of 
divine foreknowledge then he says they are blaspheming for there are no causes of 
God‟s knowledge.  Likewise if they argue that futurition in itself is not intelligible to 
God but only in its causes – which is of course the whole function of middle 
knowledge – and further that these causes are means of knowledge, then this also is 
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blasphemously suggesting that God does not know conclusions except through 
means.  Furthermore they are also presented with the problem that they cannot 
ascribe necessity to any cause of the futurition, whether its attendant circumstances 
or the habitual inclination of the will, for if they were to do so this would entirely 
destroy the conditional nature of the futurity.  So if God only has middle knowledge 
they are still left with the insoluble problem of how God can know the result of an 




This leaves only the final proposal, that of the Nominalists, that God is able to know 
things „in sola perfectione intellectus divini cum futurorum intelligibilitate‟.  As we 
might expect it is with this one alone that Baxter wholly agrees and he thinks that to 
say anything else is to risk reducing divine intellection to the level of human 
processes.
43
  To explain this opinion further he cites again the Nominalist d‟Ailly 
who argues very simply that since the divine intellect is infinite and most perfect it 
must know all intelligible things.  Future events, whether contingent or not, are 
themselves intelligible and so must be known to God.  Finally, since cause and effect 
do not apply to God, it follows that we cannot speak at all of the cause of divine 
intellection (as the Thomists, Scotists and Molinists do in their various ways) but 
only of the cause of the relative denomination of any act of the divine intellect.
44
  
Here we see that Baxter‟s resort to the Nominalist tool of extrinsic denomination 
rests ultimately on his view of God and his ways as transcending all human 
understanding and modes of intellection. 
iii) Divine Will 
Unsurprisingly as with his discussion of divine power and intellect, we find a similar 
threefold division in Baxter‟s account of the divine will.  Concerning things not yet 
existent the first object is therefore „the possibility of things, which God is said to 
will, in willing his own power as respecting them‟.  The second object is „the 
congruity, goodness and eligibility of things, as in his own knowledge; which is but 
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to will the perfection of his own understanding‟.  Finally as third object God wills 
„the future existence of things good and eligible, to be produced in their fittest 
season‟.  Once again we must stress, as Baxter himself does, that in separating out 
logical objects of the divine will he is simply speaking „as we may conceive of God 
after the manner of men‟ and thus not in any way implying priority and posteriority 
within the divine will, nor any kind of volitional process.
45
  
Here again then we find a clear Trinitarian pattern, as God wills his own Power, 
Wisdom and Will he comprehends eternally the whole field of possible and actual 
reality.  Now also with this account of the divine will in place we gain a complete 
picture of the working of the divine faculties and in particular of how each divine act, 
whether immanent or transient, itself involves the cooperation and coinherence of all 
three divine principles.  This must be understood with the proviso that the 
identification of separate intrinsic moments of divine action is always understood not 
only logically (which is common to all the Reformed orthodox) but beyond this 
according to the stringent Nominalist principle of relative denomination.  In 
denominating God‟s acts according to their various objects and effects Baxter says it 
is possible to talk of his intellections and volitions in a „certain order of nature, as 
one being before and one after another‟.  However unlike, for example, the logical 
instants of the Scotists, this does not correspond to any kind of (logical) process 
within God.
46
  This is indeed the chief distinction between Baxter and those, such as 
many other Protestant scholastics, willing to countenance the language of process 
within God so long as this is understood in logical terms. 
Once again then the principle of extrinsic denomination appears at the forefront of 
Baxter‟s discussion of divine action.  At the beginning of the discussion in his 
Methodus of divine volitions and decrees he therefore stresses the following point: 
Quamvis, ex parte sui, Dei decreta omnia sunt unicum (una scilicet 
volitione vult omnia, sicut una scientia scit omnia;) quia tamen huius 
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volitionis (ut et scientiae) tantum non infinita sunt positive objecta, tot 
etiam dici possunt; extrinseca denominatione relative, Dei volitiones.
47
 
As before then the tool of extrinsic denomination serves both to safeguard the divine 
immutability and simplicity and to allow intelligible discussion of multiple divine 
volitions and decrees.  Yet in interpreting Baxter‟s doctrine of divine government it 
is important to hold constantly before one‟s eyes the unicity of the divine will.  As 
we shall see below this also has further Trinitarian implications. 
Furthermore, in parallel to his discussion of futurition, Baxter uses the method of 
extrinsic denomination as a way of restricting the scope of God‟s volitional activity.  
He therefore insists that „nihil est‟ and „nihil erit’ cannot aptly be termed objects or 
effects of divine decrees except morally and improperly.
48
  Put bluntly, „nothing is 
not a capable terminus of a divine act‟.
49
  Baxter therefore suggests that it is foolish 
to ascribe negative decrees to God concerning the nearly infinite number of atoms, 
grains of sand and possible worlds that do not exist.  Even more significantly for his 
doctrine of God‟s relation to man Baxter maintains that „gratiam aut gloriam non-
habere nihil est‟ and therefore it is wrong to feign a divine decree of actual 
reprobation.  Baxter is clear that the same logic applies to divine permission, for he 
views this as essentially „non-impedire‟ and therefore a nothing or non-act.  However 
with regard to divine nolitions of evil Baxter holds that these are not nothing, for 
they can be reinterpreted as positive volitions of good, in the same way that positive 
impeding of evil is itself a good.  There is therefore an important distinction between 
„nolle‟, as „velle-non‟, and ‘non velle‟ which is properly nothing.  It is in this way 
therefore that Baxter seeks to make sense of the scriptural ascription of both hate and 
love to God, something which could otherwise have proved problematic for his 
doctrine of single predestination.
50
 
As well as restricting the scope of the divine will only to positive volitions and 
nolitions Baxter is also adamant that not all of God‟s volitions are causative.  He 
therefore poses a distinction between God‟s acts as effectively transient „which do 
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cause somewhat without‟ and his acts as objectively transient „which cause nothing, 
but suppose the object‟.  Baxter is clear then that „God‟s knowledge and will effect 
nothing ad extra, but by and with his active power, as efficient‟.
51
 Arguably Baxter‟s 
intention here is to define a sphere of creaturely freedom, bounded from the outside 
by all those actions of God which are effectively rather than merely objectively 
transient, which yet is utterly enclosed by and remains subordinate to God‟s own 
sovereign will.  For Baxter is clear that the fact that God‟s mere foreknowledge and 
will are not causative unless joined efficiently with power or his will de efficiendo, 
entails only a logical necessity of the consequence and not a physical necessity of the 




Finally Baxter‟s Trinitarian exposition of the divine will may be seen to encompass 
the important distinction between God‟s will of purpose and his will of precept, or 
between his voluntas de eventu and de debito.  As discussed in the introduction this 
distinction is pivotal within Boersma‟s account of Baxter‟s soteriology.  Boersma 
argues convincingly that Baxter sourced this distinction from his reading of Twisse, 
which indeed Baxter explicity states.  Its importance in his theology is seen as early 
as the Aphorismes where Baxter says „the necessity of this distinction is so exceeding 
great, that but little of the doctrinal part of Scripture can be well understood without 
it‟.
53
  Later he upheld it as a „singular key for opening the sence of Scripture‟.
54
 
Beyond its inception, however, it may be necessary to somewhat qualify Baxter‟s 
dependence on Twisse for the outworking of this doctrine in his theology.  Thus in 
his Aphorismes Baxter notes its use, by Twisse especially but also by Edward 
Reynolds in his humiliation day sermons, but adds „yet is not the exceeding necessity 
and usefulnesse of it discerned by many, nor is it improved accordingly by any that I 
have read‟.  Here he also distinguishes his own distinction of will of purpose and 
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precept from the common school distinction voluntas signi and beneplaciti, accepting 
that these are „near of kin‟ but pointing out that voluntas signi has a larger (and to his 
mind looser) scope compared to the preceptive or legislative will.  The vagueness of 
the voluntas signi for Baxter was indicated by the common use of five distinguishing 
signs of this will, described in the old scholastic tag as „praecipit ac prohibit, 
permittit, consulit, implet‟.  Baxter criticises the use of these signs holding that they 
are „uncertain‟ and noting that because of this the schoolmen used to designate the 
voluntas signi as God‟s will only in a metaphorical sense.  By contrast Baxter holds 
that God‟s preceptive will is not merely metaphorically his will but is actually so, „it 
being the effect and revelation of his reall unfeigned will‟.  Similarly Baxter is also at 
pains to point out the difference between his own distinction of God‟s will of 
purpose and precept and the more common distinction of God‟s hidden and revealed 
will, often equated with that between the voluntas beneplaciti and signi.  As he 
points out God‟s revealed will contains part of God‟s will of purpose and all of his 
will of precept, so although similar they are not identical.
55
  Significantly in both of 
these points he differs from Twisse who held firstly that only the voluntas beneplaciti 
could properly be called God‟s will and secondly that this distinction equated exactly 
with that between God‟s hidden and revealed will.
56
 
Before reviewing Baxter‟s developed Trinitarian understanding of this distinction it 
is worth reviewing one other place where Baxter discusses it.  This is in his 1652 
reply to Cartwright‟s comments on his Aphorisms.  Here Cartwright maintains that 
Baxter‟s own distinction is in fact identical to the common one between voluntas 
beneplaciti and signi.  Baxter begins by acknowledging the importance of the 
distinction between will of purpose and precept in his own theology saying „For I 
confess, I make use of this distinction as a key to my understanding of very many 
points in divinity, to which it is not commonly applied‟. However in explaining his 
own position he is insistent that it is distinct from that of other divines.  Thus his 
explanation of it begins by warning of the danger of confounding ethics and physics.  
These he says are distinguished by their proper objects: ens reale for physics and 
debitum for ethics.  Therefore as God‟s will has ens reale as its object or product it is 
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referred to as his will of purpose or voluntas de eventu, and as debitum is its object or 
product it is called his will of precept or voluntas de debito.  This distinction in 
objects Baxter says is made formally, since debitum itself seems to be a certain kind 
of being, therefore the relation between God‟s will de debito and de eventu is that 
between specific and generic.  The primary purpose of this distinction is therefore to 
uphold the difference between nature and morality.
57
 
Baxter is also very clear about the ways his own distinction differs from that of 
beneplaciti and signi.  So he points out that his own doctrine of God‟s will de debito 
considers both his immanent will de debito „which is as true and eternal an act, as his 
velle eventum‟ and his signal will de debito which is God‟s law and is therefore 
called his will metonymically.  His full intent in employing this distinction is 
therefore to distinguish God‟s law from his other acts and works, where the 
immanent will de debito can be viewed as the „soul of the law‟ and the signal will as 
its body.  This is an important clarification of a point he raised in the Aphorismes.  It 
also contrasts significantly with the scholastic definition of voluntas signi which 
Baxter says excludes the immanent will de debito and thus treats this as only God‟s 
metaphorical will.  Further to this he adds that the scholastic account does not seek to 
distinguish God‟s will by its objects, but only God‟s will as it is hidden in itself and 
as it is revealed to us.  Thus of their five signs some may be taken as indicative of 
duty and others of event which leads to still further confusion.
58
 
Speaking of his fellow Protestants Baxter notes that the situation improves 
considerably so that „divers of our own more clear divines indeed, do come near my 
meaning in their distinction of vol. praecepti et propositi‟.  Here among a host of 
others he singles out for special mention Camero who treated of the distinction „most 
plainly‟ and Twisse „most frequently‟.  It was these two, he says, who first led him to 
recognise the difference between his own distinction and that of beneplaciti and 
signi.  Speaking of Twisse in particular he adds: 
Yet it must be acknowledged, that Twiss himself (who makes more use 
of it than all others that I have read) overlooked (at least usually) the 
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immanent will of God de debito, and spake only of the precept itself; and 
therefore called it God‟s will metaphorically.  If I may prefer truth before 
modesty, I must say, that Dr Twiss saw further into the nature and use of 
this distinction than others before him had done; but yet his notions were 




Likewise, responding to Cartwright‟s repeated insistence that his own distinction is 
identical to that found in Aquinas, Twisse and Rutherford, Baxter acknowledges that 
he originally received this distinction from Twisse and therefore that it „is above half 
the same as mine‟.  Yet he also clearly differentiates his own distinction from that 
found in Twisse particularly concerning the immanent will de debito.
60
  It is clear 
then that though indebted to Twisse Baxter is far from dependent on him. 
As early as his Aphorismes Baxter insisted that the ascription of a will of purpose and 
a will of precept to God was entirely consistent with the unicity of his will and 
therefore that to suggest this made two contradictory wills in God was a „sencelesse 
objection‟.  Here he explains that this is because they are to be considered as two 
distinct acts of one and the same will.
61
  Later as we have seen he explains their 
distinction as rooted in their difference of proper objects and so suggests that they 
can be differentiated out in terms of generic and specific.  However by the time 
Baxter first drafted his treatise on Universal Redemption in the 1650s he had already 
begun to think of this distinction in the language of God‟s triadic relation to man as 
Owner, Rector and Benefactor.  So, for example, he brackets separately the gifts 
given separately by Christ as Legislator upon condition from those he gives 
unconditionally as Dominus and free Benefactor.
62
  Similarly the distinction between 
nature and morality, which for Baxter had clearly come to epitomise the account of 




                                                 
59
 Baxter, Account, 7-8. 
60
 Baxter, Account, 14. 
61
 Baxter, Aphorismes, 4.  Baxter was of course hardly unusual in this, for to suggest two wills in God 
would be to contravene his simplicity. 
62
 Baxter, Universal Redemption, 16-19. 
63
 Baxter, Universal Redemption, 29-33. 
313 
 
From here it was but a small step to the explicitly Trinitarian model of the Methodus 
and Catholick Theologie.  Therefore Baxter notes in the former that: 
Quoad causalitatem moralem igitur recte denominandum, Dei-Rectoris 
voluntas semper distinguenda est a voluntate eius sub relatione Domini 
aut Benefactoris; et voluntas Rectoris consequens, id est, executive, ab 
antecedente, id est, legislativa.
64
   
Although this is precisely the same framework as found in his Universal Redemption 
in this context such a doctrine carries with it a further metaphysical implication.  This 
is that earlier in the Methodus Baxter had already made the link between the divine 
principles of Power, Wisdom and Love and God‟s relations to man as Owner, Rector 
and Benefactor respectively.  It is clear then that we should interpret his statements 
here as implying a difference between the actions of God‟s Power-Love in 
unconditionally choosing and benefitting his own and the actions of his Wisdom in 
framing universal, conditional laws. 
We may see the same turning to the Catholick Theologie where the same link is 
made between the divine principles and the relational triad.
65
  Here Baxter again 
explains the distinction of his own voluntas de eventu and de debito from that 
employed by the schoolmen and by Twisse in the terms we would expect.
66
  He thus 
points out that the distinction of the two wills is fetched from that of their objects as 
between nature and debitum.  Furthermore he clarifies this, defining law variously as 
„the governing will of a Rector signified, constituting or confirming right (or 
dueness) from and to the subject‟ or „the sign of a Rector‟s will constituting right‟.  
In saying this he seeks to ground law in both God‟s immanent will and his signal will 
de debito with neither alone being sufficient to establish obligation.
67
   
So much we might anticipate, but in seeking to characterise God‟s will in terms of its 
Trinitarian shape Baxter clearly goes beyond his pre-Methodus formulations: 
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If we will denominate Gods will here ab origine, it is 1. antecedent to the 
creature, (supposed;) and that is his creating will.  2. Supposing the 
creature in being, and that is, 1. his will as proprietary and actor of all 
things; and that is his moving and disposing will of events. 2. His will as 
governour (morally) and that is his morally ruling will. 3. His will ut 
amator et finis; and that is his beneficient and felicitating will. 
Here also we begin to see the rigid twofold distinction of Owner-Benefactor and 
Rector begin to blur into a threefold perichoretic treatment.  Thus speaking of law 
and subjects under the law, clearly the domain of the Rector, Baxter includes the act 
of the governing Benefactor antecedently to the subjects‟ merits establishing what 
shall be due to them.
68
 This is important, for Baxter here distinguishes God‟s will as 
Benefactor from his will as Owner where before he did not do this explicitly, 
suggesting that the earlier twofold distinction is properly enclosed within this broader 
Trinitarian interaction. 
Similarly in his discussion of the distinction between God‟s effectual and ineffectual 
will Baxter highlights the inadequacy of various scholastic responses to this question, 
including those of d‟Orbellis and Gregory of Rimini.  The „plain truth‟ Baxter says is 
that God‟s will must be distinguished as it is the first efficient, the chief dirigent and 
the final cause in which the three principles of Power, Wisdom and Love 
respectively are eminent.  As efficient he says God‟s will is ever effectual, as chief 
dirigent it is effectual in making laws and establishing due or right but often violated 
by human sin and as final it is not effectual so far as it refers to complacency in the 
being, action or relation of a creature already supposed.
69
 
All this leads to an important, hitherto largely unnoticed, feature of Baxter‟s 
theology.  This is that the law is properly seen as an expression of God‟s love: 
But here is a wonderful inseparable twist; and in the main an identity.  
God ruleth us as a Father, or Regent Benefactor: All his benefits are free-
gifts, as to the thing and value; but given 1. in an order 2. and the rest as 
means to the ultimate.  In which respects they are a reward, or means to 
it.  His very law is a gift and a great benefit.  Duty is the means to keep 
his first gifts and to receive more.  The very doing of the duty is a 
receiving of the reward; the object of duty being felicitating. (As if 
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feasting or accepting offered wealth or honour were our work.)  Holiness 
is happiness, in a great part.  And in our end or state of perfection all will 
be one: to love God, rejoice in him and praise him, will be both our duty 
and felicity, means and end, as it were, in one.
70
 
Perfectly captured within this remarkable paragraph is the reciprocal interaction of 
law and love, grace and duty, so vital to Baxter‟s developed theology.  This we have 
now seen to be grounded on the mutual conditioning and inherence of the three 
divine principles.  As a consequence we are driven to qualify Boersma‟s overall 
thesis that Baxter‟s Twissian account of God‟s twofold will was determinative of his 
theology of justification.  In the same way that Boersma affirmed Packer‟s 
groundbreaking thesis, that Baxter‟s political method was the missing key to unlock 
his theology, with a qualified „yes, but…‟ (pointing out that this excluded God‟s will 
de rerum eventu as Dominus) so we may simultaneously applaud Boersma‟s research 
as being of enormous value, while pointing beyond this twofold distinction to 
Baxter‟s Trinitarian conception of God as the living, beating heart of his theology. 
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